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PREFACE
In preparing this manuscript, I employed certain terms that require a brief 
explanation. When referring to those American colonists who supported the British, I 
have used the term “loyalists” throughout the text, foregoing use of the synonym 
“Tories,” which had a derogatory connotation. When quoting from sources, however, the 
terms “Tory” and “Tories” were left unaltered. I used the terms “Whigs,” “rebels,” and 
“Americans” interchangeably when referring to those colonists who supported the 
Revolution. To maintain consistency with the documentary sources, I have generally used 
the term “Indians” rather than “Native Americans.” The terms blacks, slaves, and African 
Americans are used interchangeably. In those rare instances involving blacks who were 
not slaves, I have indicated their free status. Charleston, South Carolina, was spelled 
“Charles Town,” “Charlestown,” and “Charleston” during the 1770s and 1780s; I have 
left the original spelling intact in quotations, but used “Charleston” uniformly in the text.
In manuscript collections in which each page is numbered, such as the Cornwallis 
Papers, I have given only the number of the first page of the cited document in the 
footnotes. The information or quotation from that document may appear on a subsequent 
page or pages. To reduce the length of the footnotes, I have employed several 
abbreviations for sources and archives. An explanation of these abbreviations 
immediately precedes the bibliography.
V
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The completion of a work of this magnitude requires the assistance and 
encouragement of many people. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor James 
Axtell, for his guidance and support, along with Professors Eliga Gould, James 
Whittenburg, and Ronald Schechter for their advice. Thanks also to Professor Ronald 
Hoffman of the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture for 
suggesting the Revolutionary South as an appropriate topic.
I am grateful to the David Library of the American Revolution, the Institute of 
Southern Studies at the University of South Carolina, and the William L. Clements 
Library for providing fellowship support, and to the College of William & Mary for 
providing several research grants. Many archivists and librarians also provided valuable 
assistance, and although space does not permit me to list them all, Sam Fore and Henry 
Fulmer of the South Caroliniana Library, John Dann, John Harriman and the staff of the 
Clements Library, Kathy Ludwig and the staff of the David Library, Linda Baier of the 
Harriet C. Irving Library at the University of New Brunswick, and the staffs at the 
Library of Congress, Georgia Historical Society, and the Earl Gregg Swem Library at the 
College of William & Mary merit special thanks.
Anne Yehl also deserves thanks for an outstanding job in assisting me with 
research.
Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my wife Lori and son Joey for their 
patience and support, and, although they can’t read this, to my Siberian huskies Shyleea 
and Max, who seemed to know that a long run in the woods can be the best remedy for 
writer’s block.
vi
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
ABSTRACT
This study examines the roles of white loyalists, Indians and African-Americans 
in the British effort to regain control of South Carolina and Georgia during the American 
Revolution, 1775-1782.
British officials believed that support from these three groups would make the 
conquest of the Deep South colonies a relatively easy task. But when the British launched 
a major effort to regain first Georgia and then South Carolina, the attempt ultimately 
ended in failure. Most historians have explained this outcome by arguing that British 
planning was faulty in its conception, and that officials overestimated both the numbers 
of southern loyalists and the effectiveness of Indian support.
A detailed account of the contributions loyalists, Indians and slaves made to 
British operations in the South demonstrates the scope and effectiveness of this support, 
and concludes that neither a lack of assistance from these three groups nor poorly 
conceived plans were responsible for British failure to regain control of Georgia and 
South Carolina. Rather, British leaders failed to coordinate effectively the efforts of their 
supporters in the Deep South, largely because they did not recognize that the peoples on 
whom they counted for aid had disparate interests and a history of mutual animosity that 
needed to be overcome to achieve their full cooperation. Furthermore, the British never 
provided their supporters with adequate protection from regular troops, which allowed 
the American rebels to undertake a brutal campaign of suppression against all who 
favored the royal cause. Although loyalists, Indians, and slaves strove valiantly to aid the 
British in the face of such persecution, the violence eventually took its toll and enabled 
the rebels to overcome their opponents.
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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of December 14, 1782, the weak winter sun revealed dozens of 
British ships clogging the waters of Charleston harbor in South Carolina, waiting for the 
shift of the tide that would carry them over the bar and out into the Atlantic. Throngs of 
people, blacks as well as whites, crowded the decks, the murmurs of thousands of voices 
drowning out the sounds of water lapping against wooden hulls, of masts and spars 
creaking in the wind. The passengers discussed with sadness the events that had led them 
to this point, and the uncertain future that lay ahead.
Hundreds of miles to the west, in towns scattered throughout the wilderness 
between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, thousands of Native Americans also 
pondered their past and their future. Like their black and white counterparts aboard the 
evacuation fleet, they had committed themselves to supporting the royal cause in the 
American Revolution. That cause was now irretrievably lost. Yet all of those who had 
fought for it, black, red, and white Americans, British and German soldiers, had made 
great efforts on behalf of King George III. The proof of their commitment could be found 
in the thousands of graves that seeded the soil of South Carolina, Georgia, and East and 
West Florida, from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Ohio 
River. It could be found in the ashes of burned Indian towns, in the bloody scars left by 
whips across the backs of slaves who had fled to the British, in the once-prosperous farms
2
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
and plantations lying desolate after having been confiscated by the victorious American 
rebels.
In that gloomy December, white loyalists, African Americans, and Native 
Americans all wondered how things had gone so very wrong, how the hopes they had 
entertained for their future within the British empire, which had dimmed and flared so 
many times during the past seven and one-half years, had finally been extinguished. Had 
they themselves failed to do enough? Did the British government fail them? Or were 
there other reasons for the distressing outcome of the war? Whatever conclusion they 
reached, one thing was certain: this was not the fate anyone among them had envisioned 
in 1775.
British officials had certainly not expected such an outcome either. From the start 
of the American Revolution, King George III and his ministers believed that the support 
of the numerous southern loyalists, Indians, and slaves would enable the army to restore 
royal authority in Georgia and South Carolina with relative ease. Yet despite a promising 
start when British forces finally launched a campaign in the South at the end of 1778, the 
effort eventually failed. In the aftermath of defeat, British leaders devoted little effort to 
an analysis of the reasons for the failure of their southern operations, focusing instead on 
blaming their political opponents, or avoiding blame themselves, for the lost war.
Historians, however, have since sought to explain why the British failed to regain 
control of South Carolina and Georgia. Most attribute the British defeat to a fundamental 
error in planning the southern campaign: officials in London “grossly exaggerated the 
extent of loyalism in the South.”1 Don Higginbotham wrote that the decision to
1 Don Higginbotham, “Reflections on the War o f Independence, Modem Guerilla Warfare, and the War in 
Vietnam,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., Arms and Independence: The Military Character o f
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undertake the southern campaign was made because the ministry “mistakenly thought 
great Tory strength lay slumbering in the South.”2 He blamed the royal governors for 
“disseminating false information” in this regard, thus creating the “illusion” of numerous 
loyalists in the South. The eminent British historian Sir John Fortescue stated that the 
British based their military plans for the southern colonies “on the presumed support of a 
section of the inhabitants. Of all the foundations whereon to build the conduct of a 
campaign this is the loosest, the most treacherous, the fullest of peril and delusion.” It 
was not surprising, Fortescue declared, that the campaign met “with the invariable 
consequence of failure and disaster .... The mere fact that the British Ministry rested its 
hopes on the co-operation of the American loyalists was sufficient to distract its councils 
and vitiate its plans.”4 Piers Mackesy likewise wrote that the “real miscalculation” made 
by British officials in their planning “was the strength and vitality of the loyalists.”5 
Elsewhere, he asserted that British planning was handicapped by advice from “biased and 
out-of-touch loyalists” who convinced the king’s ministers that large numbers of loyalists
the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press o f  Virginia, 1984), 18. See also Paul David 
Nelson, “British Conduct o f the Revolutionary War: A Review of Interpretations,” JAH, Vol. 65, No. 3, 
Dec. 1978, in which Nelson states that loyalist support in the South was less than expected, “partly because 
loyalists were restrained from joining the British army by the activity of patriot guerrillas, but mostly 
because loyalist numbers had been greatly exaggerated in the first place,” 628. H. T. Dickinson makes the 
same assertion, H.T. Dickinson, ed., Britain and the American Revolution (New York: Addison Wesley 
Longman, 1998), 16. For similar assessments, see Alan Valentine, Lord George Germain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1962), 433; Robert McCluer Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760- 
1781 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), xi; Robert Stansbury Lambert, South Carolina 
Loyalists in the American Revolution (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1987), 307; John S. 
Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (University: University 
of Alabama Press, 1985), 3.
2 Don Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina 
Press, 1961), 101.
3 Don Higginbotham, The War o f  American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763- 
1789 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983), 135.
4 Sir John Fortescue, The War o f Independence: The British Army in North America, 1775-1783 
(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 21-22.
5 Piers Mackesy, The War fo r  America, 1775-1783 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 32.
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5stood ready to assist British troops.6 Continuing in the same vein, David K. Wilson 
insisted that British strategy in the South was based “on the erroneous premise that the 
majority of the population in the southern colonies was loyal to the king” and criticized 
British leaders for clinging to this idea “notwithstanding the accumulation of
n
considerable evidence to the contrary.” Those who have written on the southern 
campaign for a popular audience generally share these opinions.8
Only a few historians believe that British officials had been fairly accurate in their 
appraisal of loyalist strength in the South. John Shy insisted that the British assessment of 
the numbers of southern loyalists was at least partially correct, writing that “British 
estimates of American attitudes were frequently in error, but seldom were they 
completely mistaken.”9 John Richard Alden went a step farther, describing southern 
loyalists as “numerous, vigorous and dangerous,” and noting that loyalists comprised a 
large proportion of the population in both South Carolina and Georgia.10
Those who concede that British officials were generally correct in believing that 
loyalists were relatively numerous in the South nonetheless argue that southern loyalists 
failed to come forward and actively assist the British.11 Some of these historians attribute 
this lack of loyalist support to flaws in British policy, as well as to the loyalists’
6 Piers Mackesy, Could the British Have Won the War o f  Independence? (Worcester, MA: Clark University 
Press, 1976), 10.
7 David K. Wilson, The Southern Strategy: Britain’s Conquest o f  South Carolina and Georgia, 1775-1780 
(Columbia: University o f  South Carolina Press, 2005), xiii.
8 See Lucien Agniel, The Late Affair Has Almost Broke My Heart: The American Revolution in the South, 
1780-1781 (Riverside, CT: Chatham Press, 1972), 9, 12; John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford 
Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 105.
9 Quoted in Nelson, “British Conduct o f the Revolutionary War,” 638.
10 John Richard Alden, The South in the Revolution, 1763-1789 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1957), 324-325. A few historians agree with Alden’s assessment; see North Callahan, Royal Raiders: 
The Tories o f  the American Revolution (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1963), 37; and Henry Lumpkin, 
From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South (New York: Paragon House, 1981), 9.
11 Russell F. Weigley, The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign o f 1780-1782 (Columbia: 
University o f South Carolina Press, 1970), 10.
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6essentially passive nature. In his study of the loyalists’ role in British planning, Paul H. 
Smith found that British officials had no consistent policy regarding the employment of 
loyalists in support of the army. “The capacity of the Loyalists to affect the outcome of 
the war, their real ability to thwart the aims of the Revolution, was directly tied to their 
projected role in British plans to end the rebellion,” he wrote. “Since they were almost 
entirely dependent upon British military decisions, their part can be understood only in 
terms of British efforts to organize them. For this reason it is fruitless to attempt to assess 
their contribution in terms of their strength, concentration, attitudes, and military 
capacity, without examining British plans for their mobilization.”12
Smith described the British attitude toward loyalists as one of “ambivalence,” 
with the ministers “eager to use them and unwilling to make the concessions and detailed 
preparations required to weld them into an efficient force.” He concluded that “the 
Loyalists never occupied a fixed, well-understood place in British strategy. Plans to use 
them were in the main ad hoc responses to constantly changing conditions.”13 In addition, 
Smith stated that British leaders never fully understood the loyalists, whom he described 
as “conservative, cautious, abhorring violence ... The Loyalist’s virtues were military 
weaknesses. He was generally uncertain of his position, and was disinclined to commit 
himself boldly. He was more likely to hesitate than to volunteer, to watch on the sidelines 
than to fight openly.”14 This has become the prevailing view among historians. With 
regard to South Carolina, Wallace Brown declared that loyalists there “are exceptionally
12 Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill: University 
o f North Carolina Press, 1964), viii-ix.
13 Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, ix.
14 Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 58. Piers Mackesy, departing from his opinion that British officials vastly 
overestimated the number of loyalists, takes a position similar to that o f Smith. Mackesy writes that the 
British belief in loyalist strength “was nearer the truth than was once supposed,” and that “American 
loyalists were indeed numerous. B u t... they lacked organisation, unity o f interests, and a common standard 
around which they could rally.” Mackesy, War fo r  America, 36.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
open to the charge of timidity and equivocation.”15 Ann Gorman Condon wrote that 
“American historians have been inclined to dismiss [loyalists] as weak and unimaginative 
hangers-on, as lackeys of the Crown.”16
Such criticism of the southern loyalists, which originated during the Revolution 
and continues to pervade the secondary literature, has proven an obstacle to an accurate 
assessment of loyalist contributions to the British effort to regain control of the southern 
provinces. Denunciations of the loyalists came from both British and American writers. 
Lieutenant General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, commander of the British southern 
department, described loyal South Carolinians in November 1780 as “dastardly and 
pusillanimous.”17 Cornwallis’s complaints earned him the sympathy of a French 
observer, the Marquis de Chastellux, who wrote that it was the British general’s sad fate 
“to conduct, rather than command, a numerous band of traitors and robbers, which 
English policy decorated with the name of Loyalists. This rabble preceded the troops in 
plunder, taking special care never to follow them in danger. Their progress was marked 
by fire, devastation, and outrages of every kind.”18
The views expressed by Cornwallis and Chastellux demonstrate a paradox in 
opinions of the loyalists. On one hand, loyalists are criticized as passive, while on the 
other they are assailed as brutal, vengeance-driven purveyors of death and destruction.
15 Wallace Brown, The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York: William 
Morrow, 1969), 65.
16 Ann Gorman Condon, “The Foundations of Loyalism,” in Robert S. Allen, ed., The Loyal Americans: 
The Military Role o f  the Loyalist Provincial Corps and Their Settlement in British North America, 1775- 
1784 (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1983), 2.
17 Cornwallis to Alexander Leslie, Nov. 12, 1780, in Charles Ross, ed., Correspondence o f  Charles, First 
Marquis Cornwallis, Vol. 1 (London: J. Murray, 1859), 69.
18 Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782, Howard C. Rice, 
Jr., trans. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), Vol. 2, 570.
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The earliest American historians of the Revolution in the South, writing in the 
heat of anti-British sentiment that persisted well into the nineteenth century, established 
this portrait of loyalists as venal, bloodthirsty traitors to the glorious American cause.19 
By the 1850s, this had become the standard historical account. In 1851, Joseph Johnson 
blamed the loyalists for both the viciousness of the war in South Carolina and for the 
harsh measures the Whigs applied against the loyalists. “They caused the horrors of a 
civil war, by which the country was desolated; and with it, the vindictive or retaliatory 
acts, the banishment, sequestration, and the destruction of life and property, on both
JOsides,” Johnson asserted. Those who joined the loyal militia in the South Carolina 
backcountry in 1780 “were the most profligate and corrupt men in the country,” M. A. 
Moore declared in 1859.21
Attacks on the loyalists also became a staple in fictional works. Nineteenth- 
century writer William Gilmore Simms published a series of historical novels based on 
events in revolutionary South Carolina, many of which first appeared in serial form in
19 David Ramsay, The History o f  the Revolution o f  South-Carolina, from a British Province to an 
Independent State (Trenton, NJ: Isaac Collins, 1785); Edward McCrady, The History o f  South Carolina in 
the Revolution, 1775-1780 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1901; reprint, New York: Russell & Russell, 
1969); Hugh McCall, The History o f  Georgia Containing Brief Sketches o f  the Most Remarkable Events, up 
to the Present Day (Savannah: Seymour & Williams, 1811-1816). A rare exception to the endless attacks 
on loyalists, from an American writer, is Alexander Garden’s praise for the loyalists’ “zeal and activity in 
the cause in which they had engaged.” Garden describes the loyalists’ efforts as being “o f the highest utility 
to our enemies, and leads to the developement o f a melancholy fact, that in almost every instance where our 
armies have been foiled in action, the opposition proceeded from our own countrymen.” Garden, who 
served in the rebel forces and wrote his history forty years after the war ended, may have been influenced 
by the fact that his father, Doctor Benjamin Garden, was a staunch loyalist. Yet Garden, referring to the 
operations o f loyalist units such as the British Legion and the partisan bands of Daniel McGirt and David 
Fanning, criticizes “the deeds of horror perpetrated by this merciless banditti.” Alexander Garden, 
Anecdotes o f  the Revolutionary War In America, with Sketches o f  Character o f  Persons the Most 
Distinguished, in the Southern States, fo r Civil and Military Service (Charleston: A. E. Miller, 1822; 
reprint, Spartanburg, SC: The Reprint Co., 1972), 258-259.
20 Joseph Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly o f  the American Revolution in the South: 
Including Biographical Sketches, Incidents and Anecdotes, Few o f which have been Published, Particularly 
o f  Residents in the Upper Country, (Charleston: Walker and James, 1851; reprint, Spartanburg, SC: The 
Reprint Co., 1972).
21 M. A. Moore, Sr., M. D., Life o f  General Edward Lacey, (Spartanburg, SC: Douglass, Evins, & Co., 
1859; reprint, Greenville, SC: A Press, 1981), 11.
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magazines and have been frequently reprinted. “Simms never treated the Loyalists with
99either sympathy or admiration,” one historian notes in polite understatement. In his 
novel Joscelyn, for example, Simms describes loyalist leader Thomas Brown as a 
drunkard, “a savage, a brute, in many respects, ferocious and cruel.” Simms portrays
9TMoses Kirkland, another prominent loyalist, as an incompetent coward. Loyalist 
partisans practice “lust, and murder, and spoliation” in Simms’s The Scout.24 Similar 
themes pervade the rest of Simms’s revolutionary novels, such as Eutaw?5
The trend of depicting the Revolution in the South as a clear-cut conflict between 
good and evil, the former personified by the American rebels and the latter by their 
opponents, continued with the work of Lyman C. Draper, who has been described as a 
“hero-worshiper and patriot” and “a maker of heroes.” Draper’s account of the Battle of 
King’s Mountain glorified the brutal overmountain men who butchered Patrick Ferguson
9  f iand his loyalist detachment. Later historians have given these early histories far more 
weight than they deserve, either accepting them at face value or insufficiently questioning 
their overall accuracy.
Canadian historian Thomas Raddall identified an important reason why loyalists 
have seldom received fair treatment in accounts of the Revolution. He observed that for 
Americans, the struggle for independence “was an epic story to be written in epic fashion,
22 C. Hugh Holman, “William Gilmore Simms’ Picture o f the Revolution as a Civil Conflict,” JSH, Vol. 15, 
No. 4, Nov. 1949, 460.
23 William Gilmore Simms, Joscelyn (Published serially in the “Old Guard,” Jan.-Dec. 1867; reprint, 
Spartanburg, SC: The Reprint Company, 1976), 76, 117,296, 298.
24 William Gillmore Simms, The Scout; or, the Black Riders o f  Congaree (New York: Redfield Co., 1841; 
reprint, Atlanta: Martin & Hoyt, n.d.), 109, 160.
25 William Gillmore Simms, Eutaw, A Sequel to The Forayers, or the Raid o f  the Dog-Days. A Tale o f  the 
Revolution (New York: Redfield Co., 1856), e.g. 10, 233, 468.
26 William B. Hesseltine, “Lyman Draper and the South,” JSH, Vol. 19, No. 1, Feb. 1953, 20, 27. Lyman C. 
Draper, King’s Mountain and its Heroes: History o f  the Battle o f  K ing’s Mountain, October 7lh, 1780, and 
the Events Which Led to It (Cincinnati: P. G. Thomson, 1881; reprint, Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 2002).
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10
with scant regard for the other side of the argument, indeed with scant regard for the truth 
where the truth diminished in any way the glory of their achievement.” As a result, 
Raddall asserted that while the rebels’ cause was “fundamentally just,” historians have 
ignored the often less-than-heroic means the rebels employed in order to succeed, along 
with “the persecutions, the confiscations and banishment they inflicted upon their fellow- 
Americans.”27
Thus the violent nature of the Revolution in the South has often been overlooked, 
except when acts of cruelty can be attributed to the British or loyalists. Both participants 
in the Revolution and later historians have ignored, downplayed, or attempted to justify 
the brutality with which Americans treated their enemies, for such viciousness 
contradicted the very ideals for which the rebels fought. As Charles Royster observed, 
American revolutionaries “agreed that the future of American liberty depended first on 
winning the war and second on how the war was won. Liberty could survive, many 
Americans believed, only if the people showed themselves to be worthy defenders of 
it.”28 The rebels soon learned, however, that winning the war often required measures that 
contrasted sharply with the ideals of their cause. Rather than recognize their willingness 
to sacrifice principle in the name of necessity, most revolutionaries found it easier to 
blame the British and loyalists for initiating acts of cruelty, leaving the Americans no 
choice but to retaliate in kind. Historians, too, chose this more palatable course.
Don Higginbotham, in one example of this practice, wrote that “brutality and 
savagery ... had no appeal for the Americans in 1775.” He described the revolutionaries’
27 Thomas H. Raddall, “Tarleton’s Legion,” Collections o f the Nova Scotia Historical Society, Vol. 28, 
1947, 1,2.
28 Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775- 
1783 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1979), 3.
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goal as “[o]rganized resistance carried out with restraint,” while noting “the absence of 
British suppression and American vengeance.” Noting that the conflict in the South was 
exceptional for its high level of violence, Higginbotham blamed this on the loyalists. He 
described them as “for the most part angry, bitter men” who “wanted a course of harsh 
retribution” against their former oppressors. The “bloodthirsty loyalists” drove the 
Americans “into open defiance,” while influencing Banastre Tarleton, Patrick Ferguson, 
Lord Rawdon and other British officers “most exposed to tory opinions” to embrace
• 9 0harsh, coercive policies.
Some writers concede that the Whigs were occasionally guilty of acts of violence 
and cruelty, but continue to insist that the British and loyalists behaved much worse. 
Cynthia A. Kiemer wrote that “scholars and contemporaries agree that the Whigs were 
less ruthless than their opponents .... Tories and British regulars terrorized the 
backcountry’s civilian population, murdering, plundering, taking prisoners, and causing
TO • • »chaos in many communities.” Walter Edgar argued that British occupation policy in the 
South depended on cruelty for its success: “From Charles, Lord Cornwallis, to the 
humblest Tory militiaman, the occupying forces believed that fear and brutality would 
cow the populace.” Edgar blamed the British for the atrocities committed by both sides, 
stating that they “were initiated by British regulars or their Tory allies. Patriot militia 
bands responded in kind, and the violence escalated into a fury that laid waste to entire
91communities.”
29 Don Higginbotham, “Reflections on the War of Independence, Modem Guerilla Warfare, and the War in 
Vietnam,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Arms and Independence, 5,1,  11, 20-21.
30 Cynthia Kiemer, Southern Women in Revolution, 1776-1800: Personal and Political Narratives 
(Columbia: University o f  South Carolina Press, 1998), 17.
31 Walter Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide o f  the American 
Revolution (New York: William Morrow, 2001), xvi, xvii, 71.
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Very few historians have challenged this view. Fortescue described the rebel 
militia’s “intimidation of loyalists” as a form of “terrorism” that “soon degenerated into 
indiscriminate robbery and violence,” leading to loyalist retaliation and “in Carolina, a 
civil war of surpassed ferocity.”32 Martha Condray Searcy was even more emphatic in 
placing responsibility for the violence in the South upon the Whigs. “The rebels began 
the violence,” she wrote, referring to the outbreak of the Revolution in Georgia, and 
added that no evidence indicates that Georgia loyalists retaliated in kind.
Two other obstacles to an accurate assessment of the numerical strength of the 
southern loyalists, their contribution to the royal cause, and the soundness of British plans 
based on the expectation of loyalist support are the difficulty in gauging the loyalists’ 
numbers and the fact that the allegiance of many southerners frequently shifted from one 
side to another. Statistical evidence of loyalist strength in the South derives from the 
claims submitted to the British government after the war by loyalists seeking 
compensation for their losses. This data indicates that loyalism was more common in 
South Carolina and Georgia than in any other colony except New York, but claims were 
filed by only a small fraction of loyalists, making any evidence derived from the claims 
incomplete.34
32 Fortescue, War o f  Independence, 259.
33 Martha Condray Searcy, The Georgia-Florida Contest in the American Revolution, 1776-1778 
(University: University o f Alabama Press, 1985), 171.
34 Wallace Brown, The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives o f  the American Loyalist Claimants 
(Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1965), 213-214. Brown writes that South Carolinians filed 328 
claims, representing .47 percent o f the province’s prewar white population. This proportion, while slightly 
less than that in New York, was “much higher than in any other colony ... except Georgia.” Among 
Charleston residents, the percentage of inhabitants filing claims stood at 2.17, making that place “the most 
strongly loyal city in all America,” with a proportion more than four times higher than that o f New York. 
For the difficulty o f  using the loyalist claims as a basis for statistical analysis, see Eugene R. Fingerhut, 
“Uses and Abuses o f  the American Loyalists’ Claims: a Critique of Quantitative Analyses,” WMQ, Vol. 25, 
No. 2, April 1968, 245-258.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
13
People in the southern colonies supported the British cause for a variety of 
reasons, some of which had more to do with local conditions than with attitudes toward 
imperial governance.35 Other colonists were neutral or not firmly committed to either 
side, so that in addition to the contest between staunch loyalists and Whigs, the 
Revolution in the South was “a struggle for the allegiance of the rank-and file of the 
colonies’ white population.”35 In a study of political allegiance in revolutionary Georgia, 
Leslie Hall concluded that many people adhered to whichever side was best able to 
provide them with land or protect their claim to the land they owned.37 Rachel Klein, 
explaining the rebels’ success in controlling the South Carolina interior, wrote that “the 
whigs more consistently represented the broad class interests of rising backcountry 
slaveowners.”38 While these assertions are undoubtedly true so far as neutral southerners 
and lukewarm Whigs and loyalists are concerned, they overlook those whose loyalism 
arose from a commitment to political principles, and which led them to sacrifice their 
land and economic prospects rather than forsake their allegiance to Great Britain.
Given the preponderance of opinion, is it possible to come to any other conclusion 
than the prevailing one that British policy in the South was fundamentally flawed, based 
on chimerical predictions of loyalist support provided by biased loyalists and royal 
officials? Or that the few southern loyalists were either passive or brutal, and thus of little
35 The issues o f  loyalist motivation and political belief are for the most part beyond the scope o f this study. 
For information on these topics, see Brown, The Good Americans', Calhoon, Loyalists in Revolutionary 
America; Brown, King’s Friends; William H. Nelson, The American Tory (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1961); Ann Gorman Condon, “Marching to a Different Drummer -  The Political Philosophy o f the 
American Loyalists,” in Esmond Wright, ed., Red, White, and True Blue: The Loyalists in the Revolution 
(New York: AMS Press, 1976); Condon, “Foundations o f  Loyalism,” 2-4.
36 Dan L. Morrill, Southern Campaigns o f  the American Revolution (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation 
Publishing Company, 1993), 3.
37 Leslie Hall, Land and Allegiance in Revolutionary Georgia (Athens: University o f Georgia Press, 2001), 
esp. xi-xii.
38 Rachel Klein, Unification o f  a Slave State: The Rise o f  the Planter Class in the South Carolina 
Backcountry, 1760-1808 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 81-82.
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use to the British? In fact, a careful study of the documentary evidence leads to very 
different conclusions. Casting aside the unsubstantiated reminiscences that constituted 
many of the early histories of the Revolution in the South, and carefully analyzing 
contemporary accounts from both British and American sources, reveals that British 
officials were indeed correct in believing that large numbers of loyalists inhabited 
Georgia and South Carolina, and that they would contribute greatly to the effort to restore 
royal authority in those provinces.
The best evidence for this can be found by comparing British assessments of 
loyalist strength in the South with those made by their American opponents. When 
compared, the reports are virtually interchangeable. Biased and out of touch the loyalist 
exiles and royal officials may have been, yet Americans in the South held identical 
opinions in regard to the numbers and military potential of the loyalists, as well as of the 
possible dangers that would arise if Indians and slaves assisted the king’s forces. 
American generals Robert Howe, Benjamin Lincoln, and Nathanael Greene and civil 
officials such as South Carolina governor John Rutledge did not share the loyalists’ 
biases, and they were certainly not out of touch: they were on the scene and in close 
contact with the inhabitants of the southern provinces.
This suggests that British officials based their plans to regain control of the Deep 
South colonies on accurate information, and the evidence further demonstrates that when 
British troops arrived in the South, large numbers of loyalists came forward to assist 
them. Some loyalists did hesitate to openly support the British, not from a “passive” 
nature, but from fear instilled by years of persecution at the hands of the rebels. The 
unremitting campaign of Whig cruelty, which far surpassed the brutality attributed to the
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loyalists, also eventually drove many loyal Americans to abandon their allegiance to 
Britain to escape continued suffering. The British failed to restore royal authority in 
Georgia and South Carolina, not because loyalists were too few, too passive, or too cruel, 
but because the rebels relentlessly murdered, imprisoned, abused, and intimidated those 
who supported the king’s government. Many British officers recognized this situation and 
sympathized with the loyalists’ plight. “The richest loyalist runs the risk of becoming a
• IQbeggar” if  left unprotected by the British army, a Hessian officer noted in 1778.
Like the loyalists, Indians constituted one of the pillars upon which British hopes 
for the reconquest of the southern provinces rested. Also like the loyalists, the Indians 
have been criticized for providing inadequate support to the British and for committing 
acts of cruelty which drove many white southerners into the rebel camp. As James H. 
O’Donnell, III, noted, “The general theme that the Indian was an utter villain” arose 
during the Revolution and “would continue to distort historical accounts.”40 Peter 
Marshall believed that “a strong case can be made for the view that the horror aroused by 
Indian participation in military campaigns far exceeded the assistance thus secured by 
either side.”41 Edward J. Cashin asserted that the British should have avoided using 
Indians altogether. “The decision to use Indians was a major miscalculation by the British 
high command,” he wrote, adding that the policy insured that land-hungry backcountry 
settlers, most of whom were “Indian haters,” would support the rebels.42
39 Quoted in Bernhard A. Uhlendorf, ed. and trans., The Siege o f  Charleston, With an Account o f  the 
Province o f  South Carolina: Diaries and Letters o f  Hessian Officers from the von Jungkenn Papers in the 
William L. Clements Library (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938), 11.
40 James H. O’Donnell, III, Southern Indians in the American Revolution (Knoxville: University o f  
Tennessee Press, 1973), ix.
41 Peter Marshall, “First Americans and Last Loyalists: An Indian Dilemma in War and Peace,” in Wright, 
ed., Red, White, and True Blue, 33.
42 Edward J. Cashin, ‘“But Brothers, It Is Our Land We Are Talking About’: Winners and Losers in the 
Georgia Backcountry,” in Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds., An Uncivil War: The
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Cashin based his opinion on the erroneous assumption that if British officials had 
not called upon the Indians for support, the latter would have remained idle spectators to 
the Anglo-American conflict. Indians recognized that they had a great stake in the 
outcome of the Revolution, and would have participated regardless of what British 
ministers in London decided. “The logic of nearly two hundred years of abrasive contact 
with colonizing Europeans compelled the choice” most Indians made to support Britain, 
Gary Nash observed, since it was the colonists “who most threatened Indian autonomy,” 
whereas for more than a decade the British government had attempted to halt the influx 
of settlers onto Indian land.43
British officials did make several errors in their plans to use Indians against the 
rebels. First, the ministers assumed that the Indians would act only when instructed to do 
so by British Indian agents, overlooking the fact that the Indians were independent allies 
who preferred to fight the colonists on their own terms, which did not always coincide 
with British plans. Second, British leaders tended to think of the southern tribes as a 
single entity, overlooking the divisions between the four southern Indian nations, some of 
which had been aggravated by Britain’s own Indian agents in order to provide security 
for the colonists by promoting animosity among the Indians. Furthermore, all of the 
major southern Indian nations, except the Chickasaws, were riven by internal dissension 
that made unified action by even a single nation difficult to achieve. Finally, British 
officials failed to realize the animosity that existed between the Indians and backcountry 
whites, regardless of whether the latter were loyalists or Whigs. This produced the
Southern Backcountry in the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), 
249-250.
43 Gary Nash, “The Forgotten Experience: Indians, Blacks, and the American Revolution,” in William M. 
Fowler, Jr., and Wallace Coyle, eds., The American Revolution: Changing Perspectives (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1979), 39.
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paradox of committed loyalists alternately fighting the rebels and joining with their white 
opponents against their erstwhile Indian allies. Despite these flaws in British policy, 
southern Indians did contribute significantly to the British effort in the South; even when 
they remained inactive, the Indians constituted a potential threat that rebel leaders could 
not ignore, and the mere rumor of an Indian attack frequently diverted Whig militia and 
regular troops who would otherwise have been employed against the British and loyalists. 
Responding to the Indian menace in the same manner as they dealt with the loyalists, the 
Whigs unleashed a torrent of brutality to suppress their Indian enemies and intimidated 
them into withdrawing from the conflict.
The role of Britain’s third group of supporters in the South, African American 
slaves, was overlooked for nearly two centuries. Most historians followed the path of 
David Ramsay, the South Carolina rebel who wrote in his influential history of the 
Revolution that slaves were “so well satisfied with their condition, that several have been 
known to reject proffered freedom ... emancipation does not appear to be the wish of the 
generality o f them.”44 Ramsay could not have helped personally observing the flight of 
thousands of slaves to the British; he and those who wrote afterwards evidently preferred 
to write histories that would please themselves and their patriotic readers rather than face 
the unpleasant fact that for most African Americans it was the British, not the Whigs, 
who provided the opportunity to gain liberty. As Gary Nash noted, “the American 
Revolution represents the largest slave uprising” in American history. “Discovering the 
power of the revolutionary ideology of protest, slaves found the greatest opportunities for 
applying it by fleeing to the very forces against which Americans directed their
44 Quoted in Arthur H. Shaffer, “Between Two Worlds: David Ramsay and the Politics o f Slavery,” JSH, 
Vol. 50, No. 2, May 1984, 190.
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ideological barbs.”45 Nash added that this uprising “was carried on individually rather 
than collectively for the most part, because circumstances favored individualized 
struggles for freedom.”46 The war “gave slaves new leverage to challenge both the 
institution of chattel bondage and the allied structures of white supremacy.” Divisions in 
the planter class between Whigs and loyalists shattered the white unity on which the slave 
system depended, and allowed slaves to seize opportunities to alter their status that arose 
amidst the wartime chaos 47
Driven by their desire for freedom, African Americans refused to remain idle 
during the struggle. “Whatever the schemes of patriot and tory leaders during 1775, local 
slave leaders ... were attentive and active participants rather than ignorant and passive 
objects,” Peter H. Wood wrote. Black activists sought to capitalize on the white struggle 
in their plans for freedom fully as much as white factions tried to implicate half a million 
blacks in their political designs.” Most slaves, hoping to escape bondage amid the 
tumult of war, naturally looked to the British. Many slaves had heard of the Somerset 
case, tried in England in 1772, in which James Somerset, a slave brought to Britain in 
1769, sued for his freedom. Although Chief Justice Lord Mansfield was reluctant to issue 
a decision that would emancipate the 14,000 slaves then in England, he finally, on June 
22, ordered Somerset released. Mansfield’s ruling effectively abolished slavery in Great
45 Gary Nash, Race and Revolution (Madison, WI: Madison House Publishers, 1990), 57, 59-60.
46 Nash, “Forgotten Experience,” in Fowler and Coyle, eds., American Revolution: Changing Perspectives, 
36.
47 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries o f  Slavery in North America (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 1998), 219-220.
48 Peter H. Wood, ‘“The Dream Deferred’: Black Freedom Struggles on the Eve o f White Independence,” 
in Gary Y. Okihiro, ed., In Resistance: Studies in African, Caribbean, and Afro-American History 
(Amherst: University o f  Massachusetts Press, 1986), 173. Benjamin Quarles expresses a similar opinion in 
“The Revolutionary War as a Black Declaration o f Independence,” in Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman, eds., 
Slavery and Freedom in the Age o f  the American Revolution (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1986), 
290.
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Britain.49 Some American slaves had concluded that they would be free if they could 
somehow get to England. The slaves had not forgotten this when the war began. Even if 
the British army did not offer them outright emancipation, slaves were “accustomed to 
sorting our degrees of exploitation. If their goal was freedom, the British offered the 
quickest route to it, almost the only route, in fact, in the South.”50
Although British leaders recognized that slaves were likely to assist them in their 
efforts to suppress the rebellion and discussed various means of employing them, the 
ministry never settled upon a policy for the use of slaves. This is hardly surprising, since 
royal officials recognized that any tampering with the institution of slavery risked doing 
more harm than good to the king’s cause. The status and wealth of many southern 
colonists was inextricably linked to slave ownership.51 Furthermore, the constant danger 
of slave revolt filled white southerners with “a chilling fear which even the rhythmic 
tedium of daily life could never entirely smother.” Few white inhabitants of Georgia or 
South Carolina, whatever their political opinions, could contemplate any change in the 
slave system unaccompanied by violent upheaval. “A successful insurrection loomed as 
total destruction, as the irretrievable loss of all that white men had won in America.” It 
would be a “social revolution” that was “wholly destructive” of southern white society.52 
The Whigs in fact capitalized on rumors that the British government planned to arm 
slaves to motivate their supporters and to try to bring loyalists into the rebel camp. “The 
latent distrust of the slave seems to have been deliberately exploited by Southern patriots
49 Ellen Gibson Wilson, The Loyal Blacks (New York: Capricorn Books, 1976), 21; Benjamin Quarles, The 
Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1996), 37.
50 Wilson, Loyal Blacks, 3.
51 Duncan J. MacLeod, Slavery, Race and the American Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1974), 136.
52 Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: 
University o f North Carolina Press, 1968), 112, 115.
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as a means of arousing animosity toward the British and of coercing those who were 
lukewarm or timid about breaking with England,” Benjamin Quarles wrote; “such
•  S’}propaganda was effective in stilling any inclination to make a warrior of the Negro.”
The British government’s failure to establish an official policy concerning slaves 
meant that, as Ira Berlin observed, “the British proved to be unreliable liberators .... as 
they feared identification as the slaves’ friend would drive slaveholding Loyalists into the 
Patriot camp.” When forced to deal with large numbers of runaway slaves, “British 
commanders wavered,” which “made it impossible for fugitives to predict whether they 
would be greeted as freed people or slaves, treated as allies or spoils of war.” Yet if this 
inconsistency prevented many slaves from fleeing to the British, the slaves clearly 
understood that they could not expect any opportunity for freedom from the Whigs.54
The limited use that the British made of slaves antagonized many rebels and 
alienated some loyalists, although not all southern whites embraced the institution of 
slavery. In the backcountry, where loyalism was strongest, “white frontiersmen with 
little sympathy for the nabobs of the tidewater sometimes sheltered such black men and 
women” who had run away from their masters, “employing them with no questions 
asked.”55 Nevertheless, Sylvia R. Frey went so far as to assert that in 1780 “the South 
Carolina pacification program broke down primarily because of British attempts to use 
slaves as weapons against their masters.”56 This is a considerable overstatement, since 
British officials tried to disrupt the system of slavery as little as possible. Although the 
British often employed rebel-owned slaves in noncombat roles with the army, many
53 Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 14.
54 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 296-297, 298.
55 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 91.
56 Sylvia R. Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), 113.
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others, whether owned by Whigs or loyalists, were returned to their plantations. In the 
end, British reluctance to draw upon the support of African Americans to the fullest 
possible extent hurt the royal cause by depriving the British of a valuable resource. 
Already outraged at the limited use the British had made of slaves, the Whigs’ animosity 
could not have been made much worse, and any dissatisfaction arising among white 
loyalists from the creation of large units of black troops would have been more than 
offset by the accession of strength to the British army. Even in a restricted role, African 
Americans made significant contributions to the British effort to regain the southern 
provinces, and their potential had not come close to being fully realized.
As was the case with loyalists and Indians, the rebels responded ruthlessly to the 
threat from their slaves. Again, historians have tended to overlook this aspect of the 
Revolution in the South. Peter H. Wood attributed this to a desire on the part of most 
Americans to preserve the idea that the Revolution, a noble cause, was fought and won 
by noble Americans in a noble manner. “After all,” Wood wrote, “the Revolutionary Era 
remains the most closely guarded treasure in our national mythology. Adding too much 
realistic detail about the situation of African Americans at the moment when the colonies 
were declaring their independence might well, in the words of James Baldwin, ‘reveal 
more about America to Americans than Americans wish to know.’”57
Had British leaders chosen to arm large numbers of slaves, they might have faced 
much difficulty in coordinating the actions of Indians and blacks, because they would 
have had to overcome the effects of their own previous colonial policies. William S. 
Willis observes that “the Colonial Southeast was the only place where Indians, Whites,
57 Peter H. Wood, ‘“The Facts Speak Loudly Enough’: Exploring Early Southern Black History,” in 
Catherine Clinton and Michele Gillespie, eds., The D evil’s Lane: Sex and Race in the Early South (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 12.
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and Negroes met in large numbers.” Since the colonists constituted “a frightened and 
dominant White minority [that] faced two exploited colored majorities,” colonial officials 
“willfully helped create ... antagonism between Indians and Negroes in order to preserve
♦ • SRthemselves and their privileges” from the danger of combined Indian-slave opposition. 
The methods used to promote animosity between slaves and Indians included laws 
prohibiting blacks from entering Indian lands and hiring Indians to capture runaway 
slaves. These policies were partially effective, although J. Leitch Wright noted that the 
policy “failed as often as it succeeded ... Africans and Indians intermingled, learned each 
others’ language, intermarried, and at times made common cause against whites.”59
Unifying white loyalists, Indians, and slaves in a common effort to aid the British 
army in retaking Georgia and South Carolina would certainly have been a difficult, but 
not impossible, task. The British belief that these three diverse peoples would be the 
means by which royal authority would be restored in the southern colonies can be likened 
metaphorically to a rope, in which each of the three groups was a strand; once braided 
together, this rope would be strong enough to bind South Carolina and Georgia to the 
British Empire. British officials correctly expected considerable loyalist support; 
however, they failed to realize the divisions within the Indian nations, as well as the utter 
lack of harmony among loyalists, Indians, and slaves, which complicated any attempt to 
bring them to act in concert. In addition, neither Indians nor slaves were so pliable as to 
act only when and if the British government demanded their assistance. The Indian 
nations pursued their own interests as allies rather than as subjects of King George, while
58 William S. Willis, “Divide and Rule: Red, White, and Black in the Southeast,” Journal o f  Negro History, 
Vol. 48, No. 3, July 1963, 157-176, esp. 157, 168, 160.
59 J. Leitch Wright, The Only Land They Knew: American Indians in the Old South (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1999), 272-273.
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African Americans challenged British hesitance to employ them by fleeing in large 
numbers to the British army and offering their support. Frustrated at their inability to 
direct the Indians and fearful of the consequences of arming slaves, British officials relied 
primarily on the loyalists, made little effort to encourage cooperation between loyalists, 
Indians, and slaves, and thus deprived themselves of the full strength that would have 
accrued to them by fully mobilizing and unifying their diverse supporters. This enabled 
the rebels to suppress the loyalists and Indians separately, while only a fraction of the 
vast potential of southern slaves to support the British was brought to bear against the 
Whigs. As a result, Britain’s southern strategy, although sound in conception, failed 
because the ministers formed no detailed plan for its execution. Yet in spite of this 
impediment, loyalists, Indians, and slaves contributed far more to the British effort to 
retake South Carolina and Georgia than has been previously recognized. What is striking 
about their role in the southern provinces is not that they contributed so little, but that in 
the face of unremitting, brutal opposition, they contributed so much.
The geographic scope of most histories of the Revolution in the South 
encompasses Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. This study shifts the regional focus to 
South Carolina, Georgia, East Florida, and West Florida, which permits a more coherent 
analysis of the roles of loyalists, Indians, and slaves. The Floridas were the homeland of 
three of the Indian nations allied to the British, served as refuges for southern loyalists 
and slaves seeking to escape the Whigs, and functioned as bases from which British 
regulars, loyalists, and Indians operated against the frontiers of Georgia and South 
Carolina. While the recapture of North Carolina and Virginia were key elements in the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
24
British southern strategy, the British made no sustained effort to mobilize their supporters 
in either of those provinces.
This is the first regional study of the American Revolution undertaken from the 
perspective of the British and their supporters. As such, it seeks to correct the 
exaggerated tales of untarnished American valor and the unmitigated perfidy of those 
who adhered to the royal cause. The result is an often unflattering portrayal of the Whigs, 
while loyalist, Indian, and slave supporters of the British appear in a more favorable light 
than is usual. An objective analysis of the sources permits no other interpretation. As 
Gary Nash stated, “for many of the people of North America the struggle for life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness in the 1770s and 1780s was carried on by fighting with the 
British and against those American patriots upon whom our patriotic celebrations have 
always exclusively focused.”60 Those peoples -  white, red, and black -  who supported 
King George III do not deserve to be forever castigated by historians solely because they 
pursued a different dream for America’s future.
60 Nash, “Forgotten Experience,” in Fowler and Coyle, eds., American Revolution: Changing Perspectives, 
32.
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CHAPTER I 
REVOLUTION COMES TO THE DEEP SOUTH
Between 1763 and 1775, the dispute between Great Britain and several of the 
North American colonies over the issue of taxation grew increasingly bitter. American 
Whigs refused to concede that the British parliament had the authority to tax the 
provinces, while British officials believed that parliamentary sovereignty was the 
foundation on which the empire rested and would not consider surrendering that authority 
to the colonists.
The colonies of the Deep South responded to the imperial crisis in different ways. 
South Carolina’s political leaders, the wealthy planters of the lowcountry, embraced 
Whig principles and took a prominent role in the colonial resistance to British policy. 
Although they did not speak for all of the province’s inhabitants, they were powerful 
enough to align the colony with their neighbors to the north in the revolutionary 
movement. Georgians, kept in check by their skillful and popular royal governor, Sir 
James Wright, and fearful that opposition to parliament’s authority might cause them to 
forfeit British protection from their powerful Indian neighbors, hesitated to commit 
themselves fully to the Whig cause. Finally, pressured by South Carolina’s Whigs and 
incited by its own small but vocal rebel party, Georgia became the last of the thirteen 
colonies to join the American resistance in 1776. In the provinces of East and West 
Florida, Whigs were few; most inhabitants showed little interest in the disputes of the
25
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1760s and 1770s, and both provinces remained loyal to Britain when hostilities began in 
1775.
South Carolina
South Carolina was one of the wealthiest provinces in North America. Charleston, 
the fourth-largest town in the American colonies, was the provincial capital as well as a 
leading commercial center. On the vast plantations in the coastal region known as the 
lowcountry, enslaved African Americans produced large crops of rice and indigo for 
export, enriching the aristocratic planters who dominated the economic and political life 
of the colony. Jealous of their power and privileges, the planters actively opposed British 
policies that appeared to threaten their rights.1
When Parliament passed the Stamp Act in 1765, imposing a tax on newspapers, 
customs documents, and legal papers, South Carolina planters as well as many Charleston 
artisans believed that the law encroached upon their right to be taxed only by their own 
provincial assembly and prepared to resist any attempt to enforce the act. With the law 
scheduled to take effect on November 1, protests began in October. Opponents of the 
stamp tax burned an effigy of the stamp distributor, broke several windows at his house, 
and eventually forced him to resign. They also conducted a mock funeral for “liberty.” 
Yet compared to their counterparts in many other colonies, South Carolinians’ resistance 
to the Stamp Act was relatively restrained; they did not engage in the kind of destruction 
practiced in places like Boston. Tensions ended when Parliament responded to the 
protests by repealing the act m early 1766.
1 Alden, South in the Revolution, 24-25; Robert M. Weir, “A Most Important Epocha The Coming o f  the 
Revolution in South Carolina (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 3-5.
2 Weir, "Most Important Epocha”, 15, 17,21.
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Parliament’s imposition of the Townshend Revenue Acts in 1767 again strained 
the province’s relationship with Britain. The taxes on imported glass, lead, paint, paper 
and tea were seen as another attempt to raise money from the colonists without their 
consent. Charleston’s artisans, who were most affected by the acts, expressed immediate 
dissatisfaction and soon pressured the planters and merchants, who had initially shown 
little concern about the new taxes, to join them in opposing the law. Representatives of 
all three groups agreed to halt the importation of British goods until the acts were 
repealed. The opponents of British policy, who styled themselves “Whigs,” employed 
harsh methods to enforce the nonimportation agreement. Adopting the motto “Sign or 
Die,” the Whigs threatened violence to anyone who showed reluctance to subscribe to the 
pact.4 In most cases, however, the coercion was economic: “associators denied 
nonsubscribers the use of their wharves and refused to purchase their rice, indigo, or 
other plantation products.”5 Yet many prominent merchants refused to cooperate, so that 
British exports to South Carolina dropped by no more than fifty percent. Merchants who 
had agreed to nonimportation, seeing their competitors profiting by ignoring the 
agreement, sometimes resumed the purchase of British goods. Parliament repealed the 
Townshend duties in April 1770, except for the tax on tea.6
While lowcountry Carolinians denounced British policies they considered 
oppressive, their counterparts in the province’s interior or backcountry raised similar 
complaints about the treatment they received at the hands of the lowcountry planters who 
governed them. “The planters of South Carolina... were unwilling to grant representation
3 Weir, “Most Important Epocha ”, 32, 34-35; Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons o f  Liberty: A Study o f  the 
Artisans, 1763-1789 (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1959), 44 ,45.
4 Walsh, Charleston’s Sons o f  Liberty, 48, 50.
5 Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development o f  American 
Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 122.
6 Weir, “Most Important Epocha”, 36-37.
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to the upcountry, and its House of Commons was an exclusively eastern body.”7 The 
Assembly ignored the desire of backcountry residents for representation, local courts, and 
other institutions to establish order and secure their rights. When an outburst of violent 
crime struck the backcountry in 1767, many of the inhabitants joined together to demand 
that the provincial government address their grievances. Known as “Regulators,” these 
people meted out punishment to criminals while pressuring officials to grant them the 
right to vote, provide courts and jails, and institute other legal reforms. By 1769, when 
the movement came to an end, the Regulators had achieved many of their demands. 
Provincial officials created four judicial districts in the backcountry, each with its own 
sheriff, court, and jail, and established two parishes whose inhabitants could elect 
representatives to the Assembly. Nevertheless, backcountry representation in the 
Assembly remained disproportionately small until the eve of the Revolution, when the 
provincial congress, in an effort to increase backcountry support for the Whigs, allocated
o
about one-third of its seats to representatives from the region.
Shortly after Regulator unrest had subsided, the Assembly voted in December 
1769 to send a contribution of £1500 sterling (nearly $200,000 in 2002 value) to the 
Society of the Gentlemen Supporters of the Bill of Rights, an organization devoted to 
assisting British political radical John Wilkes in his opposition to the government. Wilkes 
was popular among South Carolina Whigs; Charleston’s artisans had earlier formed a 
“John Wilkes Club.”9 Lt. Gov. William Bull and the Council were aghast, not only 
because they opposed the payment, but because it had been made without their consent.
7 Jackson Turner Main, “Government by the People: The American Revolution and the Democratization of 
the Legislatures,” WMQ, Vol. 23, No. 3, July 1966, 396.
8 Klein, Unification o f  a Slave State, 47-48, 74; Main, “Government by the People,” 398.
9 Walsh, Charleston ’s Sons o f  Liberty, 31. The 2002 value o f the contribution is based on information at 
http://eh.net/hmit, using the pound’s value in 1780.
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The Council therefore refused to permit the Assembly to recover the funds from the 1770 
tax receipts. To force the Council’s hand, the Assembly refused to pass a tax bill that did 
not cover the expense of the donation to Wilkes. Bull and the Council found this 
unacceptable and a deadlock ensued. When Governor Lord Charles Montagu arrived in 
September 1771, he too resisted the Assembly’s efforts to include the Wilkes funds in a 
tax bill, and eventually dissolved the house. Both sides remained intransigent, as the 
dispute evolved into a debate over the relative powers of the Assembly and the Council. 
“No annual tax bill was passed in South Carolina after 1769 and no legislation at all after 
February 1771. For all practical purposes royal government in South Carolina broke 
down.”10
The breakdown of legal government enabled the Whig committees to take 
effective control of affairs in Charleston. They were therefore ideally situated to take 
advantage of the next crisis in the imperial relationship -  the passage of the Tea Act in 
1773. Parliament’s intention had been to assist the financially-troubled East India 
Company by allowing it to sell tea directly to the colonists at a lower cost; the act 
actually reduced the tax on tea. To the Whigs, however, the act appeared to be a ploy by 
the British government to deceive them into abandoning their opposition to British 
taxation by purchasing taxed tea, something they had avoided since the repeal of the 
Townshend Acts. When a shipment of tea arrived in Charleston on December 1, a crowd 
gathered to protest. The merchants to whom it was consigned, fearing the wrath of the 
mob, refused to accept it. Before a confrontation could develop, Lt. Gov. Bull confiscated
10 Jack P. Greene, “Bridge to Revolution: The Wilkes Fund Controversy in South Carolina, 1769-1775,” 
JSH, Vol. 29, No. 1, Feb. 1963, 19-52 (quotation 52).
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the tea for nonpayment of the tax and stored it in town. This action defused the protests in 
Charleston.11
In Boston, opponents of the Tea Act had dumped a large quantity of tea into the 
harbor in mid-December. Parliament responded to the news by passing the Coercive 
Acts, which closed the port of Boston and placed Massachusetts under military 
government. South Carolina’s Whigs believed that the Coercive Acts foreshadowed a 
British attack on the people’s liberty throughout the colonies and joined their eleven 
northern neighbors in sending representatives to a Continental Congress in 
Philadelphia.12
When the delegates returned, the Whigs called for the election of a provincial 
congress, as the Assembly was still moribund as a result of the Wilkes Fund dispute. The 
congress adopted a nonimportation agreement, chose delegates to attend a second 
Continental Congress, and began preparations to resist the British with force. In the 
spring of 1775, reports of fighting between British troops and Americans at Lexington 
and Concord and rumors that British officials planned to incite slave revolts and unleash 
Indian attacks on South Carolina radicalized the Whigs. They used coercion to enforce 
nonimportation and make people sign the Continental Association declaring their 
opposition to British policy. The recently arrived royal governor, Lord William 
Campbell, found the Whigs in control of the militia and himself powerless to assert any 
authority. Fearing for his safety, he took refuge aboard a British warship in Charleston 
harbor on September 15, 1775. Royal authority no longer existed in the province.13
11 Weir, “Most Important Epocha”, 51-52; Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 275-276.
12 Weir, “Most Important Epocha ”, 52-55.
13 Weir, “Most Important Epocha”, 58-59, 62-64, 68.
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Because lowcountry planters dominated the Assembly and nearly all of them were 
Whigs, the transition from royal government to Whig control was relatively smooth. This 
made it virtually impossible for loyalists to retain a voice in provincial affairs.14 One of 
the few who expressed an opinion displeasing to the Whigs quickly felt their wrath. On 
August 12,1774, the Rev. Mr. John Bullman, assistant rector at St. Michael’s Church, 
preached a sermon in which he urged the people to keep their proper station, do their 
duty, and not usurp the authority of others. His advice “afforded the Demagogues a 
handle to work up such resentment in the minds of the People” that Bullman was 
immediately labeled an enemy of liberty. The vestry of St. Michael’s forbade him from 
officiating at future services. Although seventy-four church members later signed a 
petition requesting that Bullman be reinstated, the vestry refused. The humiliated minister 
returned to England in the spring of 1775.15 His fate was a harbinger of what awaited 
South Carolina’s loyalists when they dared to challenge the Whigs.
The rebels had other concerns besides an occasional critic. They worried about 
the reluctance of their neighbors in Georgia, who in their opinion did not exhibit 
sufficient zeal for the revolutionary cause. The Georgians showed little desire to 
cooperate in nonimportation, leading angry South Carolinians to declare that the province 
should “be amputated from the rest of their brethren, as a rotten part that might spread a 
dangerous infection.”16
Loyalist clerics and wavering Georgians were minor problems compared to other 
dangers the Whigs faced. From the beginning of the dispute with Britain, South
14 Jack P. Greene, “The Role o f the Lower Houses o f  Assembly in Eighteenth-Century Politics,” JSH, Vol. 
27, No. 4, Nov. 1961,455.
15 William Bull to Dartmouth, March 15, 1775, Dartmouth Papers, #1107, Microfilm, DLAR.
16 Quoted in Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 121.
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Carolina’s large slave population had complicated the political situation. By 1775, slaves 
would outnumber the province’s white population by 104,000 to 70,000. With nearly 
two-thirds of whites living in the backcountry and more than ninety percent of slaves in
17the lowcountry, the fear of slave insurrection was pervasive among lowcountry whites.
To keep their laborers subservient, the planters established a system of rigid control that 
constituted “the most rigorous deprivation of freedom to exist in institutionalized form 
anywhere in the English continental colonies.”18 Thus much of the restraint the Whigs 
demonstrated during the Stamp Act protests was the result of whites’ concern that any 
tumults might provoke unrest among the slaves. The fear was well founded, as some 
“disorderly negroes,” emulating white opponents of the stamp tax, marched through 
Charleston in January 1766 shouting “Liberty.” The march threw Charleston residents 
into an uproar; provincial officials called out the militia and sent emissaries across the 
colony looking for signs of slave rebellion.19
As relations with Britain worsened, the actions of a black Methodist preacher 
named David made clear to whites that the threat from their slaves might be magnified by 
the conflict. David had been trained in England and sent to America by the Countess of 
Huntingdon to convert slaves to Christianity. In late 1774 or early 1775, David preached 
a sermon in Charleston on the delivery of the Israelites from bondage in Egypt, declaring 
that “God will deliver his own People from Slavery.” Whites recognized the incendiary 
nature of David’s message, and some of David’s white supporters had to rush him out of
17 Klein, Unification o f  a Slave State, 9; Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, xiii.
18 Jordan, White Over Black, 85.
19 Pauline Maier, “The Charleston Mob and the Evolution o f Popular Politics in Revolutionary South 
Carolina, 1765-1784,” Perspectives in American History, Vol. 4, 1970, 176-177.
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9fttown before he was lynched. Taken to Georgia, he continued to attack the institution of
21slavery until whites there, angered by his crusade, returned him to England.
Fear of slave rebellion was also widespread among backcountry settlers. Many 
backcountry settlers hoped to one day become slaveowners themselves; while they were
99hostile toward the lowcountry aristocracy, they “were not hostile to slavery.” One of the 
Regulators’ complaints had been that whenever they managed to “save a little M oney... 
Wherewith to purchase Slaves,” robbers learned of it and stole the funds.23 The number 
of slaves in the backcountry grew steadily in the years before the Revolution, reaching 
about 6,000 by 1770.24
Reverend Charles Woodmason, an Anglican missionary, recognized the fear of 
slave revolt in the backcountry as he traveled through the region in the 1760s and used it 
to strengthen his argument for religious tolerance. Woodmason pointed out the threat that 
arose from “an Internal Enemy,” the province’s numerous slaves. “Over these We ought 
to keep a very watchful Eye,” he advised, “lest they surprize us in an Hour when We are
9c
not aware, and begin our Friendships towards each other in one Common Death.” In 
promoting the establishment of schools in the backcountry, Woodmason tried to tap into 
the fear to dampen the inhabitants’ desire for slaves. He expressed the hope that 
education “may prove a Means of lessening the Number of Negroes that are now
20 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 175.
21 Philip D. Morgan, “Black Life in Eighteenth-Century Charleston,” Perspectives in American History, 
New Series, Vol. 1,1984,208-209.
22 Robert d w ell, Masters, Slaves, and Subjects: The Culture o f  Power in the South Carolina Lowcountry, 
1740-1790 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 31.
23 Remonstrance o f the Regulators to the SC Assembly, 1767, in Charles Woodmason, The Carolina 
Backcountry on the Eve o f the Revolution, Richard J. Hooker, ed. (Chapel Hill: University o f North 
Carolina Press, 1953), 226.
24 d w ell, Masters, Slaves, and Subjects, 31.
25 Woodmason, Carolina Backcountry, 93-94.
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employ’d as family Servants and therefrom by Degrees freeing this Land from an Internal 
Enemy that may one day be the total Ruin of it.”26
Woodmason also found backcountry inhabitants to be extremely hostile to the 
Indians and likewise appealed to this sentiment to advance his agenda. “There is an 
External Enemy near at Hand, which tho’ not formidable either to our Religion or 
Liberties, still is to be guarded against,” he told a Presbyterian audience in urging them 
not to discriminate against people of other denominations. “These are our Indian 
Neighbours. Common Prudence, and our Common Security, requires that We should live 
like Brethren in Unity, be it only to guard against any Dangers to our Lives and 
Properties as may arise from that Quarter.” He also demonstrated the value of education 
by contrasting white society with that of the Indians, asserting that among the latter, “for 
want of due Instruction, the most Savage Dispositions and detestable Practises contrary to 
the Principles of Humanity as well as of Religion, are transmitted down from one 
Wretched Generation of Creatures to another.”28 Woodmason may not have actually held 
such opinions, but he was clearly aware that appeals of this nature would be effective in 
winning support from the backcountry settlers. The Whigs would employ the same tactic 
a few years later in an attempt to convince these same people to support the rebellion.
Georgia
Georgia, the most recently founded and weakest of the thirteen rebel provinces, 
was the last to join the revolutionary movement. During the first years of the dispute
26 Woodmason, Carolina Backcountry, 121.
27 Woodmason, Carolina Backcountry, 93-94.
28 Woodmason, Carolina Backcountry, 121.
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between Britain and the colonies, Georgia’s royal governor, James Wright, who had held 
his office since 1760 and whose political skill and dedication to his province’s welfare 
made him one of the most capable provincial governors in the British Empire, succeeded 
in checking the more radical elements in Georgia. It was not until the summer of 1775 
that the Whigs finally wrested authority from him and dragged the province into 
revolution.29
The Stamp Act brought the first challenge to Wright’s popularity and leadership 
skills in 1765. Most Georgians opposed the act, believing that it infringed upon their 
liberty. Various protests took place in Savannah, while some opponents of the act 
organized themselves as “Sons of Liberty.” Wright thwarted the effort of an extralegal 
meeting of the Assembly to send delegates to the Stamp Act Congress in New York, 
although when the representatives met officially in December they dispatched a petition 
to London demanding the act’s repeal. Believing himself bound to enforce the law, 
Wright closed the port of Savannah until ships could be legally cleared through customs 
using stamped documents, a clever maneuver which led Savannah’s merchants to petition 
for enforcement of the act. With the help of the provincial rangers, merchants, and ships’ 
officers, Wright then intimidated the opposition and put the Stamp Act into effect. 
Despite his success in upholding the law, Wright realized that the Whigs had seriously 
threatened his authority and expressed “the greatest Mortification to see the Reins of
29 Kenneth Coleman, The American Revolution in Georgia, 1763-1789 (Athens: University o f  Georgia 
Press, 1958), 3, 53.
30 W. W. Abbot, The Royal Governors o f  Georgia, 1754-1775 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina 
Press, 1959), 104-105, 107, 113-115; Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 84; Coleman, Revolution in 
Georgia, 18-22.
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Government nearly hoisted out of my Hands, His Majesties authority Insulted, and the
•> i
Civil power obstructed.”
The governor had won the battle over the Stamp Act, but his victory made Whigs 
more determined to challenge him on other issues. In 1767 the Assembly refused to 
provide supplies for British troops in the province as required by the Quartering Act. The 
representatives also challenged the status of the Provincial Council, claiming it could not 
properly be considered the upper house of the legislature nor act in that capacity. Wright 
stood firm on both issues and eventually triumphed. In January 1768 the Assembly 
abandoned their challenge to the Council; they conceded to Wright on the Quartering Act 
three months later, although General Thomas Gage withdrew the troops in August. 
However, the representatives blamed Wright for causing both disputes. Wright replied 
with a scathing critique of the Assembly.32
The legislators renewed the battle in December 1768, when in spite of Wright’s 
admonitions, members adopted an address to the king protesting the Townshend Acts. In 
response Wright immediately dissolved the Assembly. Most Georgians, however, paid 
little heed to either the Townshend Acts or the Assembly’s opposition to them until 
September 1769, when protest meetings were held in Savannah, at which participants 
voted to adopt a nonimportation agreement. Upon learning that councillor Jonathan 
Bryan had presided at one of the meetings, Wright suspended him from the Council. The 
governor also worked quietly to convince people not to sign the agreement, and this, 
along with the lack of any means to enforce nonimportation, resulted in the complete
31 Quoted in Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 92.
32 Abbot, Royal Governors, 126-127, 134, 140-143; Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 26-27.
33 Kenneth Coleman, “James Wright and the Origins o f the Revolution in Georgia,” in James Kirby Martin, 
ed., The Human Dimensions o f  Nation Making: Essays on Colonial and Revolutionary America (Madison: 
State Historical Society o f Wisconsin, 1976), 116.
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failure of the agreement. Even criticism from South Carolina’s Whigs and their threat to 
suspend trade with Georgia failed to prod Georgians to further action.34
Wright battled the Assembly again when in April 1771 the members chose Noble 
Wimberly Jones as their speaker. Because Jones had been a vocal opponent of British 
policy, Wright refused to accept Jones’s election, whereupon the Assembly chose 
Archibald Bulloch instead, then passed a resolution declaring that the governor had 
violated their privileges. Wright dissolved the Assembly, reported the situation to 
London, and received orders to disapprove whomever the Assembly chose to be speaker 
at their next session. The governor then left for England, leaving Lt. Gov. James 
Habersham to deal with the matter. Three times at its next meeting the Assembly elected 
Jones speaker, finally replacing him with Bulloch at Habersham’s insistence only to 
provoke another dispute with the lieutenant governor over editing the Assembly’s records 
to remove references to Jones’s election. Habersham finally dissolved the Assembly, but 
the dispute began anew when that body reconvened the next year. The quarrel paralyzed
i f
the provincial government, so that no taxes were assessed or collected for two years.
In February 1773, Wright returned to Savannah as Sir James, the king having 
bestowed a baronetcy upon him for his services as governor. Wright soon regained much 
of his former popularity when he procured a large land cession from the Creek Indians. 
The governor toured the new lands, laying out towns, while the provincial government’s 
land office received a deluge of claims from eager settlers. Unfortunately for Wright, 
the goodwill engendered by the Creek land cession, which had diverted Georgians’
34 Coleman, “Wright and the Revolution,” 116; Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 28-32.
35 Abbot, Royal Governors, 156; Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 34-37..
36 Abbot, Royal Governors, 158, 162; Edward J. Cashin, “Sowing the Wind: Governor Wright and the 
Georgia Backcountry on the Eve o f the Revolution,” in Harvey H. Jackson and Phinizy Spalding, eds., 
Forty Years o f  Diversity: Essays on Colonial Georgia (Athens: University o f Georgia Press, 1984), 240- 
243.
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attention from the revolutionary movement, did not last long. When Creeks who did not 
approve of the cession attacked the province’s frontier in late 1773 and early 1774, many 
Georgians hoped that Wright would use the attacks as a pretext to extort more land from 
the Indians. When Wright and Indian superintendent John Stuart instead brought a 
peaceful end to the dispute in October 1774, backcountry inhabitants denounced the 
governor, believing that he had sacrificed their interests for the Indians’ benefit. The 
Whigs capitalized on this to win many new adherents to their cause.37
Overshadowed by the threat of war with the Creeks, the Tea Act had gone 
virtually unnoticed in Georgia. However, when the British government responded to the 
Boston Tea Party by passing the Coercive Acts, Whigs seized the opportunity to renew 
their protests against imperial policy. At a meeting in Savannah on July 27, 1774, Whig 
leaders resolved, despite some opposition, to raise money to aid the Bostonians. A 
subsequent meeting on August 10, held in spite of Wright’s proclamation declaring the 
gathering illegal, approved resolutions condemning the Coercive Acts and supporting 
American rights. Those attending also decided not to send delegates to the Continental
TO
Congress that would soon convene in Philadelphia.
This somewhat restrained protest resulted in part from serious divisions among 
the Whigs. The Assembly was dominated by representatives from Christ Church Parish, 
many of whom were also leaders in the Whig movement. Many had strong ties to Wright 
and other royal officials; while they opposed British policy, they hoped to achieve reform 
within the existing system, “with as little accompanying disturbance as possible.” They 
especially wished to avoid having the Assembly’s power pass into the hands of extralegal
37 Cashin, “Sowing the Wind,” 243.
38 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 40-42.
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meetings and congresses. The inhabitants of St. John’s Parish, who were descended from 
New England immigrants and advocated a more radical resistance to British policy, 
challenged the conservatives’ authority. The Christ Church conservatives, therefore, 
blocked the St. John’s representatives’ attempt to send a delegation to Philadelphia.39
Wright worked to counteract the effects of the August meeting by promoting 
dissenting views. In the weeks after the meeting, petitions circulated throughout Georgia 
expressing opposition to the Whigs’ proceedings. The petitioners noted that those whose 
opinions differed from the Whigs had been denied admission, that the meeting’s purpose 
had been misrepresented, and that attendees who disagreed with the Whigs had been 
ignored. Seven of these petitions, with 633 signatures, still survive as an indication of 
loyalist strength in the province, although many signers later joined the Whigs.40
After several months of quiet, Whig agitation resumed in December when St. 
John’s Parish adopted the Continental Association and demanded that Georgia send 
representatives to the second Continental Congress. Fearful that the radicals might gain 
control of the opposition movement, many conservative Whigs agreed to convene a 
provincial congress in January 1775. Wright tried to thwart the Whigs by calling the 
Assembly to meet on the same day, hoping that since many members of the Assembly 
were also attending the congress, the extralegal meeting might not take place. The 
representatives duly appeared when the Assembly met. Wright delivered an address that 
“was a sincere attempt to ... discourage revolutionary activities.” The members listened 
politely, then ignored two petitions with 260 signatures denouncing the colonial radicals
39 Harvey H. Jackson, “Consensus and Conflict: Factional Politics in Revolutionary Georgia, 1774-1777,” 
GHQ, Vol. 59, No. 4, Winter 1975, 389-391.
40 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 42-43. For examples of some of the dissenting petitions, see “Dissent to 
the Resolutions o f August 10, 1774;” “St. Paul Parish Dissent to August 10 Meeting;” “Kyokee and Broad 
River Settlements Dissent to August 10 Resolutions,” in Ronald G. Killion and Charles T. Waller, eds. 
Georgia and the Revolution (Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Co., 1975), 107-111.
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and went on to vote their approval of the actions of the Continental Congress. Wright 
then dismissed the members before they could take further action in support of the 
rebels.41
Meanwhile, the provincial congress had been meeting when the Assembly was 
not in session. Representatives adopted the Continental Association and chose three 
delegates to attend the Continental Congress, but those elected declined to go because not 
all of Georgia’s parishes had been represented at the congress. In a further demonstration 
of the Whigs’ lack of support, only St. John’s and St. Andrew’s Parish put the 
Continental Association into effect, causing angry inhabitants of the former to cut off 
trade with the rest of Georgia and attempt, unsuccessfully, to secede and join South 
Carolina.42
News of the fighting at Lexington and Concord finally swung the political balance 
in favor of the Whigs. Reports of the incident reached Savannah on May 10, and that 
night rebels broke into the town’s powder magazine and carried off the stores. Georgia 
Whigs attracted new supporters by pointing out that British troops had attacked the 
colonists and spreading rumors that British officials planned to incite Indian wars and 
slave insurrections. Another provincial congress convened in Savannah on July 4, which 
assumed control of Georgia’s affairs and committed the province to the Whig cause.43 
Later that month, Wright wrote that “the friends o f government are falling off daily 
because they get no support.” Although his own commitment to king and country did not
41 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 45-49.
42 Jackson, “Consensus and Conflict,” 392; Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 49-50.
43 Jackson, “Consensus and Conflict,” 392-394; Abbot, Royal Governors, 171,173, 178-179; Coleman, 
Revolution in Georgia, 52.
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waver, the governor had no power to enforce his authority and could only watch as 
rebellion raged about him.44
Despite their initial enthusiasm, the Whigs faced many difficulties. Georgia’s 
white population was about 25,000 in 1775, barely equal to the number of slaves in the 
province, and whites were bitterly divided among themselves. This, along with the 
presence of the Creeks on Georgia’s western frontier and the proximity o f East Florida, 
would make it hard for the rebels to protect themselves against a serious British effort to 
reassert royal authority in the province. The Whigs had joined the revolution, but they 
would not find it easy to make their rebellion succeed.45
East Florida
The provinces of East and West Florida were established in 1763 from territory 
that Spain ceded to Britain at the end of the Seven Years’ War. Both colonies were left 
open to settlement under the terms of the Proclamation of 1763, which halted the western 
expansion of existing colonies at the Appalachians. East Florida’s boundaries were the St. 
Mary’s River to the north and the Apalachicola River to the west. Settlement was 
concentrated along the Atlantic coast for approximately fifty miles north and south of the 
capital, St. Augustine. There were several large plantations along the St. John’s and St. 
Mary’s Rivers, and another plantation south of the capital at New Smyrna, where some 
one thousand indentured servants from Minorca and southern Europe labored. The 
province grew slowly: its non-Indian population was only about three thousand in 1775,
44 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 53.
45 Alden, South in the Revolution, 9; Charles E. Bennett and Donald R. Lennon, A Quest fo r  Glory: Major 
General Robert Howe and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 
1991), 45-46.
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half of whom were African American slaves.46 Most slaves had been imported from 
Georgia, South Carolina, or directly from Africa to meet the demand for labor on the 
newly established plantations 47
Shortly after the Spanish cession, Governor James Grant arrived with a few 
settlers along with some troops to garrison the fort at St. Augustine. Land grants attracted 
immigrants who established plantations along the rivers. Trade with the Indians 
developed and soon East Florida was exporting furs, lumber, turpentine, rice, indigo, and 
a variety of other goods.48
The Stamp Act aroused no opposition in East Florida. The handful of settlers 
complied with its terms, although Governor Grant reported that all of the inhabitants 
rejoiced when the act was repealed early in 1766. While British taxation was clearly 
unpopular, East Florida depended on a parliamentary subsidy to finance its government 
and defense, so the inhabitants had little grounds to protest the payment of taxes. Nor was 
there an assembly to provide a forum for complaints against imperial policy; the 
province’s free white population was too small to require the creation of a legislature, and 
none was elected until 1781
East Floridians continued to show little sympathy for the revolutionary cause in 
subsequent years. In part, this was because a majority of the free white settlers were 
government contractors, artisans who supplied the army, or former soldiers. Scots were
46 J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Florida in the American Revolution (Gainesville: The University Presses o f Florida, 
1975), 2-4, 6, 7 ,12 . Population estimates for East Florida vary. In a different essay, Wright provides a 
figure of 2000 slaves, who he states outnumbered the white population by a two to one ratio, Wright, 
“Blacks in British East Florida,” FHQ, Vol. 54, No. 4, April, 1976,427. Another estimate is that only one- 
third of the province’s 3000 inhabitants were slaves, Carole Watterson Troxler, “Refuge, Resistance, and 
Reward: The Southern Loyalists’ Claim on East Florida,” JSH, Vol. 55, No. 4, Nov. 1989, 566.
47 Edwin L. Williams, Jr., “Negro Slavery in Florida,” FHQ, Vol. 28, No. 2, Oct. 1949, 94, 96.
48 Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American Revolution (Jacksonville, FL: Guild Press, 1932), 3.
49 Wilfred B. Kerr, “The Stamp Act in the Floridas, 1765-1766,” MVHR, Vol. 21, No. 4, March 1935,463; 
Wright, Florida in the Revolution, 17, 18.
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numerous and in all of the colonies displayed a staunch loyalty to the crown throughout 
the Revolution. The province’s weakness relative to the Indians, and its vulnerability to a 
Spanish attack, also helped strengthen loyalism there. So too did the strong leadership of 
Governor Patrick Tonyn, a former army officer who arrived in 1774. Grant had left East 
Florida in 1771, and in the interim Lt. Gov. John Moultrie had administered the province. 
Tonyn had seen extensive military service in Europe and brought his military habits to his 
new post. Although his uncompromising attitude alienated some East Floridians, Tonyn 
scrupulously enforced parliamentary legislation in the province and tolerated no 
opposition. During the Tea Act controversy, Tonyn had matters so firmly under control 
that he informed British officials that all the tea destined for the southern colonies should 
have been sent to St. Augustine, where the duty would have been paid, and the tea could 
then have been shipped to the other American provinces without incident.50
When the war began, Tonyn, acting on Lord Dartmouth’s instructions, issued a 
proclamation offering loyalist refugees land grants exempt from quitrents for ten years 
and protection. Large numbers of loyalists, mostly from Georgia and the Carolinas, found 
the offer enticing, especially as Whig persecution increased. Small farmers constituted 
the majority of immigrants, although planters with their slaves, traders, and ministers 
came as well. The influx of loyalists insured that the province would remain firmly pro- 
British.51 After Parliament prohibited the rebel colonies from trading with the rest of the 
empire, the British West Indies, along with the army and navy, looked to East Florida to
50 Barrs, East Florida, 4; Wright, Florida in the Revolution, 15, 17, 19.
51 Wright, Florida in the Revolution, 22, 23.
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meet their demand for food and other goods, sparking rapid economic growth and making 
it relatively easy for most loyalist immigrants to support themselves.52
West Florida
West Florida extended westward from the Apalachicola River to the Mississippi, 
with its northern boundary, adjusted in 1764, set just above the thirty-second parallel. The 
British government appointed George Johnstone governor and established the provincial 
capital at Pensacola. Two former French settlements, at Mobile and Natchez, were the 
only other significant population centers. In the 1760s West Florida developed more 
slowly than its eastern counterpart. British merchants in West Florida quickly opened a 
highly profitable trade with Spanish Louisiana which continued until the early years of 
the Revolution. Growth accelerated in the 1770s as settlers became aware of the great 
fertility of the Mississippi Valley soil, although disease and the hot climate led to the 
deaths of many immigrants. The capital and the lands along the Mississippi were home to 
the majority of the province’s inhabitants, who numbered about 2,500 whites and 600 
slaves in 1774.53
The Stamp Act triggered protests from West Florida’s inhabitants, who were still 
struggling to establish themselves and did not need an additional financial burden. Many 
of them refused to accept their land grants in order to avoid paying the stamp duty. 
Determined to enforce the law, Governor Johnstone threatened to award the land to 
others if the tax was not paid. Angry settlers and Johnstone’s political opponents, who
52 Wright, Florida in the Revolution, 23-24.
53 Robin F. A. Fabel, The Economy o f British West Florida, 1 763-1783 (Tuscaloosa: University o f Alabama 
Press, 1988), 108-109; Margaret Fisher Dalrymple, ed. The Merchant o f  Manchac: The Letterbooks o f  John 
Fitzpatrick, 1768-1790 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 9; Wright, Florida in the 
Revolution, 2, 4, 9-10; Cecil Johnson, British West Florida, 1763-1783 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1943; reprint, [Hamden, CT]: Archon Books, 1971, 3, 149; C. N. Howard, “Some Economic Aspects 
o f British West Florida, 1763-1768,” JSH, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 1940, 203,205.
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saw the unrest as an opportunity to stir up animosity against the governor, subjected 
Johnstone to “a torrent of abuse.” Lt. Gov. Montfort Browne circulated a petition calling 
for Johnstone’s removal, but no organized groups arose to oppose the Stamp Act.54 Quiet 
returned to the province after the act’s repeal in 1766, and the inhabitants virtually 
ignored the Townshend Acts and other subsequent parliamentary legislation that 
produced strong resistance elsewhere in America.55
West Floridians elected their first Assembly in 1766, and Johnstone enjoyed good 
relations with the representatives, although he frequently quarreled with the military 
officers in the province over the proper limitations of the civil and military spheres.56 
The governor also had problems dealing with the Indians. The Mortar, a leader of the 
Upper Creeks, criticized the British for failing to prevent whites from settling on Indian 
land and accused the governor of fomenting war between his people and the Choctaws. 
Angered when the Creeks killed two whites, Johnstone advocated an attack on that nation 
with the help of the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokees. British officials, however, 
insisted that every effort be made to accommodate the Indians.57 Johnstone’s declining 
popularity in the province and his aggressive Indian policy led to his recall in 1767. Lt. 
Gov. Browne became acting governor until he too was recalled as the result of 
complaints. Elias Dumford then assumed the office of lieutenant governor until the 
arrival of Peter Chester in August 1770.58
54 Kerr, “The Stamp Act in the Floridas,” MVHR, Vol. 21, No. 4, March 1935,465-468; J. Barton Starr, 
Tories, Dons, and Rebels: The American Revolution in British West Florida (Gainesville: University 
Presses o f Florida, 1976), 37-40, 42.
55 Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 36.
56 Stan, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 11-12.
57 Stan, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 16-17.
58 Johnson, British West Florida, 60-62, 69-71, 76.
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Chester’s arrival coincided with an influx of settlers from the older colonies, who 
were attracted by the rich potential of the Mississippi Valley lands. The governor 
encouraged immigration with generous land grants. In dealing with the Assembly,
Chester strove to uphold the royal prerogative and his own authority as governor, which 
resulted in conflicts that ended when he dissolved the Assembly in 1772. The legislature 
did not convene again for six years.59
Chester took advantage of the disturbances in the provinces along the Atlantic 
coast to induce settlers to come to West Florida. He offered generous land grants to 
newcomers, as well as the right to cut timber on royal lands without charge provided it 
was shipped to the West Indies. Among the immigrants attracted by the governor’s 
generosity were members of the Company of Military Adventurers and their families. 
These Connecticut residents, over one hundred families numbering some seven hundred 
people altogether, began arriving in Pensacola in March 1774. Chester granted land to 
qualifying veterans of the Seven Year’s War and advised the rest to occupy land as 
squatters until royal approval arrived for their grants. The settlers were later joined by 
others fleeing New England because of their loyalist sentiments.60
In October 1774, the Continental Congress appealed to West Floridians to join the 
American resistance, sending a letter explaining its actions and criticizing British policy. 
The letter, addressed to Speaker of the Assembly Edmund Rush Wegg, accomplished
59 Johnson, British West Florida, 136, 138; Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 28.
60 Garland Taylor, “Colonial Settlement and Early Revolutionary Activity in West Florida up to 1779,” 
MVHR, Vol. 22, No. 3, Dec. 1935, 353-354; Robin F. A. Fabel, “Bom of War, Killed by War: The 
Company o f Military Adventurers in West Florida,” in Maarten Ultee, ed., Adapting to Conditions: War 
and Society in the Eighteenth Century (University: University o f Alabama Press, 1986), 109-111.
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nothing. Wegg was also the province’s attorney general, and he turned the letter over to 
Governor Chester, who in turn refused to make its contents public.61
Some West Floridians, however, did support the American rebels. The most 
notable, James Willing of the Natchez district, tried to win over other inhabitants, 
apparently with some success, but eventually left for Pennsylvania. Those with Whig 
sentiments, if  not already outnumbered by loyalist neighbors, were soon overwhelmed by 
the influx of loyalist refugees. At the outbreak of war, Chester issued a proclamation 
publicizing Dartmouth’s offer to grant land to loyal refugees; by April 1776 large 
numbers of loyalists were arriving in the province, most of them from South Carolina and 
Georgia. Virginians and Pennsylvanians also traveled to West Florida by boat down the 
Ohio River to the Mississippi. Between 1775 and 1781, the Council granted lands to
between 1,312 and 1,643 refugees, although these figures do not reflect the total number
62of refugees who came to the province.
The Native Peoples of the South
Five Indian nations occupied the lands south of the Ohio River and west of the 
line of white settlement, all of whom would play a role in the revolutionary struggle. 
Three of these nations, the Catawbas, Cherokees, and Creeks, lived adjacent to rebel 
colonies. American leaders would enlist the Catawbas in their service and work to keep 
the Cherokees and Creeks neutral. The Choctaws and Chickasaws, who lived farther 
west, were generally ignored by the rebels until late in the war. The British, on the other 
hand, while dismissing any possibility of winning Catawba support from the outset, made
61 Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 45-46.
62 Johnson, British West Florida, 144, 147; Wright, Florida in the Revolution, 20, 22; Starr, Tories, Dons, 
and Rebels, 48-49,230. Starr notes that even the figures for those granted lands cannot be exactly 
determined, since many grantees listed family members who may not have accompanied them to West 
Florida.
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great efforts to maintain the loyalty of the four larger nations. The Cherokees and Creeks, 
by their proximity to the rebellious southern colonies, were a potentially valuable asset to 
the royal cause. Though more distant, the Choctaws and Chickasaws could contribute to 
the defense of the Floridas and could possibly be employed against the frontiers of the 
rebel provinces as well. Altogether, the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws 
possessed a total of about 14,000 fighting men. This was a powerful resource for the 
British if  the crown’s Indian agents could unify the nations and coordinate their actions 
with those of regular troops and loyalists.
The Catawbas were the smallest of the southern tribes. Their towns, centered 
along the Catawba River, lay wholly within the boundaries of North and South Carolina. 
They had assisted the British and colonists during the imperial wars with France and 
Spain, which had enabled them to procure favorable trade terms and abundant presents 
from their allies. However, the expansion of white settlements in the Carolina interior 
eventually led to conflict and violent confrontations. By the mid-1750s, one Catawba 
leader recognized that “the White people were now seated all round them and by that 
means had them entirely in their power.” With the Catawba population plummeting 
below five hundred after a 1759 smallpox outbreak, the tribe realized that 
accommodation of the whites offered their only hope of survival. After being granted a 
reservation in 1763 at their own request, they subsisted by pursuing runaway slaves and
63 Jack M. Sosin, The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 
5.
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renting their land and selling handicrafts to the colonists.64 Their weakness had rendered 
them, in the words of one observer, “inoffensive, insignificant people.”65
The Cherokees, residing in what is now northwestern South Carolina, western 
North Carolina and Virginia, and eastern Tennessee, shared the longest border with the 
colonies of any southern Indian nation. They had been subjected to increasing pressure 
from expansionist whites in the years before the Revolution. In 1759 they had gone to 
war against the colonists, only to see their towns destroyed, which forced them to make 
peace in 1761.66 Afterwards, the Cherokees sought “stability in their relationship with 
whites,” which led their leaders to cede land in order to maintain peace. Some Cherokees, 
unwilling to accept the loss of land, challenged those who favored conciliatory policies. 
This internal conflict shattered Cherokee unity in March 1775, when settlers from North 
Carolina led by Richard Henderson purchased a vast tract of land west of the 
Appalachians for £10,000 ($1.3 million) in trade goods.67 The treaty, signed at Sycamore 
Shoals on the Watauga River, enraged Dragging Canoe, the son of Attakullakulla, who 
did not share his father’s willingness to accommodate the colonists. Dragging Canoe 
walked out of the negotiations, denounced the transaction, and pledged to resist with
/TO
force any further white encroachment on Cherokee territory.
At the start of the Revolution, the Cherokee population was estimated at between 
twelve and fourteen thousand, of whom some three thousand were capable of bearing
64 James H. Merrell, “The Indians’ New World: The Catawba Experience,” WMQ, Vol. 41, No. 4, Oct. 
1984, 541,544,554,555-559.
65 James H. Merrell, The Indians ’ New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact 
through the Era o f  Removal (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1989), 214.
66 Tom Hatley, The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Revolutionary Era (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 139-140.
67 Hatley, Dividing Paths, 217.
68 Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle fo r  Unity, 1745-1815 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 48; Hatley, Dividing Paths, 217-218.
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arms.69 British officials classified the Cherokees into “four divisions” according to the 
location of their towns. The Overhill Cherokees lived along the Little Tennessee and 
Tellico Rivers, the Valley and Middle divisions in the Blue Ridge Mountains, and the 
Lower Towns were situated along the border with South Carolina.70
The Creeks inhabited an area comprising western Georgia and much of present- 
day Alabama and Florida. Whites referred to those living along the Coosa, Tallapoosa, 
and Alabama Rivers as Upper Creeks, and designated others whose towns were located 
near the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers Lower Creeks. This distinction vastly 
oversimplified the divisions within the Creek nation, which was in fact a conglomeration 
of native peoples. “One might refer to the Creek ‘confederation,’ but it would be more 
meaningful to employ ‘confederation of confederations,”’ explained J. Leitch Wright,
Jr.71 These Indians did not consider themselves Creeks, the name given to them by 
whites, but instead “identified with their families and towns more than with any larger 
political organization.” Their primary loyalty was to their clan, which was determined by 
matrilineal descent, and their secondary loyalty was to their town.72 This made efforts by 
either the British or the American rebels to deal with the Creeks exceedingly difficult,
TXsince authority among the Creeks was so decentralized. When the Revolution broke out, 
Creek allegiances were often determined by ethnicity. “In general, pure Muskogees 
supported Britain, and those in the opposing moiety,” with the exception of the 
Seminoles, “looked to the United States and Spain.” The non-Muskogees, who had
69 Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown, 19.
70 Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native 
American Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 185.
71 J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Creeks and Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration o f  the Muscogulge 
People (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1986), 1, 3, 12.
72 Claudio Saunt, A New Order o f  Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation o f the Creek Indians, 
1733-1816 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 19, 22.
73 Saunt, New Order o f  Things, 32.
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inferior status in Creek society, may have seen an opportunity to challenge Muskogee 
dominance by supporting the opposite side in the conflict.74
Spanish influence among the Creeks further complicated British relations with 
these Indians. Some Lower Creeks “preserved a strong attachment to the Spanish” after 
the Seven Years’ War, and Spanish officials who hoped someday to regain the Floridas 
did their best to maintain communication with them. Spanish vessels occasionally visited 
the Florida coast to transport friendly Creeks to and from Havana, where the Indians were 
welcomed and given presents.
Creeks who inhabited East Florida, known as Seminoles, were developing an 
identity as a separate nation in the eighteenth century, although they remained at least 
nominally part of the Creek confederation during the revolutionary era. The leader of this 
Creek faction, Ahaya of Cuscowilla, known to the whites as Cowkeeper, lived in the area 
of present-day Gainesville. An ally of the British since 1740, Cowkeeper remained a 
staunch friend of Great Britain throughout the Revolution. Governor Tonyn, finding the 
Seminoles well-disposed to the British and realizing that East Floridians could ill afford 
hostilities with their Indian neighbors, worked to maintain good relations with 
Cowkeeper’s people.76
By the 1760s African-Americans had begun to establish a presence in Creek 
territory. Most were the slaves of whites involved in the Indian trade, who ignored laws 
forbidding traders to bring slaves into the Indian nations. The Creeks saw and often 
adopted the traders’ racial attitudes. A few Creeks even acquired slaves of their own.
74 Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 113-114.
75 Mark F. Boyd and Jose Navarro Latorre, “Spanish Interest in British Florida, and in the Progress of the 
American Revolution,” FHQ, Vol. 32, No. 2, Oct. 1953, 92-97.
76 Wright, Only Land they Knew, 145; Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 246-247, 249, 255.
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Other blacks among the Creeks were runaways who had been adopted into the nation. 
These people were often accorded a relatively low status among the Creeks, unless they 
married Indians or remained long enough to win full acceptance. For the most part, 
however, the Creeks cooperated with their white neighbors in maintaining the slave 
system. Under the terms of a 1763 treaty with Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
and Virginia, the Creeks received a bounty of £5 ($650) in goods for every runaway slave 
they returned. The colonists’ generosity arose from their desire to prevent interaction 
between slaves and Indians; in 1768 Georgia governor Wright noted the danger that 
might arise if Indians armed fugitive slaves to assist them in the event of war with the 
whites. To further promote this objective, a 1774 treaty between Georgia and the Creeks 
required the Indians to hand over any slave they found in their territory to white officials 
and increased the bounty to £50 ($6500) in goods for each slave the Creeks returned.77
The Choctaws, whose territory encompassed southern Mississippi and western
78Alabama, were also a divided people. After their emergence as a nation sometime in the 
seventeenth century, they remained split into the Western, Eastern, and Sixtowns groups. 
This structure “preserved ethnic, geographic, political, and cultural differences.” These 
differences contributed to a Choctaw civil war, fought from 1747 to 1750, and even in the 
1760s many Choctaws identified primarily with their ethnic group rather than with the 
larger Choctaw nation. Some went so far as to consider the other divisions of the tribe to 
be separate nations altogether. Each division maintained its own clan organization and
77 Saunt, New Order o f  Things, 51; Kathryn E. Holland Braund, “The Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery,” 
JSH, Vol. 57, No. 4, Nov. 1991, 608-609; Martha Condray Searcy, “The Introduction o f African Slavery 
into the Creek Indian Nation,” GHQ, Vol. 66, No. 1, Spring 1982, 22-23, 24.
78 Richard White, The Roots o f  Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the 
Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 1983), 4.
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political organization.79 Authority was divided among civil leaders, war leaders, and clan 
leaders.80
The Choctaws had been allies of the French until 1763 and during the Seven 
Years’ War had fought against the pro-British Chickasaws, against whom they had been 
frequently at war since the 1730s. After the cession of West Florida to Britain, they 
encountered difficulties in adjusting to the new relationship with the British. Although 
the British negotiated an end to the war with the Chickasaws, the British inability to 
supply the Choctaws with adequate trade goods in the 1760s and early 1770s complicated 
the relationship. When the British demanded a land cession from the Choctaws at the 
Mobile Congress of 1765, the Indians reluctantly complied in exchange for trade goods, 
but the transaction placed further strain on the Choctaw-British relationship.81
So too did the behavior of traders who flocked to the nation. Charles Stuart, the 
Choctaws’ agent, estimated in 1770 that rum comprised eighty percent of the sales that 
traders made to the nation. Governor Chester worried in 1771 that the “great abuses and 
impositions” of the “licentious” traders might provoke a war.83 The Choctaws also fought 
a war against their traditional enemies, the Creeks. British officials encouraged this 
conflict, which had begun with “a series of revenge killings” between the two nations. 
Trader James Colbert, at the behest of Governor Johnstone, “persuaded the Choctaws to 
reply to the last killing not with another murder but with numerous war parties.” The
19 Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830 (Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 
2002), xvi, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19.
80 White, Roots o f  Dependency, 40.
81 O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 27; White, Roots o f  Dependency, 65, 70, 72; Greg O’Brien, 
“Protecting Trade Through War: Choctaw Elites and British occupation o f the Floridas,” in Martin Daunton 
and Rick Halpem, eds., Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850 
(Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 149.
82 White, Roots o f  Dependency, 75.
83 O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 27, 83.
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Creeks responded in kind and the war escalated; by 1771 the death toll had reached an 
estimated three hundred people in each nation. The war continued until the outbreak of 
the Revolution.84
The Chickasaws inhabited what is now northern Mississippi and western 
Tennessee. In 1731 a French observer had estimated their population at three thousand, 
plus an additional 250-300 Natchez Indians who lived among them. Their numbers had 
dropped to approximately 1,600 by the end of the Seven Years’ War, but had increased to 
about 2,300, including 450 warriors, at the outbreak of the Revolution. Their performance 
in the many wars of the eighteenth century earned them a reputation as “the most warlike 
people on the Mississippi,” and many visitors to their country praised their courage and
• » • RSfighting spirit.
The Chickasaws had maintained the best relations with Great Britain of any 
southern nation during the years before 1763. Unlike their neighbors, the Chickasaws 
never accepted French domination and maintained a trading relationship with the British. 
Royal officials considered the Chickasaws as longtime allies; they failed to recognize that 
Chickasaw support for Britain had been a tactic to maintain independence from French 
control. Whatever the previous reasons for the Chickasaws’ pro-British stance, royal 
officials worked to cement the relationship after the French had been driven from North 
America. Both Johnstone and John Stuart used the Proclamation of 1763 to assuage 
Chickasaw fears that whites would encroach on their territory. The presence of Briton 
James Colbert, who had been living with the tribe since 1729 and was the father of six
84 White, Roots o f  Dependency, 77-78.
85 Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 213, 214, 216-217.
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sons by Chickasaw women, helped reinforce ties. Whites living among the Chickasaws
o z r
introduced slavery to the nation by the 1750s. Colbert alone owned 150 slaves.
Chickasaw-British relations were not wholly pacific, however. Indian leaders 
complained that traders took unfair advantage of them and that immigrants to West 
Florida passed without permission through Chickasaw territory, in some cases occupying 
Chickasaw lands. Stuart and Johnstone attempted to halt such practices, but lacked the 
means to end them completely.87
Relations between the Chickasaws and the other southern tribes were generally 
good after the end of the Seven Years’ War. The Chickasaws and Choctaws made a peace 
agreement which still held at the outbreak of the Revolution, thereby insuring that two of 
Britain’s tribal allies would have no obstacles to collaboration. Some Chickasaws who 
had moved eastward to the Tennessee River Valley did anger the Cherokees, who 
attempted to drive them out in 1769. After the Chickasaws “soundly defeated” the
on
Cherokee party, both nations coexisted without further conflict.
John Stuart and British Indian Policy
The British government’s policy toward Indians in the fifteen years before the 
Revolution greatly influenced how the southern nations responded to the conflict and also 
affected many colonists’ attitude toward Great Britain. Beginning in 1761, British 
officials began to develop “an imperial policy for the wilderness ... which was in sharp 
conflict with both the aspirations of landless frontiersmen and the vested interests of 
many business groups involved in land speculation.” The most important element of this
86 Arrell M. Gibson, The Chickasaws (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1971), 59-60, 62, 65, 124.
87 Gibson, The Chickasaws, 65-67.
88 Gibson, The Chickasaws, 63.
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policy, the Proclamation of 1763, prohibited colonial governors from granting lands or 
permitting settlement in areas where such expansion might encroach on Indian territory.89
Responsibility for managing British relations with all of the Indian nations south 
of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi lay with John Stuart, Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs for the Southern Department. Bom in Scotland, Stuart had emigrated to 
South Carolina where he secured appointments to various local offices and briefly served 
in the Provincial Assembly. Beginning in the late 1750s, Stuart developed a strong 
friendship with Cherokee leader Attakullakulla, who urged provincial authorities to 
appoint Stuart agent to the tribe after the Cherokee War ended in 1761. Stuart received 
the appointment in 1762 on the recommendation of South Carolina governor Thomas 
Boone.90 Stuart’s diplomatic skills and concern for the Indians’ welfare earned him “great 
prestige” among the southern Indian nations, although many colonists “detested him 
because he tried to maintain the Indian boundaries.”91
The tensions between Stuart and the colonists arose from differing views of “what 
form the greatly expanded British empire would take” in the aftermath of France’s 
expulsion from North America. While provincial land speculators, politicians, and Indian 
traders wished to be allowed to pursue their own interests in dealing with the Indians, 
Stuart and his superiors in London believed that “only centralized frontier government 
based on British-Indian alliances could ensure peace and prosperity.” To accomplish this,
89 I.R. Christie, Crisis o f  Empire: Great Britain and the American Colonies, 1754-1783 (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1966), 26.
90 John Richard Alden, John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier: A Study o f  Indian Relations, War, 
Trade, and Land Problems in the Southern Wilderness, 1754-1775 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1944), 159, 164-165; J. Russell Snapp, John Stuart and the Struggle fo r  Empire on the Southern 
Frontier (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 56-57.
91 Alden, John Stuart, 336.
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British leaders recognized that trade abuses and encroachment on Indian land, the major 
sources of conflict between whites and Indians, would have to be halted.92
Stuart “targeted whites, rather than Indians, as the chief threat to peace,” and 
promptly set out to establish “fair and stable trade relations” to end the economic 
exploitation of the southern nations.93 The Indians were particularly vulnerable to 
unscrupulous traders, since by the mid-eighteenth century they had become “almost 
completely dependent on trade for their livelihood.” Indians traded deerskins for cooking 
utensils, muskets, ammunition, rum, and other commodities brought into their nations by 
white traders, who increased their profits by inflating prices, falsifying weights and 
measures, and plying their Indian clients with rum to induce them to accept one-sided 
bargains.94 The superintendent urged the British government to take control of the Indian 
trade, license traders, restrict the sale of rum, and fix prices for trade goods to prevent 
abuses. Officials from the Indian department would enforce these regulations. With 
support from Indian leaders, the London government, Governors Wright and Johnstone, 
and General Thomas Gage, the commander-in-chief in North America, Stuart put most of 
his plan into effect beginning in 1766, despite opposition from many colonists. Stuart and 
his deputies found it impossible to halt all of the abuses in the Indian trade, but they 
managed to limit traders’ exploitation of the Indians.95
Stuart also succeeded in checking the colonists’ expansion into Indian land during 
the 1760s. The Proclamation of 1763 gave the superintendent the necessary authority to 
prevent settlers from encroaching on Indian territory and insured that officials in the
92 Snapp, John Stuart, 2-3.
93 Snapp, John Stuart, 57, 59.
94 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 7.
95 Snapp, John Stuart, 60-62, 69-71, 73, 78, 102.
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provinces would support him, whether or not they agreed with the terms of the 
proclamation. Settlers, however, soon chose to ignore the law, and by 1770 Virginians 
and North Carolinians had begun settling in the Watauga, Nolichucky, and Holston River 
valleys west of the Appalachians. This was Cherokee land, but the settlers disregarded 
both Cherokee protests and the orders of provincial governors. The squatters tried to 
legitimize their actions through the Sycamore Shoals treaty, which was repudiated by 
Stuart and Governor Josiah Martin of North Carolina.96
With the cooperation of Governor Wright, Georgians did manage to win the 
British government’s approval for their acquisition of a large tract of Indian land in the 
interior of that province. Claimed by both the Cherokees and Creeks, the former nation 
agreed in 1771to cede the land to the colonists as payment for debts owed to Indian 
traders. Since the Creeks insisted that the Cherokees had no authority to sell the territory, 
in 1773 colonial officials negotiated a separate agreement with Creek leaders on similar
• 07terms. Georgia thus acquired more than 1.6 million acres of land.
Stuart opposed the cession. He believed that using debt owed to traders as 
leverage to wrest land from the Indians undermined imperial authority. He informed 
Wright that many Creeks had repudiated their leaders’ decision to cede the land and that 
relations with that nation might become hostile. His prediction proved true when Creek 
parties attacked the Georgia frontier in December 1773, then ambushed a militia force 
sent to chastise them. In response, other Georgians encountered one party of Creeks and 
killed their leader, Big Elk, along with all of the men, women, and children in the Indian 
camp. Fearing a full-scale Indian war, Georgia’s leaders asked General Gage to send
96 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 12-13.
97 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 7; Cashin, “Sowing the Wind,” 240-241..
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troops and, in conjunction with the other southern provinces, imposed an embargo on 
trade with the Creeks. The embargo helped avert war and eventually brought the Creeks 
to accept the cession, although tensions remained high on the frontier.98
With the dispute between Britain and the colonies moving rapidly toward armed 
confrontation, the colonists’ actions continued to inflame the Indians and push them into 
the arms of the British. During the Creek crisis, an Indian leader who came to Augusta in 
March 1774 to discuss peace “treacherously slain” by a colonist named Thomas Fee. 
When Fee was arrested in South Carolina on Wright’s orders, a mob who applauded the 
murderer’s actions freed Fee from the jail at Ninety Six.99 Another Georgian, planter and 
prominent rebel Jonathan Bryan, deceived the Creeks into leasing him a vast quantity of 
land. Uncertain of what they had signed, the Creeks presented the document to Stuart and 
Wright in Savannah. Upon examination, Stuart found that seven or eight Indians had 
granted Bryan a 99-year lease to all their hunting grounds in East Florida. The Creeks 
“were much surprised and Offended at it, they severely reprimanded the Indians who had 
signed the Deed & who hapened to be present.” The signers replied that they thought they 
had only granted Bryan permission to build a house and keep a few cattle nearby on their 
land. “The Indians insisted that the Deed should be cancelled, and those who had signed 
tore away their Marks & Seals from it.” But when the Creeks left Savannah, Bryan 
“intercepted about 20 ... and having made them Drunk prevailed upon them to execute a 
new Deed.”100 David Taitt, Stuart’s agent to the Creeks, feared that Bryan’s actions “will 
certainly be the Cause of an Indian War.” He promised to meet with Creek leaders and
98 Snapp, John Stuart, 121, 139-140; Louise Frederick Hayes, Hero o f Hornet’s Nest: A Biography o f  
Elijah Clark, 1733 to 1799 (New York: Stratford House, 1946), 24-26; Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 8.
99 Cashin, “Sowing the Wind,” 241-242.
100 Stuart to Gage, Jan. 18, 1775, Thomas Gage Papers, American Series, Vol. 125, WLCL.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
60
convince them to oppose any land cession.101 Although Bryan continued his efforts to 
persuade the Creeks to uphold the agreement they had signed, Taitt assured Stuart that 
the Indians would ignore Bryan’s demands.102
Bryan’s clumsy attempt to defraud the Creeks and the murder of the Creek leader 
helped strengthen Stuart’s position with that nation at a time when it appeared the British 
government might call on the Indians for assistance against the rebels. By late December 
1774, General Gage warned Stuart that some Americans had been telling the Iroquois that 
the king had abandoned the Indians. “I mention it to you,” Gage wrote, “lest the like 
Methods should be attempted to debauch the Southern Nations.” Gage urged Stuart to 
“keep all the Indians firm in their Love and Attachment to the King and in a Temper to be
• * • 1OTalways ready to Act m his Service.”
This was Stuart’s intention, but he found his situation further complicated when 
Wright and Tonyn suddenly decided that the time was right to make their own attempt to 
acquire Indian land. In December 1774, Tonyn informed Stuart that the Creeks appeared 
willing to sell more of their land, and if so, he would “consider a Proper Time to fix for a 
Congress to Treat for it.”104 A month later Wright also wrote the superintendent, 
reporting that the Creeks were willing to cede land. The governor had bypassed Stuart 
and written directly to his deputy, David Taitt, with instructions “to see whether they [the 
Creeks] will offer or propose it as we think it will be a good Exchange.”105 Well aware 
that “the Indians can have no such powerfull motive of quarelling with us as our 
insatiable avidity for land,” Stuart took steps to check Tonyn’s and Wright’s “Inclination
101 David Taitt to Stuart, Dec. 17, 1774, Gage Papers, Vol. 125, WLCL.
102 Taitt to Stuart, Dec. 29,1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 125, WLCL.
103 Thomas Gage to John Stuart, Dec. 28, 1774, Gage Papers, Vol. 125, WLCL.
104 Extract o f Tonyn to Stuart, Dec. 18,1774, Gage Papers, Vol. 125, WLCL.
105 Extract o f Wright to Stuart, Jan. 12, 1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 125, WLCL. Emphasis in original.
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to be tampering with the Creeks for more Land.” He informed the East Florida governor 
that the Indian boundaries could not be changed without royal approval, and suggested 
that Tonyn’s energy would be better spent on improving relations with the Seminoles.106 
Stuart then procured Gage’s support to insist that Wright abandon his own plan to acquire 
Creek land.107
Stuart’s adept handling of Indian relations, and the colonists’ own behavior, 
insured that the southern Indian nations were well disposed toward Britain at the outbreak 
of the Revolution. Nevertheless, the superintendent would have to overcome some 
obstacles of his own creation to effectively employ Indians against the rebels if  and when 
that measure became necessary. First, if the British government intended to use slaves as 
well as Indians against the Whigs, they would have to overcome the effects of their own 
policy of sowing discord between the two races. Stuart had spent a decade trying to 
“prevent the Indian country [from] becoming an asylum for negroes”108 and had 
personally emphasized the importance of “breaking that Intercourse between the Negroes 
& Savages which might have been attended with very troublesome Consequences.”109 
This work might now have to be undone. Second, Stuart now found it necessary to bring 
the Creek-Choctaw war to an end, after he had already rebuffed overtures from both 
nations to help them negotiate peace. The war he had encouraged to protect the colonists 
from the Indians now became an obstacle to any effort to employ the Indians against the 
colonists.110 On October 24,1775, Stuart instructed his brother Henry to be ready to 
bring the Creeks and Choctaws to the negotiating table as soon as Gage approved the
106 Stuart to Gage, Jan. 18, 1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 125, WLCL.
107 Gage to Stuart, March 11, 1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 126, WLCL.
108 Saunt, New Order o f  Things, 51-53.
109 Braund, “Creek Indians, Blacks, and Slavery,” 613.
110 O ’Donnell, Southern Indians, 31-32.
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measure. However, it was not until October 1776 that John Stuart finally met with leaders 
from both nations and brought the war to an end.111
Even with all of the southern Indian nations committed to support the king, there 
were drawbacks to employing them against the rebels. Not only would the Indians prove 
less tractable than Stuart and officials in London hoped, but their method of waging war, 
which emphasized sporadic raids by small parties, was not compatible with the sustained 
type of military campaigns that the British planned to subdue the Whigs. Furthermore, 
when Indians went to war, it meant that they were unable to hunt and plant. Since they 
could not provide for their own subsistence, they naturally expected their white allies to 
provide the food and goods needed for their survival.112 The Indians’ dependence on 
agriculture also made them vulnerable to their enemies; “whenever whites destroyed 
Indian granaries and cut down their com the effect was devastating. Survivors fled to the
113woods, where they starved.”
When war between the British and American rebels broke out in April 1775, the 
ministry in London had not sent Stuart any orders to employ the Indians, but in response 
to the warning Gage had sent him in December, Stuart took precautions to “guard against 
any Attempt... to debauch the Indians” in his department. He promised to do his best to 
keep the southern Indians firmly attached to the king and ready to act when called 
upon.114 The Chickasaws and Choctaws, Stuart informed Gage, were all “in the most 
freindly Disposition towards us,” and the Cherokees and Creeks likewise adhered to the
111 John Stuart to Henry Stuart, Oct. 24,1775, in K. G. Davies, ed., Documents o f  the American Revolution, 
1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1976), 11:162-163; John Stuart to Lord 
George Germain, Oct. 26, 1776, DAR, 12:239-240.
112 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 11; Wright, Only Land They Knew, 174.
113 Wright, Only Land They Knew, 222.
114 “Indian Agents,” [1775], in Dartmouth Papers, Reel 3, DLAR. This document is not numbered but 
follows #1210B.
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British.115 Two months later, Stuart confirmed that the southern tribes were still well 
disposed, but warned that the Creeks and Cherokees lacked arms and ammunition, which 
he urgently wished to provide them “at this very critical conjuncture.”116
No matter how hard the Whigs might try to win over the southern Indians or at 
least keep them neutral, they could never overcome the advantages the British held at the 
start of the conflict. The British government already had an organization in place with 
agents and commissaries who often lived among the nations to which they were assigned, 
they were better able to supply the Indians with arms and trade goods, and most 
important, Stuart had consistently opposed the colonists’ attempts to illegally purchase or
117settle on Indian land. In 1775 “the primary pressure on the southern Indians was the 
colonial desire for land, a desire which seemed to the natives an insatiable lust.” Thus the 
southern Indian nations had good reason to involve themselves in the conflict, and 
naturally leaned toward the British, who “represented a source of protection” against the 
encroaching settlers.118 Furthermore, in the 1770s most of the Indian nations were in the 
midst of a cultural and spiritual revival that brought unprecedented unity and manifested 
itself in part in a movement to prevent further loss of territory to the colonists.119 To the 
Indians, the war was merely “a continuation of the struggle about Indian land and who
115 Stuart to Gage, March 27, 1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 127, WLCL.
116 Stuart to Gage, May 26,1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 129, WLCL.
117 Jack M. Sosin, “The Use o f Indians in the War o f the American Revolution: A Re-Assessment of 
Responsibility,” in Bruce A. Glasrud and Alan M. Smith, eds., Race Relations in British North America, 
1607-1783 (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1982), 284.
118 James H. O’Donnell, III, “The South on the Eve o f the Revolution: The Native Americans,” in W. 
Robert Higgins, ed., The Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1979), 71.
119 Dowd, Spirited Resistance, 46.
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was to get it.”120 The Creeks, Choctaws, Cherokees and Chickasaws were prepared, if 
necessary, to fight alongside the British to insure that they retained their land.
120 Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 19, 23. See also Sosin, Revolutionary Frontier, 87.
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CHAPTER n
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUPPORTERS 
REACT TO THE REVOLUTION
As royal authority collapsed in South Carolina and Georgia at the beginning of
1775, the Whigs moved rapidly to consolidate their control of both provinces. Rebel 
officials, with the aid of mobs, persecuted loyalists and enacted harsh measures to 
prevent slave insurrections. They adopted a milder approach to the Indians, attempting to 
win their support or at least to neutralize them through diplomacy and gifts.
The British government, unwilling to abandon the southern provinces, considered 
various means to regain control of them. The ministry sifted through numerous proposals 
and eventually decided to send troops to reestablish royal authority with the aid of 
loyalists. However, British forces arrived too late. The Whigs resorted to force and 
defeated the South Carolina loyalists, then repulsed the British expedition that attempted 
to capture Charleston. Shortly afterward, the Cherokees ignored the advice of British 
Indian agents, attacked the rebels, and suffered an overwhelming defeat. By the end of
1776, both the king’s supporters and his troops were beaten and demoralized, although 
East and West Florida still remained securely under British control.
Origins of the Southern Strategy
Responsibility for the planning and conduct of military operations against the 
American rebels lay with King George Ill’s ministers. Lord North, the chief minister, felt 
himself ill-suited to lead the British war effort. “Upon military matters I speak ignorantly,
65
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and therefore without effect,” he confessed to the king.1 Although he participated in 
planning operations during 1775, in subsequent years North would be only peripherally 
involved in determining the conduct of the American war. North’s failure to provide 
leadership left management of the military affairs in the hands of the Secretary of State 
for the American Department, Lord Dartmouth, and from November 1775, Lord George 
Germain. Although Germain’s contentious personality often made it difficult for him to 
cooperate with his fellow ministers, his consistent support for a tough American policy, 
skill in parliamentary debate, and abilities as an administrator and strategist convinced
•j
North and the king that Germain was well qualified to direct the war.
King George III shared Germain’s opinion that the government must take a firm 
stance on the American issue. “The colonies must either submit or triumph,” he asserted; 
“we must not retreat.” He enjoyed a good relationship with Germain, and while he left 
the details of managing the war to his ministers, he followed the situation closely, “often 
offering advice more sensible and realistic than that of his senior officers.”
Royal officials considered New England the center of the rebellion and focused 
their initial efforts on defeating the rebels there in the belief that once this had been 
accomplished, the other provinces would quickly submit to British authority. Yet at the 
same time, reports from the southern colonies indicated that loyalist sentiment in that 
region was strong. A steady stream of correspondence from America and from loyalist 
exiles in England described the great opportunities waiting to be reaped in the South
1 Quoted in Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes 
(New York: Avon Books, 1990), 18.
2 Alan Valentine, Lord North (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1967), Vol. 1, 383; Ian R. Christie, 
Wars and Revolutions: Britain, 1760-1815 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 114, 128; 
Gerald Saxon Brown, The American Secretary: The Colonial Policy o f  Lord George Germain, 1775-1778 
(Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1963), 26, 30.
3 Christopher Hibbert, George III: A Personal History (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 72, 76, 145, 150, 
153.
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should British troops be sent there to cooperate with the loyalists. This led the ministers 
to consider a variety of plans for regaining control of the southern provinces.4
Alexander hmes, Governor Campbell’s secretary, informed Dartmouth in May 
1775 that there were numerous loyalists in South Carolina, but warned that without 
military assistance they were rapidly losing hope. “[T]he King’s Friends in this Province 
(who are not a few if  they durst appear) are in the lowest state of despondency,” Innes 
wrote, “expecting every moment to be drove from their Occupations, and Homes, and 
plundered of all they have earned.”5 Less than a month later, Innes reported that many 
Charleston loyalists were signing the rebel Association from “dread of the terrible 
consequences both to their persons and properties that may follow a refusal,” which was 
to be expected since they had been left “without Leader, Countenance or Protection.’'’6
While some loyalists in Charleston succumbed to Whig intimidation, Governor 
Campbell found that the situation in the backcountry appeared more promising. “The 
intolerable tyranny and oppression” practiced by the rebels “has already given offence to 
the moderate of their own party and has stirred up such a spirit in the back part of this 
country, which is very populous, that I hope it will be attended with the best effects,” he 
informed Dartmouth in July. Campbell added that representatives from the Camden and 
Ninety Six districts had visited him, bringing news that loyalists in those areas numbered 
“some thousands.” The governor instructed these emissaries to tell the people “to
4 Ira D. Gruber, “Britain’s Southern Strategy,” in Higgins, ed., Revolutionary War in the South, 206-207.
5 Alexander Innes to Dartmouth, May 16, 1775, in B. D. Bargar, ed., “Charles Town Loyalism in 1775: The 
Secret Reports o f Alexander Innes,” SCHM, Vol. 63, No. 2, July 1962, 129.
6 Innes to Dartmouth, June 10, 1775, in Bargar, ed., “Charles Town Loyalism,” 132.
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persevere” and pledged that he would provide them “both protection and reward as soon 
as it is in my power.”7
Confined aboard a “poor solitary worm eaten Sloop” in Charleston harbor after 
the rebels forced him to flee his home, Campbell waited impatiently for Gage and 
Admiral Samuel Graves to answer his requests for military support. He complained to 
Dartmouth in August “of the ill consequences that has attended the total neglect of this 
Province,” asserting that South Carolina’s loyalists had become “so abandon’d to 
despair” that it was almost impossible for him to convince them that support from the
o
British government was coming. Yet the situation, Campbell noted, was not entirely 
hopeless. On August 19 militia Colonel Thomas Fletchall had written the governor that 
“a departure from the Laws and Principles of the Constitution of government is Not so 
universal as has been represented.” At a muster six days earlier, the members of 
Fletchall’s backcountry regiment had drawn up a “Memorial of Loyalty” and only two 
men had refused to sign it. Fletchall estimated that four thousand men in his district 
“would Appear in Arms for the King” if called upon.9 Loyalist leader Moses Kirkland, 
who had made his way to Charleston from the backcountry, also confirmed in mid- 
September that four thousand men could be recruited “for the service of government 
whenever a force appears on this coast.” According to Kirkland, these men needed only 
arms and “a few experienced officers” to effectively cooperate with British troops.10
From Georgia, Sir James Wright sent similar reports to Dartmouth. “There are 
still many friends to government here,” he wrote on June 9, “but they begin to think they
7 Campbell to Dartmouth, July 19 and 20, 1775, DAR, 11:50.
8 Campbell to Dartmouth, Aug. 19,1775, Dartmouth Papers #1446, Microfilm, DLAR.
9 Fletchall to Campbell, Aug. 19, 1775, Dartmouth Papers, # 1446, Microfilm, DLAR.
10 Campbell to Dartmouth, Sept. 19, \115,DAR, 11:118.
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are left to fall a sacrifice to the resentment of the people for want o f proper support and 
protection, and for their own safety and other prudential reasons are falling off and 
lessening every day.”11 Later that month, Wright told Campbell that “without any 
protection or support” from the army or navy, Georgia was “at last likely to be drawn in” 
to the rebellion.12 Yet Wright still considered most Georgians loyal, informing Dartmouth 
that although a majority of Georgians had signed the rebel Association, “great numbers
• 13 •have been intimidated to sign.” The governor’s implication was clear: most Georgians 
would return to their allegiance if they received assistance from the government.
A few dissenters challenged these reports. One writer stated that most Charleston 
residents were Whigs, and that “it is dangerous for the friends of government (who are 
very few in number) to speak or write their sentiments.”14 Another, allegedly a deserter 
from the British army, believed that royal authority could not be restored in South 
Carolina. The king’s troops “can do nothing in this country,” he asserted.15
Such accounts, buried amid a flood of letters from governors, lesser officials, and 
loyalist exiles testifying to the strength of southern loyalism, had no effect on the 
ministry. The weight of evidence convinced the ministers that if  the loyalists received 
support from a small military force, they could reestablish royal authority in the southern 
provinces. Campbell’s and Wright’s reports made an operation of this sort urgent, since 
loyalist morale appeared to be collapsing in the face of Whig persecution, and loyalism 
might wither beyond recovery if assistance did not come quickly.
11 Wright to Dartmouth, June 9,1775, DAR, 9:167.
12 Wright to Lord William Campbell, June 27, 1775, in Joseph W. Barnwell, ed., “Correspondence o f Hon. 
Arthur Middleton, Signer o f the Declaration o f Independence,” SCHGM, Vol. 26, No. 3, July 1926, 115.
13 Wright to Dartmouth, Aug. 7, 1775, DAR, 11:68.
14 “Extract o f a letter from Charles-Town, South Carolina, January 17, [1775]” in Margaret Wheeler 
Willard, ed., Letters on the American Revolution, 1774-1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1925), 57.
15 “Copy o f a letter received by a tradesman at York from his son,” Feb. 3, 1775, in Willard, ed., Letters on 
the Revolution, 61.
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Many people believed that an effort to regain control of South Carolina and 
Georgia would benefit from the support of Indians as well as loyalists. Several army 
officers urged the ministry to employ Indians to assist in crushing the rebellion. General 
Gage wrote Dartmouth in June 1775 suggesting that “we must not be tender of calling 
upon the Savages,” because the rebels were using New England Indians to aid in the 
siege of Boston. From Nova Scotia, General James Grant wrote that same month that “a 
few scalps taken by Indians ... would operate more upon the minds of these deluded 
distracted People than any other Loss they can sustain.”16 Patrick Tonyn, one of the most 
persistent advocates of using Indians against the rebels, asserted that “the Americans are
17a thousand times more in dread of the Savages than of any European troops.” Ironically, 
John Stuart “could see no advantage to using the Indians until it could be done in such a 
way as to damage the American cause materially,” and in 1775 he worked to keep the 
Indians at peace until they could be used in a manner he thought proper.18
While Dartmouth had been reluctant to order British agents to employ the Indians, 
his successor Germain recognized the potential value of the Indians, believing that in 
addition to their actual military contributions they would “strike terror” into the rebels.19 
Yet he, like Stuart, realized that the government would have to proceed cautiously in this 
regard. Germain wrote Tonyn praising the governor and Stuart for their successful efforts 
to keep the southern nations’ allegiance, while recommending restraint in employing 
Indians against the rebels. Germain pointed out that “the making those Savages Parties in 
the present unhappy Dispute, is a measure of a very delicate Nature, and perhaps ought
16 Valentine, Lord North, 1:375.
17 Cashin, “But Brothers, It Is Our Land,” in Hoffman, et al, eds., An Uncivil War, 250.
18 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 29-31.
19 Valentine, Lord George Germain, 185.
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not to be pressed forward, but in proportion as it may be necessary to counteract any 
Steps of the like Tendency, which may be taken by the Rebels.”
A major reason for Germain’s reluctance to authorize the use of Indians was his 
fear that the ministry’s opponents in Parliament, who sympathized with the American 
rebels, would take advantage of the issue to turn public opinion against the war.
Germain’s deputy, William Knox, warned that this might happen and was soon proved 
correct.21 In the House of Lords, opposition peers denounced the idea of using Indians 
against the rebels. Lord Shelburne described proposals to do so as “[bjarbarous” and
“cowardly,” while the Duke of Richmond assailed the notion of inciting “those assassins
00to stab your enemy in the back.” The opposition in the House of Commons also
O'Kvociferously criticized any plan to use Indians against the rebels.
If determining the role of Indians in the war was, as Germain put it, “very 
delicate,” the question of whether or not to seek aid from slaves was even more 
vexatious. From the beginning of the conflict, a surprising number of Britons advocated 
arming slaves and granting them freedom as a reward for their assistance. This idea, 
although horrifying to most Americans, seemed reasonable to many in Great Britain, 
where attitudes toward slavery had been gradually changing.
In the years before the Revolution, comments by Britons concerning American 
slaves demonstrated their inability “to recognize that in the colonies the revolutionary 
new division of men arising from racial slavery was not simply one of temporal
20 Germain to Tonyn, Dec. 23,1775, Germain Papers, Vol. 4, WLCL.
21 Leland J. Bellot, William Knox: The Life & Thought o f  an Eighteenth-Century Imperialist, (Austin: 
University o f  Texas Press, 1977), 153.
22 Lord Shelburne’s Speech, Nov. 10, 1775; Duke o f Richmond’s Speech, Nov. 10, 1775, in R. C. Simmons 
and P. D. G. Thomas, eds., Proceedings and Debates o f  the British Parliaments Respecting North America, 
1754-1783 Vols. 5 and 6 (White Plains, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1986-1987), 6:227, 234.
23 Frank O’Gorman, “The Parliamentary Opposition to the Government’s American Policy 1760-1782,” in 
Dickinson, ed., Britain and the American Revolution, 117.
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condition.” For example, the Bishop of London had referred to blacks as “truly a Part of 
our own Nation,” while the authors of a 1771 geography book recommended that slaves 
who behaved well should be freed and allowed to become planters, which would unite 
them to the whites by “bands of friendship, and by mutual good offices.”24 These ideas 
reflected the growing strength of the emancipation movement in Britain. By the 1760s 
many Britons had come to regard slavery as a moral wrong and thought that blacks 
laboring in the colonies should be treated as subjects rather than property. As the 
likelihood of war increased, some abolitionists saw an opportunity to weaken the 
rebellious Americans by striking a blow against slavery. “Proclame Freedom to their 
Negroes, then how long would they be a people?” Sir William Draper asked in 1774. 
“They would soon cry out for pardon, and render unto Caesar the things which are 
Caesar’s.”25
Others who advised the ministry to arm slaves did so simply because they 
believed it to be an expedient way to defeat the rebels. Some members of Parliament 
proposed to strike at the economy of the southern provinces by emancipating the slaves, 
but the House of Commons rejected the proposal.26 Opposition leader Edmund Burke 
argued that “declaring a general enfranchisement” of slaves would not have much effect. 
He suggested that to counter a British threat to emancipate the slaves, the Americans 
might act first to grant slaves their freedom and arm them to fight the king’s troops.27
The ministry’s supporters in Parliament rejected such arguments. On October 26, 
1775, William Lyttelton, a former governor of South Carolina, told the House of
24 Jordan, White Over Black, 208-209.
25 Christopher L. Brown, “Empire Without Slaves: British Concepts o f Emancipation in the Age o f the 
American Revolution,” WMQ, Vol. 56, No. 2, April 1999, 273-306, quotation, 304.
26 Sylvia R. Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), 54-55.
27 Burke’s Speech, March 22, 1775, Proceedings and Debates, 5:612.
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Commons that the southern colonies were the weak link in the rebel chain because of 
“the number of negroes in them” and suggested that “if a few regiments were sent there, 
the negroes would rise, and embrue their hands in the blood of their masters.” Lyttelton 
did not shrink from this violence, asserting “that the colonies ought to be conquered and
98then to have mercy shown them.” Most members of Parliament, however, sided with 
former West Florida governor George Johnstone, who pronounced the scheme “too black 
and horrid to be adopted.”29 Lyttelton’s motion to arm slaves failed by a vote of 278- 
108. Ralph Izard, a South Carolinian who was then in London, denounced Lyttelton for
• 7 1“encouraging the Negroes ... to drench themselves in the blood of their masters.”
British army officers had fewer qualms regarding the arming of slaves. Shortly 
before giving up his command, Gage endorsed the idea, telling Lord Barrington, the 
secretary for the army, in June 1775 that “things are now come to that Crisis, that we 
must avail ourselves of every resource, even to raise the Negros, in our cause.”32 General 
John Burgoyne advised King George that Indians should be employed in support of the 
army and that “arms should be provided for the Negro slaves to overawe the southern 
colonies.” Burgoyne even suggested that the northern Indians could be used to transport 
arms southward for the slaves.34
Various officers also assigned slaves a prominent part in several plans that they 
submitted to Germain for retaking the southern provinces. One suggestion, devised by
28 William Lyttelton’s Speech, Oct. 26, 1775, Proceedings and Debates, 6:96.
29 George Johnstone’s Speech, Oct. 26, 1775, Proceedings and Debates, 6:105.
30 Frey, Water from the Rock, 67.
31 Ralph Izard to “a friend in Bath,” Oct. 27,1775, in Anne Izard Deas, ed., Correspondence o f  Mr. Ralph 
h a rd  o f  South Carolina, from the Year 1774 to 1804; with a Short Memoir, Vol. 1 (New York: Charles S. 
Francis, 1844), 135.
32 Frey, Water from the Rock, 60.
33 John Brooke, King George III (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 178.
34 Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels, 57.
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Captain Dalrymple of the 20th Regiment, called for the creation of a corps o f 2,000 Irish 
Catholic volunteers, who would be dispatched to the Chesapeake to assist Virginia’s 
governor, Lord Dunmore. To this force, Dalrymple recommended, Dunmore “should add 
the bravest & most ingenious of the black Slaves whom He may find all over the Bay of 
Chesapeake.” Dalrymple described these blacks as “full of Intelligence, Fidelity & 
Courage as will be found upon Enquiry.” He believed that the combined black and 
Catholic force could raid along the shores of Chesapeake Bay or even capture 
Philadelphia if  the opportunity arose.
A variation of this plan recommended that the expedition to the southern colonies 
then preparing to sail under the command of General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, should be 
sent to Chesapeake Bay rather than the Carolinas. The troops could capture Baltimore, 
the writer asserted, and augment their numbers by adding five thousand indentured 
servants and convicts, along with “the Bravest and most Ingenious of the Black Slaves.” 
This force could destroy supplies and ironworks along the shores of the Bay, bribing 
other slaves to destroy facilities farther inland. After achieving its objectives in the 
Chesapeake, “the Army of Troops, Convicts, Blacks &c may carry the war into 
Pennsilvania,” and still be available “to Subdue the Carolinas in Winter.”36
Yet another proposal, from an officer who had served in the West Indies in earlier 
wars, asked Germain “to judge, of what Service a Regt of Stout Active Negro’s will be, 
Commanded by White Officers.” The writer did not envision this regiment as a combat 
unit; instead, its members would “Contribute to ease the Soldier, from many dutys both
35 “Project for Strengthening General Howe’s Operations in the North by a Diversion in the South, without 
taking o ff the Troops,” [1775], Germain Papers, Vol. 4, WLCL.
36 “Advantages o f  Lord Cornwallis’s Expedition going rather to Chesapeak Bay than to the Carolinas,” 
[1775?], Germain Papers, Vol. 4, WLCL.
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discouraging and prejudicial to the healths of those” needed to actually fight the rebels. 
Another benefit of such a unit, the writer noted, was that upon its going ashore in any of 
the southern colonies, “not a Slave in ten, but would desert to Such a Corps, a 
Circumstance I am well assured much more dreaded; & of more fatall Consequences to 
the Rebells then the loss of a Battle.” He added that many planters in the West Indies had 
“Expressed their Surprise ... that Government have made no application to the west India 
Collonies, for a Body of their Negros on this Occasion.” These planters, the writer noted, 
said that Jamaica alone could easily furnish one thousand slaves for such a regiment, and 
if the ministry approved the plan, the slave unit could be ready for action by April 1776.
The same writer sent a more detailed proposal to Lord North, listing the number 
of slaves each West Indies province could contribute to the proposed regiment, which 
was to consist of two battalions of seven hundred men each, with white commissioned 
and noncommissioned officers drawn from existing regiments. The black troops were to 
be armed and equipped in the same manner as other British soldiers, and “every Negro of 
the Sd Regt who Shall distinguish himself during the war, shall receive his Freedom, & if 
he is rendred Unfitt for Service a Small pension of £4 [$525] a year during Life.” The 
government would either reimburse the owners for the slaves provided to the army or 
replace them with “other Negros taken from .the Rebells.”38
As some of the writers indicated to the ministers, precedent existed for employing 
slaves to assist in military operations. British forces had made considerable use of slaves 
in the Caribbean during the Seven Years’ War, while free blacks performed militia duty
37 “Campbell” to Germain, Jan. 16,1776, Germain Papers, Vol. 4, WLCL. Frey identifies the writer o f this 
document and the one cited below as Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell, who later commanded the 
expedition to Georgia. Frey, Water from the Rock, 69.
38 “Campbell” to Lord North, n.d., enclosed in above.
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in the West Indies. In Jamaica, unclaimed runaway slaves labored in royal service to 
support army garrisons under the provisions of a 1757 law, carrying supplies, mounting 
artillery, and cleaning barracks. An officer in Dominica wrote that without the assistance 
of slaves he did not have enough troops to perform all of the duties at his post.
Thus, as these reports indicated, many West Indian planters were surprised that 
“the government did not ask them to supply slaves for military service in North America 
.... Some of the large planters in Jamaica were willing to provide a thousand slaves for 
military service on the mainland.” Their willingness to do so arose in part from their 
desire to help suppress the rebellion, as well as from their fears that the unstable 
conditions created by the Revolution increased their danger from both the rebels and their 
own slaves.40
Several other prominent Britons and loyalists, including writer Samuel Johnson 
and former South Carolina attorney general Sir Egerton Leigh, urged the use of slaves in 
some capacity, while some such as Thomas Day ridiculed the “American patriot, signing 
resolutions of independency with the one hand, and with the other brandishing a whip 
over his affrighted slaves.”41 The ministry, however, refused to go farther than the tacit 
permission that Dartmouth had given Lord Dunmore in July to use the black troops the 
latter had already raised.42
Domestic opposition to the arming of slaves contributed to the ministry’s 
hesitance in the matter. Several British “Gentlemen, Merchants, and Traders” petitioned
39 Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British 
Caribbean (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 45-46, 175.
40 O’Shaughnessy, Empire Divided, 149.
41 Hibbert, George III, 143-144; Egerton Leigh to Lord Gower, Jan. 15, 1775, in Jack P. Greene, “The 
Political Authorship of Sir Egerton Leigh,” SCHM, Vol. 75, No. 3, July 1974, 146-148; Wilson, Loyal 
Blacks, 2-3.
42 Dartmouth to the Earl o f  Dunmore, July 12, 1775, DAR, 11:45.
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King George III in October 1775 to express their horror at the idea of arming slaves, 
urging him to reject any such proposal.43 Memorials from London and Bristol protesting 
a policy of harsh coercion in America included denunciations of promoting “insurrections 
of negroes” as “improper,” while the Annual Register criticized proposals to arm slaves 
as undermining both the social system and property rights.44 A British traveler in 
America, having heard rumors that the ministry planned to arm slaves, predicted “that 
such action would put an end to all quarreling between American patriots and Tories, for 
‘in that case friends and foes alike will be all one.’”45 The Duke of Manchester declared 
that it would be difficult to bring the Americans to accept a peace agreement, after the 
government had enraged them by “giving orders to arm the Indian tribes against them; 
and encouraging the black slaves to rise and cut the throats of their masters.”46
As the duke had correctly observed, the question of whether to employ Indians 
and slaves against the rebels was linked to the larger issue of how the war was to be 
fought. Sharp divisions existed between those civil and military officials who advocated a 
harsh policy of subjugation and others who favored applying just enough force to bring 
the Americans to their senses in order to promote reconciliation.47 Realizing that if they 
“raised the Negroes or placed greater emphasis on the Indians ... the task of reconciliation 
would have been far harder.” Because a harmonious restoration of the imperial
• • • • 48relationship was their primary goal, the ministers seized upon an attractive option.
43 Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 112.
44 Frey, Water from the Rock, 69, 72-73.
45 Jordan, White Over Black, 114.
46 Duke o f Manchester’s Speech, May 22, 1776, Proceedings and Debates, 6:565.
47 Stephen Conway, “To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct o f the Revolutionary 
War,” WMQ, Vol. 43, No. 3, July 1986, 381-407.
48 Jeremy Black, War for America: The Fight fo r Independence 1775-1783 (Bridgend: Sutton Publishing 
Ltd., 1991), 37. See also Brooke, King George III, 178.
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Lord William Campbell had reported that the mere presence of so many slaves 
made South Carolina vulnerable. “I leave it to any person of common sense to conceive 
what defence they can make in a country where their slaves are five to one,” he wrote49 
Sir James Murray also noted that while a small military force “can make but little 
impression on the Continent of America,” it appeared likely that a minimal number of 
troops could “overawe the southern colonies on account of their Negroes.”50 The 
ministers decided that slaves could provide passive assistance by tying down a large 
percentage of rebel troops to guard against insurrection, easing the task of the king’s 
soldiers, yet avoiding the complications that arming slaves would create. Therefore 
“British military leaders and Crown officials seized upon the idea of intimidating 
independence-minded white southerners with the threat of a slave rising without, 
however, actually inciting one.”51
Lord North then set to work reassuring Parliament, the British public, and loyalist 
slaveowners that the ministry had not originated the idea of using slaves and Indians 
against the rebels. In the House of Commons on November 20,1775, he stated that “there 
never was any idea of raising or employing the negroes or the Indians, until the 
Americans themselves had first applied to them.”
The ministry’s failure to take full advantage of slave support proved an immense 
benefit to the rebels. Southern Whigs recognized that the large slave population in the 
region made them particularly vulnerable, but also understood that any British effort to
49 Quoted in Stephen Conway, “British Governments and the Conduct o f the American War,” in Dickinson, 
ed., Britain and the American Revolution, 160.
50 James Murray to Mrs. Smyth, Nov. 18, 1775, in Eric Robson, ed., Letters from America, 1773-1780. 
Being the Letters o f  a Scots Officer, Sir James Murray, to his Home during the War o f  American 
Independence (New York: Bames & Noble, 1950), 16-17.
51 Frey, Water from the Rock, 45.
52 Lord North’s Speech, Nov. 20, 1775, Proceedings and Debates, 6:281.
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arm the slaves would alienate many loyalists. While attending the Continental Congress 
in Philadelphia, Georgia delegates Archibald Bulloch and John Houstoun told John 
Adams “that if  1000 regular Troops should land in Georgia and their commander be 
provided with Arms and Cloaths enough, and proclaim Freedom to all the Negroes who 
would join his Camp, 20,000 Negroes would join it from the two Provinces in a 
fortnight.” In the Georgians’ opinion, only the fact that many loyalists owned slaves 
would prevent British officials from taking such a step. “They say,” Adams wrote, “their 
only Security is this, that all the Kings Friends and Tools of Government have large 
Plantations and Property in Negroes. So that the Slaves of the Tories would be lost as 
well as those of the Whiggs.”
Most Whigs did not share Bulloch’s and Houstoun’s confidence that the ministry 
would not arm slaves, so when rumors that such a policy had been adopted reached the 
southern provinces, an uproar ensued. Governor Wright reported in late May 1775 that an 
account “that administration have it in view ... to liberate the slaves and encourage them 
to attack their masters, have thrown the people in Carolina and this province into a 
ferment.” Although Wright considered the information “absurd and improbable,” he 
noted that it “had an exceeding bad effect and I am afraid will involve us all in the utmost 
distress.”54 The rumors received apparent confirmation when Whig Arthur Lee wrote 
from London to an acquaintance in South Carolina, declaring that “the ministry had in 
agitation not only bringing down the Indians on the inhabitants of this province but also 
to encourage an insurrection of their slaves.” The rebels circulated tales that Governor 
Campbell had brought 14,000 stand of arms for the slaves’ use. Campbell informed
53 John Adams, Diary and Autobiography o f  John Adams, L.H. Butterfield, ed., (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1961), Vol. 2, Diary, 1771-1781, Sept. 24, 1775, 182-183.
54 Wright to Dartmouth, May 25, 1775, DAR, 9:144.
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Dartmouth that it was impossible to describe “the flame that this occasioned amongst all 
ranks and degrees; the cruelty and savage barbarity of the scheme was the conversation of 
all companies and no one dared contradict” the reports.55
One of the infuriated Whigs, Thomas Lynch of South Carolina, wrote in horror 
that the British government “calls in Savages to ravage our frontiers -  to massacre our 
defenceless women -  and children -  offers every incitement to our Slaves to rebel -  and 
murder their masters.” These actions, Lynch said, strengthened the rebels’ will to fight, 
but had little other effect, as he saw only “our Indians keeping the peace, against all acts 
-  used to detach them from us, by lies -  calumnies -  and interest. Our Slaves remaining 
faithful -  against the promise -  even of liberty.”56
Henry Laurens, one of the most moderate rebels, declared that “the discoveries 
which have lately been made of a Settled plan to involve us in all the horrible Scenes of 
foreign & domestic Butcheries (not War) have not tended to lull us into Security -  While 
Men of War & Troops are to attack us in front the Indians are to make inroads on our 
backs -  Tories & Negro Slaves to rise in our Bowels.” Like Lynch, he observed that the 
news had made Whigs more determined to resist. If Britain intended “to manumit & Set 
free those Africans whom She Captivated, made Slaves, & Sold to us, the people are also 
ready to anticipate the pious work -  they are ready to fight against her Soldiers, against 
false Brethren, against Indians” rather than submit, Laurens declared.57
Thus the decision not to arm slaves deprived the ministry of one of its potentially 
most powerful weapons against the rebels, yet brought the government no advantage. The
55 Campbell to Dartmouth, Aug. 31, 1775, DAR, 11:94.
56 Thomas Lynch to Ralph Izard, Nov. 19, 1775, Correspondence o f  Izard, 1:154.
57 Henry Laurens to William Manning, Feb. 27, 1776, in David R. Chesnutt, ed., The Papers o f  Henry 
Laurens, Vols. 10-14 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1985-1994) 11:123-124.
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rumors that British officials planned to instigate slave rebellions did as much damage to 
the royal cause as the actual arming of slaves would have done, without the offsetting 
benefit of strengthening the army with black troops. The ministry preferred to rely 
primarily upon the loyalists, supplemented by Indian support when necessary, and would 
persevere in this policy throughout the war.
The Loyalists: Resistance and Defeat
With royal government no longer functioning in South Carolina, the Whigs 
moved quickly to consolidate power. Their Council of Safety, chosen by the rebel 
congress to act in an executive capacity to manage provincial affairs, had as its primary 
goal the suppression of loyalists. The council unleashed a campaign of persecution 
targeting virtually anyone who did not endorse the rebel position. Georgia’s Whigs, 
hampered by opposition from Governor Wright and the strong loyalist element in that 
province, moved more slowly. Prodded by their counterparts in South Carolina and eager 
to strengthen their own authority, rebels in Georgia eventually bludgeoned the loyalists 
there into submission. From the royal governors to small farmers, almost everyone in 
either province who supported the British or preferred to remain neutral suffered; 
“harassment was directed almost as vigorously at the least powerful of loyalists, the
CQ
wives and children,” as it was against men who opposed the Whigs.
The earliest indication of how far the Whigs in South Carolina were prepared to 
go to seize and punish loyalists came in April 1775, when some rebels considered 
capturing Governor Campbell as a hostage to exchange for loyalists they had identified as 
particularly dangerous. When the Whigs learned that Moses Kirkland, a prominent
58 Christopher Moore, The Loyalists: Revolution, Exile, Settlement (Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1994), 
110.
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backcountry loyalist, had reached safety aboard the British warship Tamar with 
Campbell’s help, rebel Arthur Middleton proposed “that the Gov. by whose Assistance he 
escaped, should be taken into Custody & offered in Exchange for K.” Cooler Whigs 
rejected the idea, but Middleton warned that it was possible the governor “may yet be 
nab’d, if  he does not take care of himself.”59
The Whigs continued to show restraint until the summer of 1775, when rumors 
that British officials planned to incite Indian attacks and slave insurrections provided a 
pretext for the rebels to raise troops and take action against Charleston’s loyalists. The 
Whigs then informed royal officials that they were “Hostages, & must Suffer whatever 
might be inflicted, on any of the Americans.” The newly raised rebel forces helped to 
intimidate loyalists and the wavering and checked the “dangerous Spirit of resistance, to 
the recently usurped authority.” Yet one loyalist observed that even these units “were not 
without Symptoms of discontent & Sedition.”60
In the Whigs’ opinion, the best way to deal with such discontent was to employ 
violence against anyone who refused to sign the Continental Association or otherwise 
challenged rebel authority. Several rebels forced their way into the bedroom of Doctor 
Alexander Garden, who was severely ill, to demand that the prominent Charleston 
physician and suspected loyalist sign the Association. Too sick to read the document, 
Garden signed with the stipulation that he would renounce it if  its contents were at
59 Arthur Middleton to William Henry Drayton, April 15, 1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 113.
60 Frances Reece Kepner, ed., “A British View o f the Siege o f Charleston, 1776,” JSH, Vol. 11, No. 1, Feb. 
1945, 95-96.
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variance with his allegiance to Great Britain. After recovering, Garden decided that he 
should probably not have signed it.61
Garden’s treatment was mild compared to the fate of others. On June 9, the rebels 
took Laughlin Martin and James Dealy, the former a man “of Some Credit in Town,” into 
custody. The “two impudent fellows ... had not only refused to Subscribe the Association 
but threatned vengeance against the whole Country by exciting an Insurrection.” An 
impromptu court sentenced the two men to be tarred and feathered, after which they were 
“put into a Cart & driven up & down the Broad Street -  instantly after that degrading 
punishment was over they were put on board a Vessel in order to be banished hence for 
ever.”62 The brutal punishment “did much to cow loyalists in the capital.”63
George Walker, the gunner at Fort Johnson, was another who made the mistake of 
holding political opinions contrary to those of the Whigs. On August 12, when a ship 
captain invited him to join in a toast of “damnation” to George III, Walker delivered a 
scathing reply.64 As punishment for this “insolent speech,” the rebel mob seized Walker, 
tarred and feathered him, and then carted him from one “Tory House,” to another.65 At 
each stop Walker was forced “to drink damnation” to the inhabitants.66 Loyalists visited 
by the mob and their prisoner included Alexander Innes, James Simpson, and William 
Wragg. At Fenwick Bull’s home, the crowd threw a sack of feathers onto Bull’s balcony 
and asked him to keep it until it was his turn to be tarred and feathered. Eventually the
61 Edmund Berkeley and Dorothy Smith Berkeley, Dr. Alexander Garden o f  Charles Town (Chapel Hill: 
University o f North Carolina Press, 1969), 263.
62 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, June 8, 1775, PHL, 10:167-168.
63 Keith Krawczynski, William Henry Drayton: South Carolina Revolutionary Patriot (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 141-142. The author gives Dealy’s first name as John.
64 Terry W. Lipscomb, The Carolina Lowcountry April 1775-June 1776, and the Battle o f  Fort Moultrie 
(Columbia: South Carolina Department o f Archives and History, 1994), 14.
65 Peter Timothy to William Henry Drayton, Aug. 13, 1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 129.
66 Arthur Middleton to Drayton, Aug. 12, 1775, “Correspondence o f  Middleton,” 126.
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f t lrebels released Walker at the home of another loyalist, Doctor George Milligen. Having 
twice refused to sign the Association, the doctor replaced Walker as the target of the 
crowd’s wrath. The throng surrounded Milligen “like so many hissing snakes,” so that he 
drew his sword to defend himself. He eventually reached safety inside his house, but left 
for England later that month. Reflecting the Whigs’ amusement at the loyalists’ distress, 
Arthur Middleton joked that while he knew of no “pressing necessity” for Milligen’s 
departure, it was probable that the doctor “had an unconquerable Dislike to the mode of 
Cloathing lately adopted,” a reference to the tarring and feathering of Walker. To prevent 
other loyal inhabitants from escaping to British vessels, the Council of Safety took steps 
to prevent the loyalists from using their boats to travel within the harbor.69
On August 2, another Whig mob confronted Thomas Brown, a recent immigrant 
from Yorkshire, at New Richmond in the backcountry. Brown’s refusal to sign the Whig 
association sparked a struggle in which Brown wounded one of his attackers, then held 
off others with his sword until he was struck in the head from behind by a musket. The 
Whigs then tied Brown to a tree, tarred his legs and applied burning wood to his feet, 
which caused him to lose two toes. They also partially scalped him and carted him 
through several settlements before leaving the battered loyalist in Augusta, Georgia. This
• 70brutality forced Brown to sign the Association, but he soon recanted.
Even members of the clergy were not exempt from Whig intimidation. “Our 
Committee has shut up all the ports the Courts & the Church,” Middleton wrote, “the last
67 Arthur Middleton to Drayton, Aug. 12,1775; Peter Timothy to Drayton, Aug. 13,1775,
“Correspondence o f Middleton,” 126,129.
68 Berkeley and Berkeley, Dr. Alexander Garden, 265-266.
69 Arthur Middleton to Drayton, Aug. 22, 1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 135.
70 Edward J. Cashin, The K ing’s Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern 
Frontier (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999), 27-29.
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for a Sermon preach’d in it by Mr. Smith which they did not like.”71 The Anglican rector 
of Prince George Parish in Georgetown, the Rev. James Stuart, was “violently assaulted 
by a Savage Mob” because of his loyalism. When he appealed to local officials, “the very 
Judge applauded the Brutality of the Banditti” who had attacked him, “and encouraged 
the Aggressors ... to insult him in their Court of Justice.”72
The various mob actions terrified most Charleston loyalists. “The people were in 
such a humour that I believe there was scarce a non-subscriber who did not tremble,” 
Whig printer Peter Timothy observed. Hoping to capitalize on the fearful atmosphere 
they had created, the Whigs decided to stage a public display of power to intimidate the 
wavering inhabitants of Charleston into signing the Association.
On July 22, the Council of Safety convened to hear the cases of twenty-four men, 
including several high-ranking provincial officials, who had refused to sign. The Whigs 
expected that their inquiry, backed by the implied threat of violence, would force many 
prominent loyalists to recant and others would follow their example. Those appearing 
before the committee included Chief Justice Thomas Knox Gordon, Attorney General 
James Simpson, four judges, and some lesser officials. However, only three of the men 
signed the Association. The majority instead shared the views of judge William Gregory, 
who declared himself “ever a faithfull Subject & He has taken two Oaths of Allegiance 
[to the king] and will never break them.” Simpson was the most vocal in denouncing the 
rebel Association, insisting he could not “subscribe it without Perjury and Perfidy.”74
71 Arthur Middleton to Drayton, Aug. 4, 1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 122.
72 Henry D. Bull, ed., “A Note on James Stuart, Loyalist Clergyman in South Carolina,” JSH, Vol. 12, No. 
4, Nov. 1946, 573.
73 Peter Timothy to Drayton, Aug. 13, 1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 129.
74 “Loyalists reasons for refusing to unite with the Whigs,” South Carolina Box -  Loyalists, NYPL. 
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Disappointed with the unexpectedly poor results of their proceedings, after a few 
days of deliberation the Whig committee decided that the reasons the loyalists had given 
for refusing to cooperate in the rebels’ measures were unsatisfactory. The nonsubscribers 
were ordered to surrender their weapons, barred from leaving Charleston, and forbidden 
to interact with Whigs.75
The committee made an exception for William Wragg, confining him to his 
plantation outside of town, from whence he wrote Henry Laurens to explain his refusal to 
take the rebel oath and protest the injustice of the Whigs’ proceedings. “Can Liberty be 
worth contending for or ever preserved, when the first principles, & the essential 
foundations of it are violated?” Wragg asked. “I have seen Sentence; & am still at a Loss 
to know my Offence.” Wragg added that he would remain on his plantation as the 
Council of Safety had ordered, but he chided Laurens and the Whigs for their fears of 
“the formidable power of twenty Gentlemen, whose Age, Disposition, & the Education of
7 f \most of them” hardly qualified them as dangerous conspirators. Laurens agreed that the 
Whigs had been too harsh in their treatment of loyalists and urged his colleagues to act 
with moderation in hopes that kind treatment might induce most to change their views. 
“Our Cause is good, it does not Stand in need, like Mahomet’s Religion, of Sword & Fire 
to bring Men into it,” Laurens wrote.77
In fact, the rebel leaders themselves recognized that they had not succeeded in 
eradicating loyalism in Charleston. Despite a summer of vigorous persecution, the
stated in a letter to William Henry Drayton dated August 12, 1775, that the investigation o f the “non­
subscribers” will take place on August 14, which apparently refers to a separate proceeding, 
“Correspondence o f  Middleton,” 126.
75 John Drayton, Memoirs o f  the American Revolution as Relating to the State o f  South Carolina 2 Vols. 
(Charleston: A. E. Miller, 1821; reprint, New York: New York Times, 1969). 1:315-317.
76 William Wragg to Henry Laurens, Sept. 5, 1775, PHL, 10:369-370.
77 Henry Laurens to Jonas Baird, Aug. 16, 1776, PHL, 11:247.
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Council of Safety worried in late September that “there are more [loyalists] within this 
Metropolis than without it in proportion to numbers.”78
The loyalists outside the town also had to be dealt with. Recognizing that it would 
be more difficult to impose their will on the inhabitants of the vast backcountry region 
than it was in Charleston, Whig leaders first opted for an attempt at persuading loyalists 
to join them. In April the Committee of Intelligence composed the first of four letters it 
circulated throughout South Carolina in the spring and summer of 1775. These letters 
denounced Britain’s American policy, warned that the British planned to use force to 
snuff out American liberty, and urged unified resistance against such measures. While it 
is impossible to determine the effect of the letters, Governor Campbell believed that they 
did hurt the royal cause.79
Campbell, who maintained a clandestine correspondence with backcountry 
loyalists with the assistance of Charleston merchant Andrew Mackenzie, felt frustrated at 
his inability to aid the king’s supporters. The governor could do little other than to 
inform Thomas Fletchall, the acknowledged leader of the backcountry loyalists, that he 
“was without power to protect, or assist you.” Campbell could only reassure Fletchall and 
his followers that the government would eventually take steps to aid them. Meanwhile, he 
advised Fletchall to keep the peace, cultivate loyalism among the people, and “by every
means avoid giving offence, or doing the smallest injury to any of your Fellow Subjects,
81and rest satisfied at present.”
78 Council o f Safety to Stephen Bull, Sept. 23, 1775, PHL, 10:418-419.
79 Krawczynski, Drayton, 127-129.
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The Whigs believed that if they could convert Fletchall to their cause, it might 
defuse the impending crisis in the backcountry. On July 14 Henry Laurens wrote to the 
loyalist leader, reviewing the rebels’ reasons for resisting British authority and appealing 
for Fletchall’s support on the basis of racial solidarity. With the province “alarmed by 
threats of Invasions by the British Soldiery, of instigated Insurrections by our Negroes, of 
inroads by the Neighbouring Tribes of Indians & of what is far more to be dreaded the 
practices & insidious acts of false Brethren,” it was urgent that everyone stand together 
for mutual protection, Laurens stated. He gave Fletchall an opportunity to dissociate 
himself from other loyalist leaders, stating that he had heard accounts that Fletchall was 
friendly to the Whigs “but that you were deterred, partly by the malevolent artifices of 
Ministerial Hirelings” and by a fear of losing his militia commission. Laurens thus left 
open a door by which Fletchall could restore himself to the rebels’ good graces.82
Fletchall replied on July 24, assuring the Council of Safety that while “many 
reports have been maliciously asserted against me,” he could prove they were false.
There was little of comfort in the remainder of his letter, however. Fletchall readily 
admitted that not a man in the militia regiments between the Savannah and Broad Rivers 
had signed the Whig Association, but that many had instead signed a loyal resolution 
circulated by Joseph Robinson. Insisting that he had not compelled anyone to sign either 
document, Fletchall stated while that he did not concur with the Whigs’ views, he was 
not “an enemy to my country.” For the time being, he declared, “I am resolved, and do 
utterly refuse to take up arms against my king, until I find it my duty to do otherwise.”
82 Henry Laurens to Thomas Fletchall, July 14, 1775, PHL, 10:214-217.
83 Thomas Fletchall to Council o f Safety, July 24, 1775, in Robert W. Gibbes, ed., Documentary History o f  
the American Revolution, Consisting o f  Letters and Papers relating to the Contest fo r  Liberty Chiefly in 
South Carolina, From Originals in the Possession o f  Gen. Francis Marion, by Gen. Peter Horry, o f
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Like Robinson, other loyalists challenged the rebels by circulating resolutions 
declaring their allegiance to the king. People living along the Pacolet River composed a 
statement expressing their “utmost abhorrence and detestation” of “the dareing 
proceedings o f those infatuated people, who call themelvs committee men, or Liberty 
boys.” To counter such actions, the loyalists promised to “embody at the shortest notice, 
to support the rights of the crown, as soon as called by any Legal Authority.”84
The loyalists soon got the opportunity to act upon their pledge. While the Council 
of Safety sparred with Fletchall, they took more forceful steps to gain control of the 
backcountry by dispatching Major James Mayson with a company of rangers to seize 
Fort Charlotte on the Savannah River. The outnumbered militia garrison surrendered to 
the rebels without resistance on July 12. Mayson took the two pieces of artillery and other 
captured supplies to Ninety Six, leaving a few men to hold the fort. When the loyalists 
learned of Mayson’s action, Robert and Patrick Cunningham and Joseph Robinson 
assembled about two hundred men who marched to Ninety Six on July 17, forced 
Mayson to surrender, carried off all the supplies taken from the fort except the two 
cannon, and then released their prisoners.85
The loyalists’ success against Mayson convinced rebel Colonel William Thomson 
that vigorous measures were needed if  the Whigs were to gain control of the backcountry. 
Thomson informed the Council of Safety that Fletchall, Robert Cunningham, and 
Robinson had deceived the backcountry settlers into opposing the Whigs. If the three
M arion’s Brigade: Together with Others from the Collection o f  the Editor, 3 Vols. (New York: D. 
Appleton & Co. 1853-1857), 1:123-124.
84 Resolution o f the Loyalists on Pacolet River, South Carolina, [1775], in Alexander Chesney, The Journal 
o f  Alexander Chesney, a South Carolina Loyalist in the Revolution and After, E. Alfred Jones, ed., Ohio 
State University Bulletin, Vol. 26, No. 4, Oct. 30,1921, 144-145.
85 Marvin L. Cann, “Prelude to War: The First Battle o f Ninety Six, November 19-21, 1775,” SCHM, Vol. 
76, No. 4, Oct. 1975, 198.
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were Indians, Thomson wrote, he would consider himself justified to “Send the Councill 
o f Safety their Scalps.” However, Thomson believed that “the poor People by them 
deluded I think may yet be Brought Over by fair Means.” He recommended that the 
Reverend William Tennent be sent to persuade them, “as they are Chiefly of his Religion,
o /
I think he would undeceive and Open the Eyes of many of them.”
The Council decided to follow Thomson’s advice and act against the loyalist 
leaders while seeking to persuade the backcountry people to join the Whigs. The council 
ordered an inquiry “into the Conduct of Mr. Kirkland,” which was purported to have “a 
very dark and suspicious aspect.” Council member Arthur Middleton wanted Kirkland to 
receive “such punishment as his Crimes deserve; as the matter has been represented he
87has certainly been guilty both of Mutiny & Desertion.” A week later the council 
received the evidence it desired in the form of an affidavit allegedly proving Kirkland to
I
be “a rebellious, seditious xxxx,” and questioning the allegiance of Indian trader Richard 
Pearis.88 In addition, the council dispatched Tennent, the Rev. Oliver Hart, and William 
Henry Drayton to the backcountry “to cure this Evil.” Henry Laurens hoped that “by 
proper applications all those people may be brought at least to promise absolute neutrality 
& many of them to join us.”89 To strengthen the hand of its emissaries, the council 
ordered Thomson to send rebel militia units on a sweep through the province. The 
council authorized its emissaries to call for assistance from the militia if  they found it
90necessary.
86 William Thomson to Council o f  Safety, July 22, 1775, PHL, 10:241-242.
87 Arthur Middleton to Drayton, Aug. 4, 1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 122-123.
88 Arthur Middleton to Drayton, Aug. 12, 1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 126.
89 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, July 30, 1775, PHL, 10:257-258.
90 William Moultrie, Memoirs o f  the American Revolution, So Far As It Related to the States o f  North and 
South-Carolina, and Georgia 2 Vols. (New York: David Longworth, 1802), 1:82-83; Krawczynski, 
Drayton, 160.
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Drayton and Tennent set out together on August 2.91 Their first report to the 
Council o f Safety, written five days later, contained little good news. At Congaree Store, 
in the midst of settlements of German immigrants, the Whigs summoned the people to a 
meeting. “To our great mortification not one German appeared but one or two of our 
friends,” Drayton and Tennent wrote. The people in the area were said to believe that if 
they took up arms against the king, they would lose their land. Conceding that their hopes 
of success were “but small in this quarter,” they added that they had resorted to threats in 
order to force some of the Germans to listen to them. They asked Colonel Thomson to 
order a muster, “& we have declared if  the Officers disobey, they shall be broke.”92
In response to Thomson’s threats, many people attended the August 9 meeting, 
although Tennent noted that a large number “had come a great way to oppose” the
QTWhigs. The rebel emissaries harangued them, however, until all but fifteen men agreed 
to sign the Association. But Drayton and Tennent’s subsequent efforts were less 
successful. At an August 11 meeting on the Saluda River they convinced only one person 
to subscribe, while the next day not even one out of one hundred people whom Drayton 
addressed at Evan McLaurin’s home would sign.94 Nevertheless, Drayton informed the 
Council of Safety that he believed that if these people were allowed to elect 
representatives to the provincial congress, they would recognize its authority. However, 
he also warned that unless Moses Kirkland was prevented from returning to the
91 Krawczynski, Drayton, 163.
92 William Henry Drayton and William Tennent to Council o f  Safety, Aug. 7, 1775, PHL, 10:278-279.
93 William Tennent, “Fragment o f a Journal kept by the Rev. William Tennent Describing his Journey, in 
1775, to Upper South Carolina at the request of the Council o f Safety, To induce the Tories to sign an 
Association to support the cause o f  the Colonists,” City Year Book o f  Charleston, 1894, 297-298.
94 Tennent, “Fragment o f a Journal,” 297-298; Krawczynski, Drayton, 169-170.
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backcountry, “our progress will have been in vain.”95 In reply, the council authorized 
Drayton to “spare no expence to secure & have him brought” to Charleston.96
Meanwhile Hart had traveled to the forks between the Broad and Saluda Rivers 
after conferring with Drayton and Tennent on August 7. There he gave a sermon on the 
political situation, which his audience “heard with Attention.” He later learned that “one 
opposer was convinced and sharply reproved one who quarreled with the Sermon.”97 This 
small victory marked the limits of Hart’s success. The next day Hart stayed at the home 
of the Reverend Philip Mulkey, and was disappointed to learn that his host “rather sides 
with ministerial Measures.” Hart probed others for their sentiments, finding to his chagrin 
that “People, in general, are certainly (as they say) for the King; ie, for the Minister, & 
his Measures; one Man, with whom we conversed, fairly trembled through Madness.” On 
August 11 Hart discussed affairs with more of Mulkey’s neighbors and “found them so 
fixd on the Side of the Ministry, that no Argument on the contrary Side, seemed to have 
any Weight with them.” That evening Hart preached to between twenty and thirty people 
with no better result. One loyalist said that he “wishd 1000 Bostonians might be killed in 
Battle .... On the Whole they appear to be obstinate and irritated to an Extreme.” After the 
sermon, Hart spoke with Fletchall, who said that while he did not wish to fight his 
countrymen, he nonetheless disapproved of the Whigs’ measures “and complain’d of 
sundry Threats which He says are given out against Himself, and the Inhabitants of the 
Frontiers.” Several people who listened to the discussion “seem’d almost universally, by 
Words & Actions to applaud every Thing” that Fletchall said. Hart concluded that “there
95 William Henry Drayton to Council o f Safety, Aug. 9, 1775, PHL, 10:286-287.
96 Council o f Safety to William Henry Drayton, Aug. 13, 1775, PHL, 10:297.
97 Oliver Hart, “Diary o f Oliver Hart written during his Journey to the Back-Country, 31 July -  6 
September 1775,” SCL.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
93
appears but little Reason, as yet, to hope that these People will be brought to have a
QO
suitable Regard to ye Interests of America.”
Hart spent a few more days in the area, but made no progress. On August 13 he 
noted that “there is the greatest Appearance of a civil War” unless God intervened to 
prevent it. The next day he attended a meeting where Joseph Robinson “Read a 
ministerial Piece” that Hart thought was “well calculated to fix the Minds of all 
disaffected Persons. With Sorrow I saw Marks o f Approbation set almost on every 
Countenance.” At that point, Hart evidently began to fear that the loyalists might seize 
him or his papers; he began writing his diary entries in code and did not stop doing so 
until September 5, when he was on his way home from his unsuccessful mission."
Tennent, who had joined Hart, was also frustrated. “The Pamphlet sent up by the 
Governor has done much damage here. It is at present their Gospel,” he wrote in 
reference to the “ministerial Piece” that Hart had denounced. “It seems as though nothing 
could be done here.”100 Like Hart, Tennent feared that the loyalists in the area were so 
strong “that they are nearly ripe to shew themselves and make no Scruple to threaten the 
whole province with Devastation in a short time.” Tennent had also heard rumors that 
three thousand Cherokee warriors were to join them, and that British troops would also 
arrive soon. “In short,” the frustrated minister wrote, the loyalists “are preparing a great 
Dish of Blood for you and expect... to bear down all before them.” The situation had “all 
the Appearance of an hellish Plott,” Tennent declared.101
98 Hart, “Diary,” SCL.
99 Hart, “Diary,” SCL. Hart calls Robinson “Major Robertson.”
100 Tennent, “Fragment o f a Journal,” 299.
101 William Tennent to Henry Laurens, Aug. 20, 1775, PHL, 10:337-339.
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Drayton’s arrival spurred a new effort to convert Fletchall, although the latter, 
abetted by Robinson and Thomas Brown, remained obstinate. Unwilling to give up, 
Drayton and Tennent focused their efforts on the weak-willed colonel at an August 23 
meeting from which Brown, Robinson, and other loyalist leaders were absent. The two 
Whigs convinced Fletchall to muster his regiment and allow Drayton and Tennent to 
address the men. When Brown later learned what Fletchall had done, he tried to dissuade 
the colonel and nearly came to blows with Drayton in the process. Fletchall refused to 
change his mind, however, and the meeting went ahead as scheduled the next day.102 
The event fell far short of the Whigs’ expectations. Only 270 of about 1,500 men in 
Fletchall’s regiment attended, the rest having taken the advice of their officers and 
remained at home. Drayton’s harangue provoked a swift challenge from Moses Kirkland, 
and their confrontation nearly provoked “a terrible riot.” Fletchall and others had to 
intervene to prevent Kirkland from striking Drayton. After calm had been restored, 
Tennent spoke, after which Brown made a rebuttal. At the close of the meeting, about 
seventy men signed the Association, most of whom had already signed it at other 
meetings. Drayton and Tennent then turned their attention to other regions, but failed to 
make significant inroads among the loyalists.103 Members of the Council of Safety were 
not surprised at the poor results. “As I expected you have not hitherto made many 
Proselytes, & I am sory to prophecy that you will not meet with much more success,” 
Middleton wrote Drayton on August 22.104
Thomas Brown reported the failure of the Whig emissaries to Governor Campbell 
on October 18. “Every Artifice Fraud & Misrepresentation were practiced to impose
102 Krawczynski, Drayton, 175-176.
103 Tennent, “Fragment o f a Journal,” 301-302; Krawczynski, Drayton, 179-180.
104 Arthur Middleton to Drayton, Aug. 22,1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 134.
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upon the People,” Brown wrote, but the loyalist leaders had prepared the people for 
“these Incendiaries,” so that Drayton and his colleagues won few converts.105 Campbell 
accurately summed up the outcome of the Whigs’ mission in a report to the ministry. 
Having been sent “to poison the Minds of these People,” they “succeeded so badly, that 
they have been under a Necessity... to effect by Force what they could not accomplish by 
Threats, Bribes, or Persuasion.”106
Drayton had in fact concluded that since persuasion had not had much effect, 
stronger measures were needed to sway the loyalists. On August 21 he advised the 
Council of Safety to apply economic pressure against its opponents. If the loyalists were 
“debarred all communication with Charles Town & all trade with the Country Stores,
1 0  *7they will be much chagrined,” he stated. The council adopted this recommendation, 
which created consternation among the loyalists. Moses Kirkland reported that 
“Thousands of poor People” were “much distressed” because they were “not allowed the 
Liberty to pass over any Ferry, nor deal in any Store, nor have their Com ground at any 
Mill; they are not allowed to purchase Salt to eat with their Provisions, their Estates are 
threatned to be taken from them.” If this were not enough to make them sign the rebel 
association, Kirkland said, behind these measures lay the further threat that “their Lives 
next are to be taken by Sword.” Kirkland’s own life was endangered: the Whigs had 
offered a reward for his execution or capture, his plantation had been plundered, and he 
had been forced to employ “Life Guards, to escort me from place to place.” He decided to
105 Thomas Brown to Lord William Campbell, Oct. 18, 1775, in James H. O ’Donnell, ed., “A Loyalist 
View o f the Drayton-Tennent-Hart Mission to the Upcountry,” SCHM, Vol. 67, No. 1, Jan. 1966, 17-18.
106 Campbell to Dartmouth, Aug. 31, 1775, abstract, Dartmouth Papers, #1467, Reel 13, DLAR.
107 William Henry Drayton to Council o f Safety, Aug. 21, 1775, PHL, 10:344-345.
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leave the province and sail to Boston, where he hoped to convince Gage to send troops to 
aid the loyalists.108
Kirkland’s assessment of Whig intentions was correct; Drayton was already 
planning to use force against the loyalists. Responding to the Council o f Safety’s fear that 
Kirkland’s arrest might provoke an uprising, Drayton said that would not be the case if 
the other loyalist leaders were taken at the same time. Noting that when Thomson’s 
militia had marched through loyalist areas, “the King’s men ... were terrified,” Drayton 
intended “to march into the heart of Fletchall’s quarters with about 800 men and 6 pieces 
of cannon,” expecting the show of force to be enough to overcome the loyalists without 
bloodshed.109 Thomson announced his readiness to give Drayton “all the Military aid in 
my power, whenever he shall think proper to demand it.”110
Seeking a pretext to use force against the loyalists, Drayton found it when he 
learned in late August that Kirkland and his followers were “actually in Arms to attack 
Augusta & Fort Charlotte.” As soon as he had confirmation that Kirkland’s troops were 
moving, Drayton told the Council of Safety that he would consider himself “fully 
authorized ... to proceed to every extremity that may have a tendency to suppress those 
Men who oppose the authority of Congress.”111 Drayton then gathered militia from 
Thomson’s and Andrew Williamson’s regiments at a camp near Ninety Six. By mid- 
September the rebels numbered some eleven hundred men. The show of force thwarted 
Kirkland’s plan; Drayton then sent parties to capture or kill Kirkland, Brown, and Robert 
Cunningham. All three escaped, however, and Brown and Cunningham assembled two
108 Moses Kirkland to Dartmouth, Sept. 20,1775, Dartmouth Papers, #1526, Reel 14, microfilm, DLAR.
109 William Henry Drayton to Council o f Safety, Sept. 11,1775, PHL, 10:375-378.
110 William Thomson to Henry Laurens, Sept. 6, 1775, PHL, 10:371.
111 William Henry Drayton to Council o f  Safety, Aug. 30,1775, William Henry Drayton Papers, SCL.
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hundred loyalists to oppose Drayton. Fletchall soon arrived with an additional 250 men 
and assumed command, over the objection of some of the more militant loyalists.112
Rather than risk defeat, Drayton appealed to Fletchall to negotiate. Had Brown 
and Cunningham accompanied him to the negotiations, Fletchall may have been more 
resolute, but both feared that the Whigs might seize them, so Fletchall went with six other 
men. Preferring to avoid conflict and aware that his men were short of ammunition, 
Fletchall and the Whigs signed the Treaty of Ninety Six on September 16.113 Both sides 
agreed that the “misunderstandings” between them should not be allowed to develop 
“into quarrels and bloodshed.” The loyalists then declared that they did not oppose the 
proceedings of the rebel congress, nor did they plan to aid British troops, but rather 
wanted only “to abide in their usual peace and tranquility.” They promised to turn over to 
the rebels anyone who spoke against the Whig authorities, and in exchange Drayton 
promised that the loyalists would not be molested so long as they remained peaceful.114 “I 
am persuaded Fletchall & his people will be true, & I make no doubt but that the affair is 
now crushed,” Drayton exulted. Yet Drayton feared the attachment of the backcountry 
people to Governor Campbell and wrote that “our Safety is utterly precarious while the 
Governor is at liberty.” Drayton advised the council to “make Hostages o f the Governor 
& the officers” of the crown or else his success might be undone.115
Some loyalists believed that Drayton had taken unfair advantage of Fletchall and 
therefore did not consider themselves bound by the treaty. Brown stated that Fletchall had 
been “struck with terror” upon watching the maneuvers of the Whig militia. Brown and
112 Krawczynski, Drayton, 184-186; Brown to Campbell, Oct. 18, 1775, in O’Donnell, ed., “Loyalist 
View,” 19.
113 Krawczynski, Drayton, 186-189.
114 Treaty ofNinety Six, Sept. 16, 1775, Documentary History, 1:184-186.
115 W.H. Drayton to Council o f Safety, Sept. 17,1775, PHL, 10:392-393.
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Cunningham considered making a surprise attack on the Whigs with their eight hundred 
men during the negotiations, but decided against it. They undoubtedly wished they had 
carried out their plan when Fletchall returned with the treaty. Upon learning its “shameful 
disgraceful” terms, many of the men were “seized with Rage & Indignation” and swore 
“that they would never abide by them.”116 Cunningham told Drayton that the latter had 
dishonorably taken advantage of people “half scared out of their senses at the sight of 
liberty caps and sound of cannon.” Cunningham said he would not abide by the
117agreement, which he pronounced “false and disgraceful from beginning to ending.”
Brown and Cunningham met afterwards to discuss a course of action. Since they
were short of ammunition, they decided to dismiss their troops until they received further
instructions from Campbell. Brown then went to Charleston to meet with the governor.
Kirkland had already managed to reach Charleston in disguise and get aboard the Tamar,
where Campbell had taken refuge after the Whigs discovered that he had been discussing
plans with backcountry loyalists to cooperate with British troops. With Kirkland out of
reach, the Council of Safety ordered Drayton to capture Robinson, Cunningham, and
118Brown or to drive them from the province. Brown was arrested but quickly released.
Robinson had observed the rebels’ military preparations at Ninety Six and heard 
that they intended to “bum and destroy the Houses and property of all Person who 
refused to join them” as soon as they had enough troops. Robinson went to Charleston to 
seek advice from Governor Campbell, who advised him “to levy Forces and March 
against the Rebels.” Robinson assembled two thousand men, but Fletchall had signed the
116 Brown to Campbell, Oct. 18, 1775, in O’Donnell, ed., “Loyalist View,” 20-21, 24.
117 Robert Cunningham to Drayton, Oct. 5, 1775, Documentary History, 1:200.
118 Brown to Campbell, Oct. 18, 1775, in O’Donnell, ed., “Loyalist View,” 24-25; Council o f Safety to 
William Henry Drayton, Sept. 15, 1775, PHL, 10:386-387; Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:69-70; John Ball to Isaac 
Ball, Sept. 19, 1775, Ball Family Papers, SCHS.
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treaty with Drayton before these reinforcements arrived. Learning that Campbell had fled 
Charleston and finding himself “without further Orders, Money or Military Stores,” 
Robinson sent his followers home with instructions “not to suffer any false pretences of 
the Rebel Party to deceive them, or to efface their principles of Loyalty, until we should 
enjoy a more favorable opportunity.”119
Largely through Drayton’s aggressive efforts, the Whigs had temporarily 
succeeded in neutralizing the backcountry loyalists. Alexander Innes complained to 
Patrick Tonyn that if the loyalists had been assisted by “any decent force” of troops, they 
might have accomplished much. “[B]y what infatuation or neglect these unhappy 
provinces to the southward have been so totally abandoned, for such a space, I cannot
1 9 0imagine,” Innes lamented.
Peace in the backcountry did not last long, however. At the end of October, two 
Whig actions provoked the loyalist uprising that the rebel leaders had tried to forestall. 
First, they arrested Robert Cunningham, brought him to Charleston, and on November 1 
ordered him imprisoned for refusing to recant. Cunningham’s brother Patrick promptly 
organized a force in hopes of freeing Robert. Second, because the Cherokees were 
complaining of the stoppage in trade, the Council of Safety hoped to placate them and 
prevent an Indian war by dispatching a wagon with one thousand pounds of gunpowder 
and some lead for the Cherokees’ winter hunt. When Patrick Cunningham learned of the 
shipment, he and loyalist Richard Pearis spread word that the Whigs were supplying
119 “Memoir o f Lt. Col. Joseph Robinson, 1797,” Rare Books and Special Collections Division, McGill 
University Library, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
120 Alexander limes to Patrick Tonyn, Oct. 15, 1775, in “Papers o f the First Council o f Safety o f the 
Revolutionary Party in South Carolina, June-November, 1775,” SCHGM, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1902, 75.
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munitions to the Cherokees for use against the loyalists. With 150 enraged followers,
191Cunningham overpowered the escorting rebel troops and captured the wagon.
Whig Colonel Andrew Williamson immediately summoned his militia to recover 
the ammunition. By November 18, nearly nineteen hundred rebels had taken position in a 
makeshift fort near Ninety Six. The loyalists gathered about two thousand militiamen and 
surrounded the Whig fort. Skirmishing continued until November 21, with small losses 
on both sides. That night the loyalists sent in a demand for surrender, and representatives
199of the two sides met to negotiate the next day. A treaty was soon arranged that allowed 
the rebel militia to leave the fort, whereupon it was to be destroyed. They would then 
return home unmolested. The loyalists would march across the Saluda River. Each side 
would release its prisoners, and neither side would engage in hostilities until the 
“differences between the people” were adjusted. This was to be done by referring the 
matter to Governor Campbell and the Council of Safety for arbitration -  actually a moot 
point since there was no possibility that the rebel council would even consider 
Campbell’s views. Any reinforcements coming to the assistance of either party “also 
shall be bound by this cessation,” the treaty stated.123
The loyalists upheld their part of the agreement, but Colonels Thomson and 
Richard Richardson, commanding other units of rebel militia, decided that “the Cessation 
of Arms was not binding on us.” They proceeded to assemble men, but encountered much 
opposition and had to resort to drafts to fill their ranks. In the Orangeburgh and Congaree 
areas, the men drafted by Thomson “seem’d very insolent... & in fact did as much as to
121 Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:96; Affidavit o f Moses Cotter, Nov. 3, 1775, in Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:97-100; 
Cann, “Prelude to War,” 207; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 44-45.
122 Cann, “Prelude to War,” 208-211; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 45.
123 Agreement for a Cessation o f Arms Between Maj. Joseph Robinson ... and Major Andrew Williamson, 
Nov. 22, 1775, Documentary History, 1:214-215.
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declare themselves Kings Men.” There were similar problems with some of Richardson’s 
conscripts. Thomson believed that some of these loyalists had actually “murdered people 
in the Woods who had been our Associates.” He decided to apply the coercive elements 
of the militia law to quell the resistance.124
Richardson began his campaign in late November with 1,500 men. The Whigs 
had an immense advantage because the loyalists had just disbanded under the terms of the 
treaty and thought themselves protected by it. As Richardson marched through the 
backcountry arresting loyalist leaders, other Whig parties swelled his force to double its 
original size. Some loyalists tried to embody and resist, but could not collect more than 
four hundred men, too few to challenge the large rebel force. Leaderless and intimidated, 
most of the loyalists pledged neutrality to avoid further persecution.125 Richardson sent 
six captured loyalist officers to Charleston at the beginning of December, asking the 
Council of Safety not to set them free “as they are Look’d Upon as Active and pemitious 
men.”126 Two weeks later he sent down nine more captives, including Fletchall and 
Pearis.127
Many loyalists fled to Cherokee territory, where Richardson’s Whig militia 
caught up with them on December 21. After surrounding the loyalist camp, Richardson 
ordered an attack. Patrick Cunningham managed to escape, but about 130 loyalists were 
captured and five or six killed. Richardson wrote that it was “happy the men were
124 William Thomson to Council o f Safety, Nov. 28, 1775, PHL, 10:523.
125 Lewis Pinckney Jones, The South Carolina Civil War o f 1775 (Lexington, SC: Sandlapper Store, 1975), 
77-79.
126 Richard Richardson to Council o f Safety, Dec. 2, 1775, PHL, 10:529-530.
127 Richard Richardson to Council o f Safety, Dec. 16, 1775, PHL, 10:567.
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Restrain’d or Every man had died,” implying that the dead loyalists may have been
128executed rather than killed in combat.
A few loyalists eluded the Whigs. Joseph Robinson, upon learning that the rebels 
had offered a reward for killing him, fled to the Cherokees, then made his way through 
Creek territory before finally reaching East Florida in 1777.129 Captain James Phillips and 
his company of loyal militia escaped the rebels with the assistance of Alexander Chesney, 
a nineteen-year-old who lived on the Pacolet River near Grindall Shoals. Chesney led 
Phillips and his men to his family’s farm, then found another loyalist to guide them to 
North Carolina, from whence they made their way to St. Augustine through Indian lands. 
Phillips’s company formed part of the South Carolina Royalist battalion later created in 
East Florida. “I piloted all the loyalists who came in my way,” Chesney wrote. When the 
Whigs learned of Chesney’s activities, they arrested him and ransacked his father’s home. 
After a week’s imprisonment they released him, offering him a choice of joining the rebel 
army or undergoing trial for aiding loyalists. He chose the former “to save my father’s 
family from threat.”130
Chesney, Robinson, and other loyalists were fortunate to escape the full fury of 
the Whigs. All of the loyalist leaders whom the Whigs judged to be most influential and 
therefore most dangerous were subjected to harassment, imprisonment, and other forms 
of persecution. A total of 136 loyalist prisoners had been sent to Charleston.131 After two 
months’ imprisonment, thirty-three of the captives, including Fletchall, Pearis, and 
Robert Cunningham, announced their willingness to “Settle Peace” with the Whigs. In a
128 Richard Richardson to Henry Laurens, Jan. 2, 1776, PHL, 10:610-611.
129 “Memoir of Lt. Col. Joseph Robinson.”
130 Chesney, Journal, 6.
131 Prisoners Sent to Charles Town by Col. Richardson, n.d., Documentary History, 1 -.249-253.
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petition to the Council of Safety, they expressed regret that they had been at odds with 
their countrymen and their wish to see unity restored in the province.132 Richardson urged 
the council to release Cunningham and any others who were repentant, so long as they 
pledged their property as security for their future good behavior.133
Release from prison did not bring an end to the loyalists’ troubles. Pearis endured 
nine months of captivity only to return home to find “his House burnt, his Property 
destroyed and his Family drove off.” Pearis rejoined his family and learned that the 
Whigs who burned his home had also beaten and abused his daughters. He stayed with 
his family for a time, “but was so harrassed that he was obliged to fly” to Charleston, 
where he obtained protection from rebel Governor John Rutledge.134 Evan McLaurin, a 
merchant and militia leader who had managed to avoid capture, likewise could not escape
persecution. The Whigs seized £400 ($52,500) worth of deerskins he had shipped to
1Charleston, and harassment at home ruined his business.
The Whigs exulted in their victory. The Council of Safety embraced Richardson’s 
and Thomson’s sophistry and approved their decision to ignore the terms of the treaty 
between Williamson and the loyalists.136 Henry Laurens expressed joy at the speed with 
which the rebels had managed to suppress the king’s supporters. They had “obliged many 
hundreds of the Insurgents to Surrender their Arms, took about 150 prisoners of the most 
troublesome ringleaders & drove out of the Country Such as would not Surrender.”137 
With the most active loyalists either gone from the province or in prison, Laurens stated
132 Petition from Backcountry Prisoners, Jan. 20, 1776, PHL, 11:51-52.
133 Richard Richardson to Council of Safety, Jan. 23, 1776, PHL, 11:56.
134 Richard Pearis Loyalist Claim, Aug. 22, 1783, SCHS.
135 Isabella McLaurin Memorial, April 8, 1783, SCHS.
136 South Carolina Council o f Safety to Richard Richardson, and to William Thomson, Dec. 4, 1775, PHL, 
10:533-535.
137 Henry Laurens to Robert Deans, Jan. 8, 1776, PHL, 11:11.
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that “the common people whom they had deluded are convinced of their mistake & in 
general declare their willingness to join their Brethren” in defense of their rights.138
Governor Campbell expressed great disappointment at the loyalists’ defeat. He 
had hoped that the backcountry people would remain united and prevent the Whigs from 
gaining complete control of the province until British troops arrived.139 He attributed 
their decision to sign a treaty with the rebels to “want of a leader of either consequence or 
knowledge enough to direct their enterprises.” The unscrupulous Whigs then “broke 
every article of it and are I am told determined to extirpate the whole body” of 
loyalists.140
Although the rebels did not go as far as Campbell had feared, they did take 
advantage of the disorganization of the loyalists resulting from the imprisonment and 
exile of their leaders. The Whigs seized this opportunity to appoint reliable men to 
command the backcountry militia. With the rebels in control of the militia, “the loyalists 
stood no chance. They could not organize a counterforce, for they were disarmed, 
atomized, and terrorized.”141 Yet rebel leaders realized that they had by no means 
eradicated loyalism in the backcountry. In 1776 the Council of Safety had to send 
ammunition to the Whig militia in Ninety Six district “to keep the Tories in awe, who 
were plenty enough in that section and continued to do more mischief.”142
The Whigs continued to harass any loyalist who challenged their authority. On 
June 29, 1776, rebel troops arrested John Champneys for refusing to do duty with the
138 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Jan. 16, 1776, PHL, 11:35.
139 Campbell to Dartmouth, July 19 and 20, 1775, DAR, 11:50.
140 Campbell to Dartmouth, Jan. 1, 1776, DAR, 12:30.
141 Piers Mackesy, “What the British Army Learned,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., Arms 
and Independence: The Military Character o f  the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1984), 195.
142 Josiah Culbertson, Pension Application, in John C. Dann, ed., The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness 
Accounts o f  the War fo r  Independence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 175.
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militia. He was imprisoned in Charleston with twenty-one other loyalists and suffered 
through several days of “insults and bad usage.” The prisoners petitioned rebel leaders for 
permission to take an oath of neutrality; they were still awaiting a reply when someone 
fired a bullet through the window of their room. “This leaden messenger occasioned the 
conversion of six of the prisoners, who took the oath of allegiance ... the same day,” 
Champneys wrote. Eventually most of the prisoners swore an oath declaring that the 
British government had violated American rights, which earned four men their release.
But although Champneys had taken the oath, he and five other prisoners were marched to 
the Cheraw jail. Champneys remained in prison there until January 15, 1777, during 
which time his six-year-old son died. The Whigs refused his pleas to be allowed to return 
home to aid his family. Champneys was finally sent back to Charleston and released on 
February 24 with orders to leave South Carolina within sixty days.143
In Georgia, the rebels’ position was more precarious and in consequence they 
acted with more restraint than did their neighbors to the north. South Carolina’s Whigs 
grew so frustrated with Georgia’s reluctance to join the rebels that on February 5, 1775, 
they banned all trade between South Carolina and Georgia, on the grounds that the 
latter’s populace was “unworthy of the rights of freedom, and as inimical to the liberties 
of their country.” The Continental Congress took similar steps in May 1775.144
In response to this prodding, Georgia Whigs moved to consolidate their control by 
striking at the loyalists. On June 5 the rebels ordered William Tongue, a loyal refugee 
from New York who had just arrived in Savannah, to leave the province within seven
143 John Champneys, An account o f  the sufferings and persecution o f John Champneys, a native o f  Charles­
town, South-Carolina; inflicted by order o f  Congress, fo r his refusal to take up arms in defence o f the 
arbitrary proceedings carried on by the rulers o f  said place. Together with his protest, &c., London, 1778, 
1-2, 4-5.
144 Heard Robertson, ed., “Georgia’s Banishment and Expulsion Act o f September 16, 1776,” GHQ, Vol. 
55, No. 2, Summer 1971, 275.
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days or “abide by any consequences that may follow.” Three other loyalists received a 
similar warning.145 Having heard a report that pilot John Hopkins had drunk a toast 
damning America, a rebel mob seized him at his Savannah home on the evening of July 
25 and carried him to the town square. There Hopkins was tarred and feathered, then 
carted through the streets for three hours. The mob forced him to “drink ‘Damnation to 
all Tories and Success to American Liberty,”’ and repeatedly threatened to hang him. He 
was finally released and the crowd dispersed with threats to apply the same treatment to 
the Rev. Haddon Smith, rector of Christ Church, who had refused to observe a fast day 
declared by the Continental Congress.146 Wright witnessed the abuse of Hopkins, which 
the governor described as “a horrid spectacle.”147 When Smith learned of the incident and 
the threats made against him, he fled to Tybee and from there sailed to England.148
Loyalists living outside Savannah also faced persecution. Mobs at Sunbury tarred 
and feathered James Watts, a ship’s carpenter, for loyalism, and attacked James Kitching, 
the collector of customs, on the night of August 1. The mob plundered Kitching’s home 
when he refused to sign the Association. Kitching then fled by boat to Tybee, where he 
found safety aboard a British warship after a twenty-hour journey.149
Such mob actions notwithstanding, Georgia rebels worried about their province’s 
reluctance to commit itself to the revolutionary movement. Peter Taarling told John 
Houstoun that Georgia’s Whigs lacked “warlike spirit.” Taarling wished that Georgians
145 Affidavit o f  William Tongue, June 7, 1775, DAR, 9:166-167.
146 Deposition o f John Hopkins, July 25, 1775, in Catherine S. Crary, ed., The Price o f  Loyalty: Tory 
Writings from the Revolutionary Era (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 63.
147 Wright to Dartmouth, July 29, 1775, DAR, 11:59.
148 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 65.
149 Heard Robertson, Loyalism in Revolutionary Georgia, [Atlanta:] Georgia Commission for the National 
Bicentennial Celebration and Georgia Department of Education, 1978, 6; James Kitching Loyalist Claim, 
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“had a 10th. part” of the enthusiasm displayed by northern rebels, and could only hope 
that “a few months more, may rouse us.”150
Loyal Georgians thought that the Whigs were aggressive enough. One Savannah 
resident noted that loyalists in the province were in no condition to protect themselves. 
They were “not sufficiently supplied with ammunition, nor can they possibly collect 
together those who would readily join them, they being dispersed up and down the 
country.”151 Doctor Thomas Taylor, an English immigrant who arrived at Savannah in 
December 1775, noted that “in this province two out of three are friends to government, 
but as there is neither ships nor troops to protect them, they know it is in vain to oppose
1 S9the current, as the Carolina people are all in arms.” When Taylor reached the 
backcountry town of Wrightsborough in early January 1776, he found that most people in 
the vicinity were also loyal to Britain. “Altho’ this Province has acceded to the 
Resolutions of the Congress yet the Majority of the People are Friends to Government,” 
he wrote. News of the defeat of the backcountry loyalists in South Carolina had further 
demoralized the Georgia loyalists, however. They had learned that their counterparts 
“have been lately dispersd,” and “about 150 have been taken Prisoners who after being 
cruelly used were sent down to Charles Town. The rest dare not return to their 
Habitations so that the Country around is pillagd & desolate.”153 This convinced most of 
the king’s friends in the Georgia backcountry to remain passive and avoid offending the 
Whigs.
150 Peter Taarling to John Houstoun, Oct. 24, 1775, John Houstoun Papers, GHS.
151 “Extract of a letter from Savannah,” Nov. 29, 1775, in Willard, ed., Letters on the Revolution, 226.
152 Thomas Taylor to Mr. Morrison, Dec. 16, 1775, in Robert S. Davis, Jr., ed., “A Georgia Loyalist’s 
Perspective on the American Revolution: The Letters of Dr. Thomas Taylor,” GHQ, Vol. 81, No. 1, Spring 
1997, 125.
153 Thomas Taylor to the Rev. Thomas Percy, Jan. 13, 1776, Miscellaneous Manuscripts, WLCL.
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When a British naval squadron arrived off Savannah in mid-January to procure 
rice for the Boston garrison, frightened Whigs took prompt action to prevent any 
cooperation between loyalists and the royal navy. Eminent loyalists, including Governor 
Wright, were “bound up by a parole, not to aid or assist any of his Majesty’s ships or 
troops,” while less prominent inhabitants suspected of loyalism were disarmed.154
Some Georgians showed reluctance to resist the British. When the Council of 
Safety ordered a militia company from St. Matthew’s Parish to march to Savannah’s 
defense in January, all but one of the men refused to go. The Whigs accused two 
loyalists, tavemkeeper James Pace and planter John Hall, of telling the militiamen that 
they had no obligation to obey rebels. The council ordered both men arrested.155
When fighting between the British ships and Georgians onshore broke out on 
March 3, many loyalists took advantage of the confusion to flee to the British. The rebels 
“were inflamed” by the battle, and “particularly at our own People who had treacherously 
Joined the Enemy against us.”156 Governor Wright, who had already sought safety aboard 
a British warship, asked the naval commander to stay to protect the loyalists, but that 
officer had orders to return to Boston. Wright, fearing for his own safety, had no choice
157but to abandon the province.
The last vestige of British authority now vanished in Georgia “as a result of the 
battle and the flight of Governor Wright.” The Whigs triumphed, “not because a majority 
of the Georgians were willing” to openly rebel, “but because a highly organized and
154 “Extract of a letter, dated on board the Brig Allerton, Cockspur, in Georgia,” March 24, 1776, in 
Willard, ed., Letters on the Revolution, 297.
155 E. Merton Coulter, “Edward Telfair,” GHQ, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1936, 107-108.
156 Lachlan McIntosh to George Washington, March 8, 1776, in Lilia M. Hawes, ed., “The Papers of 
Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799,” GHQ, Vol. 38, No. 2, June 1954, 151.
157 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 70.
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determined minority” had overthrown royal government.158 Wright would later state that 
with the help of the loyalists he had “Checked the Spirit & Attempts of the Factions, & 
kept Georgia out of the Rebellion, & Prevented them from Sending Delegates to 
Congress for near twelve Months.” He insisted that it was only the lack of troops and the 
efforts of South Carolina rebels in “Spiriting up the ill affected in Georgia, & giving them 
assistance,” that led to the downfall of royal government in his province.159
Many loyalists decided to follow the governor’s example and escape while they 
still had an opportunity to do so. Merchant William Moss, expecting to be arrested or 
assaulted, had fled from Savannah to his plantation upriver when the British ships 
arrived. From there he sailed in his schooner to join the British, took several other 
refugees aboard, and went on to St. Augustine. John Lightenstone (or Lichtenstein), 
operator of a scout boat for the provincial government, fled his house at Yamacraw when 
the rebels came looking for him. He hid in a field until his slaves could safely get him to 
his boat and row him to the British flagship. Other loyalists joined him; all were 
eventually taken to Halifax, Nova Scotia, leaving their families and possessions 
behind.160
Whig leader Lachlan McIntosh considered the skirmishes with the British fleet 
and its subsequent withdrawal to be a major victory. He hoped it would convince many 
loyalists to join the rebels, but still worried that the loyalists “may prevail” in carrying out
158 Coulter, “Edward Telfair,” 108-109.
159 Memorial o f Sir James Wright to William Pitt, 1785, British Museum, Egerton Mss. 2135, transcript, 
LOC.
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Vol. 52, No. 3, Sept. 1968, 272-273; Elizabeth Lichtenstein Johnston, Recollections o f  a Georgia Loyalist, 
Rev. Arthur Wentworth Eaton, ed. (New York: Mansfield and Co., 1901; reprint, Spartanburg, SC: The 
Reprint Co., 1974), 45-46.
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“their own Sinister Ends” of opposing the Whigs.161 To insure that this did not happen, 
the rebels launched new attacks upon the loyalists. On June 26, the Council of Safety 
proscribed forty-three Georgians deemed a threat to American liberty. But the resolution 
contained no enforcement mechanism, so that while some of the named loyalists fled to 
East Florida, most remained in the province and managed to escape harassment. The 
council took more aggressive action against the Reverend John J. Zubly. Zubly had 
staunchly defended American rights in articulate sermons and pamphlets since the Stamp 
Act crisis and had represented Georgia in the Continental Congress until his opposition to 
independence led him to resign. Despite his peaceable demeanor and prior contributions 
to the Whig cause, the council declared the minister a danger to public safety and ordered 
his arrest.162
Local Whig leaders also took steps to control or punish loyalists. In September the 
rebel committee in St. Andrew’s Parish decided that loyalists could no longer be allowed 
to go at large. The Whigs asserted that the loyalists showed “an Inveterate hatred, & 
malice against the cause of America ... which threaten our own safety.” The loyalists 
were charged with various crimes, including the refusal to pay fines imposed on them by 
the Assembly, and “Rejoicing on every Prospect of the success of our Enemies whether 
Civilized (if they may be so called) or Savages.” The committee ordered that twenty-nine 
men be taken immediately into custody until they took the oath of allegiance to the state 
or gave adequate security for their good behavior.163
161 [McIntosh?] to Button Gwinnett, May 1, 1776, “Papers of McIntosh,” 154-155.
162 Robertson, “Georgia’s Banishment and Expulsion Act,” 277; Randall M. Miller, ed. “A Warm & 
Zealous Spirit John J. Zubly and the American Revolution, A Selection o f  His Writings (Macon, GA: 
Mercer University Press, 1982), 20-22.
163 “Resolve o f St. Andrews Parochial Committee,” “Papers of McIntosh,” 58-59.
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The twenty-nine loyalists marked for arrest were all men, but women did not 
escape persecution. “At the outbreak of the war, loyalist women expected that ‘their Sex 
and the Humanity of a civilized People’ would protect them from ‘disrespectfull 
Indignities.’ Most of them soon learned otherwise.” The Whigs “consigned female 
loyalists to much the same fate as their male relatives.” Women whose husbands had fled 
were particularly vulnerable and rebels frequently plundered their property. Loyal women 
were “verbally abused, imprisoned, and threatened with bodily harm even when they had 
not taken an active role in opposing the rebel cause.” Women who directly aided the 
British, usually by helping prisoners or gathering intelligence, often suffered physical 
abuse as well.164
When possible, most loyalist refugees brought their families with them; however, 
this did not protect them from other hardships. About 180 loyalists fled to Amelia Island, 
where they spent the summer of 1776 suffering from heat, hunger, and insects. One 
refugee, Jeremy Wright, watched his property burning on the mainland after Whigs 
torched the buildings. Refugees traveling overland to East Florida could not escape the 
Whigs’ wrath either. After the rebels plundered his Ogeechee River plantation in 
September 1776, James Shivers gathered his family and movable possessions and set out 
for East Florida. On the way he was attacked by Whigs who carried off eight slaves and 
seventy-five head of cattle. He received two hundred acres of land from Governor Tonyn, 
however, which enabled him to establish a farm.165
Governor Tonyn did everything in his power to fulfill his promise to make East 
Florida “an asylum to the friends of the Constitution.” To facilitate settling the refugees,
164 Mary Beth Norton, “Eighteenth-Century Women in Peace and War: The Case of the Loyalists,” WMQ, 
Vol. 33, No. 3, July 1976, 398.
165 Callahan, Royal Raiders, 91; Troxler, “Refuge, Resistance, and Reward,” 567-568.
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Tonyn procured Dartmouth’s assent to suspend all restrictions on the sale and granting of 
provincial lands. Tonyn then issued a proclamation announcing the availability of land 
which circulated in South Carolina and Georgia, encouraging further immigration.166 
Many refugees, however, found it difficult to obtain land because large tracts had been 
granted earlier to absentees who had never come to Florida. On November 1,1776, forty- 
nine loyalists from Georgia petitioned Tonyn, explaining their difficulty in acquiring 
small tracts of farmland. The governor referred the matter to London, and in March 1777 
the government declared that all granted lands that had not been settled or developed for 
three or more years reverted to the crown. This enabled Tonyn to divide the large parcels 
and provide land to the petitioners and other refugees.167
Tonyn also personally intervened to allow loyalists to sell provisions and 
livestock that were badly needed in the province. Some refugees had brought these items 
to East Florida, and loyalists in the rebellious provinces also managed to ship grain to St. 
Augustine. Unfortunately, royal officials there confiscated most of these goods in 
accordance with the British embargo on trade with the thirteen colonies. Tonyn issued 
licenses allowing loyalists to circumvent the embargo, which alleviated the financial 
distress of the refugees while meeting the province’s need for provisions.168
Fearing a Whig attack on East Florida, Tonyn decided to create a battalion of 
militia to defend the province. On August 20, 1776, he addressed the inhabitants of St. 
Augustine and urged them to serve. To his satisfaction, “the whole joyfully consented,” 
and Tonyn appointed Lt. Gov. Alexander Moultrie colonel of the unit. Tonyn expected to
166 Wilbur H. Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785, The Most Important Documents Pertaining 
Thereto Edited With an Accompanying Narrative, 2 Vols. (Deland: Florida State Historical Society, 1929), 
1:23-24.
167 Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 1:48-50.
168 Troxler, “Refuge, Resistance, and Reward,” 569.
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raise four companies in St. Augustine, two from settlers along the St. John’s River, and 
four companies of blacks.169
The rebels had already launched attacks along the northern border of East Florida. 
In May 1776, the Georgia council of safety ordered Captain William McIntosh to clear 
loyalists from their plantations along the St. Mary’s River. McIntosh attacked five 
plantations, captured four loyalists, and destroyed buildings and crops. Tonyn had learned 
of the impending raid and ordered troops to the St. Mary’s, but they arrived too late to 
prevent the damage. During a skirmish with the retreating rebels, three of the four loyalist 
prisoners managed to escape. The Whigs struck again in early July, plundering 
plantations, carrying off some fifty slaves, and seizing a few loyalists. A month later 
another raid destroyed a fort built by Charles Wright on the St. Mary’s; the Whigs then 
plundered and burned the plantations between that river and the St. John’s. The elderly 
Wright and twenty-four of his slaves “died of exposure and malnutrition” as a result of 
the upheaval. East Floridians in the area fled south seeking safety.170
Southern Whigs and Continental Army commander Gen. Charles Lee decided to 
follow up the raids with an invasion of East Florida to eliminate the threat posed by the 
British presence there. In August Lee assembled a force of Georgians, South Carolinians, 
and Virginians and began his march.171 Rebel patrols eventually reached the St. John’s 
River, devastating the property of the few remaining loyalists along the way. But the
169 Tonyn to Germain, Aug. 21, 1776, Colonial Office, Class 5, Vol. 556, 743-744, 
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main force got no farther than Sunbury, Georgia, before sickness and lack of supplies
i 77halted its advance. The rebels then abandoned the effort.
Tonyn then seized the initiative by launching retaliatory raids into Georgia. 
Despite his years of service in the regular army, “Tonyn adapted with startling ease to the 
type of warfare he was required to wage.” He authorized Thomas Brown to organize 
refugees from the southern provinces into a ranger unit to defend East Florida and when
1 7^possible to undertake operations against the Whigs in Georgia. In October the loyalists 
counterattacked, burning plantations in Georgia at Beard’s Bluff and in the area south of 
the Altamaha River without encountering serious opposition.174
The loyalists had made a valiant effort to uphold royal authority, particularly in 
South Carolina. They had resisted persuasion, persecution, economic coercion, and held 
their own against rebel armed force. Only when the Whigs reneged on a peace agreement 
to surprise and disarm them and arrested their leaders did resistance in South Carolina 
finally collapse. Loyalists in Georgia had enabled Wright to remain in office longer than 
any other governor in the thirteen colonies, while East and West Floridians stood firm in 
their allegiance to the crown. Despite several reverses, most loyalists did not abandon 
their principles; they only awaited the right opportunity to rally again under the king’s 
standard.
Southern Indians: A Mixed Response
All of the southern Indians carefully observed the developing conflict between 
Great Britain and the colonies. John Stuart expected the Catawbas to side with the Whigs, 
but planned to restrain the other nations until British troops were available to cooperate
172 Bennett and Lennon, Quest for Glory, 48-50; Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 61-62.
173 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 37-38.
174 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 68.
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with them. Ironically, the rebels pursued an almost identical policy, inviting the Catawbas 
to join them while working to keep the neighboring Cherokees and Creeks neutral. But 
neither Stuart nor the Whig agents could ultimately control the Indians. Seeing an 
opportunity to strike at the land-hungry colonists, the Cherokees ignored Stuart’s 
admonitions and attacked the southern frontier in the summer of 1776. The assault failed; 
the Cherokees suffered a disastrous defeat that rendered them incapable of assisting the 
British for some time and convinced most Creeks to remain aloof from the conflict.
There was never any question regarding the Catawbas’ alignment. On July 25, 
1775, the South Carolina Council of Safety thanked Joseph Kershaw, the Whigs’ 
representative to that nation, for sending assurances that “those People are hearty in our
• 17SInterest” and willing to provide men to serve with the rebels. Two Catawba leaders 
visited Charleston in August to inquire into the political situation. The Whigs explained 
that they were engaged in a quarrel with other white men, and that they “expected their 
[Catawba] warriors would join ours.”176 Catawba interests and rebel interests, the Whigs 
asserted, were “just the same.”177 William Henry Drayton, always belligerent, warned the 
Catawbas that they faced dire consequence if they waged war against the South
178Carolinians.
Any fears Drayton had that the Catawbas might ally with the British were 
unfounded. John Stuart made no attempt to court them, recognizing that those Indians 
had been “practised upon and seduced by the Inhabitants with whom they live.” By 
autumn the Catawbas had begun to assist the rebels; forty of them went to the lowcountry
175 Council o f Safety to Joseph Kershaw, July 25, 1775, PHL, 10:247.
176 Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:81.
177 Quoted in Merrell, Indians ’ New World, 215.
178 Douglas Summers Brown, The Catawba Indians: The People o f  the River (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1966), 260-261.
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to track down fugitive loyalists and slaves.179 Kershaw appointed Samuel Boykin captain 
of the Catawba auxiliaries. Boykin and thirty-four Indians took the field in February 
1776, again to capture runaway slaves.180 In June, Boykin gathered about fifty Catawbas 
to help defend Charleston against the impending British attack. The Indians were
101 t t
promised “Colony pay.” These Catawbas comprised part of the defensive force at the 
northern end of Sullivan’s Island.182
The Whigs could manage the Catawbas easily enough, but they knew that Stuart’s 
influence with the other Indian nations would have to be countered. They decided to 
strike directly at the superintendent by circulating rumors that Stuart had received orders 
to lead Indian attacks and incite slave insurrections in South Carolina.183 As the rebel 
leaders intended, Stuart quickly found himself facing the “Fury of a merciless and 
ungovernable Mob.”184 At the end of May 1775, he fled Charleston for the comparative 
safety of Savannah. Not content with having driven Stuart from South Carolina, Whig 
leaders in Charleston circulated handbills in Beaufort and Savannah repeating the 
allegation that the superintendent planned to order Indian attacks on the frontier. This, 
along with emissaries from South Carolina who proclaimed Stuart’s villainy, inflamed
185the Georgians as well.
Stuart met with some of Georgia’s Whig leaders and tried to convince them that 
“no steps had ever been taken to interest the Indians in the Dispute between Great 
Brittain and the Colonies, but at the same time I told them that I had constantly
179 Quoted in Merrell, Indians ’ New World, 215,216.
180 Brown, Catawba Indians, 261-262.
181 Henry Laurens to Samuel Boykin, Jan. 14, 1776, PHL, 11:28.
182 Brown, Catawba Indians, 263.
183 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 18; Snapp, John Stuart, 160.
184 Snapp, John Stuart, 160.
185 Krawczynski, Drayton, 132.
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considered it as my principal Duty to Dispose the Indians to confide in His Majesty’s 
Justice and Protection, and to act for His Service if required.” This statement did not 
reassure the rebels, who warned Stuart that it was dangerous for him to remain in 
Savannah. He then escaped in a canoe to a British warship, barely escaping boatloads of 
armed and angry men who pursued him. Stuart then sailed to St. Augustine, where he 
found refuge but no respite from the Whigs’ slanderous assaults. He learned that the 
rebels continued to spread “the Greatest falsehoods ... in order to inflame the people 
against me.”186
In what was undoubtedly a ruse intended to lure Stuart back to South Carolina so 
that the Whigs could place him in custody, the Committee of Intelligence wrote the 
superintendent suggesting that he could demonstrate his good intentions by returning to 
Charleston, where the provincial congress would happily vindicate him if  he could prove 
his innocence. Meanwhile, the committee declared, his property “stands as a Security for 
the good Behaviour of the Indians in the Southern Department.”187 Stuart, knowing the 
risks involved if  he return to Charleston, replied that he had no intention of inciting an 
Indian war. He added that it was ironic that his property was held as security for the 
Indians’ good behavior, since their actions depended not on his instructions but “upon the 
Conduct of the inhabitants of the Provinces.”188
Not content with having driven Stuart to East Florida and threatening to seize his 
property, the Whigs proceeded to take punitive measures against his wife and married 
daughter. On February 3, 1776, the provincial congress ordered that the two women be 
confined to their home in Charleston “as hostages for his [Stuart’s] good behavior.” Two
186 Stuart to Gage, July 9, 1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 131, WLCL.
187 Committee o f Intelligence to Stuart, June 21, 1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 132, WLCL.
188 Stuart to Committee o f Intelligence, July 18, 1775, Gage Papers, Vol. 132, WLCL.
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days later, the congress allowed Stuart’s daughter to leave Charleston with her husband, 
on condition that she not leave the province, and permitted Mrs. Stuart to leave her house 
if  accompanied by an officer. However, Stuart’s wife could not receive visitors without
189written permission from rebel officials. Henry Laurens believed the measure was 
effective, writing that “nothing but Mr. Stuarts family has for Some time past been a 
barrier against the massacre & butchery of hundreds of Innocent families in Georgia and 
Carolina.”190 Stuart took a dimmer view of the matter, writing that his wife had been 
detained, “insulted and threatened.”191 Despite rebel precautions, Mrs. Stuart eventually 
escaped, and her son-in-law was immediately jailed “on suspicion of aiding and assisting 
her.”192
With Stuart gone, the Whigs focused their attention on Alexander Cameron, his 
deputy to the Cherokees. Like Stuart, Cameron fled to avoid capture. On July 14 
Cameron’s friend, Whig colonel Andrew Williamson, reported that Cameron had “gone 
to the Cherokee Nation,” and that “at this Time there is a good deal of Confusion” in the 
backcountry “on Acct. of the expected Danger from the Cherokees.” Williamson 
promised to quiet these fears, as he had received assurances from Cameron that the latter 
had no intention of ordering the Indians to attack the province.193
The Whigs then tried to convince Cameron to join them. When that failed, they 
resorted as usual to threats and violence. On July 23 the Council of Safety asked 
Williamson to offer Cameron a position as the Whigs’ agent to the Cherokees, with the
189 Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:123.
190 Henry Laurens to Georgia Council ofSafety, Feb. 7, 1776, PHL, 11:91.
191 John Stuart to David Taitt, Aug. 29, 1775, Documentary History, 1:159.
192 Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:123.
193 Andrew Williamson to Council ofSafety, July 14, 1775, and enclosure, July 12, 1775, PHL, 10:222- 
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same salary he received from the British.194 William Henry Drayton wrote Cameron that 
the rebels “look upon you as an object dangerous to our welfare” and would not be 
satisfied until Cameron had moved a sufficient distance from the Cherokees to be unable 
to exercise his duties as Stuart’s representative. Drayton suggested St. Augustine or 
Pensacola as acceptable destinations. In case Cameron misunderstood the nature of the 
request, Drayton noted that it “carries all the force of a command.”195
Replying to Drayton’s threats in mid-October, Cameron politely stated that he 
could not comply with Whig demands. He also said that he found it strange that he was 
“threatened with condign punishment” when all his efforts had been directed “to cultivate 
peace and friendship between the Indians” and the South Carolinians.”196
The Whigs did not even wait for Cameron’s reply before sending their militia to 
seize him. Colonel William Thomson set out with some troops in late July to find the 
agent and learned on July 31 that Cameron was at Oconee Creek with a dozen white men 
and several Indians. Thomson immediately marched to surprise his quarry, but on 
entering the town of Seneca was ambushed by a party he estimated at thirty whites and 
thirty Cherokees. After driving off the defenders, Thomson burnt the village and six 
thousand bushels of com. He then ordered other Whig units to bum nearby Cherokee 
towns. Captured whites informed Thomson that Cameron was about thirty miles away,
• 107with “about one hundred and fifty white men and Indians.”
Cameron finally reached safety in the Cherokee town of Keowee in mid-August. 
He noted that the Cherokees were “very cross about the usage their father [Stuart] met
194 Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:76.
195 W.H. Drayton to Alexander Cameron, Sept. 26, 1775, Documentary History, 1:194-195.
196 Alexander Cameron to W.H. Drayton, Oct. 16, 1775, Documentary History, 1:208.
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with in Charles Town, and me at Long Canes being obliged to leave our houses. That 
they see plainly that the white people mean a war with them,” a conclusion that was not 
surprising after Thomson’s attack on Seneca. The Cherokees, Cameron believed, 
preferred war sooner rather than later and “are to a man resolved to stand for the great 
King and his warriors.” He wanted ammunition for them and wanted to know Stuart’s 
whereabouts. Despite the uncertain situation, Cameron took comfort in the Cherokees’ 
loyalty both to him and to the king. They were “the most faithful Indians on the main,” he 
wrote. The rebels intercepted this letter, which helped convince them that quick action
198was essential to forestall a Cherokee attack.
Ominous reports of Cherokee intentions had been coming from the backcountry 
throughout the summer. Robert Goudey swore a deposition at Ninety Six on July 10 that 
earlier in the day Man Killer of Keowee, a Cherokee, told him that “Some Few Days ago, 
a Certain John Vann told the Indians in the Cherokee Nation that they must fall upon the 
White people on This Side Savannah River and kill them (Meaning the people of South 
Carolina),” but that the Georgians were not to be molested. According to Man Killer, the 
Cherokees had replied that “they Could not go to War, that they had no Ammunition.”199 
On August 20, the Rev. William Tennent informed Henry Laurens that the 
loyalists were preparing to strike and that he had heard “Cameron is among the over hill 
Cherokees and will soon join them with 3,000 gun men.”200 In a subsequent letter, 
Tennent asserted that the loyalists were too few to challenge the Whigs alone and that 
“their Dependance is upon the Savages to join their Army. & that the rest of the
198 Alexander Cameron to Andrew M’Lean, Aug. 16, 1775, Documentary History, 1:143-144.
199 Deposition of Robert Goudey, July 10,1775, Ninety Six District Papers, SCL.
200 William Tennent to Henry Laurens, Aug. 20, 1775, Documentary History, 1:146.
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Inhabitants will be forced to join them, to save their Families from a Massacre.”201 
Jonathan Clark of Ninety Six District told Drayton that John Garwick, a friend of 
Cameron, had warned Clark that when British troops arrived in South Carolina, Clark 
should “remove from the frontiers.” Garwick added that three weeks earlier, Cameron 
had met with four hundred Cherokees and urged them to support the king’s troops, and 
that the Indians, after being assured that Cameron would supply them with ammunition, 
signified their willingness to attack the colonists with gunshots and war whoops.202
Other accounts, however, contradicted these reports, leaving the Whigs uncertain 
as to how they should proceed. “Our Cherokee Indians according to advices which we 
have just received from thence are well disposed towards us,” Henry Laurens wrote on 
August 20. He added that the Cherokees “pathetically lament the Scarcity of Gunn 
Powder & Bullets,” but thought that “it would not be consistent with Sound policy if we 
were just now to Supply them with those articles.”203
With the affairs of the British Indian Department apparently in disarray, rebel 
leaders saw an opportunity to keep the Indians peaceful by assuming management of 
Indian affairs. In early August, South Carolina Whigs learned that Congress had created 
three Indian departments, divided geographically, and allocated $10,000 to the southern 
department for presents and other expenses. South Carolina appointed George Galphin, 
an Indian trader with a Creek wife and several mixed-race children, to act as one of three
201 William Tennent to Council ofSafety, Sept. 1, 1775, PHL, 10:359.
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agents to the Creeks. Andrew Williamson, the backcountry militia colonel, was named 
one of three representatives to the Cherokees.204
William Henry Drayton, still in the backcountry after his failed mission to convert 
loyalists, took it upon himself to deal with the Cherokees as well. In September he met 
with some Cherokee leaders at the Congarees and attempted to explain the political 
situation. Drayton said that the Whigs were in part fighting to preserve the deerskin trade. 
He asserted that since the British abused fellow white men, the Indians should not expect 
better treatment.205
Yet while Whig leaders courted the Cherokees, other whites undermined their 
efforts. In late September, four Georgians murdered a Cherokee man and wounded two 
others “in cold blood.” Although rebel officials claimed that the assault was “a 
contrivance by our Enemies to set those barbarians upon us,” the crime increased their 
fears of an Indian attack.206 Colonel Thomson sent some of his Whig militia to apprehend 
the culprits in order to conciliate the Cherokees.207
To further placate the Cherokees, in October the Whigs finally relented and 
agreed to provide them with gunpowder and lead. When the loyalists seized the wagon 
carrying munitions, the rebels sent an emissary to the Cherokees with a promise that the 
ammunition would be sent as soon as the Whigs had recaptured it.208
While the Whigs attempted to gain the Indians’ goodwill, Stuart and his deputies, 
whose activities had not been disrupted to the extent the rebels believed, continued to 
exercise their influence with the southern nations. As he had repeatedly told the Whigs,
204 Arthur Middleton to Drayton, Aug. 5, 1775, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” 124; O’Donnell, Southern 
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Stuart’s goal was to keep the Indians neutral. He informed David Taitt, his representative 
to the Creeks, that in spite of the persecution he had suffered, he was “so far inclined to 
retaliate good for evil, that I wish to maintain peace.” Stuart told Taitt to avoid any 
statements that might incite the Creeks to war and instead try “to preserve peace, and 
attach the Indians to his Majesty’s interest.” Taitt’s most important duty, Stuart declared, 
was “to frustrate the machinations of Mr. Galphin and his associates.”209 Stuart also sent 
talks to the Creeks and Cherokees in which he emphasized his desire that the Indians 
remain at peace. The “difference between the people in England and the white people in 
America .... does not concern you,” he told the Cherokees; “they will decide it between 
themselves.” Stuart promised to do his best to provide supplies to both nations and urged 
them to follow the advice of his agents.210
Cameron worked particularly hard to keep the Cherokees neutral because of his 
own aversion to an Indian war. In November he told Stuart that if the Indians attacked the 
colonists, “the Issue of it would be terrible, as they could not be restrained from 
Committing the most inhuman barbarities on Women and Children.” Cameron added that 
he thought himself unable to lead the Indians “against Friends, Neighbours and fellow
911Subjects ... altho the behaviour of the people would almost justify me in doing it.”
In September, Gage finally sent Stuart instructions “to make [the Indians] take 
arms against His Majesty’s enemies” if an opportunity arose.212 Stuart, however, was 
reluctant to do so until the ministry confirmed the orders. The superintendent replied only 
that he would work to keep the Indians firmly attached to the king. He also advised his
209 John Stuart to David Taitt, Aug. 29, 1775, Documentary History, 1:158-159.
210 John Stuart’s Talk to the Cherokees, Aug. 30, 1775; John Stuart’s Talk to the Creek Indians, Aug. 1775, 
Documentary History, 1:159-162.
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brother Henry to go among the Upper Creeks, try to obtain their commitment to assist the 
British, and then consult with Taitt as to how the Indians could be used to distress the 
rebels. After that, Henry Stuart was to visit the Cherokees and urge them to expel rebel 
agents and traders from their nation. John Stuart understood that it was more important to 
eliminate rebel influence and secure the Indians’ allegiance than to launch a premature 
war.213
When Stuart learned in December that fighting had broken out between loyalists 
and rebels in the South Carolina backcountry, he ordered Cameron to bring the 
Cherokees to aid the loyalists, but not to launch indiscriminate attacks on the frontier. 
Stuart’s plan was foiled because Cameron did not receive the letter until six months 
later 214 Many loyalists, however, did take refuge among the Cherokees after their defeat. 
Whig Colonel Richardson believed that those loyalists had actually “gone to bring the 
Indians Down” to attack the rebels. If so, Richardson declared, “it Cou’d not be in a 
better time,” since the Whig militia was assembled and ready.215
The expected Indian attack did not come, but many Whigs believed war was 
imminent. News reached Charleston on February 22, 1776, that the Cherokees had 
scalped two whites and “danced the War Dance.” Other reports alleged that Stuart was in 
Boston discussing plans with British officers for an attack on the southern colonies.
“Lord Dartmouth’s Indian Engines will probably now begin their pious play of 
Butchering Women & Children,” Henry Laurens wrote.216 Some Whigs, however, 
believed that an Indian war would benefit them by uniting the backcountry people. Pierce
213 John Stuart to [Henry Stuart], Oct. 24, 1775; John Stuart to Gage, Oct. 24, 1775, DAR, 11:162-164.
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Butler declared that “if the Indians are prevail’d on to attack us,” the men in the frontier 
districts would unite to protect their homes.217
The Cherokees were in fact considering war. The militant faction in the nation 
saw conflict among the whites as an opportunity to strike back against those who had 
taken their land. Militant leader Dragging Canoe visited Henry Stuart, John Stuart’s 
deputy, at Mobile during the spring of 1776 to announce his support for the British.
Henry Stuart provided Dragging Canoe with a large quantity of ammunition, which the 
latter brought to the Cherokee town of Chota. There Stuart and Cameron conferred with 
leaders from all parts of the nation. The British agents urged the Cherokees to remain at 
peace, but could not sway Dragging Canoe or other militants, who paid more attention to 
the Shawnee and Mohawk emissaries who favored war. Nor could accommodationist 
Cherokee leaders such as Oconostota or Attakullakulla dissuade Dragging Canoe. Stuart 
gave up his effort to argue for peace, contenting himself with obtaining a promise from
the militants that they would not cross the Indian boundary or kill women, children, or
218loyalists when they went to war.
The Cherokees began their attacks on July 1, targeting frontier settlements from 
Georgia to Virginia and catching the Whigs by surprise.219 Rebel leaders had been lulled 
to some degree; “the Cherokees had amused us by the most flattering Talks, full of 
assurances of friendship,” Henry Laurens wrote. Then, “very suddenly, without any 
pretence to Provocation those treacherous Devils in various Parties headed by White 
Men” struck the frontiers, killing an estimated sixty South Carolinians.220
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218 Hatley, Dividing Paths, 218-219; Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 191, 194-195.
219 Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown, 20.
220 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Aug. 14, 1776, PHL, 11:229.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
The attacks threw the South Carolina backcountry into confusion. “The whole 
country was flying,” one Whig reported, “some to make forts, others as low as 
Orangeburgh.” Officers tried to muster the militia, “but the panic was so great” that few 
men turned out at first.221 The Cherokees “spread great desolation all along the frontiers” 
of the province, a Whig wrote. “Plantations lie desolate, and hopeful crops are going to 
ruin.”222 In North Carolina, William Sharpe wrote that people for fifty miles along the 
frontier in Rowan and Tryon Counties had abandoned their homes and taken refuge in 
garrisons, and that four men and six children had been killed and a militia officer 
mortally wounded. “About thirty houses burned and plantations destroyed hundreds of 
fields loaded with A plentiful harvest laid waste and destroyed, many Cattle killed and
223horses taken away,” he reported.
As Henry Laurens had observed, many of the initial Cherokee attacks were 
conducted jointly by Indians and white loyalists. On July 15 the Whigs repulsed an attack 
on a militia camp, after which the Indians fled and thirteen whites were captured. By July 
19, however, reports began to arrive that “the white people in general had quitted the 
Indians” after an estimated 88 Cherokees and 102 whites made an unsuccessful attack on 
Lindley’s Fort. Some whites who abandoned the Cherokees turned themselves in to rebel
224militia officers and were imprisoned at Ninety Six.
Many Whigs believed that, before the attacks, the Cherokees and loyalists had 
devised signals so that the Indians could identify and spare loyalists. The Cherokees were
221 Francis Salvador to W. H. Drayton, July 18, 1776, Documentary History, 2:24.
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said to have “observed sacredly” these signs, except in a few instances.225 It is possible 
that some loyalists received warnings from friends who had escaped to the Indians, but 
there is scant evidence that most loyalists had advance notice of the Cherokee attack. One 
person who insisted there had been collusion, the Rev. James Creswell, asserted that the 
loyalists in Ninety Six district “were really elated with the prospect” of Cherokee 
intervention. He accused loyalist militiamen of failing to appear at musters in the weeks 
preceding the attack, which he considered proof that the loyalists had made a secret 
compact “to assist the savages to ruin the country.” Yet Creswell also wrote that the 
Cherokees “killed the disaffected in common, without distinction of party,” which, he 
said, caused many loyalists to abandon their plans to cooperate with the Indians.226
Fulfilling Pierce Butler’s prediction, the Cherokee attacks promoted unity among 
most backcountry inhabitants, regardless of their political principles. Loyalist Alexander 
Chesney “marched against the Indians, to which I had no objection,” and seemed proud 
of the fact that he “helped destroy 32 of their towns.”227 Robert Cunningham “would not 
at first believe that the British Administration were so wicked as to Instigate the Savages 
to War against us.” When he realized it was true, Cunningham and other loyalists
imprisoned in Charleston offered to serve against the Cherokees, and the Council of
228  •Safety released them from confinement. Cunningham and Richard Pearis reported to 
Andrew Williamson’s camp as volunteers. Although suspicious of Pearis, Williamson 
was certain of Cunningham’s reliability. But Williamson decided that “it would be 
improper to confer any public trust” on Cunningham because the backcountry people
225 “Memoir of Joseph McJunkin, o f Union,” The Magnolia; or Southern Appalachian, New Series, Vol. 2, 
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were “so much exasperated” by the sight of loyalists, some “painted as Indians,” 
cooperating with the Cherokees.229
Most backcountry loyalists did not see any contradiction between their support for 
royal authority and serving against the Cherokees. The Indians’ presence blocked settlers 
access to new lands and thus to potential economic advancement, and conflict between 
whites and Indians was endemic to the frontier. Neither Governor Campbell nor Stuart’s 
agents had given the backcountry loyalists any indication that the king’s supporters and 
the Cherokees were now allies in a common cause. Without such instructions, the 
loyalists followed their usual behavior and acted to protect their homes and families from 
the Indian threat. As a result, the king’s white supporters who assisted the Whigs found 
themselves pitted against other loyalists and their erstwhile Indian allies, so that Britain’s 
supporters ended up weakening each other while simultaneously strengthening the Whig 
position in the backcountry.
Other loyalists who had been victims of Whig persecution took advantage of the 
confusion that resulted from the Cherokee attacks to escape to Indian territory. David 
Fanning of Raebem’s Creek, South Carolina, had first fled to the Cherokees in late 1775 
when the Whigs subdued the backcountry loyalists. Captured in January 1776, Fanning 
was briefly imprisoned, then jailed a second time on suspicion of conspiring to assist the 
Cherokees. Amid the chaos caused by the Indian attacks, Fanning escaped to his home, 
where he found that “a number of my friends had already gone to the Indians, and more 
disposed so for to do.” Fanning assembled twenty-five men and joined a Cherokee party 
of over two hundred warriors on Reedy River. After finding that Whig posts in the area
229 Williamson to unnamed, July 22. 1776, Documentary History, 2:27.
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were too strong to be attacked, Fanning left the Indians and went to North Carolina.230 
Other loyalists also took the opportunity to escape to the Cherokees; at least fifteen were 
later captured in the rebel offensive against the Cherokee towns.231
By July 22, the Whigs had recovered from the first shock of the Cherokee attack, 
and Andrew Williamson had assembled seven hundred militiamen to punish the 
“treachery and faithless behavior” of that nation.232 Some Catawbas also joined the Whig 
forces and served as scouts during the invasion of Cherokee territory. Williamson 
began his advance on July 31. In the early morning hours of August 1, a large party of 
Cherokees ambushed the militia but were driven off. The rebels found one Indian dead 
and three seriously wounded on the field; their own losses were three killed and fourteen 
wounded. Williamson resumed his march and over the next several days burned many 
towns. On August 12, some Cherokees ambushed a Whig detachment commanded by 
Andrew Pickens. The encircled rebels managed to fight off their attackers and claimed to 
have killed or wounded eighty-three Indians. The militia then continued their march,
9 - 5 4
burning towns and crops while most of the Cherokees fled to the mountains. “I have 
now burnt down every town, and destroyed all the com, from the Cherokee line to the 
middle settlements,” Andrew Williamson reported on August 22. Williamson spared only 
the town of Little Chota, which was on land claimed by the Creeks.235
Other Whig parties encountered few Indians and carried out their work of 
destruction with little opposition. Lt. William Lenoir of North Carolina served in a fifty-
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man militia unit which set out on August 17 to invade the Cherokee lands. After uniting 
with other militia units, the force grew to 3,500. Lenoir did not see any Cherokees until 
September 6, when a party of militia encountered five Indians. The next day twenty 
Cherokees attacked Lenoir’s detachment, which had separated from the larger unit and 
numbered one thousand men. One North Carolinian was wounded before the Indians 
withdrew. The Cherokees killed one man on September 12 after a Whig party had killed 
and scalped a Cherokee woman.236 The expedition reached the Cherokees’ Valley Towns 
on September 19, and on that day and the next killed eight Indians and took several 
prisoners while destroying the towns and cornfields. Two militiamen were killed by 
Indians on September 22, and on the same day John Roberson “killed an old Indian 
prisoner & was put under Guard Tyed for it.” Two days later a detachment brought in 
two white prisoners with their Indian wives and mixed blood children, plus four blacks 
and “some other prisoners.” The party had also taken between seventy and eighty horses, 
some cattle, and a quantity of deerskins. The plunder was sold the next day at high prices; 
the captured Indians and blacks were probably sold as well.237
The North Carolinians met Williamson’s militia at the town of Hiwassee on 
September 26 after both forces had destroyed every Indian town within their reach. The 
combined force completed their work of destruction, which in addition to the burned 
towns and provisions claimed the lives of an estimated two thousand Cherokee men, 
women, and children. South Carolina reported a loss of ninety-nine men killed in the
236 J.G. De Roulhac Hamilton, ed. “Revolutionary Diary o f William Lenoir,” JSH, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 1940, 
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campaign; the casualties of the other southern states were lower. It had been a small price 
to pay to break Cherokee power.238
Some militia units continued to launch raids against the Cherokees until late in the 
year. Brigadier General Griffith Rutherford of North Carolina sent nearly one hundred 
men on a march deep into Cherokee territory in mid-October. They killed and scalped a 
few Indians, captured three others, and burned a small town of twenty-five houses. At an 
abandoned Cherokee camp the Whigs found an “Abundance of plunder, of Horses And 
Other Goods, to the Amount of Seven Hundred Pounds.” When the raiders returned, they 
sold their plunder and divided the proceeds. The fate of the three captives, however, 
caused a dispute between Captain William Moore, who wanted to keep the women and 
boy as prisoners until they could be properly questioned, and the other officers and men, 
who “Swore Bloodily that if they were not Sold for Slaves upon the Spot, they would kill 
and Scalp them Immediately.” Moore relented to save the Indians’ lives and they were 
sold. Eager to procure more slaves and plunder, Moore’s troops announced that they were
• 239“Very Desirous” to undertake another expedition against the Cherokees.
The Whigs had to limit their actions against the Cherokees in order to end the war 
quickly and avoid the risk of being assailed on two fronts should British forces return to 
the South. Rebel officials therefore halted the militia raids. When a Capt. Robinson of the 
Watauga settlement sought permission in mid-November to invade the Overhill Cherokee 
lands to get horses, he received a stem refusal from William Christian, who ordered that 
no one be permitted to enter Cherokee territory.240
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The rebels’ victory over the Cherokees had far-reaching consequences.
Devastated by the Whig counteroffensive, the Cherokees sued for peace. Only Dragging 
Canoe remained intransigent, taking his followers farther west rather than surrender.241 
By making skillful use of the fact that some loyalists had fought alongside the Cherokees, 
the Whigs also managed “to score a propaganda victory ... by tapping deep-seated anti- 
tribal fears among the backcountry farmers.” The rebels manipulated the Indian issue so 
well that they emerged from the Cherokee war “as the opponents of alliance with the 
Cherokees, even though they had themselves courted the tribe.”242 William Henry 
Drayton articulated the new Whig position, declaring that “the public would have 
received an essential piece of service” if the whites who had aided the Cherokees had 
“been all instantly hanged.” In addition, he believed that the war provided an opportunity 
to eliminate the Cherokees once and for all. Drayton advised militia officers to “cut up 
every Indian corn-field, and bum every Indian town,” and suggested “that every Indian 
taken shall be the slave and property of the taker; that the nation be extirpated, and the 
lands become the property of the public.”243
The timing of the Cherokee attack, which had begun just three days after the 
British attacked Charleston, provided more propaganda for the Whigs since it appeared to 
confirm their allegations that the British government had instigated the Indian war. Henry 
Laurens thought that the Cherokees “probably acted in a concerted Plan with the Ships & 
Troops,”244 while the Rev. Creswell wrote that it was “quite evident that the savages were
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made acquainted with the designs of the British fleet against Charlestown, and that there 
was a concerted scheme between them against our country.”245
Another consequence of the Cherokees’ defeat was that it made the Creeks 
reluctant to assist the British. When the rebels launched their counterattack, Charles Lee 
stated that one of their objectives was “striking a necessary terror into the minds of the 
other Nations.”246 Henry Laurens likewise hoped that a Whig victory would make other 
southern Indians “simple Spectators of our contest” with Britain.247 The results of the war 
met these expectations; Stuart failed to convince the Creeks to assist the Cherokees, and 
later reported that “all the Southern Tribes are greatly dispirited, by the unopposed 
successes of the Rebells, and no appearance of any Support from Government.” Whig 
Indian agent George Galphin contributed to Creek inactivity by circulating reports of the 
devastation inflicted on the Cherokees.248
Whig leaders had been working to undermine Stuart’s influence with the Creeks 
since the summer of 1775, although they remained more wary of that nation than of the 
Cherokees. Thus the South Carolina Council ofSafety advised the Georgians to reject 
Creek demands for gunpowder, warning that it might “be putting Arms into their Hands, 
which they might be influenced to use against the Colonies.” Instead, the South 
Carolinians suggested giving some Creek leaders a small quantity of powder, which 
might be enough to satisfy them.249 Galphin, however, warned the council that unless 
they could supply the Creeks, the Indians would think that the Whigs had lied to them 
about their friendly intentions, as Stuart’s agents had told the Creeks that the rebels were
245 James Creswell to W.H. Drayton, July 27, 1776, Documentary History, 2:30-31.
246 Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, July 21, 1776, Charles Lee Letterbook, SCL.
247 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Aug. 14, 1776, PHL, 11:230.
248 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 49-50, 52.
249 South Carolina Council ofSafety to Georgia Council ofSafety, July 24, 1775, PHL, 10:243-244.
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deceiving them. Galphin noted that “about half the uper Towns” of the Creeks were 
aligned with the British because of the Whigs’ inability to provide supplies and were 
using “all there Interest to bringe the rest of the nattion to there way of thinking,” albeit
• 9 SOwithout success. This report convinced the council to promise Galphin that they would 
provide the Creeks with clothing and ammunition. But two months later, the council 
informed Galphin that they were unable to deliver the two thousand pounds of 
gunpowder he had requested for the Indians.251
The Georgians also took steps to maintain peace with the Creeks. Upon learning 
in January 1776 of “some disturbances that have lately happened between an Indian and 
some white people,” the Council of Safety ordered Whig committees in the frontier 
counties to arrest any whites who disturbed “Indian amity with this Province.”252 This 
failed to satisfy Galphin, who worried in early February that the disruption of trade made 
war with the Creeks imminent. Aware that “it is the Trade with them that keeps them in 
our Intrest,” Galphin warned that action was necessary to counter Stuart’s efforts to unite 
the southern nations against the rebels. The combined strength of the Indians, Galphin 
wrote, was “ten or twelve thousand Gun men, but as long as we can keep the Creeks our 
Friends they will be a Barrier between us & all the other Indians.” But “if the trade is 
stop’d from here they will all go to Florida, & then we may Expect an Indian War, when 
Thirty or forty stragling Indians made the Greatest part of Georgia run, what must the 
whole Nation do,” he asked.253 In reply, the council sent Galphin one thousand pounds of
250 George Galphin to Council ofSafety, Oct. 15, 1775, PHL, 10:467-468.
251 South Carolina Council ofSafety to Galphin, Oct. 22, 1775, and Dec. 18, 1775, PHL, 10:491, 572.
252 “Proceedings of the Georgia Council o f Safety,” Jan. 8, 1776, in Collections o f  the Georgia Historical 
Society, Vol. 5, Part 1, Savannah: Braid & Hutton, 1901, 29.
253 Galphin to South Carolina Council ofSafety, Feb. 7, 1776, PHL, 11:93-97.
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gunpowder for the Creeks and pledged to procure blankets and more gunpowder. They 
also promised to seek assistance from the Continental Congress.254
Galphin’s worries appeared chimerical when about seventy Creeks who were in 
Savannah fought alongside the Whigs in the March battle against the British. Afterwards, 
Stukychee of the Cussitas allegedly declared that “he & his people would now join & 
assist” the Americans.255 Hoping to capitalize on this sentiment, the Georgia Council of 
Safety considered providing the Creeks with cattle in exchange “for their good 
offices.”256 In May, because “several accounts received respecting the Indians are very 
unfavorable,” the council continued its efforts to keep peace by repeating its orders to 
backcountry militia officers to do everything possible “to prevent the murder of any
yen
Indians.” At the same time, the Whigs took precautions by assigning sixty mounted 
men to guard their western border “from the insults of Indians who are likely to be 
troublesome.”258
Georgians’ fears of a Creek attack increased in the spring and summer. Lt. Col. 
Samuel Elbert of the Georgia Continentals warned Charles Lee that information from St. 
Augustine indicated that a joint British-Creek invasion was probable. “[T]he Savages are 
too Much inclin’d [to use] the Hatchet against us,” Elbert wrote.259 The Council of Safety 
also pleaded with Lee for assistance in July, shortly after the Cherokees had begun their 
attacks. “To the w est... are the most numerous tribes of Indians now in North America, 
viz.: the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and a number of small tribes, in the whole at least 
15,000 gun men,” the council reminded Lee. “All of these nations have been much
254 Henry Laurens to George Galphin, Feb. 14, 1776, PHL, 11:102.
255 South Carolina Council o f Safety to Georgetown Committee ofSafety, March 15, 1776, PHL, 11:165.
256 Saunt, New Order o f  Things, 50.
257 Proceedings of the Georgia Council ofSafety, May 15 and 16, 1776, CGHS, Vol. 5, 52-55.
258 Lachlan McIntosh to George Washington, April 28, 1776, “Papers o f  McIntosh,” 154.
259 Samuel Elbert to Charles Lee, May 14, 1776, “Papers o f McIntosh,” 155.
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tampered with by the emissaries of Government, and without the utmost exertions of 
prudence on our side, it is feared may be brought to act against us.”260
Lee used the southern Whigs’ fear of the Creeks to convince them to support his 
plan to invade East Florida. He told Gov. John Rutledge of South Carolina that the 
conquest of East Florida would “make a most salutary impression on the minds of the 
Creeks -  which is an object of the highest consideration.” Lee asked Rutledge to provide 
some South Carolina troops to the expedition.261 After receiving Lee’s proposal, the 
Georgia Council of Safety agreed with the general that the occupation of East Florida 
would, “from principles of dread, attach the Indians to our interest” and cut off British 
communication with the Indian nations.262 “I heartily wish the settlements” in East 
Florida “were entirely broke up,” Lachlan McIntosh wrote, endorsing Lee’s plan. “It 
would detach the Creek Indians from their [British] Interest.”
Many Georgia rebels, however, preferred to wage war against the Creeks rather 
than invade East Florida. Having seen the ease with which the Cherokees had been 
defeated, the Georgians hoped to similarly destroy the Creeks and seize their land. They 
pressured their own government and Lee to attack the Creeks, but Whig officials refused 
to approve a measure that might devastate Georgia.264 War with the Creeks appeared 
likely enough without seeking a confrontation; in October an ominous report reached 
Savannah that representatives from the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws 
were meeting with Stuart at Pensacola to decide whether to launch “a general War” on
260 Proceedings o f the Georgia Council ofSafety, July 5, 1776, CGHS, Vol. 5, 72.
261 Charles Lee to [John Rutledge], Aug. 1, 1776, Charles Lee Letterbook, SCL.
262 Proceedings of the Georgia Council ofSafety, Aug. 19, 1776, CGHS, Vol. 5, 93.
263 McIntosh to Charles Lee, July 29, 1776, “Papers of McIntosh,” 159.
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the rebels. According to the informant, five hundred Creeks in Florida were ready to 
attack Georgia.265
As Whig relations with the Creeks worsened, Stuart’s prospects for retaining that 
nation’s allegiance correspondingly improved. In September 1776, George Galphin’s 
nephew, David Holmes, partially undermined Galphin’s work by joining the British. 
Stuart promptly employed Holmes to work with the Creeks to take advantage of the 
latter’s influence with them.266 Patrick Tonyn also labored to keep the Creeks attached to 
the British interest, despite Germain’s instructions to refrain from “indiscriminate use of 
Indians against the rebels.”267 The governor defused a potential crisis in the summer of 
1776, when twenty-two Creeks raided East Floridians living along Indian River. Insisting 
that the settlers were “much more alarmed than hurt,” Tonyn rejected proposals to 
retaliate. Instead, he summoned the Indians who were in the vicinity of St. Augustine, 
“said what was proper,” and secured their promise to identify the offenders. He also 
asked David Taitt to inform Creek leaders that “such violences ought to be punished.”
The best way to maintain good relations with the Creeks, Tonyn believed, was to 
use them in conjunction with backcountry loyalists to harass the rebels. The governor 
blamed Stuart for moving too slowly to bring the Indians into action, complaining to Gen. 
Henry Clinton that Stuart needed “a strong Spur” to get him to act.269 Tonyn also 
expressed his “fear” to Germain that “it is the intention of the Government not to employ 
the Indians,” adding that such a policy would be a mistake. The Indians, Tonyn asserted,
265 McIntosh to Howe, Oct. 22, 1776, “Papers of McIntosh,” 160.
266 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 73.
267 Brown, American Secretary, 60.
268 Tonyn to Germain, July 19, 1776, Edward M. Coleman, ed., “Letter from Governor Patrick Tonyn of 
East Florida to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1776,” MVHR, Vol. 33, No. 2, 
Sept. 1946, 290.
269 Snapp, John Stuart, 168.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
138
were “ready to join the British troops.” The governor added that he was “well informed 
the back country of the two Carolinas wished greatly for the Indians to cooperate with 
them, for His Majesty’s service, but were in great dread of the Indians making an 
indiscriminate attack.” However, Tonyn believed that “it would be easy to conduct the 
Indians discriminately” by appointing proper guides for them and designating locations 
where they could rendezvous with the loyalists.270
Pressure from Tonyn and others finally convinced Germain to approve the use of 
Indians in October 1776. Germain advised William Howe, the army’s new commander- 
in-chief in America, that if the general decided to undertake “a Southern Expedition”
• 271during the upcoming winter, an “Indian war” might facilitate his operations. Several 
weeks later, Germain emphasized the “great Importance of engaging the Southern Indians 
in Our Interest” in another letter to Howe. Stuart would be awaiting Howe’s orders to 
employ the Indians “in seconding any Operations you may think fit to direct” in the 
south, Germain noted.272 Howe had already decided to use Indians, albeit only in a 
defensive role. He had ordered Stuart on August 25 “to engage the Indians for the
O'l'Kdefence of the Florida’s” as soon as possible.
Some Creeks had already begun to assist the British. About twenty Creeks and 
some loyalists attacked rebel troops near Fort Barrington in Georgia in October, killing 
four, destroying several plantations in the vicinity and sending the inhabitants and militia 
fleeing. Two months later another Creek party raided a rebel post at Beard’s Bluff, then
270 Tonyn to Germain, July 19, 1776, in Coleman, ed., “Letter from Governor Tonyn,” 291-292.
271 Germain to William Knox, Oct. 19, 1776, William Knox Papers, WLCL.
272 Germain to William Howe, Nov. 6, 1776, Germain Papers, Vol. 5, WLCL.
273 William Howe to John Stuart, Aug. 25, 1776, Carleton Papers, Vol. 3, No. 258.
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killed four Whigs when the garrison emerged to pursue the attackers. Most of the rebels 
then deserted the post.274
Other Creek leaders also appeared ready to join the war. Tonyn and Thomas 
Brown managed to convince Cowkeeper to commit the Seminoles to assist in the defense 
of East Florida, while Emestisiguo of the Upper Creeks informed John Stuart in 
November 1776 that his people would attack the Americans if the northern nations would 
cooperate with them. At the end of the month, several hundred Creeks gathered to resist a 
rumored rebel attack on the Lower Creeks, but the report proved false.275
Stuart had to consider defensive strategy as well as offensive maneuvers. Both he 
and Gov. Chester recognized the importance of protecting West Florida as the base from
97 f \which the Indians would be supplied. Stuart also understood that the Indians would 
have to bear most of the burden of West Florida’s defense since the white population was 
small. In August 1776 he informed Germain that there were about “four hundred good 
white men, traders and packhorsemen” who lived among the Indians, and “might be 
embodied” for use “in carrying on any service jointly with the Indians.” Stuart added that 
such men, “acquainted with the manner and language of the Indians ... might, I conceive, 
be very useful and tend to prevent the disorders and excesses which bodies of Indians, not 
conducted by white men might probably commit.”277 Howe, who had heard rumors that 
the rebels planned to attack West Florida, agreed. He instructed Stuart to prepare the
274 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 68, 77-78; Lachlan McIntosh to [Robert Howe?], Oct. 29, 1776; 
McIntosh to Howe, Oct. 1, 1776, Oct. 29, 1776, “Papers o f McIntosh,” 157, 159, 160.
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Indians to defend the province and to “appoint proper persons to accompany and lead”
them.278
Stuart assigned the Chickasaws to guard the trails that passed through the upper 
Tombigbee Valley in case the rebels attempted to march overland against the British 
posts on the Gulf of Mexico. He provided them with arms and ammunition; but when the 
superintendent asked them in late 1776 to guard the Mississippi and Tennessee River 
approaches to West Florida, the Chickasaws refused, claiming that such duty would 
interfere with their winter hunt.279
Phantom Slave Insurrections, Real Repression 
When reports that British officials planned to arm slaves and incite insurrections 
reached South Carolina and Georgia, rebel leaders immediately took steps to prevent 
their slaves from assisting the British. The Whigs put the militia on guard, searched for 
signs of slave rebellion, and took harsh action against any blacks who appeared 
dangerous. Slave laws were rigorously enforced, so that “black people -  free and slave -  
found that regulations which had gone unenforced for years were given new life.”
Upon hearing the first rumors of the alleged British plan, Charles Pinckney, 
commander of Charleston’s Whig militia, informed loyalist Lt. Gov. William Bull that he 
had information of “some bad designs in the negroes.” At Pinckney’s request, Bull issued
an order increasing the strength of militia patrols in the town.281 One company patrolled
• 282Charleston during the day and two at night to guard against slave insurrection. Whig 
Josiah Smith wrote that the militia’s primary duty was “to guard against any hostile
278 Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 52.
279 Gibson, The Chickasaws, 71; Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 222.
280 Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 292.
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attempts that might be made by our domesticks.”283 He also noted that the provincial 
congress’s decision to create three regiments of troops was intended to keep slaves “in
984awe,” as well as to resist a possible British attack.
Rebel authorities in South Carolina knew that if such an attack came, many slaves 
would flee to the British at the first opportunity and carefully studied how to prevent 
slaves in the lowcountry from reaching the king’s forces. A committee charged with 
planning the colony’s defense proposed a drastic measure: if the British approached the 
coast, “All the negroes between the sea, and a line drawn from North Edisto Inlet to 
Tugaloo, thence along the river to Stono, thence to Dorchester, thence to Goose Creek 
bridge, thence to the mouth of Back river, thence to Cain Hoy, and thence to the sea, 
should be removed” to safer locations. The militia would then constantly patrol these
9RSboundaries to prevent any communication between the slaves and the British. This plan 
would have deprived the province’s most productive plantations of their laborers for as 
long as the British were in the vicinity of Charleston, and perhaps indefinitely if the 
British managed to occupy the town, yet South Carolina’s Whigs preferred to let their 
plantations lie idle rather than risk the loss of their slaves. Such a massive relocation of 
people, however, would have been nearly impossible to carry out, and the confusion that 
would have resulted might actually have created opportunities for slaves to escape. 
Therefore no such systematic evacuation of slaves was ever attempted.
Some Whigs hoped that persuasion would suffice to prevent their slaves from 
fleeing to the British. In an effort to insure that slaves remain at home, Henry Laurens
283 Olwell, Masters, Slaves, and Subjects, 238.
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summoned all the slaves on his brother’s plantation to a meeting, where he advised them 
“to behave with great circumspection” and “set before them, the great risque of exposing 
themselves to the treachery of pretended freinds & false witnesses if they associated with 
any Negroes out of your family or mine.” Laurens said that the slaves “were sensibly 
affected” by his speech, “& with many thanks promised to follow my advice.”286 
Most rebels considered such mild measures insufficient to prevent a slave 
uprising. The Charleston press fueled white anxiety by frequently publishing material 
“calculated to incite the fears of the People.” At the same time, reports that Governor 
Campbell had brought arms for them reached many slaves, encouraging some to 
“impertinent behaviour.”287 In late May or early June, a schooner sailing from Charleston
into the Carolina interior “was robbed by Some Negroes, they took Nothing else but
288Powder,” adding further credence to reports that a slave revolt was imminent.
Whig leaders responded to the threat by beginning criminal proceedings against 
blacks suspected of rebellious tendencies. “Trials of Several Negroes Suspected & 
charged of plotting an Insurrection have been conducted this Week,” Henry Laurens 
wrote on June 18. “Jerry the pilot is among the most Criminal -  two or three White 
people are Committed to prison upon Strong Negro Evidence.” Laurens expected even 
more plots to be revealed, as the Rev. Oliver Hart had reported that one of his slaves and 
another owned by Joshua Ward “could make very ample discoveries.” The Whigs
289immediately took the two slaves into custody so they could be interrogated.
286 Henry Laurens to James Laurens, June 7, 1775, PHL, 10:162-163.
287 Frey, Water from the Rock, 56.
288 Joseph Manigault to Gabriel Manigault, June 4, 1775, Manigault Family Papers, SCL.
289 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, June 18, 1775, PHL, 10:184-185.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
143
A few days later the investigators reported that there was “very little foundation” 
to the rumors of an impending slave rebellion, “however one or two Negroes are to be 
Severely flogged & banished.” The Whigs conceded that they had not found any 
substantial evidence of their guilt, but thought it best to make an example of them. Two 
whites suspected of plotting with the slaves were released for lack of evidence. These 
findings did not reduce white apprehensions, however, and the militia was “kept on Duty 
Night & Day” as rumors of slave revolts continued to circulate.290
By early July the fears of insurrection began to abate. Henry Laurens declared on 
July 2 that “I am sure we have nothing to fear from within.”291 Another Whig, Gabriel 
Manigault, concluded that the tales of impending slave revolts had no validity. “We have 
been alarmed by idle reports that the Negros intended to rise, which on examination 
proved to be of less consequence than was expected,” he informed his son on July 8; 
“however a Strick watch has been Kept for fear of the worst.”292
This air of assurance evaporated a few days later when the Council of Safety 
received a letter from St. Bartholomew’s Parish, dated July 5, which claimed that Whigs 
there had discovered “that Several of the Slaves in the neighborhood, were exciting & 
endeavouring to bring abt. a General Insurrection.” Local officials had arrested “such as 
were said to be the Principal leaders of their Infernal designs” and put them on trial. 
Several of the slaves were sentenced to receive “Exemplary punishmts,” including the 
hanging of one suspect. The testimony of the accused slaves also revealed the instigator 
of the alleged insurrection: John Burnet, a Scot who “hath been a long time preaching to
290 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, June 23, 1775, PHL, 10:191-192.
291 Henry Laurens to James Laurens, July 2, 1775, PHL, 10:202.
292 Gabriel Manigault to Gabriel Manigault, Jr., July 8, 1775, in Maurice A. Crouse, ed., “Papers o f Gabriel 
Manigault, 1771-1784,” SCHM, Vol. 64, No. 1, Jan. 1963, 2.
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the ... Negroes ... In the Woods -  and other Places.” One of the accused slaves testified 
that another suspect had informed him that Burnet told his black listeners that “the old 
King had reced a Book from our Lord by which he was to Alter the World (meaning to 
set the Negroes free),” but had died and gone to hell for failing to follow his divine 
instructions. However, “the Young King, meaning our Present One, came up with the 
Book, & was about to alter the World, & set the Negroes Free.” On the basis of this 
hearsay evidence, officials in St. Bartholomew Parish arrested Burnet and sent him to 
Charleston for further interrogation.293
After examining Burnet, the Council of Safety found him guilty only of excessive 
enthusiasm for converting slaves to Christianity, which had led him to preach without 
obtaining permission from the slaves’ owners. Burnet “denied having any Knowledge of 
the pretended Book,” so the council released him on his promise not to return to St. 
Bartholomew’s Parish. He then left for Georgia.294 Despite Burnet’s acquittal, rumors of 
slave rebellions continued to circulate and gain credence. Even Henry Laurens, who had 
dismissed the accounts a few weeks earlier, was now certain that “[insurrections of our 
Negroes attended by the most horrible butcheries of Innocent Women & Children” were 
part of the ministry’s “dark Hellish plots for Subjugating the Colonies.”
The Council of Safety believed that Thomas Jeremiah, known to the Whigs as 
“Jerry,” intended to take a leading role in the ministry’s supposed plot; he was the man 
Laurens described as the worst among the suspected black conspirators arrested in mid- 
June. Jeremiah, a free black whose skills as a harbor pilot had enabled him to amass 
considerable wealth, apparently angered the Whigs simply because he was a successful
293 Thomas Hutchinson to Council o f Safety, July 5, 1775, PHL, 10:206-208.
294 Council o f Safety to St. Bartholomew Committee, July 18, 1775, PHL, 10:231.
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black man in a slave society. Laurens considered him “a forward fellow, puffed up by 
prosperity, ruined by Luxury & debauchery & grown to an amazing pitch of vanity & 
ambition.”296 During the interrogation of the black prisoners, one slave claimed that 
Jeremiah had asked him to bring some guns to a runaway slave named Dewar, “to be 
placed in Negro’s Hands to fight against the Inhabitants of this Province, and that He 
Jeremiah was to have the chief Command of the said Negroes.” Jeremiah also allegedly 
stated that he had enough powder but “wanted more Arms.” A second slave said that 
when he had asked Jeremiah what he should do if war came, Jeremiah told him to “join 
the Soldiers; that the War was come to help the poor Negroes.”297
On August 11 the Whigs put Jeremiah on trial, found him guilty of plotting an 
insurrection, and sentenced him “to be hanged and afterwards burned.” Gov. Campbell, 
who did not think that the legal proceedings even deserved to be called a trial, protested 
to the presiding judge, pointing out “the weakness of the evidence” against Jeremiah. 
Campbell’s intervention “raised such a clamour among the people as is incredible,” the 
governor wrote, “and they openly and loudly declared that if I granted the man a pardon 
they would hang him at my door.”298 Campbell then asked Henry Laurens for assistance 
in preventing Jeremiah’s execution, noting that one of the slaves who had testified for the 
prosecution had since retracted his testimony.299 Laurens answered that he had brought 
the issues Campbell had raised before the Council of Safety, and that “they utterly 
refused to take them under Consideration.” Laurens added that he understood that 
Jeremiah had received a fair trial and justified the Whigs’ threats of violence if he were to
296 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Aug. 20, 1775, PHL, 10:320-322.
297 Campbell to Dartmouth, Aug. 31, 1775, abstract, Dartmouth Papers, #1467, Reel 13, DLAR.
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be released. “In the Calamitous Situation of this Colony under the threats of 
Insurrections, strong proofs of which the people are possessed of, no wonder they are 
alarmed at the Sound of Pardon to a Man circumstanced in all respects as Jerry is,” he 
wrote.300 Alexander Innes renewed the correspondence with Laurens the following day in
• -5A1hopes of obtaining a repneve for Jeremiah, but without success. Some rebels sneered 
at the governor’s endeavors to save the condemned man; Peter Timothy told William 
Henry Drayton that “more force was exerted for his being saved, than there would have 
been for you.”302
Privately, Laurens pronounced himself “fully Satisfied that Jerry was guilty of a 
design & attempt to encourage our Negroes to Rebellion & joining the King’s Troops if 
any had been sent here.” The “uncommon pains taken to Save his Life” by Campbell and 
Innes led the Whigs to suspect their motives; Laurens wrote that their efforts on the black 
man’s behalf “had filled the minds of many people with great Jealousies against certain 
Crown Officers.”303 The governor believed that the rebels suspected loyalists of 
involvement in the alleged plot to promote slave insurrections and sought an opportunity 
to punish them for it. “Happy it was for the friends of government in this country that the 
wretched creatures who were doomed to death could not be prevailed upon to accuse any 
white person though repeatedly told it was the only chance they had for life,” Campbell 
wrote. “I am convinced if any had been accused they must have fallen a sacrifice to the 
fury of the mob.”304
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In a letter to Dartmouth, Campbell expressed his horror at Jeremiah’s execution.
“I could not save him My Lord! the very reflection Harrows my Soul!” the governor 
lamented. His only consolation was that he had done all in his power to save Jeremiah’s 
life.305 Campbell called the Whigs “a set of barbarians who are worse than the most cruel 
savages any history has described.”306
Campbell’s horror at the execution and compassion for the victim were shared by 
many in Britain when the news arrived there. Supporters of the government used the 
judicial murder of Jeremiah to justify taking a hard line against the rebels, whom they 
portrayed as savages. Pamphleteer John Lind included the incident in a tract designed “to 
demonstrate how American patriots were using terror to establish a regime which neither 
the British constitution nor English common law could ever legitimate.”307 The Earl of 
Sandwich, speaking for the ministry in the House of Lords, declared that the rebels “have 
put an innocent free negro to death, attended with every circumstance of cruelty and 
baseness.” He recounted how “a mock tribunal” had allowed the perjury of a slave to 
convict Jeremiah, even though provincial law did not allow a slave to testify against a 
free person. This affair proved the need for a harsh policy to suppress the rebels. “After 
such outrages, lenity would be culpable,” Sandwich stated.308 In a vain attempt to undo 
the damage Jeremiah’s execution had done to the rebel cause, John Laurens, at his 
father’s request, published a justification for the Whigs’ actions in a London
309newspaper.
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Had the ministry wished to arm slaves, or at least to offer freedom to those willing 
to serve in the king’s forces, the death of Jeremiah and the accompanying outrage 
provided an excellent opportunity to justify the decision. If the ministers had asserted that 
such measures were necessary to allow blacks to protect themselves from rebel cruelty, it 
would have been difficult for opponents to counter that argument. However, there is no 
evidence that Jeremiah’s execution caused the ministers to reconsider their policy in 
regard to slaves.
If the ministers still refused to give blacks a more active part in subduing the 
southern rebels, slaves at least fulfilled their assigned role by keeping the Whig militia 
occupied. The large number of slaves in South Carolina complicated efforts to keep the 
rebel militia in service, for with most white men away from home the possibility of a 
slave insurrection increased. In September 1775, militia Col. Stephen Bull reported that 
he had been forced to send some of the men from Prince William Parish home because 
“there were the fewest white men in proportion to the Domestics” there. Bull observed 
that this was a common problem. “As to the Argument of their domestics being left 
without white Men,” he wrote, “they certainly are in the predicament with every other 
Parish or District on Field or Muster days; and you certainly will allow that when they 
[militia] are in a body they are more safe and ready to march to ... any other part where an 
Insurrection may be apprehended.”310 But Bull worried that “should a sudden 
Insurrection of our Domestics happen,” the militia lacked sufficient gunpowder “to make 
the least defence.”311 Joseph Glover reported that in Colleton County “the Patrol Service
310 Stephen Bull to Henry Laurens, Sept. 19, 1775, PHL, 10:313-314.
311 Stephen Bull to Henry Laurens, Aug. 18, 1775, PHL, 10:309.
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(which is one of the Materialist in the lower districts)” occupied so much of the men’s
time that the officers were unable to conduct any training.312
The decision by Virginia governor John Murray, Earl of Dunmore, to arm slaves
to suppress the rebellion in that province sparked another uproar in South Carolina.
Dunmore believed that his plan would deprive rebel planters of their labor force, keep
them at home to guard against slave uprisings instead of serving in the rebel forces, and
most importantly, provide both soldiers and laborers for the British army. This latter
benefit appeared to be easily realized, as word of Dunmore’s proclamation of freedom to
any slave who would join him, spread verbally by the slaves and circulated by loyalists,
brought three hundred slaves to the governor within a week of its issuance. The
proclamation also “undoubtedly had an indirect effect on thousands of additional slaves,”
even if they did not join the British, by “quickening their hopes for freedom.”313 It clearly
linked the British with emancipation in the minds of slaves across the South.
Dunmore’s actions threatened to undermine the entire social and economic
structure of the southern provinces and also had the potential to provide enough black
troops to defeat the rebels. One Whig, writing from Philadelphia but evidently quite
familiar with southern slavery, described rebel views on the issue with great insight:
Hell itself could not have vomitted any thing more black than his 
[Dunmore’s] design of emancipating our slaves; and unless he is cut off 
before he is reinforced, we know not how far the contagion may spread.
The flame runs like wild fire through the slaves, who are more than two 
for one white in the Southern Colonies. The subject of their nocturnal revels, 
instead of music and dancing, is now turned upon their liberty. I know not 
whence these troubles may lead us. If our friends in England are not able to 
oblige the ministry to give way, we are lost; and already gone too far to
3,2 Joseph Glover to Henry Laurens, Sept. 22, 1775, PHL, 10:416.
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retract with safety.314
South Carolinian Edward Rutledge, who several weeks earlier had urged the 
Continental Congress to discharge all blacks serving in the rebel army, asserted that 
Dunmore’s actions would “more effectually work an eternal separation between Great 
Britain and the Colonies, -  than any other expedient, which could possibly have been 
thought of.” After the colonists saw “our Slaves emancipated for the express purpose of 
massacreing their Masters,” Rutledge thought that they would no longer consider 
reconciliation with the mother country.315
Like their counterparts in Virginia who sought freedom with Dunmore, many 
South Carolina slaves escaped from their masters and made their way to Charleston, 
hoping to get aboard British warships stationed in the harbor. Some did reach the ships 
and began cooperating with royal navy sailors in nighttime raids along the province’s 
coast. In early December, Whig leaders learned that nearly five hundred black fugitives 
were camped on Sullivan’s Island awaiting an opportunity to board the British vessels.316 
On December 9, Gen. William Moultrie ordered Major Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to 
take 150 men to the island “to surprize, seize, and apprehend” the slaves. The plan was 
frustrated, however, when Pinckney failed to locate a ford that would allow him to cross 
to the island.317 The Whigs made a second attempt on December 18; in keeping with
314 “Extract o f a letter from Philadelphia,” Dec. 6, 1775, in Willard, ed., Letters on the Revolution, 233. 
Based on the writer’s obvious familiarity with the situation o f slaves in the southern provinces, it is 
probable that he was either a southern delegate attending the Congress in Philadelphia or a northern 
delegate who obtained his information from a southern colleague.
315 Edward Rutledge to Ralph Izard, Dec. 8, 1775, Correspondence o f Izard, 1:165-166. On Rutledge’s 
opposition to the enlistment o f  blacks in the rebel forces, see Alden, South in the Revolution, 40. Rutledge 
eventually succeeded in convincing Congress to stop the enlistment of blacks.
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their policy of encouraging animosity between blacks and Indians, the Whigs sent fifty- 
four Catawbas to participate in the attack. Their early morning assault killed an estimated 
fifty blacks and captured several more along with a few British sailors. Almost twenty 
blacks escaped and were picked up by boats from the British warships.318 The Council of 
Safety hoped that the attack “will serve to humble our Negroes in general.”319
Angered at the British naval officers for providing refuge to fugitive slaves, the 
Whigs repudiated an agreement by which they sold provisions to the navy in exchange 
for the officers’ pledge not to take supplies by force. Fenwick Bull, a Whig who had gone 
aboard a warship to discuss the British seizure of a merchant vessel on December 10, 
accused Capt. John Tollemache of harboring runaway slaves during the discussion. 
Tollemache replied that the blacks “came as free men, and demanded protection; that he 
could have had five-hundred who had offered.” He refused a demand to return the slaves, 
asserting that the Americans were rebels and he had orders to distress them in any way 
possible. The rebels believed that Tollemache’s ship, the Scorpion, carried off between 
thirty and forty slaves when it left the harbor shortly afterwards.321 One of these was “a 
valuable black Pilot” whom the captain took “by way of Reprisal & for worse purposes 
perhaps.”322 Another was John Marrant, who had been “pressed on board” because the 
British “were told I could play on music.” Marrant served as a musician in the royal navy 
until the end of the war.323 When the other ships departed, each also had several blacks on
318 Wood, “Dream Deferred,” 179; Wood, “The Facts Speak Loudly,” 8; Brown, Catawba Indians, 262; 
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board. Henry Laurens considered the British “robberies” of slaves “sufficient to alarm 
every Man in the Colony.”324
In the spring of 1776, South Carolina Whigs began to suspect that a British attack 
somewhere in the South was imminent. They immediately took steps to prevent slaves 
from fleeing to the British by passing a law mandating the death penalty for any slave 
who tried to join the king’s armed forces. Two slaves who stole a schooner in a vain 
attempt to reach British warships scouting Charleston’s defenses were ordered hanged on 
April 27 to demonstrate that the law would be strictly enforced.325 Undeterred, five of 
William Moultrie’s slaves who worked as crewmen on a barge used the vessel to reach a 
British ship in May. Whigs believed the British naval officers had “obtained ample means 
of information” from the fugitives.326
The rebels feared that if a British attack did come, the necessity of concentrating 
the militia to defend Charleston would make it difficult to control the large slave 
population in the lowcountry. “The Militia near the Sea Coast You Know Consists of 
Overseers, if they are kept from their business, little is to be expected in the Planting 
way,” Pierce Butler stated. “Besides it is surely improper to leave numbers of Negroes 
without a White Man. By all Accts. at this time there is Scarce an Overseer on any of the 
Plantations from Purysburg to Combahee.”327 Affairs on Ralph Izard’s plantation were in 
the “utmost distraction” in late March because five of the six overseers had been away 
on militia duty.328 Gen. Charles Lee was aware of these problems but decided that 
concentrating all available troops to hold Charleston would ultimately prove to be the
324 Henry Laurens to Stephen Bull, Jan. 20, 1776, PHL, 11:50.
325 Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 128.
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best means of keeping the slaves in check. It was important, Lee wrote, to convince 
slaves that the Whigs held real power, as “the opinion which the slave will entertain of 
our superiority or inferiority will naturally keep pace with our maintaining or giving 
ground.”329
Lee’s assessment was correct; the rebels succeeded in defeating a British attack 
on Charleston at the end of June without their slaves creating any disruption. When the 
opportunity offered, however, slaves continued to escape to British naval vessels that 
frequently patrolled the South Carolina coast. In early August the frigate Active landed a 
party of forty whites and twenty armed blacks on Bull’s Island, where they took some 
cattle and “augmented their black Guard by stealing Six more Negroes.” While Henry 
Laurens took comfort in the fact that none of his slaves had escaped to the British, he 
realized that he had been fortunate in that regard, for “many hundreds of that Colour have 
been stolen & decoyed by the Servants of King George the third -  Captains of British 
Ships of War & Noble Lords have busied themselves in such inglorious pilferage to the 
disgrace of their Master & disgrace of their Cause.”330 Later, when Laurens suspected 
that one of his disgruntled slaves might try to escape to a British vessel, he ordered his 
overseer to secure the man in irons.331
After their initial outrage at reports that the British government planned to incite 
slave insurrections, Georgia rebels appeared to have worried far less about such an event 
than did their counterparts in South Carolina. It was not until January 1776, when British 
warships arrived at Savannah to procure rice for the garrison at Boston, that the Whigs in 
Georgia acted to prevent their slaves from revolting or fleeing to the British. The Council
329 Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 122.
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of Safety then sent the militia “to Strip the Negroe Houses” on both the Georgia and 
South Carolina sides of the Savannah River of “Arms and Ammunition.” Whig troops 
searched the homes of overseers as well as slaves; all of the muskets and ammunition 
found were confiscated, except that overseers were each allowed to keep one musket and 
thirteen rounds of ammunition. If the slaves did revolt and defeat their overseers, Whig
•5 -5 ' j
officials did not want them to gain access to a significant supply of arms.
Many slaves did attempt to reach the British ships, angering rebels who 
complained that naval officers were “encouraging our slaves to desert to them.”333 If this 
were not infuriating enough, some slaves added to the Whigs’ frustration during a battle 
that erupted in March when the rebels tried to prevent the British from seizing several 
rice-laden vessels. British troops on Hutchinson’s Island had retreated under a barrage of 
rebel musket fire, abandoning two pieces of artillery. Before the Whigs could secure 
these trophies, slaves belonging to John Graham, the loyalist lieutenant governor, 
recovered the cannon and returned them to the British.334
Col. Stephen Bull, who had taken some of his South Carolina militia to reinforce 
the Georgians, believed that vigorous action had to be taken to halt the flight of slaves to 
the British and punish those who had taken refuge on Tybee Island waiting to go on 
board royal navy vessels. Bull learned in mid-March that between forty and fifty slaves 
belonging to South Carolinian Arthur Middleton, along with over 150 others, were at 
Tybee.335 Bull urged the South Carolina Council of Safety to approve harsh measures
332 Harvey H. Jackson, “The Battle o f the Riceboats: Georgia Joins the Revolution,” GHQ, Vol. 58, No. 1. 
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against the runaways. If the British were permitted to carry off the slaves, Bull stated, it 
“will only enable an enemy to fight us with our own money or property,” money if the 
slaves were sold and the funds applied to the war effort, property if the slaves were 
armed.336
Bull proposed to solve the problem with the aid of seventy Creek warriors who 
were then at Savannah.337 He suggested that the Indians raid Tybee and execute all the 
slaves who could not be recaptured; their owners could be compensated at public 
expense. The Creeks were the ideal people to conduct the raid and kill resisting slaves, 
Bull asserted, because the destruction of the refugees might not only “deter other negroes 
from deserting” but “will establish a hatred or aversion between the Indians and negroes.” 
A Creek leader had assured Bull of his willingness to lead a party in an attack on the 
fugitive slaves; however, Bull lacked the authority to order the measure and doubted 
whether the Georgia Council of Safety was resolute enough to approve his plan. He 
therefore sought authorization from South Carolina officials, while urging them to keep 
the matter “a profound secret,” so that the slaves would not learn of the attack and flee, or 
obtain arms from the British and ambush the Creeks.338 Bull, who made up in astuteness 
what he lacked in morality, easily recognized the advantages of inflaming the hostility of 
two potential enemies towards one another at the outset of the conflict in order to spare 
the rebels the difficulty of opposing both.
On March 16, the South Carolina Council of Safety informed Bull that his plan 
was “an awful business notwithstanding it has the sanction of Law to put even fugitive & 
Rebellious Slaves to death, the prospect is horrible.” The council advised Bull that it was
336 Bull to Laurens, March 14, 1776, Documentary History, 1:268.
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up to the Georgians “to give that encouragement which is necessary to induce proper 
Persons to seize & if nothing else will do to destroy all those Rebellious Negroes upon 
Tybee Island or wherever they may be found.” Indians could be used if the Georgians 
thought proper, but white men should lead them if possible. The owners of any slaves 
killed in the raid should be reimbursed by the public, and South Carolina officials were 
willing to share the cost with Georgia. The council also told Bull to blame the violence 
on the British: “to those Royal Miscreants who are carrying on an inglorious picaroon 
Warr let every inglorious unavoidable act of necessity which we may be driven to 
commit for our self preservation, be imputed.”339 Southern Whigs would resort to this 
device throughout the war, committing the most brutal acts of violence and then claiming 
that their enemies had left them no alternative.
The Georgia militia, dressed and painted like Indians, and some thirty Creeks 
attacked Tybee Island on March 25. They killed one of six British marines who were on 
the island at the time, wounded several others, and burned three houses. The rebels also 
captured a handful of white loyalists and about a dozen slaves.340 Evidently they killed 
many fugitive slaves, since the British claimed that both whites and Indians in the 
attacking party practiced “the most savage barbarity,” and that in this regard the whites 
had behaved worse than the Indians.341
After the British left Georgia, some slaves continued to escape to British vessels 
whenever they appeared on the coast, while others made the trek overland to the Floridas. 
Georgia’s Council of Safety noted in July that “negroes are daily inveigled and carried
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away from their plantations” by British warships.342 In September, George Aaron, 
overseer at Henry Laurens’s plantation at New Hope, Georgia, fled with five of Laurens’s 
slaves and a sixth belonging to William McIntosh.343 Laurens later learned that his slaves 
had gone to St. Augustine and complained that they “had been actually Stolen.” He wrote 
that “the Man who had perpetrated that act of villainy had returned with a party in order 
to carry off as many more as he could take” and failed only because Laurens had already 
moved the remaining slaves elsewhere.344 It is not clear whether Aaron took the slaves 
forcibly for his own benefit or whether they voluntarily accompanied him. Since Aaron 
would have found it almost impossible to manage six reluctant companions, in all 
likelihood the men either agreed to escape together; perhaps he deceived the slaves with 
promises of liberty in Florida, only to sell them back into bondage after they arrived.
Georgia’s rebel leaders worried that loyalists in East Florida would arm the 
runaway slaves and employ them against their former masters, which led the Council of 
Safety to advocate an invasion of East Florida in the summer of 1776.345 Gov. Tonyn, 
however, lacked the resources to undertake such a measure; in October he wrote that 
“there are a number of Runaway Negros from Georgia, whom I relieved the Captains of 
the Navy of, to whom they fled for protection,” but added that he needed government 
assistance to support the slaves and white loyalist refugees who had come to the
346province.
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Tonyn willingly armed blacks to defend his province. When he created a militia 
battalion in August 1776, he informed Germain that “we shall be able to raise four black 
Companies.” Tonyn planned to maintain discipline in those units by assigning “double or 
treble” the number of white officers in comparison to the amount of officers in white 
companies.347 Slaves served in the provincial militia throughout the war; others, perhaps 
free blacks or those who had escaped from rebel masters, joined Thomas Brown’s Florida 
Rangers, which at one time included about 150 black soldiers.348 Like their governor, 
“white Floridians assumed not only that slaves should be impressed to labor on 
fortifications but also that if need be they should be armed and employed as ordinary 
soldiers.” Several planters along the St. Mary’s River and on the coastal islands, areas 
particularly vulnerable to rebel raids, probably armed and trained their slaves to defend 
their estates.349 Slaves also helped defend the province by providing intelligence of rebel 
movements. When seventy Whig militiamen from Georgia marched southward to attack a 
fort at Germyn Wright’s plantation on the St. Mary’s River, a slave warned Wright of 
their approach, so that the rebels found the defenders prepared for them and had to 
retreat.350
Unlike their neighbors in East Florida, the loyalist planters of West Florida were 
not threatened by the Whigs and thus preferred to maintain the status quo in regard to 
slavery. The most serious danger West Floridians faced in 1776 was in fact a possible 
slave insurrection. On June 24, three neighbors called upon planter William Dunbar of 
Natchez and told him that they had discovered a slave conspiracy centered at his
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plantation. They named three of Dunbar’s slaves and a fourth owned by another planter 
as the ringleaders. “Of what avail is kindness & good usage when rewarded by such 
ingratitude?” a shocked Dunbar asked himself. He summoned one of the accused slaves, 
who “seemed to know nothing of the matter,” even when confronted by his accusers. 
Later that day, while the slave was in a boat “with his arms pinioned,” he threw himself 
into the Mississippi and drowned. Dunbar attributed the suicide to the slave’s feeling of 
guilt that “his intended Diabolical plan” had been discovered. The other three accused 
conspirators were tried on July 1, found guilty, and hanged the next day. Several other 
slaves suspected of involvement received milder punishments.351
West Florida was the only southern province where slaves had not been directly 
affected by the Revolution. In Georgia and South Carolina, numerous slaves had sought 
freedom with the British, an eventuality the ministry had apparently failed to consider 
when formulating its southern strategy. The slaves’ actions had prompted British officers 
to grant blacks what protection they could provide, while royal governors Dunmore and 
Tonyn had, on their own initiative, armed blacks. Yet in spite of these clear indications 
that slaves would not remain passive and that both civil and military officials were 
willing to employ blacks against the rebels, the ministry refused to alter their policy to 
take full advantage of slave assistance.
Royal Relief Fails
In the autumn of 1775, the ministry began preparations for an expedition to 
relieve the loyalists in the southern provinces. Acting in response to the information he
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had received from southern governors, in early September Lord Dartmouth suggested a 
southern expedition to Gen. William Howe. Lord North, who hoped to mollify those 
Britons who demanded vigorous action by winning a victory with minimal effort, put the 
plan before the king on October 15. The next day the king approved the diversion of five 
regiments from Ireland, originally intended to reinforce Boston, for a winter campaign 
with the objective of retaking North Carolina.352
Dartmouth informed Howe of the plan, going so far as to suggest that “the 
Appearance of a respectable Force” in the South might “have the effect to restore Order 
and Government” in both Carolinas, Georgia, and Virginia.353 The determination of 
where to attack first would be left to the officer in command of the expedition; Howe was 
to appoint a general and send him with some troops from Boston to the Cape Fear River 
to meet the fleet from Britain, which was assembling at Cork in Ireland.354 Despite his 
insistence that Howe undertake the southern expedition, Dartmouth harbored doubts as to 
whether the army would find the loyalist support on which its success depended. He told 
Howe that if the army found “no appearance of a disposition in the inhabitants of the 
southern colonies to join the King’s Army, I fear little more will be effected than the 
gaining of some respectable post to the southward, where the officers and servants of 
government may find protection.”
Howe was reluctant to make the move, writing Dartmouth that he thought it better 
“to leave the southern provinces in the fullest persuasion of their security until the rebels
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have been defeated on the side of New York.”356 Yet in spite of his objections, Howe 
complied with Dartmouth’s orders and dispatched Gen. Henry Clinton from Boston with 
between twelve and fifteen hundred troops on January 20, 1776. Clinton doubted whether 
he could succeed, because he believed that the southern governors had exaggerated the 
prospects of defeating the rebels. He noted that “governors are sanguine, the malady is 
catching, and ministers sometimes infected.”357
Loyalists disagreed with Clinton, believing that the opportunity was ripe to regain 
control of the southern provinces. John Pownall informed Howe in September “that a 
very considerable part of the People” in South Carolina “have shewn a Disposition to 
resist” the Whigs and urged the general to aid them.358 One South Carolinian lamented 
“the inattention of Government, to this important Colony” in the two years preceding the 
British expedition. A province “in the habit of Alarm, upon every appearance of ill- 
humour in the most trifling Tribe of Indians on its Western frontier,” was certainly 
vulnerable to a regular force, he maintained.359
En route southward, Clinton met others who echoed that opinion. At New York 
Clinton conferred with former North Carolina governor William Tryon, whose assertion 
that the Scotch Highlanders in that province would eagerly support the British dispelled 
some of Clinton’s pessimism. A mid-February conference with Lord Dunmore in 
Hampton Roads further raised Clinton’s hopes for success. But when the fleet reached 
Cape Fear at the end of the month, Clinton found that the Highlanders had risen 
prematurely and been defeated by the rebels at Moore’s Creek Bridge. Furthermore, he
356 Brown, American Secretary, 52.
357 Willcox, Portrait o f  a General, 67-69.
358 John Pownall to William Howe, Sept. 25, 1775, Carleton Papers, Vol. 1, No. 52.
359 Frances Reece Kepner, ed., “A British View o f the Siege o f Charleston, 1776,” JSH, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
Feb. 1945, 95. Kepner attributes authorship o f the unsigned document to James Simpson.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
162
did not meet the expedition from Ireland, which should have joined him there. Clinton 
thus had to formulate a new plan.360
While awaiting the Cork fleet, Clinton conferred with Lord William Campbell, 
who had arrived aboard the frigate HMS Syren. Campbell told Clinton that the loyalists 
in South Carolina, “overflowing with zeal,” had been “precipitate in showing 
themselves,” and as a result they had been “overpowered, disarmed, and many 
imprisoned” by the Whigs. The general considered this report and the news of Moore’s 
Creek Bridge “gloomy forebodings” of what lay ahead, although the southern governors 
“were not dispirited.”361 Clinton proceeded to formulate two plans that might replace the 
North Carolina operations. The first was to establish a post on the Chesapeake near 
Norfolk, Virginia, where the bay, Atlantic Ocean, and Dismal Swamp created a virtual 
island where loyalists who joined the troops would have considerable security. The 
second contemplated an attack on Savannah and a march into the Georgia interior to open 
communication with the loyalists in the South Carolina backcountry. Further delays in 
the arrival of the Cork fleet led Clinton to abandon both plans.
Meanwhile, Patrick Tonyn submitted an even more ambitious scheme for 
Clinton’s consideration. The governor proposed to take 150 regulars from the St. 
Augustine garrison, augmented by thirty rangers, one hundred loyalists, and three 
hundred Indians, and march into Georgia. Tonyn believed that his force would gather 
more loyalists and Indians as they marched and could capture Savannah and allow 
Governor Wright to resume his post. Thomas Brown would provide additional support by
360 Willcox, Portrait o f  a General, 76-77.
361 Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion, Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative o f  His Campaigns, 1775- 
1782, With an Appendix o f  Original Documents, William B. Willcox, ed. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1954), 26.
362 Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 26.
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returning to the Georgia and South Carolina backcountry, where he expected to recruit 
two or three thousand loyalists. Uniting this force with the Cherokees, Brown intended to 
secure the backcountry, then march to the coast to join the other British units. Rather than 
lose time waiting for Clinton’s reply, Tonyn dispatched Brown to the backcountry and 
informed the general of the plan. Clinton replied only that he had not yet decided where 
he would attack.363 Tonyn, impatient to strike the rebels, continued to press the general to 
adopt his plan and requested “full powers to carry it on with spirit and effect.”364 
Clinton did not authorize Tonyn to act, but the governor’s idea may have 
influenced the general’s thinking as he contemplated a third plan of his own. Like 
Tonyn’s proposal, this plan was intended to take advantage of loyalist and Indian 
support. Clinton believed that he could dispatch several hundred troops to Pensacola, 
from where they would advance up the Alabama River and across Indian territory to the 
Georgia and Carolina backcountry. There they would unite with Indians and loyalists to 
take control of the interior of those provinces. Clinton even intended to insure continued 
loyalist support by providing schools, courts, and political representation to the 
backcountry inhabitants. The plan was barely feasible given the distances the troops 
would have to traverse through the wilderness; Clinton abandoned the idea when he
-3 zr r
learned there were not enough boats at Pensacola to transport troops upriver.
The first ships of the Cork fleet, which had been expected to sail on December 1, 
1775, finally began straggling into Cape Fear in late April. The ministry’s decision to 
increase the force to seven regiments, and a lack of naval escort, postponed the fleet’s
363 Wright, Florida in the American Revolution, 32; Gary D. Olson, “Thomas Brown, the East Florida 
Rangers, and the Defense o f East Florida,” in Samuel Proctor, ed., Eighteenth-Century Florida and the 
Revolutionary South (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1978), 16-17.
364 Tonyn to Clinton, April 15, 1776, Clinton Papers, Vol. 15, No. 17, WLCL.
365 Olson, “Thomas Brown,” 18; Wright, Florida in the American Revolution, 34.
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departure until February 10. Then foul weather dispersed the ships and caused further 
delay. When the entire force had assembled, Clinton consulted with Gen. Charles, Earl 
Cornwallis and Admiral Sir Peter Parker, the respective commanders of the land and 
naval forces, about how to proceed. Clinton argued that the delay had ruined any chance 
of assisting the loyalists, since he had orders to rejoin Howe shortly and could not leave 
enough troops to protect them if they turned out as expected.366
Better than anyone else in the ministry or the army’s high command, Clinton 
understood the problems the loyalists faced. Most British leaders believed that once 
regular troops had defeated the Whigs in a province, the loyalists would be able to 
maintain control with little or no support from the army. Clinton, however, recognized 
that the rebels would not accept defeat so easily, but would turn upon the loyalists once 
the army left. In that case, he declared, “all the friends of government will be sacrificed” 
in one province after another. Only sustained support from the army would enable the 
loyalists to retain control of a province when it had been recaptured.367 Clinton believed 
that “to bring those poor people forward” without providing adequate support “would 
have only exposed them to the resentment and malice of their enemies, and multiplied
368our difficulties by putting the rebels so much the more on their guard.”
Despite his reluctance to undertake an attack that in his opinion would harm the 
loyalists more than help them, Clinton allowed Parker to convince him that Charleston 
was weakly defended and could be easily captured. Parker’s insistence on attacking 
Charleston reflected the views of both Dartmouth and Germain; in November 1775, both
366 Robson, “Expedition to the Southern Colonies,” 544-545, 547-548, 553; Willcox, Portrait o f  a General, 
81.
367 Willcox, Portrait o f  a General, 83.
368 Clinton, American Rebellion, 27.
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had suggested the town as a promising objective should operations in North Carolina 
appear infeasible. Dartmouth had gone so far as to instruct Gov. Campbell to send 
emissaries to the backcountry to organize the loyalists and lead them to the coast to meet 
the expedition. Clinton doubted that the town could be taken, but convinced himself that 
the establishment of a post on Sullivan’s Island at the entrance to the harbor would at 
least demonstrate to the loyalists the government’s intention to support them and provide 
a base for a future attack on Charleston itself.369
By February, South Carolina rebels expected a British attack and prepared to meet
'5'7A .
it, impressing every available slave to build fortifications to protect Charleston. Whig 
leaders particularly feared that the arrival of the British would ignite a loyalist uprising. 
Pierce Butler doubted the reliability of backcountry militiamen who had come to 
reinforce Charleston. “The real Sentiments of a great part of them I believe we are 
ignorant of,” he noted.371 Gen. Charles Lee, believing that the British would attempt to 
establish themselves on the mainland and summon the loyalists to join them, posted
'1H')
troops to prevent Clinton’s soldiers from coming ashore. Other Whigs sought to 
intimidate loyalists from aiding the British by launching another wave of persecution. 
“Supported by Military force, every appearance of Discontent or dissention, received 
immediate punishment,” wrote one observer. Troops were quartered in the homes of 
suspected loyalists, where they plundered and vandalized the contents. When the British 
fleet finally appeared, Whig militiamen began to make examples, “in terrorem, of such as 
discovered any disinclination to Act, or refused a Test-Oath, which was then tendered.
369 Willcox, Portrait o f  a General, 84-85; Clinton, American Rebellion, 29; Germain to William Howe, 
Nov. 8, 1775; Dartmouth to William Campbell, Nov. 7, 1775, Carleton Papers, Vol. 1, Nos. 80, 81.
370 Richard Hutson to Thomas Hutson, June 7, 1776, “Letters o f Richard Hutson,” 316.
371 Pierce Butler to unnamed, March 21, 1776, “Correspondence of Middleton,” 140.
372 Richard Hutson to Isaac Hayne, June 24, 1776, “Letters o f Richard Hutson,” 319.
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The Crown officers, and all such as were more immediately suspected of disaffection, 
were put into close confinement, and their Papers Plate &c Seized.”373
The Whigs had good cause for their fears, since many loyalists hoped to escape to 
the British when the fleet arrived at Charleston. Several men deserted from rebel units 
and managed to reach a royal navy frigate that appeared off Charleston bar in May to 
sound the channel.374 Other loyalists coerced into serving with the Whig forces tried 
unsuccessfully to reach the British when Clinton’s forces landed on Long Island. 
Alexander Chesney, posted across the channel from the British camp, tried with some 
friends to make a crossing “but failed for want of a boat.”
Parker’s fleet, guided by black pilots, arrived off Charleston harbor on June 1.
The presence of one pilot, Sampson, particularly angered many Whigs, who accused him 
of having convinced the British to attack the town. Clinton landed his troops on Long 
Island, north of Sullivan’s Island where the rebels were building a fort. People with the 
expedition had informed Clinton that the water between the islands was only eighteen 
inches deep at low tide, which would allow British troops to cross to Sullivan’s Island 
and attack the fort by land while the navy assaulted it by sea. Unfortunately, upon 
examination the channel proved to be seven feet deep, so the troops stood idle while 
Parker’s warships attacked the fort on June 28. Parker, also acting on faulty intelligence, 
kept his ships too far from the fort for their fire to be effective, while the Whigs
373 Kepner, ed., “British View o f the Siege of Charleston,” 97.
374 William Richardson to Nan, [May 19, 1776], in Emma B. Richardson, ed., “Letters o f William 
Richardson, 1765-1784,” SCHGM, Vol. 47, No. 1, Jan. 1946, 16.
375 Chesney, Journal, 7.
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pummeled the royal navy. After the defeat, Clinton and Parker had no choice but to rejoin 
Howe, who was preparing to attack New York.376
The repulse of the British inspired the Whigs and left the loyalists dispirited. In 
South Carolina, “the success of the 28 June made some Converts” to the rebel cause.377 
Georgia’s Whigs were “much Elated” at the news, Lachlan McIntosh wrote, while “the 
Torys now amongst us are ha[rdly worth] our Notice unless it is with pity & 
Contempt.”378
Germain’s deputy William Knox lamented these effects. “The worst consequence 
of this failure will be the shewing the rebels where their strength lies and how they may 
foil us again,” he wrote. Yet Knox found some reason for hope. “Loyalist support had 
been proven no mere chimera but a force of considerable potential which needed only to
- J '7 Q  ,
be encouraged, supported, and unleashed at the right opportunity,” he concluded. His
views reflected prevailing British sentiment. The failure at Charleston “in no way 
dampened Britain’s optimistic view of the temper of the region.”380 The expedition had 
not succeeded in aiding the loyalists, but the loyalists had not been given a chance to 
come forward and cooperate with the king’s troops. They would have to wait several 
years for another opportunity.
Another effect of the Charleston operation, which went unnoticed in London, 
resulted from the timing of the attack. Although Clinton and Parker’s schedule had been 
determined primarily by the delays in the arrival of the fleet from Cork, the attack on 
Charleston took place only three days before the Cherokees attacked the southern
376 Henry Laurens to Martha Laurens, Aug. 17, 1776, PHL, 11:253; Willcox, Portrait o f  a General, 87-88.
377 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Aug. 14, 1776, PHL, 11:232.
378 Lachlan McIntosh to George Walton, July 11, 1776, “Papers of McIntosh,” 157.
379 Bellot, William Knox, 145.
380 Higginbotham, War o f  American Independence, 137.
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frontier. This coincidence helped convince many in the South that there had indeed been 
collusion between the British and Cherokees and that the ministry was determined to 
employ the Indians against the colonists.
In some respects the failure at Charleston worked to Britain’s advantage. Had 
Clinton and Parker succeeded in taking the town or establishing a post elsewhere along 
the South Carolina coast, the British position would have acted as a magnet for Whig 
troops, who would have cut off any loyalist access to it. The post would not have been 
tenable without supplies brought by sea, so that any delays or difficulties in the delivery 
of provisions or ammunition might have forced the garrison to surrender. Furthermore, 
the presence of British troops in the region would undoubtedly have caused the Whigs to 
make even greater efforts to suppress the loyalists than they otherwise did, which may 
have demoralized and neutralized the king’s supporters by the time the British were ready 
to undertake another campaign in the South. Taking these possibilities into account, 
outright failure in 1776 probably proved more advantageous for the British than a limited 
success.
Although the Whigs had suppressed the loyalists and slaves, defeated the 
Cherokees and kept most of the Creeks neutral, they did not consider themselves secure. 
Upon replacing Charles Lee as commander of the southern department in September 
1776, Maj. Gen. Robert Howe noted that South Carolina and Georgia still had “innate 
foes of more colours than one, to guard against, & more numerous than those who are 
willing to oppose them.” He expressed particular concern for Georgia, which if retaken 
by the British “would immediately bring to their aid, the Creek nation, & other potent
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
tribes of Indians.” The presence of British troops there, Howe wrote, “would be a strong
10 j
temptation for our slaves to elope, & a secure asylum for them when they do.” Howe 
worried that loyalists in South Carolina might “spirit up & join” with the blacks, “whose 
great number & alarming temper make it necessary to guard against the worst.” He 
believed that in Georgia “one third of the inhabitants are enemies to America, & only 
wait for an opportunity, to plunge a dagger, into its vitals,” while slaves there were even 
“more ready to revolt” than those in South Carolina.382 The Whigs’ victories had won 
them nothing more than a respite; the king’s supporters remained a potent foe.
381 Excerpt o f Robert Howe’s letter to unnamed recipient, Sept. 6, 1776, in Archibald MacLaine Hooper, 
unpublished biography o f Robert Howe, Robert Howe Papers, SHC.
382 Excerpt, Howe to unnamed, Nov. 21, 1776, in Hooper biography, Robert Howe Papers, SHC.
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CHAPTER III 
WHIGS ASCENDANT
After the Clinton-Parker expedition’s failure to capture Charleston, British 
strategy in the South focused on defending the Floridas from rebel attack and on 
maintaining good relations with the southern Indians until the time when their assistance 
might be required. Yet Governor Tonyn, loyalists and Indians waged their own war 
against the Whigs outside the bounds of Gen. William Howe’ s plans. Shortages of 
provisions in East Florida led Tonyn to frequently send loyalist and Indian raiders to 
capture cattle in Georgia, sparking sporadic warfare along the border between the two 
provinces. Responding to this threat, the Whigs twice invaded East Florida, while in 1778 
rebels from Pennsylvania descended the Mississippi River to attack West Florida.
Having secured control of South Carolina and Georgia, the Whigs labored to 
maintain the upper hand against both their internal and external enemies. They continued 
to persecute loyalists and banished those who persisted in opposition. Rebel officials also 
strove to keep the Indians neutral in hopes of avoiding another attack on the frontier. 
Slaves endured continued repression, although many managed to escape to the Floridas.
But Lord George Germain had not forgotten the southern provinces and 
repeatedly urged General Howe to undertake a winter campaign in the region. Howe 
agreed in November 1776 that “South Carolina and Georgia must be the Objects for 
Winter,” but said he needed fifteen thousand reinforcements before he could begin
170
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operations there.1 Germain told him that it was impossible to send that many troops, so 
Howe abandoned the plan. After studying an August 1777 memorial from Governors 
Wright and Campbell, which stressed the importance of retaking South Carolina and 
Georgia and the relative ease with which that task could be accomplished, Germain again 
advised Howe to undertake a southern campaign. “If Sir Wm Howe would carry any part 
of his army into the Southern Provinces this winter I should have no doubt of his
-5
success,” Germain told his deputy. Howe demurred, insisting that operations in the 
South were impossible unless he received additional soldiers.4 Gov. Tonyn also prodded 
Howe to attack Georgia, asserting that the conquest of that province would open a line of 
communication to the “back Settlements of the Southern provinces, where there are many 
well affected to His Majesty,” but this advice failed to sway the general.5
Suppressing the Loyalists 
By 1777, Whig attitudes toward the loyalists had hardened to a point where even 
a moderate like Henry Laurens saw no middle ground in the dispute. “ A Man who is not 
a friend to the American Cause certainly holds principles, if he holds any, which are 
injurious to America,” Laurens informed a loyalist acquaintance. If such a person refused 
to bear arms against the British, “that Man may, without any torture of construction or 
expression, be deem’d an Enemy to the American Cause.”6
To ferret out such enemies, South Carolina required its inhabitants to take an oath 
of allegiance to the state and to Congress. This was the basis of a process by which “the
1 William Howe to Germain, Nov. 30, 1776, Germain Papers, Vol. 5, WLCL.
2 Germain to Howe, Jan. 14, 1777, Germain Papers, Vol. 5, WLCL.
3 Germain to Knox, Sept. 13, 1777, William Knox Papers, WLCL.
4 Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 89-90; Howe to Germain, Oct. 22,1777, Germain Papers, Vol. 6, WLCL.
5 Tonyn to Sir William Howe, April 4, 1778, in Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institutions 
o f  Great Britain, Vol. 1 (London: Mackie & Co., 1904) Vol. 2 (Dublin: John Falconer, 1906), Vol. 3 
(Hereford: Anthony Brothers, 1907), 1:223.
6 Henry Laurens to James Brisbane, April 24, 1777, PHL, 11:333.
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southern rebels systematically began to isolate and expose” loyalists, although many of 
the king’s supporters “adopted various subterfuges in order to evade the requirement or, 
to the same end, attempted to avoid having any contact with the local authorities 
administering the oaths.”7 The oath not only forced many loyalists to reveal their beliefs, 
it also served “to compromise people in the eyes of the British and to deter them from 
fighting for the British. A man who swore loyalty to Congress and his state would be a 
documented rebel if he fell into British hands. Worse still, if he served the British and 
then fell back into American hands, he would be a documented traitor.”8
Those who refused to renounce their loyalty to Britain and take the oath to the 
rebel government were to be banished from South Carolina. Under the terms of the 
banishment act passed by the legislature in early 1777, loyalists “were expected to 
remove themselves and their families from the state within sixty days or as soon 
thereafter as they could settle their business affairs and secure passage.”9 George Harland 
Hartley, organist at St. Michael’s church in Charleston, was banished and lost an annual 
income of £450 ($59,000) from his various musical performances along with nearly two 
thousand acres of land. His wife accompanied him, as did his mother-in-law, Janet 
Cummings. Although Mrs. Cummings had not been banished, she chose to leave because 
her loyalty to Britain “exposed her to many insults from the mobs.”10
Many other loyalists also left the state voluntarily to escape persecution, without 
waiting to be officially expelled. Despite continuous harassment from the Whigs, the 
Rev. James Stuart remained in his pulpit at Georgetown, where loyalists were numerous,
7 Mary Beth Norton, The British Americans: The Loyalist Exiles in England, 1774-1789 (Boston: Little, 
Brown, & Co., 1972), 34-35.
8 Royster, Revolutionary People at War, 105.
9 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 60.
10 Robert Woodward Barnwell, Jr., ed., “George Harland Hartley’s Claim for Losses as a Loyalist,” 
SCHGM, Vol. 51, No. 1, Jan. 1950,47,48.
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until December 1777. By then he had concluded that “there was no Law, Justice, or
Protection for Loyal or even neutral Men.” Believing that his life was endangered, Stuart
fled to the West Indies.11
Evan McLaurin, one of the leaders of the backcountry loyalists, likewise decided
that it was too dangerous to remain in South Carolina and fled to East Florida. Traveling
in disguise on the Santee River, McLaurin was discovered, pursued, and nearly captured
by the rebels. He lost his canoe, weapons, and clothing, but eventually reached St.
Augustine. There McLaurin was commissioned a major in the South Carolina Royalists, a
provincial battalion commanded by fellow refugee Joseph Robinson. The influx of
loyalists soon increased the strength of the unit to three hundred men.12
Another prominent backcountry loyalist, Richard Pearis, also feared for his life,
despite Governor Rutledge’s promise of protection. Pearis fled Charleston for the
backcountry, where in August he organized four hundred loyalists in the area between the
Broad and Saluda Rivers and prepared to march to Florida. The Whigs learned of Pearis’s
activities and sent Andrew Williamson’s militia to prevent the loyalists’ escape. Rather
than risk an armed confrontation, nearly all of Pearis’s followers gave up on the plan and
remained home. Six of his supporters escaped with Pearis to Pensacola, where John
11Stuart appointed him captain of a loyal unit forming there.
David Fanning had hoped to accompany Pearis to Florida, but was thwarted by 
the Whigs. He had returned to South Carolina on March 10, 1777, but the Whigs arrested 
him the next day. Fanning managed to escape and return home, where he was “obliged to
11 Bull, ed., “Note on James Stuart,” 572-573.
12 Isabella MacLaurin Memorial, April 8, 1783, SCHS; “Memoir o f Lt. Col. Joseph Robinson.”
13 Richard Pearis Loyalist Claim, Aug. 22, 1783, SCHS; John Rutledge to [South Carolina delegates in 
Congress], Aug. 30, 1777, John Rutledge Papers, SCL; John Wells, Jr. to Henry Laurens, Sept. 29, 1777, 
PHL, 11:536.
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secrete myself in the woods, and was supplied with provisions by some Quakers and 
other Loyalists in the neighbourhood.” Learning of Pearis’s plan to lead a group of 
loyalists to West Florida, Fanning gathered some of his associates with the intention of 
joining Pearis, but was captured when a member of his party betrayed the plan to the 
Whigs. Fanning was tried for treason, acquitted, then failed in an attempt to escape to 
East Florida. After three months living in the woods with another loyalist named Samuel 
Brown, Fanning returned home, where he was repeatedly arrested and imprisoned. Each 
time he was released or managed to escape, yet by the end of December 1778 he was 
back in rebel custody, in irons in the jail at Ninety Six.14
One loyalist experienced even greater suffering than Fanning. William Fortune 
refused to renounce his allegiance to the king in 1777, and as a result was imprisoned 
eight times, had his home repeatedly plundered, and finally fled to the woods. He 
emerged only for brief meetings with his wife, who supplied him with food. Fortune did 
not leave his forest refuge until British forces occupied South Carolina in 1780.15
Some loyalists had enlisted in the state’s Continental regiments, either to avoid 
persecution or because the Whigs had compelled them to do so by threatening them and 
their families. These men frequently attempted to desert or to subvert their comrades, and 
when they were identified, suffered harsh punishment. Private James Orange, captured 
after deserting, “repeatedly damned the Continental Congress saying he was good 
English Blood & would support the cause of Great Britain to his last.” Orange received 
two hundred lashes as his penalty. Four other deserters later “found in arms against the
14 Fanning, David Fanning’s Narrative, 10-12.
15 Callahan, Royal Raiders, 227.
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United States” were executed in 1777, as were three other soldiers convicted of treason 
and encouraging desertion.16
A few Whigs considered their government’s policies unduly harsh. Gabriel 
Manigault saw many of his acquaintances expelled from South Carolina and noted that 
banishment “is exceeding hard on them.”17 Wtlliam Hasell Gibbes, an Assembly member 
from John’s Island and member of the Council, felt obligated despite his fervor for the 
Revolution to defend “the rights of others who differed from me in this respect.” Gibbes 
argued that the state’s loyalists should be left unmolested, “provided their behavior was 
peaceable and that they didn’t interfere with us or thwart our Opposition to British 
Government.” His colleagues, however, ignored his advice.18
The principal reason why most rebels refused to show lenience to loyalists was 
that the tough policies produced the desired effect: many of the king’s supporters 
gradually lost their resolve and began to incline toward the rebels. In February 1777, 
Christopher Gadsden wrote that “we grow more and more united. Numbers of the 
Theorists join us Daily, as they begin to be convinced we are of the safest side.”19 Public 
displays of support for the rebel cause also influenced the loyalists. After watching a 
celebration marking the anniversary of the repulse of the British attack on Charleston on 
June 28, 1777, a French visitor noted that the festivities fired the enthusiasm of the rebels 
while weakening the loyalists’ commitment. “Even the followers of the Royalists and
16 Walter J. Fraser, Jr., “Reflections o f ‘Democracy’ in Revolutionary South Carolina?: The Composition of 
Military Organizations and the Attitudes and Relationships o f the Officers and Men, 1775-1780,” SCHM, 
Vol. 78, No. 3, July 1977, 210.
17 Gabriel Manigault to Gabriel Manigault, Jr., April 30, 1777, “Papers o f Manigault,” 6-7.
18 William Hasell Gibbes, “William Hasell Gibbes’ Story of His Life,” Amey R. Childs, ed., SCHGM, Vol. 
50, No. 2, April 1949, 64-65.
19 Christopher Gadsden to Thomas Mumford, Feb. 19, 1777, in Richard Walsh, ed., The Writings o f  
Christopher Gadsden (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1966), 120.
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many who are indifferent to the common cause,” he wrote, “see the example set by the
• 20others at these affairs and are gradually educated around to their beliefs.”
The banishment, flight, conversion, and execution of numerous loyalists failed to
satisfy the Whigs, so in the spring of 1778 the Assembly passed another act to accelerate
the political cleansing of South Carolina. The new law required all males sixteen and
older to swear allegiance to the state. Anyone who refused would forfeit the right to vote
and to conduct business and legal transactions. Those who left the state rather than take
the oath were subject to the death penalty if they returned. Dozens of loyalists in the
lowcountry promptly sold whatever property they could and sailed for Britain or the West 
21Indies. Edward Rutledge boasted that South Carolina had “sent forth Cargoes” of 
loyalists into exile, which he described as “a small punishment, tho’ apparently severe, 
for the many Injuries, they have, and the irreparable ones they would have brought on the 
virtuous part of our Community.”22
Fleeing Loyalists experienced persecution right up to the moment of their 
departure. While a vessel “full to the brim with Tories’'1 prepared to sail from Charleston, 
a rebel mob “assembled with Pitch, Tar and other Combustibles, to bum her at the 
Wharf.” The ship was saved when some of those aboard cut the mooring lines and it 
drifted away from the dock.
20 Elmer Douglas Johnson, tr., “A Frenchman Visits Charleston in 1777,” SCHGM, Vol. 52, No. 2, April 
1951, 91. The author o f this account is unknown.
21 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 62-64.
22 Edward Rutledge to John Adams, July 16, 1778, in Robert J. Taylor, ed., The Papers o f  John Adams, 
Vol. 6 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1983), 295.
23 Louisa Susannah Wells, The Journal o f  a Voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, to London 
Undertaken during the American Revolution by the Daughter o f  an Eminent American Loyalist in the Year 
1778 and Written from Memory Only in 1779 (New York: Printed for the New York Historical Society, 
1906; reprint, New York: The New York Times and Amo Press, 1968), 23.
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Loyalists with good connections among the Whigs, or who had valuable skills, 
often managed to avoid penalties. Dr. Alexander Garden refused to take the rebel oath 
and sought assistance from his friend Henry Laurens, who advised Garden to obtain a 
certificate from a magistrate that would satisfy state authorities. Garden then swore a 
declaration that he would always promote the best interests of South Carolina, which the 
Whigs accepted as satisfactory. “Garden was not troubled again and was allowed to go 
freely about his business.”24 The only physician in Beaufort, loyalist James Fraser was 
never asked to take the oath because the townspeople could not afford to lose his 
services.25
Many backcountry loyalists, forced to choose between pledging allegiance to the 
Whigs or suffering under the new legal sanctions, came up with their own solution to the 
dilemma. Early in the spring, loyalists began assembling near Ninety Six with the 
intention of marching to East Florida. By late March, leaders Benjamin Gregory and John 
Murphy had gathered about four hundred men, all of whom were mounted. A second 
party canceled their plans to join Gregory and Murphy when rebel militia learned of their 
intentions. The loyalists set out for the Savannah River, moving rapidly.26
At first the Whigs dismissed the loyalists as “no more than a Plundering Party,”
27and sent out a few militia who searched for them without success. But when they 
realized the strength of the party, rebel leaders panicked. “The back Country is all up in 
Arms; The Tories ... have risen, and as if informed by the same spirit and moved by the 
same spring, have put themselves in motion at one and the same time throughout all parts
24 Berkeley and Berkeley, Dr. Alexander Garden, 274-275.
25 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 66.
26 Harry M. Ward, Between the Lines: Banditti o f  the American Revolution (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 2002), 195.
27 Thomas Pinckney to Harriott Pinckney, April 7, 1778, in Jack L. Cross, ed., “Letters o f Thomas 
Pinckney, 1775-1780,” SCHM, Vol. 58, No. 3, July 1957, 148-149.
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of the State,” Gov. Rawlins Lowndes wrote. The loyalists split into several parties as they 
moved, “plundering robbing and terrifying the Inhabitants” and picking up 
reinforcements on their route. On April 3 they crossed the Savannah River into Georgia,
which put “that Country in a very great Consternation.” Lowndes estimated that the
• • 28loyalists’ numbers had increased to six hundred men by the time they entered Georgia.
He sent the South Carolina militia in pursuit, but they accomplished nothing more than to 
kill and capture a few stragglers.29
Continental commander Robert Howe also attempted to intercept the loyalists. On 
April 6 he ordered Col. Samuel Elbert of the Georgia Continentals to gather as many 
troops as possible “to prevent the Insurgents, now embodied & marching to East Florida, 
from joining the forces of that province.” Howe was to treat the loyalists “as Enemies to 
the united States” and use every means “consistent with the rules of war,” to defeat 
them.30 Not only did Elbert fail to halt the loyalists, which Howe blamed on the lack of 
cavalry, but the refugees “Hoisted the British Kings standard, as they passed” through 
Georgia.31 The impunity with which the loyalists moved through Georgia and their 
summons to join them attracted as many as two hundred Georgians, including a party led 
by Colonel John Thomas and several rebel deserters.
The loyalists’ successful march to East Florida convinced many Whigs that the 
maneuver was part of a larger British plan to attack the southern states. Georgia governor 
John Houstoun believed that the incursion presaged “the total Reduction” of Georgia. 
William Moultrie agreed and predicted that an invasion from both Pensacola and St.
28 Rawlins Lowndes to Henry Laurens, April 14, 1778, PHL, 13:114.
29 William Moultrie to Robert Howe, April 10, 1778, in Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:205.
30 Robert Howe to Samuel Elbert, April 6, 1778, Robert Howe Papers, GHS.
31 Robert Howe to unnamed, April 13, 1778, Robert Howe Papers, GHS.
32 Ward, Between the Lines, 195.
33 John Houstoun to Henry Laurens, April 16, 1778, PHL, 13:121-122.
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Augustine was imminent. Rumors circulated of a simultaneous advance by loyalists and 
Indians from West Florida and loyalists and British regulars from East Florida.34 Joseph 
Clay expressed concern at “the very great additional Strength” the British were “daily 
receiving from the great Defection” in the South Carolina backcountry.35 He warned 
Henry Laurens that the influx of loyalists was making the British in East Florida “so 
formidable” that they might soon overrun Georgia.36 Robert Howe also expected “serious 
Consequences” to follow the loyalists’ junction with the British. Considering the 
weakness of the southern states and the “Disaffection among the People & that this 
Infection is still more prevalent in the Back parts of So Carolina,” Howe thought it wise 
“to prepare for the worst.”37
Howe’s assessment of loyalist strength was accurate and only the vigilance of the 
Whigs prevented more of the king’s supporters from reaching Florida. Along the Peedee 
River, more loyalists from North and South Carolina had assembled in the spring, but 
rebel militia from North Carolina attacked them. A battle ensued in which several men 
were killed on each side, including a Whig colonel.38 This battle and constant militia 
patrols ended the loyalist exodus. A few refugees who slipped through the cordon 
informed Thomas Brown in April that other South Carolina loyalists “thought proper to 
postpone their insurrection to a more favourable opportunity, as the rebels upon receiving 
intelligence of the March of Murphy and Gregory’s party had embodied themselves in 
every district.” Because the loyalists were poorly armed, they could not overcome the
34 Bennett and Lennon, Quest fo r Glory, 71-72; William Moultrie to Henry Laurens, April 20, 1778, PHL, 
13:160.
35 Joseph Clay to Josiah Smith, Jr., [undated, c. March-May 1778], Letters o f  Joseph Clay, Merchant o f  
Savannah, 1776-1783, CGHS Vol. 8, (Savannah: Morning News Printers and Binders, 1913), 70.
36 Clay to Henry Laurens, May 30, 1778, Letters o f  Clay, 76.
37 Robert Howe to Henry Laurens, April 26, 1778, PHL, 13:190-192.
38 William Gipson, Pension Application, in Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 187.
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Whigs without the element of surprise. The refugees also brought Brown a message from 
Robert Cunningham “that 2,500 Men between the forks of Saluda and Broadriver” were 
prepared to assist Brown “whenever orders are sent for that purpose.” An additional 
3,800 men at the Congarees, along the Pedee and Ennoree Rivers, and near the North
TQCarolina border were also reported ready to aid the British.
Some of these loyalists did attempt to get to Florida; in succeeding weeks, 
“several other large parties of the disaffected attempted to cross Savannah river,” but the 
South Carolina militia prevented them from entering Georgia.40 Ten loyalists returned to 
Georgia in June with a proclamation from Tonyn offering pardon and ten dollars bounty 
to anyone who came to East Florida with their arms. These men announced that they 
expected to raise a thousand loyalists in the Carolina backcountry, but the openness of 
their activities brought them to the Whigs’ attention while they were still in Georgia. 
Some rebel militia, with the aid of more than twenty Creeks sent by Galphin, caught up 
with the loyalists and their handful of recruits and killed and captured several.41
The loyalist exodus from the backcountry led Whig officials in Charleston to 
again administer the state loyalty oath to the town’s inhabitants. Many people, however, 
stayed at home when the oath was administered rather than swear allegiance to the 
rebels.42 Other loyalists chose to leave the state rather than take the oath; “two Vessels 
full of Tories” left Charleston in early May 43
Hoping that some loyalists could be won over to the Whig cause by generous 
treatment, Gov. Lowndes and the Council issued a proclamation on June 5 extending the
39 Brown to Augustine Prevost, April 10, 1778, RAM, 1:227-228.
40 James Whitefield to Henry Laurens, May 6, 1778, PHL, 13:261-262.
41 George Galphin to Henry Laurens, June 25, 1778, PHL, 13:514.
42 John Wells, Jr. to Henry Laurens, April 20, 1778, PHL, 13:162.
43 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, May 8, 1778, PHL, 13:276.
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time limit for taking the oath to the state by five days. News of this action caused 
“unspeakable Uneasiness” among Charleston Whigs, who held a public meeting to 
express their opposition to the measure. They denounced both Lowndes and Christopher 
Gadsden, who had written the proclamation.44 The mob threatened the governor, insisted 
that they would not allow the proclamation to be published, and intimidated printers into 
complying with their demands 45 They also forbade that “any Magistrate administer the 
oath, to any of the recanting Tories.” Fresh efforts were made to intimidate loyalists, 
leading John Lewis Gervais to conclude that “the Tories will have no peace in this 
quarter.” Gervais opposed the governor’s policy, declaring that “experience teaches us, 
they [loyalists] will never be our Friend longer than we are Successfull, in adversity they 
will remain our Ennemies, let them take what Oath they please.”46
The response to the proclamation astonished Lowndes, who defended his action 
as “the best Policy, and peculiarly adapted to our Circumstances.” He refused to 
withdraw the proclamation, despite “Intimations that the People were in such a ferment 
that fatal Consequences were to be apprehended” if he failed to do so. Some loyalists did 
take advantage of the extended opportunity to take the Whig oath, “but the menaces of 
the populace have detered many, and frustrated the best plan that could be devised for 
Conciliating Peace and Union amongst us,” Lowndes noted.47 Charleston’s Whigs were 
so blinded by their hatred of loyalists that they refused to recognize that reconciliation 
might be more advantageous to their cause than continued hostility.
44 John Wells, Jr. to Henry Laurens, June 10, 1778, PHL, 13:437-438.
45 Jerome J. Nadelhaft, The Disorders o f  War: The Revolution in South Carolina (Orono: University of 
Maine at Orono Press, 1981), 45-46.
46 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, June 26, 1778, PHL, 13:518-520.
47 Rawlins Lowndes to Henry Laurens, June 17, 1778, PHL, 13:479-480.
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Still in a frenzy of rage against loyalists, the rebels turned their wrath upon Joshua 
Brown and two other Quaker ministers who had come from Pennsylvania to visit 
congregations in the South. The pacifist Quakers were imprisoned at Ninety Six for 
refusing to take the Whig oath. Convinced that the men were harmless, Henry Laurens 
asked John Lewis Gervais to intercede and obtain their release.
Unlike the peaceful Quakers, some loyalists responded to the Whigs’ aggressive 
behavior with violence. In the vicinity of Orangeburgh, a group of loyalists “cut off the 
Ears of one Prichard a Magistrate, and another Man,” beat a Whig militia captain, and 
burned the house of an assemblyman. These acts “have thrown all that part of the 
Country into a general Panick, and so intimidated the Inhabitants that those well affected, 
are detered from taking any steps for their own Security least... they should bring upon 
themselves the resentment of these banditti,” Lowndes wrote. He sent one hundred 
regular troops to Orangeburgh to reinforce the local militia, ordering the officers “to 
settle the point of Law, on the spot” if they captured the perpetrators of those acts.49
Backcountry loyalists also sent the Whigs a symbolic message by electing some 
of their leaders to the state legislature. Voters in the Little River District elected Robert 
Cunningham to the senate and two other loyalists, Jacob Bowman and Henry O’Neall, to 
the house of representatives. O’Neall took his seat, along with the required oaths to the 
state. Cunningham and Bowman, however, chose not to attend the legislature.50
Despite such acts of resistance, loyalism continued to wane in response to the 
apparent decline in British fortunes and to relentless persecution. John Lewis Gervais 
noted that the news that France had entered the war on the American side “gave great
48 Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, Sept. 15, 1778, PHL, 14:312-313.
49 Rawlins Lowndes to Henry Laurens, Sept. 22, 1778, PHL, 14:343.
50 Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, 44.
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Satisfaction to all (except Tories)” in South Carolina, “& even some of those wished to 
recant.”51 Edward Rutledge boasted to John Adams that the French alliance had “worked 
wonders in the Minds of Men ... you would still be amazed to see, what a Conversion has 
taken place in the political Opinion of Numbers; from the multitude of Disaffected, we 
have had whole Hosts of Patriots ... who mean to be firm Friends to our good old Cause.” 
Rutledge nevertheless doubted the sincerity of many of these converts, observing that 
their newfound Whig principles would last only “until they shall think it for their Interest 
to be otherwise.”52 By October, many other loyalists had also taken the rebel oath, though 
not in response to the French alliance. A Whig noted that “the uniform ruin that has 
attended all those who professed themselves friends to the British Tyrant, has cured many 
of their Toryism.”53 When the military outlook and rebel persuasion failed to sway the 
loyalists, persecution as always proved the best antidote to loyalism.
Whig officials in Georgia moved more cautiously against loyalists in that state, in 
part because factional divisions between moderates and radicals paralyzed the rebel 
government, and also because there were so many loyalists in the state. Merchant Joseph 
Clay complained that the state’s leadership problems “arose in a great measure from so 
large a Number of the principal People being either Tories” or having withdrawn from 
politics to avoid becoming entangled in factional quarrels.54 John Adam Treutlen wrote 
that “our small friends, the Tories, within our Bowels, are so very numerous & have such 
ties of Consanguinity, that all our Efforts against these Enemies of American Freedom
51 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, June 19, 1778, PHL, 13:491.
52 Edward Rutledge to John Adams, July 16, 1778, PJA, 6:295.
53 John Wells, Jr. to Henry Laurens, Oct. 14, 1778, PHL, 13:416.
54 Joseph Clay to Messrs. Bright and Pechin, July 2, 1777, in Letters o f  Clay, 35.
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have hitherto been languid and ineffectual.” He suggested that the rebels might have to 
“take the treatment of these Men into their own hands” to suppress the loyalists.55
In September 1777, Georgia finally took steps to punish the loyalists when the 
Assembly passed “An Act for the Expulsion of the Internal Enemies of this State.” The 
law was intended to halt the activities of loyalists in undermining the state’s defense and 
sought to link the loyalists to the Indian menace. Declaring that by providing information 
to the British in St. Augustine the loyalists made it possible for the Indians to raid “our 
frontier settlements ... sacrificing, in the most barbarous manner, numbers of our worthy 
citizens,” the Whigs hoped to win popular support for the new law and to inflame 
Georgians against the loyalists.56
The act established twelve-member committees in each county and authorized 
them to tender an oath of allegiance to Georgia and the United States to all white males 
age twenty-one or over. Anyone summoned by the committee had to bring along “two or 
more undoubted friends to American independence” to vouch for the suspected loyalist’s 
Whig principles. Those who failed to satisfy the committee would “be deemed enemies” 
and would have to leave Georgia within forty days. They would also forfeit half of their 
property to the state, but could sell the remaining half and keep the proceeds. The penalty 
for failing to appear before the committee or refusing to accept its verdict was 
imprisonment without bail until the offender was forcibly removed from the state. If 
someone who was declared an enemy returned to Georgia without permission or was 
“found in arms” with the British, “upon conviction thereof, they shall suffer death.”57 The 
committee at Midway promptly summoned twelve accused loyalists; three refused to
55 John Adam Treutlen to John Hancock, June 19, 1777, John Adam Treutlen Papers, GHS.
56 Robertson, ed., “Georgia’s Banishment Act,” 275, 276.
57 Robertson, ed., “Georgia’s Banishment Act,” 279-281.
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appear and gave notice that they would leave Georgia within the allotted forty days. Eight 
who did appear failed to satisfy the committee and were banished.58 The law proved 
effective, for only the most committed loyalists were willing to endure such harsh 
punishments. The threat of death served as a powerful discouragement against taking up 
arms for the king so long as the Whigs held power.
Many Whigs, however, still worried that the loyalists remained dangerous.
“[T]hat there are many Disaffected” in Georgia “is past any Doubt -  but I believe no 
greater proportion than in any other State,” Clay noted in October 1777. “Fear from the 
very exposed situation of this State has operated very powerfully on many well Affected 
Citizens.”59 In response to these concerns, the Assembly passed another law in March 
1778 “to proscribe over one hundred Georgians and authorize the sale of their 
property.”60 The act declared 117 people guilty of treason and banished them, leaving 
their property liable to seizure and sale to benefit the state.61 Those banished included 
two ministers, William Ronaldson of Queensborough, and former Whig John Zubly. The 
latter eloquently defended his loyalism in an essay entitled To the Grand Jury, yet his 
legal arguments failed to overcome rebel wrath. In addition to banishing him, the Whigs 
destroyed his home and threw his books into the Savannah River. He fled to South 
Carolina, where he managed to avoid persecution from that state’s Whigs.62 John 
Jamieson of St. Paul’s Parish had escaped the notice of the rebel committee in 1777, but 
while visiting Savannah in January 1778 the local Whigs charged him with loyalism. He
58 Robertson, Loyalism in Revolutionary Georgia, 8.
59 Joseph Clay to Henry Laurens, Oct. 21, 1777, Letters o f  Clay, 54.
60 George R. Lamplugh, ‘“To Check and Discourage the Wicked and Designing’: John Wereat and the 
Revolution in Georgia,” GHQ, Vol. 61, No. 4, Winter 1977, 297-298.
61 Robert S. Lambert, “The Confiscation o f Loyalist Property in Georgia, 1782-1786,” WMQ, Vol. 20, No. 
1, Jan. 1963, 80.
62 E.R.R. Green, “Queensborough Township: Scotch-Irish Emigration and the Expansion o f Georgia, 1763- 
1776,” WMQ, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 1960, 197; Miller, “Warm & Zealous Spirit, ” 22-23.
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refused to take “their detestable and absurd oath,” whereupon the rebels seized half his 
property and banished him from the state. Before he could leave, the 1778 act went into
-I
effect and the Whigs confiscated the remaining half of his property.
Whig repression succeeded in checking any efforts by Georgia loyalists to openly 
oppose the state government, but the rebels faced a more serious threat from the refugees 
in East Florida. Legal sanctions and persecution had driven thousands of loyalists to seek 
safety there. Some 350 South Carolinians arrived in April 1776, many of them Germans 
from the Dutch Fork, Orangeburg, and Saxe-Gotha regions. In June another five hundred 
refugees entered the province. Most were South Carolinians from Ninety Six district, but 
many were Georgians and a few had made the long journey from North Carolina.64
Gov. Tonyn quickly put numbers of the immigrants to good use. He gave Thomas 
Brown a commission as lieutenant colonel and instructed him to recruit rangers from 
among the refugees who had escaped to Indian territory. The governor initially planned to 
use this force to gather cattle in Georgia to alleviate East Florida’s food shortage. Brown 
increased his force with recruits from the loyalists entering East Florida, creating the 
battalion known as the Florida Rangers. Tonyn employed this unit to carry out his desire 
to carry the war to the rebels.65
In February 1777, Tonyn dispatched Brown with his Rangers and some Indians to 
seize cattle in Georgia. Gen. Augustine Prevost, commander of the East Florida garrison, 
provided 160 regulars to support them; British Lt. Col. Lewis Fuser commanded the 
combined force. On February 17, Brown with twenty rangers and fifty Creeks and 
Seminoles attacked Fort McIntosh. The garrison of seventy rebels surrendered the next
63 Robertson, Loyalism in Revolutionary Georgia, 9.
64 Troxler, “Refuge, Resistance, and Reward,” 569-570, 572-575.
65 Cashin, King's Ranger, 49, 59, 61.
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day after four intrepid rangers stopped a relief column of three hundred men four miles 
from the fort. Fuser’s troops arrived in time for the surrender, and Fuser’s rudeness 
toward the loyalists and Indians angered Brown, who warned Tonyn that such treatment 
might cause the Indians to withdraw their support. Fuser advanced to the Altamaha River, 
skirmished with a rebel force there, and decided to return to St. Augustine. Brown’s 
Rangers brought two thousand head of cattle back with them.66
The raid convinced Georgia Whigs that it was necessary to invade East Florida to 
halt such depredations. Ignoring the objections of Continental commander Robert Howe, 
the Georgians sent an invasion force overland toward St. Augustine while a second 
detachment traveled south by sea. The land force faced sporadic resistance from small 
parties of Indians, but reached the St. Mary’s River on May 12, the day they had been 
scheduled to rendezvous with the invasion flotilla. On the night of May 14, some Indians 
captured about one hundred of the rebels’ horses, provoking a skirmish the next day in 
which two Indians were killed, scalped, and mutilated by the Georgians.
The American commander, Col. John Baker, then moved his camp to a safer 
location at Thomas Creek. On the morning of May 17, Brown with about two hundred 
loyalists and Indians attacked Baker’s slightly smaller force. The rebels retreated -  
directly into about one hundred British troops advancing to assist Brown. The stunned 
Americans fled into a swamp, leaving behind three dead and thirty-one prisoners. This
f i  8victory ruined the rebels’ prospects for a successful invasion.
66 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 84-88; Cashin, King’s Ranger, 61-62.
67 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 89, 94.
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The seaborne invasion force finally reached Amelia Island on May 18, well 
behind schedule. The following day some of the island’s loyalist inhabitants attacked a 
Whig detachment, killing an officer and wounding two men. In retaliation, rebel Col. 
Elbert ordered his troops to bum all the houses and kill all the livestock on the island. 
Having learned of Baker’s defeat, Elbert decided that it was too dangerous to put his 
troops ashore on the mainland to march southward. He then found that his boats were 
unable to pass through the channel between Amelia Island and the mainland and were too 
unseaworthy to risk venturing into the Atlantic. On May 26 he decided to return to 
Georgia.69
After the invaders withdrew, Brown’s rangers, with Creek assistance, renewed 
their raids into Georgia during the summer and fall of 1777. They attacked a party of 
twenty-two rebel troops in August, killed fourteen, and then retreated.70 Joseph Clay 
lamented in late September that the raiders had “for some Months past been continually 
making incursions into our State,” and “not the smallest Check has ever been given to 
these People,” other than one incident in which Continental troops drove off a party of 
rangers in a skirmish on the Altamaha River. Clay could not understand how a force that 
“never exceeded 150 including Indians” could operate with impunity in southern 
Georgia. This situation, Clay wrote, “is very much complained of by the Inhabitants &
71with great reason that they cannot be protected from such an inferior force.”
Brown struck again on March 13, 1778, capturing Fort Barrington on the 
Altamaha River. Swimming across the river to achieve surprise, Brown, one hundred 
rangers, and ten Creeks stormed the fort at dawn. They killed two rebels and took twenty-
69 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 92-96.
70 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 113.
71 Joseph Clay to Henry Laurens, Sept. 29, 1777, Letters o f  Clay, 40.
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three prisoners along with some artillery; their own casualties amounted only to one 
killed and four wounded. “Fort Barrington was a great Obstruction to our Foraging, as 
that difficulty is now removed,” it would be easier to procure cattle, Brown reported.72
These successes led Tonyn to conclude that British strength in East Florida was 
sufficient to conquer Georgia and possibly South Carolina as well. He pointed out to 
William Howe the “numberless inconveniences from acting always on the defensive” and 
offered an alternate plan. “With this [St. Augustine] Garrison the Rangers and Indians, 
the province of Georgia may be taken in possession, which will give a fair opportunity to 
the loyalists in South Carolina to show themselves,” Tonyn wrote. Should the loyalists in 
the latter state be as numerous as reported, “I should apprehend that province would soon 
be compelled to subjection,” the governor stated.73
Tonyn never got the opportunity to test his plan because once again the Whigs 
responded to the menace by deciding to invade East Florida. Unless that province were 
conquered, Clay asserted, “we can have no Security,” since the loyalist inhabitants of the 
Georgia and South Carolina backcountry “are continually backwards & Forwards giving 
them every information.”74 Frustrated by the attacks of Brown’s rangers and “the Acts & 
Treachery of some among ourselves,” John Houstoun agreed that an invasion was the 
only way to protect Georgia.75 John Faucherau Grimke, a major in the South Carolina 
Continentals, justified an invasion as necessary to prevent the British from uniting with 
loyalist refugees like the six hundred who had recently marched to Florida. He had heard 
rumors that Prevost intended to attack Sunbury as a diversion while other British troops
72 Thomas Brown to Tonyn, March 13, 1778, Carleton Papers, Vol. 9, No. 1014.
73 Tonyn to William Howe, April 6, 1778, Carleton Papers, Vol. 10, No. 1073.
74 Joseph Clay to Robert Howe, Oct. 15, 1777, Letters o f  Clay, 50.
75 John Houstoun to Henry Laurens, June 9, 1778, PHL, 13:428.
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would “March into the Middle Settlements of Georgia to be joined there by ... 1000 or 
1200 disaffected Insurgents from the back parts of So. Carolina, No. Carolina & 
Georgia.”76
Christopher Gadsden argued that the large number of slaves in the South Carolina 
made it necessary for the Americans to occupy East Florida. Free white laborers,
Gadsden stated, could not compete with slaves who were hired out by their masters, 
which he denounced as an “excessively impolitick” practice. The whites thus 
impoverished, along with “the Scum of all the States from Pennsylvania hitherward ... 
will naturally flock to Augustine as an asylum and no doubt Britain will give them every 
Political Encouragement,” he wrote. These desperate people would then harass both 
Georgia and South Carolina; the only way to prevent this was to deprive them of refuge 
in St. Augustine.77 Gadsden was unique among southern Whigs in believing that because 
slavery denied poor whites economic opportunity, it drove some people into becoming 
loyalists out of sheer necessity.
Gen. Robert Howe opposed the invasion of East Florida, believing that 
concentrating the regulars and militia for such an operation would leave Georgia 
vulnerable to attack from another direction. While conceding that the “daily Incursions 
from the Partizans of Saint Augustine .... Aided, abetted and Encouraged by some of the 
Inhabitants” of Georgia and South Carolina, constituted a serious problem, he insisted 
that invading East Florida would not halt their operations. The rangers’ knowledge of the
* 78country would enable them to plague Georgia even if they lost their Florida base. The
76 John Faucherau Grimke, “Journal o f a Campaign to the Southward. May 9th to July 14th, 1778,”
SCHGM, Vol. 12, No. 2, April 1911, 63-64.
77 Gadsden to W.H. Drayton, June 1, 1778, Writings o f  Gadsden, 126-127.
78 Robert Howe to unnamed, April 13, 1778, Robert Howe Papers, GHS.
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best plan, Howe advised the Georgians, would be to secure their southern frontier by 
establishing strong posts along their southern boundary and keeping scouting parties 
operating between the St. Mary’s and St. John’s Rivers, “by which means the terror & 
alarm the Enemy delight to spread would be retorted upon them.”79
Civil officials dismissed the general’s objections, and Howe reluctantly began to 
organize the invasion force. Even before the troops set out, the army was troubled by 
dissension in the ranks. Loyalists who had sought relief from persecution by enlisting in 
Continental regiments saw the march into Florida as an opportunity to escape the rebels 
and join the British. The boldest of these men attempted to persuade their comrades to 
accompany them. Shortly before the army marched, a Sergeant Alcock ofthe Fourth 
Georgia Battalion was charged with mutiny and “endeavouring to Enveigle Continentl. 
Soldiers to desert with him to the Enemy.” The accusation, however, could not be proven, 
as no one could be found to testify against Alcock.80 The Fourth Georgia, which included
SIseveral British deserters, caused problems for Howe throughout the campaign.
The Alcock incident was merely a prelude to similar troubles Howe encountered 
when his army finally reached Fort Tonyn on the St. Mary’s River. Three Continental 
privates were charged with mutiny on May 13, and the next day a Sergeant Tyrrell of the 
Fourth Georgia was tried on charges of mutiny and encouraging others to desert. Tyrrell 
was found guilty and on May 21 was executed in front of the whole army. Howe hoped 
that this punishment “may have a proper Effect upon the Minds of the Soldiers.”82
79 Robert Howe to Governor o f Georgia, Feb. 7, 1778, Robert Howe Papers, GHS.
80 Robert Howe Orderly Book, March 26 and 30, 1778, WLCL.
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Howe’s optimism did not last twenty-four hours, for the next day James Lister, a 
deserter, was captured and accused of spying, sedition, and urging soldiers to desert. 
Lister, who may have earlier deserted from the British army, had taken fifteen of his 
comrades from the Fourth Georgia with him when he deserted. Three of the men soon 
returned of their own accord, another was killed and ten captured by a detachment sent in 
pursuit. Also taken was one private of the First Georgia.83 One of Howe’s officers stated 
that Lister’s party intended to go to St. Augustine and that if they had succeeded, it
8 A“might by the Example have proved prejudicial to us.”
A court martial sentenced Lister and eight other deserters to be executed. Howe 
had by now concluded that only harsh punishment could prevent an exodus of loyalist 
sympathizers and other disgruntled soldiers from the ranks. Although the general later 
partially relented and pardoned three of the men, this time the executions had the desired 
effect. The Continental units experienced no further problems with desertion or attempted
or t
mutiny during the six weeks they remained in East Florida. The loyalists’ efforts to 
escape to the British and induce others to follow, while disruptive to Howe’s army, did 
little to impede the campaign as a whole, and in the end many sacrificed their lives 
without materially assisting the royal cause.
Howe succeeded in halting desertion among his regulars, but militiamen deserted 
frequently once they entered East Florida. In early June, thirty Georgians went “off to the 
Enemy in a body” and individuals deserted often as well. Desertions were also “daily &
83 Howe Orderly Book, May 22 and 23, 1778, WLCL; Thomas Pinckney to Harriott Pinckney, May 23, 
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frequent” from South Carolina militia units. Like many of the Georgians, “some 
Carolinians had invaded Florida to escape from the Whigs.”87 When Whig officers 
decided in early July to abandon the campaign and withdraw to Georgia, a dozen men
oo
took advantage of their last opportunity to reach the British and deserted.
While loyalists in Whig units struggled to reach the British, their counterparts in 
the king’s service labored to halt the invading army. Reports reaching American officers 
indicated that Brown’s rangers numbered 150 men, supported by 150 Indians, while 350 
South Carolina loyalists were said to be ten miles north of the St. John’s River on May 
21. An informant told the rebels that both Brown’s troops and the South Carolinians 
“were extremely discontented with their Change of Situation & had expressed a wish to 
Return.”89 Prisoners taken by the Americans on June 23 provided a different account, 
stating that although the loyalist soldiers “had been very discontented & that some of 
them had threatened to return to Carolina & throw themselves upon the Mercy of their 
Country,” they had since been “Reconciled.”90
The loyalists showed few signs of demoralization in their encounters with the 
Whigs. Brown first attempted to threaten the invaders by dispatching seventy-five rangers 
and some Indians to unite with another party of loyalists and strike the Whigs’ rear, but 
the plan failed when some of the rangers deserted and informed the rebels. Whig troops 
then attacked and dispersed the party, capturing its commander, Capt. James Moore, and 
executing him. This forced Brown to bum Fort Tonyn on the St. Mary’s River and 
retreat. Brown had more success on June 30. Pursued by about one hundred mounted
86 Grimke, “Journal,” Part 2, SCHGM Vol. 12, No. 3, July 1911, 120, 125.
87 Wright, Florida in the American Revolution, 57.
88 Grimke,” Journal,” Part 3, SCHGM, Vol. 12, No. 4, Oct. 1911, 198.
89 Grimke, “Journal,” Part 1, 65.
90 Grimke, “Journal,” Part 2, 130.
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Georgians, the rangers turned on the Whigs and, with the help of some regulars, drove off 
their enemy. At least nine rebels were killed in the encounter.91
This skirmish proved to be the only significant fighting of the campaign. Gen. 
Augustine Prevost had been “under very little apprehension of the enemy being able to 
effect any thing of consequence” and his prediction proved accurate. The Whig leaders 
fell to arguing among themselves; Georgia governor John Houstoun and Andrew 
Williamson, commanding the South Carolinians, refused to take orders from Howe, the 
officer commanding the naval squadron wanted to retreat, and Howe could not impose a 
plan that satisfied everyone. On July 14 the Whigs began to withdraw. With them went 
about fifteen South Carolina loyalists who had deserted on July l .93
Forced back on the defensive, Howe contemplated yet another invasion of East 
Florida. He advised Congress that the capture of St. Augustine would end the raids on 
Georgia and “entirely crush the Spirit of Insurgency and defection too prevalent in the 
back parts” of that state and South Carolina.94 Meanwhile, Howe prepared for a British 
attack which he expected to coincide with “the rising of a number of Insurgents” in the 
two states.95 Such a blow, he warned, would prove “fatal” to Georgia.96 Congress
97approved Howe’s proposed invasion, but subsequent British actions forestalled the plan.
Once the rebels had left Florida, Brown’s rangers resumed their raids into 
Georgia. “We are again very much infested with Tonyns Banditti Stealing our Horses & 
Negros & doing us all the Mischief they can,” Joseph Clay wrote on September 9. A few
91 Brown to Tonyn, June 30, 1778, Carleton Papers, Vol. 11, No. 1247; Cashin, K ing’s Ranger, 77-78; 
Thomas Pinckney to Harriott Pinckney, July 1, 1778, “Letters o f  Pinckney,” 157.
92 Augustine Prevost to William Howe, June 13, 1778, Carleton Papers, Vol. 11, No. 1236.
93 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 142, 144, 145-147; Grimke, “Journal,” Part 3, 191.
94 Howe to Congress, Sept. 22, 1778, Robert Howe Papers, GHS.
95 Howe to unnamed, Aug. 18, 1778, Robert Howe Papers, GHS.
96 Howe to Henry Laurens, Oct. 12, 1778, Robert Howe Papers, GHS.
97 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 157.
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weeks later, he complained that “the Floridians & Indians by their Robberies & Murders 
keep us in a continual State of Alarm.”98
The rebels had not been content to target East Florida; they decided to strike at 
West Florida as well. Aware of the potential danger, in January 1777 General William 
Howe ordered John Stuart to organize West Florida’s growing number of loyalists into 
companies and arm them to assist in defending the province. Stuart promptly formed four 
companies of men designated the “Loyal Refugees.”99
Despite considerable support in Congress for an invasion of West Florida, Henry 
Laurens managed to have the proposal shelved for 1777. Laurens believed the invasion 
would have dire consequences for the Whigs. Loyalists who had fled to that province had 
already demonstrated their antipathy to the revolution, Laurens noted, and “from Such 
Men we could expect neither assistance nor Secrecy, on the contrary they would join with 
numerous tribes of Indians who had not been thought of in the Scheme of attack.” 
Furthermore, Stuart’s agents could use the invasion to convince the Creeks that the rebels 
harbored aggressive intentions toward the interior of the continent and thus incite that 
nation to strike directly against South Carolina and Georgia.100
The next year, however, Congress decided to carry out the scheme, and 
dispatched about one hundred men under Capt. James Willing, the former Natchez 
resident, to travel down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to strike at West Florida. 
Willing’s party landed at Natchez on February 19, 1778, catching the inhabitants 
completely by surprise. Willing declared all the people in the area prisoners, paroled
98 Clay to Henry Laurens, Sept. 9, 1778; Clay to John Lewis Gervais, Sept. 25, 1778, Letters o f  Clay, 106, 
109.
99 Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 58.
100 Henry Laurens to John Rutledge, Aug. 12, 1777, PHL, 11:444-445.
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them, and claimed the region for the United States. Four days later some of Willing’s 
troops landed at Manchae, where they again paroled all of the inhabitants.101
Willing’s invasion raised the possibility that a significant number of settlers in the 
Natchez region would join the rebels, threatening British control of the Mississippi 
Valley. William Dunbar believed that “perhaps one half of the Inhabitants were in the 
American Interest.”102 Another loyalist stated that about one hundred Natchez settlers
i rv-j
enlisted with Willing. When Willing’s men arrived at Manchac, merchant John 
Fitzpatrick noted that “Several” of the inhabitants joined the rebels.104 Gov. Chester 
responded to the threat by sending John McGillivray to raise a provincial force at Mobile, 
which the governor hoped “might be the nucleus of a permanent military establishment in 
West Florida.”105
Meanwhile, Natchez loyalists took matters into their own hands. They petitioned 
the governor, declaring that they would break their paroles and resist the rebels if 
reinforced by one hundred regular troops, but added that they would not act if the only 
assistance they received came from provincial troops or Indians.106 A pair of loyalists 
who had fled to New Orleans likewise worked to thwart the rebels. Robert Ross and John 
Campbell planted a spy in the home of Oliver Pollock, a merchant who procured supplies 
from the Spanish for the Whigs’ use. Ross and Campbell were discovered plotting to 
prevent the shipment of supplies upriver to Fort Pitt and were banished from Louisiana.
101 Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 86, 88.
102 Dunbar, Diary, May 1, 1778, in Rowland, ed., Life, Letters and Papers o f  William Dunbar, 62.
103 Matthew Phelps, Memoirs and Adventures o f  Captain Matthew Phelps; formerly o f  Harwington in 
Connecticut, Now Resident in Newhaven in Vermont. Particularly in two Voyages, from Connecticut to the 
River Mississippi, from December 1773 to October 1780 (Bennington, VT: Haswell’s Press, 1802), 112.
104 John Fitzpatrick to McGillivray, Struthers, & Co., April 10, 1778, Merchant o f  Manchac, 289.
105 Abbey, “Chester’s Defense o f the Mississippi,” 24.
106 Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 106.
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But to avoid antagonizing the British, Louisiana governor Bernardo de Galvez halted the 
shipment.107
Willing had brought loyalist Anthony Hutchins to New Orleans as a prisoner, 
where he was released on parole. In an effort to sow dissension among the rebels, 
Hutchins convinced several of Willing’s men that their officers had cheated them out of 
their rightful share of plundered loyalist property. He offered a $1000 reward if they 
would capture Pollock and $500 each for Willing and his second in command. However, 
Hutchins abandoned his plan to seize the rebel leaders when he learned that some of 
Willing’s men were returning to Natchez.
Hutchins rushed back to Natchez, where he overcame the reluctance of many 
inhabitants to break their oath of neutrality and raised a party of about thirty loyalists. In 
a well-executed ambush, Hutchins’s men defeated an equal number of Willing’s troops at 
White Cliffs on April 16, killing five rebels and capturing the survivors. Other loyalists at 
Manchac, led by Adam Christie, united with a small force of provincial troops under 
Richard Pearis and attacked the rebels there. The fifteen loyalists defeated and dispersed 
forty Whigs, killing several and taking the rest prisoner. They then withdrew because 
other rebel parties were in the area, and Christie could not risk battle while encumbered 
with so many captives.109 The inhabitants of Natchez renounced the pledge of neutrality 
they had given to Willing, restated their allegiance to Britain, and made a pact to “form 
ourselves into a garrison ... and turn out as universally as necessary, to protect ourselves
107 Abbey, “Chester’s Defense o f the Mississippi,” 27-29.
108 Anthony Hutchins to Germain, May 21, 1778, in Kathryn Trimmer Abbey, ed., “The Intrigue o f a 
British Refugee Against the Willing Raid, 1778,” WMQ, Vol. 1, No. 4, Oct. 1944,400-401.
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and the settlement.”110 Willing and the rest of his force remained in New Orleans, so that 
aside from plundering, Willing’s chief accomplishment had been to strengthen loyalist 
sentiment in West Florida.111
Indian superintendent John Stuart raised four companies of loyalist cavalry, each 
numbering about fifty men, in response to the Willing raid. These troops were 
“constantly employed in the service & defence of this Province,” with two companies 
posted at Manchac, one at Natchez to scout along the Mississippi, while the fourth had 
some of its troops at Pensacola and the rest among the Cherokees. The troops “behaved
119with great Spirit, and resolution,” Stuart reported.
The loyalists, despite a lack of direct assistance, had contributed much to the 
British cause. Those who had marched to East Florida had thrown the Whigs into a panic 
and provided needed reinforcements to that province. Thomas Brown’s rangers had 
harassed Georgia and helped thwart the 1778 invasion of East Florida, weakening the 
Whigs and increasing their vulnerability to the coming British invasion. In West Florida, 
the loyalists had overcome surprise and initial defeat to regain control of the Mississippi 
Valley. Had it not been for the loyalists’ efforts, the strategic situation in the South at the 
end of 1778 would have been far less favorable to the British.
Neutralizing the Indians 
John Stuart faced two major problems as he worked to obtain assistance from the 
Indians in 1777 and 1778. First, the repercussions of the Cherokee defeat temporarily 
took that nation out of the strategic equation and continued to have an effect on the other 
southern nations. Second, George Galphin’s efforts to win over the Creeks to the rebel
110 Phelps, Memoirs and Adventures, 119.
111 Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 120.
112 John Stuart to Clinton, Nov. 22, 1778, Clinton Papers, Vol. 46, No. 25, WLCL.
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cause exacerbated the divisions in that nation, forcing Stuart to make great efforts to 
maintain the Creeks’ allegiance. Nevertheless, Stuart managed to obtain some aid from 
the Indians, which helped the British defeat Whig attempts to invade the Floridas and 
kept pressure on the Georgia frontier.
With their food supplies destroyed, the Cherokees sent messages to the Whigs 
asking for peace. In early 1777, Andrew Williamson brought a “large deputation from the 
lower middle & valley settlements” who had “humbly” come to “sue for Peace.”113 Whig 
leaders agreed to meet with the Cherokees at DeWitt’s Comer, South Carolina, on May 7. 
There, South Carolina representatives Williamson, Leroy Hammond, William Henry 
Drayton, and Daniel Horry, along with Georgians Jonathan Bryan, Jonathan Cochran, 
and William Glascock, conferred with six hundred Cherokees, many of whom had come 
in hopes of receiving presents. On May 20 the parties signed a treaty in which the 
Cherokees gave up almost all of their land in South Carolina except a small parcel in the 
western part of the state.114 The Indians also agreed to release any prisoners they still 
held, white or black, and to return all horses they had taken. The treaty terms attempted to 
drive a wedge between the Cherokees and the British by requiring that any whites “who 
instigated or endeavoured to instigate the Cherokees to the late war or encouraged or 
aided them,” and were still among them be turned over to the rebels. Anyone else, white 
or Indian, who attempted to instigate the Cherokees to further warfare, along with any 
traders unlicensed by American authorities, were likewise to be seized and brought to the 
rebels. If the Cherokees scrupulously adhered to these terms, all contact between the 
nation and the British would cease. For their part, the governments of South Carolina and
113 Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 200; Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Feb. 3, 1777, PHL, 
11:294-295.
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Georgia promised to open trade with the Cherokees and to pay a reward for each runaway 
slave the Indians captured and returned to state officials.115
After reaching agreement with South Carolina and Georgia, the Cherokees faced 
additional negotiations with representatives of Virginia and North Carolina. Virginia 
governor Patrick Henry favored conciliation and instructed his state’s delegates to agree 
to a new boundary “in the best manner you can for the Interest of the frontier Inhabitants, 
so that you at the same time do strict justice to the Indians.”116 But the negotiations nearly 
collapsed when on July 2 an “evil minded” white person murdered a Cherokee man 
named Big Bullet. The Whigs apologized and promised to apprehend the killer. Cherokee 
leader Oconostota likewise pledged that the crime “shall not spoil the good Talks.” He 
warned the rebel agents, however, that the British would use the murder to influence the 
Indians. “Cameron and Stuart will hear of this accident, they will laugh and be pleased at 
it,” he said. “I shall tell my own people not to mind Camerons & Stewarts Talks.” After a 
sham investigation, the Whigs professed to be unable to find the murderer and 
compensated the Cherokees with gifts.117
When negotiations resumed, Cherokee leaders Old Tassel and the Raven spoke 
for their nation. Both men affirmed their desire for peace and shifted blame for the war 
on the British agents who kept them “in blindness.” They did, however, protest that the 
whites had acted as though “they only wanted our land” and had encroached on Cherokee 
territory so that now the whites had “scarcely given us room to turn round.” When the 
rebels argued that the encroachments were legal because of the treaty the Cherokees had
115 “Articles o f the definite Treaty o f  Peace .. .between the States o f So. Carolina and Georgia and the 
Cherokee Indians,” May 20, 1777, in Archibald Henderson, ed., “The Treaty o f  Long Island o f Holston, 
July, 1777,” NCHR, Vol. 8, No. 1, Jan. 1931, 76-78.
116 Patrick Henry to Virginia Commissioners, June 26, 1777, in “Treaty o f Long Island,” 58-59.
117 “Proceedings at a Treaty with the Overhill Cherokee Indians,” in ‘Treaty o f  Long Island,” 62-63.
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signed with Col. Henderson, the Raven insisted that “fear only made us agree to a 
settlement at all, but we expected Government would again remedy us.” The rebels then 
blamed the trouble on the British asserting that the king had granted the lands in question 
to the settlers, but that Stuart and Cameron had lied about it in order to goad the 
Cherokees into a war against the rebels.118
This falsehood set the tone for the negotiations; the rebel commissioners had no 
desire to listen to the Indians’ grievances, wanting instead only to impose the harshest 
possible terms upon the Cherokees. Eventually the Indians submitted to rebel demands, 
although the Americans’ intransigence had aroused their suspicions. “It seems misterious 
to me why you should ask so much land so near me,” Old Tassel said. “I am sensible that 
if we give up these lands they will bring you more a great deal than hundreds of pounds. 
It spoils our hunting ground; but always remains good to you to raise families and stocks 
on, when the goods we receive of you are rotten and gone to nothing.”119 The treaty, 
signed on July 20, ceded vast tracts of Cherokee land to Virginia and North Carolina, 
required the Indians to return any prisoners they held, and barred whites from trespassing 
on the remaining Cherokee land. The Cherokees would be paid for returning runaway 
slaves. Unlike the treaty with South Carolina and Georgia, this agreement contained no 
provisions for seizing or barring British emissaries. Under the terms of the two treaties,
1 70the Cherokees surrendered over five million acres of land to the rebels.
Whig leaders continued to pursue a tough policy toward the Cherokees after the 
treaties had been signed. When South Carolina sent commissioners to mark the new
118 “Proceedings at a Treaty,” July 15-16, 1777, in “Treaty o f Long Island,” 78-86.
119 “Proceedings at a Treaty,” July 16-17, 1777, in “Treaty of Long Island,” 87-91.
120 “Articles o f a Treaty o f peace made and concluded at Fort Henry on Holston River near the Long 
Island,” July 20, 1777, in “Treaty of Long Island,” 107-108; Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 200.
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boundaries between that state and the Cherokees, Indians whose towns were in the lands 
just ceded asked permission to remain in their homes. The governor refused their request. 
In spite of such disappointments, most Cherokees’ remained “very pacific.”121
The 1777 treaties with the Cherokees did not put a complete end to hostilities with 
that nation, however. Dragging Canoe, the most militant Cherokee leader, initially 
appeared willing to make peace. In reply to a talk the Whigs had sent him in April, he 
claimed that he had come to “see clear, that Cameron and Stewart have been telling me 
lies.” The British agents, he said, had “told us that all that the Virginians wanted was to 
get our Land and kill us.” Dragging Canoe said that he now realized that the white
settlers were “the greatest friends we ever had.” But rather than attend the negotiations,
122Dragging Canoe said that he was going to confront the British agents about their lies.
The Cherokee leader in fact was just as skilled in duplicity as the Whig agents and used 
the time he had gained to lead many of the Overhill Cherokees, along with the more 
militant members of other groups, to the Tennessee River Valley, where they established 
new towns. Dragging Canoe’s faction, which came to be known as the Chickamaugas 
after a creek in their new homeland, had about one thousand fighting men. Their leader 
denounced the treaties that the other Cherokees had signed and pressed the British for 
arms so he could continue to fight the frontier settlers. “Repeated attacks were made by 
the Indians upon the settlements” west of the Appalachians in the summer of 1778, which
121 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, Nov. 3, 1777; William Henry Drayton to Laurens, Nov. 1, 1777, 
PHL, 12:2, 16.
122 Talk of Dragging Canoe, June 8, 1777, “Treaty o f Long Island,” 64.
123 Dowd, Spirited Resistance, 54-55.
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frequently forced the inhabitants to take shelter in nearby forts until the militia finally 
drove Dragging Canoe’s Cherokees away.124
The defeat and dislocation of the Cherokees, along with the large land sessions 
they had been forced to make as the price for peace, did not escape the notice of the 
Creeks. John Stuart informed Germain in January 1777 “that the fate of the Cherokee 
nation had damped” the Creeks’ enthusiasm. Two hundred Cherokees, “entirely naked 
and destitute of everything,” had joined Stuart at Pensacola, traveling through Creek 
territory where the sight of their forlorn condition demoralized the Creeks.125 In March 
Stuart noted that some Lower Creeks had met with Galphin, whose reminders of “the 
success of the rebels, operated strongly on the minds of those savages.” After returning to 
their towns, the Indians who had met with Galphin “began to form a party and to debauch
\")f\the minds of many.” The effects had not faded by June. “The distressed situation of the 
Cherokees has been beyond description,” Stuart wrote. “Driven from their habitations 
and wandering about destitute of clothes and provisions, many of them perished.” Their 
defeat had also affected the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Stuart noted after conferring with 
leaders of those two nations. “The fate of the Cherokees is constantly before the eyes of 
the other Indian nations and damps their spirits.”127
This situation greatly complicated Stuart’s situation, since he had received orders 
from Gen. William Howe to organize the southern Indians under the command of loyalist 
refugees and send them to attack the rebels. Howe believed that the loyalists’ ability to
124 Samuel Riggs, Pension Application, in Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 306.
125 John Stuart to Germain, Jan. 23, 1777, DAR, 14:34-35.
126 John Stuart to Germain, March 10, 1777, DAR, 14:49.
127 John Stuart to Germain, June 14, 1777, DAR, 14:114.
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distinguish between loyal and rebel inhabitants would enable them to target their 
opponents when operating against the backcountry settlements.128
Before he could carry out these orders, Stuart had to reverse the effects of the 
Cherokees’ defeat. He instructed Alexander Cameron “to take every Opportunity of 
inculcating into the Cherokee Indians that they themselves are Principals in this War; that 
the Defence of them & their Land is one of the greatest Causes of it.” Cameron should 
also remind them that they had gone to war “to do themselves Justice by the Recovery of 
their Lands,” and “to discountenance in them every Idea of their being engaged in a War 
merely upon our Acct. the reverse being so far true that they began it contrary to your 
Advice & Opinion.”129
It would take some time before Stuart’s agents could raise the Indians’ morale. 
Meanwhile, the Whigs seized the opportunity to increase their influence with the Creeks. 
In December 1776, Lachlan McIntosh sent a message to the Creeks in which he declared 
that the Georgians and Creeks “are, and should be one People.” McIntosh asserted that 
the British planned to take all the land belonging to both whites and Indians and enslave 
Creeks and Georgians alike. The Cherokees, McIntosh said, had believed British lies, 
gone to war, and been driven from their country. He advised the Creeks to send their 
leaders to Savannah to meet with the Georgia officials; should they refuse, McIntosh 
would not be able to restrain his men “from going up to your towns & drive you out of 
your Country as the Carolinians have drove ... the Cherokees.”130 Whatever benefit 
McIntosh hoped to obtain from this agreement was undone a few days later when, in
128 William Howe to John Stuart, Jan. 13, 1777, www.royalprovincial.com/military.rhist/wflrletl.htm, Aug. 
16, 2002.
129 John Stuart to Alexander Cameron, July 11, 1777, Carleton Papers, Vol. 6, No. 602.
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R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
205
response to a Creek raid that killed several rebel soldiers, the Whigs seized six Creeks 
who had been visiting the settlements and imprisoned them in Savannah.131
George Galphin, who had far more influence with the Creeks than McIntosh did, 
stepped in and summoned the Creeks to a meeting at his home at Silver Bluff, across the 
Savannah River from Augusta. On June 17, Galphin met with more than four hundred 
Lower Creeks and threatened that they would suffer a worse fate than the Cherokees if 
they waged war against the Whigs. Intimidated, the Creeks replied that they wanted 
peace and claimed that they had been misled by Stuart’s agents.132 Galphin reported that 
the Creeks “all went back well pleasd” and that only three Creek towns opposed the 
Americans. Their opposition, he said, “is owing to the bad. people we have on the 
frontier of Georgia that kild. Severall of their people Last winter.” Galphin feared that 
some Georgians wished to provoke a war with the Creeks, so he tried to keep the Indians 
away from the settlements from fear that the Georgians would kill them.133
In the autumn Galphin traveled to the Ogeechee River for another meeting with 
some 350 Creeks. Galphin spent seven weeks with them, from early November into late 
December, and although he complained of the “fataging time I had of it among a parsile 
of Drunken Indians,” he was able to report that he had again “Sent them all home well 
pleased.” He provided the Indians with enough goods to load eighty horses. While 
conceding that the British still had some supporters among the Creeks, he predicted that 
“by the Spring we Shall have a good footing in that nattion.” Galphin repeated his
131 Lachlan McIntosh to Robert Howe, Dec. 30, 1776; Lachlan McIntosh to William McIntosh, Jan. 2, 
1777; Lachlan McIntosh to Howe, Jan. 7, 1777, in “Papers o f McIntosh,” Part 2, 261-262, 264; Lachlan 
McIntosh to Lyman Hall, Dr. Brownson, and George Walton, Jan. 23, 1777, in “Papers o f McIntosh,” Part 
3, GHQ, Vol. 38, No. 4, Dec. 1954, 357-358.
132 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 60; George Galphin to Henry Laurens, July 20, 1777; John Wells, Jr., to 
Henry Laurens, June 23, 1777, PHL, 11:388, 402.
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warning that the Georgians were the biggest obstacle to peace, noting that whites in the 
Ceded Lands, the territory acquired in the 1773 Indian cession, had killed five Indians 
before the Creeks retaliated by killing a Georgian, and that the whites frequently stole the 
Indians’ horses. If the Georgians were not restrained, “it will not be in my power to keep 
pease Long,” Galphin declared.134
Galphin’s ability to influence the Creeks troubled British officials, who relied on
• 135that nation’s support to help defend East Florida and maintain pressure on Georgia.
Elias Dumford, an engineer officer at Pensacola, complained that the Creeks “are much 
divided, so that it is not certain what part they may take as Golphin by promises and his 
Interest keeps up a party in that nation.”136 John Stuart at first tried to downplay the 
effects of Galphin’s diplomacy, asserting that at Galphin’s May conference only “about 
200 [Creeks] of little Consequence went,” and “the rest of the Nation was extremely 
offended” by their meeting with Galphin.137 But the results of Galphin’s “tampering” 
struck home in late September, when Alexander McGillivray, one of Stuart’s agents, 
discovered that the Oakfuskee Creeks were “determined to murder Mr. Taitt, Mr. 
Cameron,” and an interpreter.138 McGillivray’s warning saved Taitt and Cameron, but the 
Oakfuskees plundered them and other British traders, and in early October a Cussita 
attempt to murder William McIntosh was thwarted by other Creeks. Two weeks later, the 
Cussitas sent a message informing Stuart that they had learned that the Upper Creeks
134 George Galphin to Henry Laurens, Dec. 22, 1777, PHL, 12:175-176.
135 William Howe to Lt. Col. Dickson, May 6, 1777; Augustine Prevost to John Stuart, June 14, 1777, 
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planned to remain neutral and that they intended to do the same. Stuart responded by
1halting trade with the Creek towns who had harassed his agents and traders.
Stuart admitted to Germain that Galphin had succeeded in dividing the Creeks so 
that they would not provide as much support as expected.140 Irritated at that nation’s lack 
of assistance, Germain expressed regret that they “do not manifest that disposition to act 
in favor of Government, which we had been taught to expect.” The minister, who was 
losing confidence in Stuart, advised Gen. Howe to “frustrate the designs o f the Agents 
employed by the Rebels, & secure the future Affection of the Savages.”141
In addition to Galphin’s Creek adherents, a pro-Spanish faction in the nation also 
undermined British efforts to maintain their influence. Creek leader Tunape and a large 
number of other Indians visited Havana in 1777, where they asked the Spaniards to open 
trade with them. Spanish officials expressed their regret at being unable to comply, but 
offered to provide specific items requested by Tunape.142
Despite these difficulties, Stuart managed to convince some Creeks to operate 
against the rebels. In late March, Creek parties struck in western Georgia, where they 
killed three men at Clark’s Fort.143 Lachlan McIntosh warned Governor Button Gwinnett 
that there were too few mounted troops to guard the frontiers and as a result the Indians 
had been “very troublesome, & kill’d several people in different parts of the State within
139 Alexander McGillivray to John Stuart, Sept. 25, 1777; John Stuart to William Howe, Oct. 6, 1777; Copy
of a Talk from the Head Men & Warriors of the Lower Creek Nation to John Stuart, Oct. 19, 1777,
Carleton Papers, Vol. 6, Nos. 677, 695, 707; O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 66.
140 Stuart to Germain, March 10, 1777, and Aug. 22, 1777, DAR, 14:49, 168.
141 Germain to Howe, Sept. 3, 1777, Germain Papers, Vol. 6, WLCL.
142 Boyd and Navarro, “Spanish Interest in British Florida,” 97.
143 McIntosh to Robert Howe, April 2, 1777, “Papers o f  McIntosh,” Part 3, 365.
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this Six Mos. past, we are under great apprehension this summer of a Genl. war with the 
Indians,” instigated by the British.144
While Galphin was still meeting with the Creeks in the summer, a party of 
Cowetas stole several horses, then ambushed a rebel force that pursued them, killing 
twenty. The Cowetas also attacked a fort on the Ogeechee River and killed two rebels.
The Whigs abandoned the fort and the Indians burned it. Another group of Creeks 
attacked Capt. Thomas Dooley and twenty Continental recruits on July 22. Dooley and 
three other whites were killed; the rest of the Whigs fled. On July 31a Creek party killed 
a woman and four children near the Ogeechee, “the only documented exception in the 
South” to the Indians’ policy of striking only armed opponents. John Stuart claimed that 
Samuel Dilkes, whose wife and children were the victims, had repeatedly abused the 
Indians and that personal revenge motivated the Creeks in this instance.145
These sporadic attacks helped the British by inciting the Georgians’ rage against 
the Indians; white hatred of the Creeks was the most convincing argument Stuart could 
use to keep the Indians’ allegiance. After the summer conference, Galphin had escorted 
Handsome Fellow and nine other Creek leaders to Charleston to consult with state 
officials. On their return journey, Thomas Dooley’s troops with some other Whigs seized 
the ten Creeks, and ignoring Galphin’s protests, imprisoned them at Augusta. The Indians 
were eventually released and escorted home by some Georgia Continentals. Galphin 
mollified them by claiming Stuart had sent out the Creek party to kill Dooley in hopes of 
provoking a war.146 John Lewis Gervais complained that “a few Georgia people have put
144 Lachlan McIntosh to Button Gwinnett, April 13, 1777, “Papers of McIntosh,” Part 3, 367.
145 Searcy, Georgia-Florida Contest, 112-113.
146 John Rutledge to [South Carolina delegates in Congress, Aug. 30,1777, John Rutledge Papers, SCL; 
John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, Aug. 16, 1777, PHL, 11:461.
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us at the Eve of a War,” just when peace with the Creeks seemed assured.147 “It is 
impossible to say what will happen when the Handsome Fellow gets Home,” John 
Rutledge wrote, echoing Gervais’s concern, “I fear a Creek War will soon take place.”148 
Whig relations with the Creeks remained tenuous into the autumn. Although a 
few Creeks occasionally killed settlers on the Georgia frontier, news that the pro-rebel 
Creek faction had driven Stuart’s agents out of their territory and plundered British 
traders led Gervais to assert that the Creeks “have at last declared in our favour.”149 But 
while the incident had the potential to seriously disrupt Creek relations with the British, 
the Georgians continued to provoke the Creeks with aggressive actions. “I am afraid the 
people in the Ceded Land, will undo all we are Doing,” Galphin wrote, noting that the 
Georgians had sent two surveyors onto Indian land to mark out plots. When the Creeks 
learned of this, Galphin warned, “it will make our Enemies words, true that we want to 
take all there Land.” He urged Georgia officials to restrain their citizens in order to 
prevent war.150
Georgia’s Assembly, blinded to potential danger by their desire for land, instead 
considered launching a war against the Creeks. Robert Howe labored to dissuade them, 
insisting that Georgia lacked the strength to go to war with the Creeks. He also warned 
them that they would be unlikely to receive aid from the neighboring states, who were 
working hard to keep the Creeks neutral.151 The Georgians finally abandoned the scheme, 
although Joseph Clay wrote that “’twas with the greatest difficulty we cou’d prevent our 
Assembly Resolving during the last Sitting to break out with the Creeks which if had
147 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, Aug. 16, 1777, PHL, 11:461.
148 John Rutledge to [South Carolina delegates in Congress], Aug. 30, 1777, John Rutledge Papers, SCL.
149 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, Nov. 13, 1777, PHL, 12:16.
150 George Galphin to Henry Laurens, Oct. 13, 1777, PHL, 11:552-553.
151 Donald R. Lennon, ‘“The Graveyard o f American Commanders’: The Continental Army’s Southern 
Department, 1776-1778,” NCHR, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 1990, 154.
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1 ^9taken place we must have been broke up as a State at once.” He found the push for a 
Creek war especially disturbing because it came “at that very time these People ... were 
giving us the most convincing Proofs of their Pacific disposition towards us -  by driving 
Stuart’s Deputies out of their Towns & bum’d their Houses.”153
Stuart spent the early months of 1778 attempting simultaneously to punish the 
Creeks for their hostile actions against his agents and to reestablish good relations with 
them. The cessation of trade led Upper Creek leaders to come to Pensacola to meet with 
the superintendent. Since they had not participated in the plundering, Stuart told them to 
carry out their winter hunt. Shortly afterward, six hundred Lower Creeks arrived to make 
amends. Stuart avoided blaming the Indians as a group; instead, he criticized those 
Indians who had “misbehaved,” but praised those who had not for their faithfulness. The 
guilty individuals apologized and asked that the traders be allowed to return. Stuart 
consented, providing that the rebellious Creeks first permitted his deputies to go back 
among them. The Oakfuskees did not go to Pensacola, but sent Alexander McGillivray 
there with a message of apology and expressed their willingness to accept an agent, so 
long as it was not David Taitt, “who was obnoxious to them.” Stuart instructed 
McGillivray to bring their leaders to Pensacola for further discussion.154
By spring, Stuart had managed to bring most of the Creeks back into the British 
fold. In March he reported that “at the most pressing solicitation of the Upper & Lower 
Creeks, Messrs Tait and Mackintosh are returned to their Nations, guarded by strong 
partys of Indians, who are determined to protect them at the risk of their lives.” With his 
agents back among the Creeks and the trade reopened, except to the pro-American towns,
152 Joseph Clay to Robert Howe, Oct. 15, 1777, Letters o f  Clay, 51.
153 Clay to Henry Laurens, Oct. 21, 1777, Letters o f  Clay, 54.
154 John Stuart to William Howe, Feb. 4, 1778, RAM, 1:189.
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Stuart predicted “that every thing in that Nation will be brought into its proper Channel in 
a very short time.”155 The “leading chiefs of all the towns in the rebel interest” came to 
Pensacola in late April “to make their peace.” Stuart believed that only a lack of direct 
support from British troops made the Indians hesitant to exert themselves more fully 
against the Whigs.156
Stuart’s progress did not satisfy Patrick Tonyn, who planned to use the Creeks 
and Brown’s rangers to launch a major offensive against Georgia. Conducting his own 
diplomacy without consulting Stuart, Tonyn had succeeded in keeping the Seminoles and 
other Creeks living near East Florida “well disposed.”157 A French visitor estimated that 
there were only four hundred Indian warriors in the province, but noted that “the English
1 ^Rare humoring them and lavishing attention on them.” Tonyn wished to keep the Creeks 
satisfied until he received approval for his attack on Georgia. Again bypassing Stuart, he 
had written directly to William Howe to point out “the necessity of employing [the 
Indians] in some shape.” The governor sought Howe’s permission to invade Georgia 
using the East Florida garrison, Brown’s rangers, and the Indians. With such a force, 
Tonyn stated, “Georgia may be taken in possession, which will give a fair opportunity to 
the loyalists in South Carolina to show themselves ... and if they prove as numerous as 
hath been given out, I should apprehend that province would soon be compelled to 
subjection and to own their allegiance to the King.” Howe, less optimistic than Tonyn, 
did not approve the proposal.159
155 John Stuart to William Howe, March 22, 1778, Clinton Papers, Vol. 32, No. 29, WLCL.
156 John Stuart to Germain, May 2, 1778, DAR, 15:113-114.
157 Tonyn to William Howe, Feb. 24, 1778, RAM, 1:197.
158 Lee Kennett, ed. and trans., “A French Report on St. Augustine in the 1770’s,” FHQ, Vol. 44, Nos. 1 & 
2, July-Oct. 1965, 135.
159 Tonyn to William Howe, April 6, 1778, RAM, 1:225.
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Equally frustrating for the governor was the news that Stuart had met with the 
Creeks and urged them to remain at peace. Tonyn complained to Gen. Howe that as a 
result of Stuart’s work, “the object, formed by the rebels, is attained, to make the Indians 
neutral.” Tonyn had expected hundreds of Indians to come to St. Augustine to assist the 
rangers in Tonyn’s alternate plan of launching extensive raids in Georgia, but after 
Stuart’s meeting only one hundred had arrived.160 Stuart did promise that the Seminoles 
were ready to provide one thousand men to assist Prevost’s forces whenever they were 
needed, but this failed to satisfy the governor.161
Tonyn had to abandon his strategy when the Whigs invaded East Florida. The 
Creeks’ contribution to the province’s defense was minimal. The Upper Creeks had 
planned “to harass and plunder the back settlements” of Georgia while many militiamen 
were away with the invasion force, but “the rebel party” among the Creeks threatened “to 
fall upon the [British] traders in the nation and the inhabitants of [West Florida] as soon 
as the others should turn out.” The pro-British Creeks “entirely quenched the flame which 
was kindling by the rebel gang,” but were too busy doing so to make the intended raids
1 f\) •on Georgia. About twenty Creeks who were in East Florida cooperated with Brown’s 
rangers; they frequently scouted the American camp at Fort Tonyn, and on June 1 caught 
and scalped a Georgian soldier who had been traveling alone.163
The Whig invasion force also included some Indians, although neither their 
numbers nor their nation was recorded. Several of them were members of “a Party of 
Indians and Soldiers” who brought nine deserters “and the Scalp of a Tenth” back to the
160 Tonyn to William Howe, May 15, 1778, RAM, 1:251-252.
161 John Stuart to William Howe, Feb. 4, 1778, RAM, 1:190.
162 John Stuart to Germain, Aug. 10,1778, DAR, 15:181-182.
163 Thomas Pinckney to Harriott Pinckney, June 4, 1778, “Letters o f  Pinckney,” 154; Grimke, “Journal,” 
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American lines.164 These Indians may have been Creeks from the pro-American towns or 
Catawbas who accompanied Andrew Williamson’s militia from South Carolina.
Gen. Prevost complained that the Indians had provided little help during the 
invasion, noting that “they did not appear to be very forward to assist.” He attributed the 
poor response to the Indians’ belief that if the rebels conquered East Florida, it “would 
only be the prelude to their [Indians’] destruction” if they actively aided the British. Once 
the invasion had failed, Prevost observed, the Indians “then came very readily to offer 
their Services and to receive the presents which their good will and friendship merited in 
their opinion.” Despite his dissatisfaction with the Indians, Prevost asked Gen. Henry 
Clinton to send more presents for them because “their friendship to us in great part 
depends upon it.” Prevost believed that their support would be more reliable if British 
forces in the province could demonstrate a clear superiority over the rebels.165
After the abortive Whig invasion of East Florida, persistent rumors that a Creek 
attack on Georgia was imminent circulated in that province and South Carolina. Andrew 
Williamson ordered his militia to prepare for action after receiving a message from 
Galphin on August 9 that “the Creeks mean to immediately attack the frontier of 
Georgia.”166 Rawlins Lowndes, who had received a similar warning from Galphin “of a 
Storm Brewing up in the Creek Nation,” worried that “our wild expedition to Florida and 
impotant taunts, will have a bad influence on our Indian Affairs.” Between the Indians 
and “our own disaffected Inhabitants,” Lowndes complained that he was constantly
167occupied trying “to Counter-act their Plots and watch their movements.” On August
164 Thomas Pinckney to Harriott Pinckney, May 23, 1778, “Letters o f Pinckney,” 149.
165 Augustine Prevost to Henry Clinton, Sept. 16, 1778, RAM, 1:293-294.
166 Williamson to John Bowie, Aug. 9, 1778, John Bowie Papers, SCDAH.
167 Rawlins Lowndes to Henry Laurens, Aug. 16, 1778, PHL, 14:169.
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20, John Houstoun heard a report that eight Creek towns had declared war on the rebels 
and that Indians had killed twenty-four people on the Ceded Lands during the previous 
week. Like Lowndes, Houstoun blamed the failure of the Florida expedition for the Creek 
attacks. That nation, he said “look’d on with eager Expectation and from every Account
were determined as usual to take the strongest Side.” The rebels’ lack of success, in his
• « 168 opinion, had convinced many Creeks that the British now had the upper hand.
Galphin, however, did not expect a full-scale war with the Creeks, although he
had warned that some Creek factions were preparing to strike. He believed that the Whigs
still had “rather a majority of the whole Nation in our interest” and reported that pro-
American Creeks had assured him “that they will make reprisals at Pensacola & Mobille
for whatever mischief the hostile Indians may do on our frontiers.”169 Rebel officials soon
received information indicating that the Creek threat had been exaggerated, but many
Whigs were infuriated by the possibility of Indian attacks. “No terms should be kept with
the perfidious Race,” John Wells, Jr. wrote. “Fire & sword are the only arguments that
can avail with them.”170
Galphin continued to assure rebel officials that the Creeks were under control, but
scattered Indian raids across the backcountry in October raised new fears among the
Whigs. Andrew Williamson again called out his militia in the middle of the month to
defend the frontier, while Rawlins Lowndes expressed concern that Stuart’s “powerful
Influence ... operates strongly” among the Creeks.171 Even Galphin himself began to lose
hope of maintaining peace. “Stuart at Last has prevailed upon his frinds to Come against
168 John Houstoun to Henry Laurens, Aug. 20, 1778, PHL, 14:192.
169 John Wells, Jr. to Henry Laurens, Aug. 23, 1778, PHL, 14:213.
170 John Wells, Jr. to Henry Laurens, Aug. 28, 1778, PHL, 14:242-243.
171 Williamson to Bowie, Oct. 14, 1778 and Oct. 18,1778, John Bowie Papers, SCDAH; Rawlins Lowndes 
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our frontier,” the agent wrote on October 26. Galphin was trying to use other Creeks to 
discourage the pro-British faction from attacking, but again blamed the Georgians on the 
Ceded Lands for creating the problem. He asserted that “had it not been for the 
Imprudence of Some of our one people it woud not been in Stuarts power and all his 
presents to have Set the Creeks upon us.” Galphin pointed out that all the Creek attacks 
thus far had targeted settlers in the Ceded Lands, while settlements that had not shown 
hostility to the Creeks had not been molested. Nevertheless, Galphin urged a tough 
response to the raids, writing that some Creeks “will be allways a picking at us till they 
get a good Drubing we Can never put up with the Insultes we have reed from them 
without Leting them no we are there masters.”172
The South Carolina Assembly considered the Creek problem in November, and 
concluded that another effort should be made to negotiate peace with that nation, even if 
it was necessary to pay the Indians in order to prevent hostilities. But if negotiations 
proved unsuccessful, the legislators decided, the Whigs should follow Galphin’s advice
1 7Tand “carry the War into the Creek country.”
Augustine Prevost had no intention of allowing the Whigs to crush the Creeks. 
Reports reaching St. Augustine in October indicated that “the Southern Colonies of 
Carolina & Georgia were collecting a large Force on their Frontiers in order to attack the 
Creek & Cherokee Indians.” Wishing to prevent a defeat that might deprive the British of 
further Indian support, Prevost decided “to effect a diversion both in the lower 
Settlements and the Centrical part of Georgia.” To accomplish this, he dispatched Lt. Col. 
Fuser with 240 men and a galley to attack the rebel fort at Sunbury, while the general’s
172 George Galphin to Henry Laurens, Oct. 26, 1778, PHL, 13:452-454.
173 Report o f Committee, Nov. 10, 1778, Edward Telfair Papers, PERK.
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brother, Lt. Col. James Mark Prevost, led a joint land and naval force consisting of a 
regular battalion and four hundred loyalists to the Altamaha River. Lt. Col. Prevost’s 
troops “proceeded with so much secrecy and Expedition” that they reached “the heart of 
the Settlements of the Province of Georgia before the Rebels were apprised of his 
Arrival.” This force drove the Georgians from several posts, killed Brig. Gen. William 
Screven in a skirmish, and captured forty men and over two thousand head of cattle.
Fuser, however, retreated from Sunbury after deciding he could not take the fort. Fuser’s 
withdrawal forced James Prevost to fall back as well. He was accompanied by “a number 
of famillies attached to Govemement.”174 Although Gen. Prevost had been wrongly 
informed of rebel intentions, the foray demonstrated his commitment to assisting 
Britain’s Indian allies.
Despite his difficulties with the Creeks, Stuart expressed great satisfaction with 
the behavior of the other nations. In May and June of 1777, he met with 2,800 Choctaws 
and Chickasaws at Mobile, where he “admonished them in the strongest manner to unite 
with the other Nations in the District, in making their mutual Defence a common Cause 
and forming a Confederacy to support the King’s Cause.” The Chickasaws declared their 
willingness to shed “their last Blood in His Majesty’s Cause,” a statement that “was 
received with applause and seconded by the principal Chactaw Chiefs.” Stuart believed
175that the Indians were sincere and could be relied upon to act when needed.
If Choctaw assistance was required, Stuart worried that it might be hampered 
because of problems with alcohol consumption in that nation. “Excessive drinking was 
decimating” the Choctaws in 1777 as British traders inundated their towns with rum.
174 Augustine Prevost to Jeffery Amherst, Jan. 18, 1779, Amherst Papers, W 034/112/3, Microfilm, DLAR.
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Choctaw leaders asked Stuart to stem the flow; the superintendent promptly contacted 
Gov. Chester to demand that restrictions be placed on the sale of rum to the Choctaws.176 
However, traders still managed to bring rum to the Indians, so in February 1778 Stuart 
assigned Richard Pearis’s company of loyalists to put a stop to the practice.177
That same month, Stuart reported that the Choctaws and Chickasaws were 
“perfectly well disposed” and that the five hundred Cherokee refugees at Pensacola, 
“notwithstanding the severe Chastisement which they lately received, are ready to act 
when called upon.”178 Gov. Chester, however, remained uneasy with the fact that West 
Florida’s defense rested mainly in the hands of the Indians. He told Germain that he 
doubted the Indians’ reliability because “many of them seem to be actuated solely by 
motives of self interest and will receive presents from anybody who will give them.”179 
The Chickasaws, who had the responsibility of disrupting rebel shipping on the 
Mississippi River, had been effective in harassing any vessels that passed. Spanish boats 
were not exempt from this interference, which led Gov. Galvez to protest to Chester.
“Not a boat has come down from Illinois, and not a trapper’s boat, without being fired 
upon” by the Chickasaws, Galvez complained. In February 1778 he sent an envoy,
Jacinto Panis, to Pensacola to demand that Chester end the harassment. In addition to 
negotiating with Chester, Panis had orders to obtain intelligence that might be useful in 
the event of war between Spain and Britain. Although Chester told Panis that he had no 
jurisdiction over the Indians, the governor ordered Stuart to inform the Chickasaws that 
Spanish vessels must be allowed to travel the Mississippi unmolested. Chester also
176 James H. O’Donnell, III, “The Southern Indians in the War for American Independence, 1775-1783,” in 
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protested that the Spaniards had been meddling with the Choctaws, inviting some of them 
to New Orleans and giving them presents. The negotiations ended without Chester and 
Panis coming to any agreement on Indian issues.180
Chester’s fears that the defense of West Florida could not be entrusted to Indians 
appeared to be realized when Willing’s expedition sailed down the Mississippi in the 
spring of 1778. Willing’s vessels passed unnoticed because the Indians had left their 
observation posts. Stuart had posted a party of Choctaws under the command of one of 
his agents to watch traffic on the river, but they had returned home and the Indians who 
were supposed to relieve them had not yet reached their station.181 Willing’s men tried to 
capture Henry Stuart, the superintendent’s brother and deputy, who was at Manchac with 
a few Indians, but Stuart received warning of the rebels’ approach and escaped to Spanish 
territory.182 With Whig troops seemingly in control of the Natchez region, loyalists 
worried about the effect it might have on the Indians. Anthony Hutchins wrote that he 
was “convinced that almost the smallest matter would turn the Chactaw and other Indians 
against us, who were ever ready to join the strongest side, and who are much caress’d by 
the Spaniards in the name of their antient friends the French.”183
In response to the raid, John Stuart immediately instructed his agents to assemble 
as many Choctaws and Chickasaws as they could, put them under the command of white 
men, and “march to the assistance of the inhabitants.”184 Some Chickasaws took post to 
watch the Mississippi from the mouth of the Ohio to a point below Chickasaw Bluffs to 
look for rebel reinforcements, while others accompanied British troops and loyal militia
180 John Caughey, “The Panis Mission to Pensacola, 1778,” Hispanic-American Historical Review, Vol. 10, 
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• • 1 RSattempting to drive out Willing’s men. Choctaw war leader Franchimastabe rushed to 
Natchez with 155 men, where they spent a month guarding the fort in the event that 
Willing returned. Farquhar Bethune, one of Stuart’s agents, praised the “regularity and 
discretion” the Indians displayed while at Natchez, which he said was cause for 
“universal satisfaction.” When the Indians left, Franchimastabe told the settlers that his 
people would stand ready to assist if the rebels returned. He also threatened that if the 
inhabitants desired “to take the rebels by the hand or enter into any treaty with them” the 
Choctaws would “treat you as our enemies.”186
The rapid Indian response to the Willing raid did not satisfy Chester, who 
complainedto Germain that despite “the great Expense which it has cost the Government 
for Presents, Provisions, etc. -  to attach these Savages .... they cannot when called forth 
be depended upon.”187 Germain shared Chester’s anger and chastised Stuart for the “most 
unpardonable negligence in the officers you had appointed” in allowing Willing to reach 
West Florida undetected. It was bad enough that the Indians had not seen the rebels 
coming, Germain declared, but it was even worse that there were no Indians on hand to 
oppose the rebels’ landing or to assist the loyalists in defending the province. The money 
spent on the Indian Department, Germain stated, should surely have been sufficient to 
engage the Indians to keep “a constant watch” on the Mississippi and have parties ready 
“of sufficient strength to defeat a much more formidable detachment than that which has
• • 1 RRbeen suffered to do so much mischief.”
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Germain felt especially bitter over the lack of Indian assistance because he had 
just been forced to make a considerable effort in Parliament to defend their use against 
the rebels. In late 1777, Lord Chatham had denounced the “bloody, barbarous, and 
ferocious” aspects of Indian warfare against the colonists in the House of Lords,189 while 
opposition members in the House of Commons also criticized Germain for employing 
Indians against the rebels. Lord Suffolk, however, defended the practice on the grounds 
that it was legitimate for the government “to use all the means that God and nature have 
put into our hands.”190 Led by Edmund Burke, the opposition renewed its protests against 
the ministry’s Indian policy in February 1778. Burke called for a halt to the government’s 
use of Indians, while Germain argued that “the Indians would not have remained idle 
spectators .... it amounted to a clear undisputed proposition, that either they would have 
served against us, or that we must have employed them.”191 Burke’s motion was defeated 
by a vote of 223-137.192
African Americans: Marking Time
Although the Whigs in Georgia and South Carolina rigidly enforced the slave 
codes and remained vigilant to prevent blacks from escaping to the British, enough slaves 
attempted to reach East Florida or to go aboard British warships plying coastal waters to 
cause significant problems for the rebels. Henry Laurens told Ralph Izard in June 1777 
that “your Negroes are continually deserting the plantations” and going to Charleston, 
“where I have no doubt many of them would have embark’d in Men of War and other 
Vessels” had Laurens not been able to recover them. Laurens attributed the slaves’ flight
189 Eliga H. Gould, The Persistence o f  Empire: British Political Culture in the Age o f  the American 
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to two causes: “the Tyranny and Villainy of Overseers and Sometimes to ... their own 
vicious Designs,” that is, a desire to find freedom with the British.193 Unwilling to 
tolerate such behavior, in August Charleston officials ordered the execution of a slave 
who had taken three women and two children with him and was “endeavouring to go on 
board the Men of War.”194 Yet not all slaves who reached British warships were satisfied 
with the conditions they found, for a month earlier nine of them that “the Men of War 
took are returned.”195 These slaves had probably been taken against their will and the 
British officers, realizing that, allowed them to leave.
While fugitive slaves in South Carolina usually went to the coast seeking refuge 
with the royal navy, Georgia slaves fled overland to East Florida.196 Other runaways 
concealed themselves in the swamps and forests to await a favorable opportunity to join 
the British. Before leaving Providence, Rhode Island, to act as agent for a merchant firm 
in the south, Elkanah Watson was warned of the danger he might face with “the negroes 
in some of the Southern States in partial insurrection.” He undertook the journey anyway 
and soon found that the menace was real. “We had been cautioned to be on our guard 
against the attacks of runaway negroes, in the passage of swamps near Wingan Bay” in 
South Carolina, Watson wrote. While crossing a swamp in November 1777, “fourteen 
naked negroes armed with poles, presented themselves in the attitude of hostility, across 
the road.” Watson and a companion drew their pistols and charged the blacks, who 
dropped the poles and fled into the woods.197
193 Henry Laurens to Ralph Izard, June 9, 1777, PHL, 11:350.
194 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, Aug. 2, 1777, PHL, 11:414.
195 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, July 26, 1777, PHL, 11:405.
196 Joseph Clay to Robert Howe, Oct. 15, 1777, Letters o f  Clay, 50.
197 Elkanah Watson, Men and Times o f  the Revolution; or, Memoirs o f  Elkanah Watson, Including Journals 
o f  Travels in Europe and America, from 1777 to 1842. Edited by Winslow C. Watson. (New York: Dana 
and Company, 1852), 25, 43.
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When found by their masters, such fugitives faced severe consequences. In 
February 1778, Pennsylvanian Ebenezer Hazard witnessed the recapture of a runaway 
slave near Pocotaligo, South Carolina. While another slave bound the runaway, the 
master watched from horseback, gun in hand. “The poor Negroe’s looks, arising from 
terrible apprehensions of future punishment, were such as I think must have affected a
1 QQ
savage,” Hazard wrote, yet the master showed no trace of sympathy. After several
fugitives belonging to Henry Laurens and other planters were recovered, John Lewis 
Gervais told Laurens that he would sell one of them as punishment and give the others “a 
Severe Correction at the Work house.”199
Even if most slaves remained on their plantations, their insubordinate behavior 
increased, to the consternation of their masters. In June 1777 a black driver, March, “was 
very Saucy” when a white overseer accused him of stealing rice. The overseer “laid hold 
of him, but the Negro proved to be the Strongest & threw him.” Other slaves refused to 
obey the man’s orders to help him subdue March, so the overseer left. He returned shortly 
afterward to find that March had cut off part of his own left hand; March then attacked 
the overseer with a knife. Only then did the other slaves intervene. March was sent to 
Savannah to be treated and then lodged in the workhouse.200
Despite Whig reluctance to alter the slaves’ situation, the vulnerability of the 
southern states to British attack led the rebels to use slaves in their traditional role as 
laborers to assist white troops. When rumors of a possible British invasion circulated in 
South Carolina in late 1777, William Henry Drayton asked the Council “for all the
198 H. Roy Merrens, ed. “A View of Coastal Carolina in 1778: The Journal o f Ebenezer Hazard,” SCHM, 
Vol. 73, No. 4, Oct. 1972, 187.
199 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, June 19, 1778, PHL, 13:494.
200 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, July 26, 1777, PHL, 11:407-408.
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labouring Negroes belonging to those who had been banished by the abjuration Act,” as 
well as slaves owned by other prominent loyalists not covered by the act, to work on 
Charleston’s fortifications. The Council granted the request and Drayton assigned the 
slaves to dig a channel connecting the Ashley and Cooper Rivers, which would serve as 
an obstacle to protect the land approaches to the town.201
Robert Howe asked Georgia authorities to provide three hundred slaves “to act as 
Pioneers” for the army invading East Florida in 1778. The Assembly reduced the number 
to two hundred, but only fifty-six reported to camp.202 They were assigned to clear roads 
and perform other forms of heavy labor. One black was killed in a skirmish.203 There is 
no evidence that any of the slaves tried to escape; perhaps the executions of white 
deserters intimidated them from making the attempt.
One South Carolina Whig believed that slaves should not only assist the army as 
pioneers and laborers, but should serve as combat soldiers. Henry Laurens’s son John, an 
aide to George Washington in Pennsylvania, wrote to his father on January 14, 1778, 
requesting “a number of your able bodied men Slaves” to be trained as soldiers. The 
younger Laurens asserted that his plan would both provide badly needed troops and 
“advance those who are unjustly deprived of the Rights of Mankind to a State which 
would be a proper Gradation between abject Slavery and perfect Liberty.”204
201 William Henry Drayton to Henry Laurens, Nov. 1, 1777, PHL, 12:1.
202 Grimke, “Journal,” Part 1, 67.
203 Bennett and Lennon, Quest fo r Glory, 75-76, 79. Concerning the man’s death, the authors assert “that 
black Americans apparently were serving in a combat capacity during the expedition” (79). No evidence 
exists to support this claim, however. It is more likely that the man was a pioneer or an officer’s servant.
204 John Laurens to Henry Laurens, Jan. 14, 1778, PHL, 12:305. For an account o f John Laurens’s efforts 
during the Revolution to arm slaves for American service, see Gregory D. Massey, “The Limits of 
Antislavery Thought in the Revolutionary Lower South: John Laurens and Henry Laurens,” JSH, Vol. 63, 
No. 3, August 1997, 495-530.
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In his reply, Henry Laurens tried to convince his son to reflect on his proposal 
before pursuing it further. “More time will be required for me to consider the propriety of 
your scheme for raising a black Regiment, than you seem to have taken for concerting the 
project,” the elder Laurens wrote, because “a Work of this importance must be entered 
upon with Caution & great circumspection.”205 The elder Laurens cautiously probed his 
colleagues in Congress to leam their opinions of the plan, but found no supporters. He 
warned John that slaves might not wish to exchange the “comfortable” conditions of 
bondage for service far from home, “where Loss of Life & Loss of Limbs must be 
expected by every one every day.”206
John Laurens conceded that he had “that monster popular Prejudice” against him, 
but insisted that his proposal was for the public good. He countered his father’s 
objections by arguing that most slaves would welcome “being rescued from a State of 
perpetual humiliation.” Furthermore, slavery had conditioned blacks to accept 
subordination, hard work, and deprivation, making them well-qualified to be soldiers.207 
These arguments failed to convince Henry Laurens, who wrote that “the more I think of 
& the more I have consulted on, your scheme, the less I approve of it.” This reproach 
caused John to ask his father’s forgiveness “for the trouble which I have given you on 
this excentric Scheme.”209
Although the Whigs’ attitude toward slaves remained largely unchanged, a 
growing number of loyalists began to recognize that blacks were reliable allies. At the 
end of June 1778, Louisa Susannah Wells, along with thirteen other banished loyalists,
205 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Jan. 22, 1778, PHL, 12:328.
206 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Jan. 28, 1778, PHL, 12:368.
207 John Laurens to Henry Laurens, Feb. 2, 1778, PHL, 12:390-392.
208 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Feb. 6, 1778, PHL, 12:412-413.
209 John Laurens to Henry Laurens, Feb. 15, 1778, PHL, 12:446.
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boarded the ship Providence bound for England. Earlier in the year, a ship carrying 
another group of exiles had run aground while leaving Charleston harbor. The passengers 
on the Providence suspected that the white pilot “had been bribed to run that unfortunate 
vessel on the Shoals.” The loyalists on the grounded ship had to remain in South Carolina 
for several months, and the people aboard the Providence wanted to avoid a similar fate. 
“For this reason,” Wells wrote, “we chose a Negro Pilot” named Bluff, paying him $100 
in rebel currency in addition to his master’s fee. In an effort to reassure the loyalists 
without making the risky statements that had led to Thomas Jeremiah’s death, Bluff 
cautiously told them that “he was a true friend to British Manufactures,” which, Wells 
said, “was as much Loyalty as he durst own.” Bluff got the loyalists safely out of the 
harbor.210 In West Florida, the inhabitants also turned to blacks for assistance, and several 
served on board the naval vessels assigned to defend the province’s rivers.211
Britain’s supporters in the South had suffered greatly in 1777 and 1778. Loyalists 
had been relentlessly persecuted and many of them were banished or voluntarily fled the 
southern provinces. The Cherokees were forced to make peace, and the Whigs sowed 
dissension among the Creeks that limited their contributions to the British. Except for a 
few hardy individuals who escaped to the Floridas or took refuge in swamps, slaves had 
to accept their lot until new opportunities for freedom appeared. Nevertheless, the king’s 
supporters had enjoyed some success. Hundreds of loyalists had reached East Florida, 
joined provincial units, and carried the war back to the Georgians. They had thwarted an 
attack on West Florida and two invasions of East Florida, and in the latter case caused the
210 Wells, Journal o f  a Voyage from Charleston, 2, 4.
211 Fabel, Economy o f West Florida, 38.
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Whigs to squander manpower and resources without achieving anything worthwhile. 
Stuart had brought the Chickasaws and Choctaws into action to defend West Florida, 
eliminated much of Galphin’s influence with the Creeks, and helped keep Cherokee 
resistance alive among the Chickamauga faction. Loyalists, Indians, and slaves awaited 
only the arrival of British troops to step forward once again and challenge the rebels. That 
day was nearly at hand.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE BRITISH RETURN
When France entered the war on the American side in March 1778, British 
officials were forced to rethink their strategy for subduing the colonies. The ministry 
could not expect its armed forces to undertake large-scale offensive operations against the 
rebels, since forces had to be diverted to deal with France as well as possible Spanish 
intervention. George III and his ministers decided to withdraw some of the troops who 
had been fighting the rebels and reallocate them in preparation for operations against 
France and Spain.1
The British government also reshuffled the army’s command and made a final 
effort to negotiate peace with the Americans. In February 1778, William Howe resigned 
and Henry Clinton succeeded him as commander-in-chief in America. Clinton, along 
with Lord Carlisle, William Eden, and George Johnstone, were appointed commissioners 
to discuss peace terms with the rebels in the hope that an agreement could be reached 
before British forces had to face a war against both France and the colonies. The British 
offer was generous -  “everything a colonial heart could desire.” If the Americans 
renounced independence and agreed to make a voluntary contribution to the cost of
1 William B. Willcox, “British Strategy in America, 1778,” Journal o f  Modern History, Vol. 19, No. 2,
June 1947, 97-121, esp. 102. See also Piers Mackesy, “British Strategy in the War o f American 
Independence,” Yale Review, Vol. 52, No. 4, Summer 1963, 539-557; Ira D. Gruber, “British Strategy: The 
Theory and Practice o f Eighteenth-Century Warfare,” in Don Higginbotham, ed., Reconsiderations on the 
Revolutionary War: Selected Essays (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 14-31; Gruber, “Britain’s 
Southern Strategy,” in Higgins, ed., Revolutionary War in the South, 205-238; John Shy, “British Strategy 
for Pacifying the Southern Colonies, 1778-1781,” in Shy, A People Numerous & Armed: Reflections on the 
Military Struggle fo r American Independence (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1990), 193-212.
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defending the empire, the British government would give up its authority to tax them.2 
Should the offer be rejected, it would at least quiet those in Parliament who demanded 
negotiations with the Americans. The commissioners informed Germain in July that the 
rebels refused to accept the terms and that only force could end the rebellion.
Germain, who had been skeptical of negotiations from the outset, had advised 
Clinton in early 1778 that after the summer campaign ended in the north, the army should 
undertake a southern offensive in October.4 As it became apparent that the peace 
commissioners could not sway the rebels, Germain reminded Clinton that “[t]he 
Recovery of South Carolina and Georgia in the Winter, or even the latter Province, if the 
Other requires a greater Force than can be spared, is an Object of so much Importance.”5 
In accordance with these instructions, Clinton dispatched an expedition to 
Georgia in November 1778. British troops easily captured Savannah and temporarily 
occupied most of the Georgia backcountry. But the rapid reaction of numerically superior 
Whig forces forced the British to retreat to the environs of Savannah. Although Gen. 
Augustine Prevost thwarted the rebels’ plan to attack the town by launching his own 
offensive into South Carolina, Prevost’s army was too weak to accomplish anything of 
lasting importance. The British withdrew to Savannah, where they were besieged in the 
autumn by a French fleet and a combined Franco-American army. British regulars, 
assisted by loyalists, Indians, and armed slaves, made a staunch defense that routed the 
French and rebels. With Savannah secure, Clinton prepared to launch the second phase of 
the southern campaign, an attack on Charleston.
2 K.G. Davies, “The Restoration o f Civil Government by the British in the War o f Independence,” in 
Wright, ed., Red, White and True Blue, 115-116; Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 82-94.
3 Willcox, Portrait o f  a General, 208,222; Mackesy, War fo r  America, 159; Davies, “Restoration o f Civil 
Government,” 116.
4 Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 83-84.
5 Germain to Clinton, Aug. 5, 1778, Clinton Papers, Vol. 38, No. 42, WLCL.
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Resurrecting the Southern Strategy
While the Whigs held control of the southern provinces, loyalist exiles sent a 
steady stream of proposals to British officials urging the recovery of those colonies. All 
of the plans relied primarily on the support of loyalists; most also counted on additional 
assistance from slaves or Indians. Germain’s deputy, William Knox, who had lived in 
Georgia and still owned property there, “served as the most direct channel of influence” 
between southern loyalists and the ministry. Knox himself favored an offensive in the 
South and advised Germain that operations there would be greatly facilitated by the aid of 
loyalists and Indians.6
In August 1777, Governors William Campbell and James Wright and their 
lieutenant governors, William Bull and John Graham, sent Germain a memorial urging a 
prompt offensive in the South to relieve the loyalists. Had such an attack been made the 
previous winter, the authors believed, “a great number of the inhabitants” would have 
seized “the opportunity of showing their loyalty.” In the intervening months, it was 
certain that “many who were then well-disposed to government have from various 
motives since changed their sentiments or are under necessity of seeming to have done 
so.” But there were still enough loyalists to help the army restore British authority in 
Georgia and South Carolina. The writers recommended shifting the focus of the war 
southward before the “friends of government... despairing of relief,” submitted to the
n
rebels or left for the Floridas.
Former South Carolina attorney general James Simpson offered his own plan, a 
proposal for an attack on Charleston which he sent to Germain in September 1778.
6 Bellot, William Knox, 164, 167.
7 Memorial o f Lord William Campbell and Others to Germain, [Aug. 1777], DAR, 14:182-184.
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Simpson asserted that the conquest of that town would lead to the occupation of most of 
South Carolina. Afterwards, he suggested, loyalist refugees from the northern colonies 
could be resettled in South Carolina. There, “when joined to the well affected,” they 
“would prove much superiour, to any Malcontents, who might remain amongst them.”8
The following month, Moses Kirkland sent Clinton a detailed proposal for a 
southern campaign. Kirkland, who was in New York after having fled South Carolina in 
1775, proposed that a force of regulars, loyalists, and Indians advance into Georgia from 
East Florida, while troops from New York attacked Savannah by sea. After taking 
Savannah, the united army could march to Augusta, open a line of communication with 
the backcountry of both Carolinas, “and the Friends of Government will flock from all 
parts to that Post to join his Majesty’s Troops.” John Stuart could assemble the 
Chickasaws and Choctaws, link up with the Cherokees, and march to the Long Canes 
district of South Carolina to meet the troops and loyalists. To prevent the rebels from 
reinforcing Georgia and the Carolinas, Kirkland suggested that the Overhill Cherokees 
and Shawnees attack the overmountain settlements and the Virginia frontier. This 
accomplished, a second expedition from New York could seize Charleston.9
Kirkland sent a revised version of this plan to the peace commissioners a week 
later. The most significant alteration was that he assigned slaves a role. Although a slave 
owner himself, Kirkland proposed to incite a slave insurrection. The labor of slaves 
provided the crops which allowed the rebels to finance their war effort, he noted. “But the 
instant that The Kings Troops are put in motion in those Colonies, these poor Slaves 
would be ready to rise upon their Rebel Masters, and be a great means of compelling
8 Simpson to Germain, [Sept. 1, 1778], Germain Papers, Vol. 20, WLCL.
9 Moses Kirkland to Clinton, Oct. 13,1778, in Randall M. Miller, ed., “A Backcountry Loyalist Plan to 
Retake Georgia and the Carolinas, 1 7 7 8 SCHM, Vol. 75, No. 4, Oct. 1974, 209-212.
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them to seek refuge in the interior Provinces.” Apparently Kirkland intended to restore 
the slaves to their laborer status once they had ousted their masters, for he made no 
mention of what was to be done with them afterward, yet noted that once the rebels were 
gone, Britain would benefit from the produce of the southern colonies.10
Continuing to press for a southern campaign, Patrick Tonyn believed that the 
rebels were on the verge of collapse and that a blow in the South would prove fatal to 
them. “I am certain the four southern provinces are incapable of making any very 
formidable resistance, they are not prepared for a Scene of war,” he wrote. A British 
attack, Tonyn predicted, “will operate to effect a quick surrender.”11
The peace commissioners, having failed to attain their original objective, turned 
their attention to subduing the rebellion and also favored a southern campaign. On 
September 21, 1778, George Johnstone told William Smith, a prominent New York 
loyalist, that he desired “a Winter Expedition to reduce S. Carolina with the Help of the 
Indians and Negroes.”12 The commissioners believed that “a footing gained and kept to 
the Southward by assistance of a few troops, back settlers, and Negroes, will show the 
Southern Colonys their danger.”13 The British would then have an opportunity to try the 
long-desired experiment of restoring civil government in Georgia, which they hoped
10 Kirkland to His Majesty’s Commissioners, Oct. 21, 1778, in Miller, ed., “Backcountry Loyalist Plan,” 
212-214.
11 Tonyn to Amherst, Nov. 11, 1778, Amherst Papers, WO 34/111/184, microfilm reel 64, DLAR.
12 William Smith, Historical Memoirs from 26 August 1778 to 12 November 1783 o f  William Smith 
Historian o f the Province o f  New York; Member o f  the Governor’s Council, and Last ChiefJustice o f  That 
Province under the Crown; Chief Justice o f  Quebec, William H. W. Sabine, ed. (New York: Amo Press, 
1971), 23.
13 Proceedings of Peace Commissioners, Dec. 12, 1778, Papers o f William Eden, First Baron Auckland, 
Microfilm Reel 4, #125, DLAR.
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would put the loyalists “in a Condition to defend their Persons and their Propertys, & to 
turn against the Ennemys of Peace the Edge of Criminal Law.”14
Some of the proposals for southern operations seemed so fantastic as to be 
unworthy of serious consideration. When Wright suggested an attack using eleven 
thousand troops supported by Indians, Germain dismissed the scheme as useless.15 
Nevertheless, Germain recognized the importance of offensive action in the southern 
colonies and devoted much effort during the winter of 1777-1778 to formulating plans for 
operations there. With the assistance of Knox, Germain devised a plan that began with 
the recapture of Savannah. A combined force of British troops, southern loyalists, and 
Indians would next attack Charleston. Success there, Germain believed, would insure 
British control of Georgia and South Carolina and lead to the quick recovery of North 
Carolina and Virginia.16
When it became apparent that France would enter the war as the rebels’ ally, 
Germain issued new orders to Clinton that set the stage for the southern campaign. The 
king, Germain wrote, had decided that “the War must be prosecuted upon a different Plan 
from That upon which it has hitherto been carried on.” Clinton’s most important 
assignments for the upcoming campaign were to bring Washington’s army to battle and 
to raid the New England coast. Germain expected these operations to be finished by 
October, and at that time, “it is the King’s intention that an Attack should be made upon 
the Southern Colonies, with a View to the Conquest & Possession of Georgia & South 
Carolina,” Germain explained. “The various accounts we receive from those Provinces 
concur in representing the distress of the Inhabitants, and their general disposition to
14 Carlisle, Clinton, and Eden to Germain, Oct. 16, 1778, Auckland Papers, Reel 4, #60, DLAR.
15 Bellot, William Knox, 146.
16 Bellot, William Knox, 163-164.
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return to their Allegiance.” Arms would be provided to enable Clinton “to raise & 
embody the well affected Inhabitants.” Germain advised Clinton to attack Georgia as 
soon as possible, with troops from New York joining the forces in East Florida and the 
Indians in a three-pronged attack. Once Georgia was secured, Germain believed, 
backcountry loyalists would be able to reach the army there and invade the interior of 
South Carolina in conjunction with another expedition from New York aimed at taking 
Charleston. These maneuvers would lead to the rapid submission of South Carolina.17
With their military manpower already strained before French intervention, British 
officials agreed that loyalist assistance was essential if the government was to retake and 
hold several provinces with the limited number of regular troops that could be spared to 
operate in the South. However, there was some disagreement concerning the actual 
strength of the loyalists and the manner in which they should be used. George III and his 
ministers shared the belief that there were large numbers of loyalists in the southern 
provinces.18 One army officer told General Jeffery Amherst, who had accepted overall 
command of the British army in 1778, that Americans who supported the king must 
“disguise their Sentiments, and never will venture to declare for Britain ‘till they see a 
prospect of being placed in Security against their Enemies.” If the British were to 
succeed, they had to adopt the same harsh measures that the Whigs had used against the 
loyalists. The latter must be put “in possession of the Government and of the Sword. 
Disarm or expel our Opponents ... Reward Our Friends by the possession of Forfeited 
Lands, and punish our irreclaimable Enemies agreable to the Forms of Civil Justice.”19
17 Germain to Clinton, March 8, 1778, Germain Papers, Vol. 18, WLCL.
18 Higginbotham, American War o f  Independence, 354; Hibbert, George III, 161.
19 “Remarks on some Improvements Proposed by an Officer to be made in the Plan o f the American War,” 
1778, Jeffery Amherst Papers, War Office 34/110/144, microfilm, reel 63, DLAR.
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Some officers doubted that the loyalists were numerous enough to accomplish 
such a task. Charles Stuart, son of the Earl of Bute, wrote his father that southern 
governors had been blinded by the “pretended affection of the people” and failed to see 
“the political state of the Country, and their own vanity flatter’d by promises of personal 
attachment induced them not only to listen to the artful and cunning insinuations of even
7flthe leaders of fashion, but to declare their Colonies submissive subjects of the Crown.” 
Captain Frederick Mackenzie of the 23rd Regiment, reflecting the views of many army 
officers, expressed the same opinion even more bluntly. “Nothing can be done to the 
Southward of Pensylvania,” he declared.21
Disagreements also arose over the use of Indians and slaves. Although Clinton 
supported the general plan, he was reluctant to employ Indians to assist his troops. In a 
discussion with William Smith on May 28, 1779, he expressed “his Dislike of the 
Savages and their unmanageableness.”22 Other officers also disliked relying on blacks 
and Indians. The Inspector General of Provincial Troops and former aide to South 
Carolina governor Campbell, Alexander Innes, complained to Clinton that loyalist 
regiments in New York included “Negroes, Mulattoes, Indians, Sailors and Rebel 
Prisoners ... to the disgrace and ruin of the provincial service.”
Germain had no qualms about using Indians against the rebels, but hesitated to 
endorse arming slaves. In March 1778 he cautiously advised Clinton that the army might
20 Charles Stuart to the Earl o f Bute, Feb. 4, 1777, in Mrs. E. Stuart Wortley, ed., A Prime Minister and His 
Son. From the Correspondence o f  the 3rd Earl o f  Bute And O f Lt.-General The Hon. Sir Charles Stuart,
K.B. (London: John Murray, 1925), 97.
21 Frederick Mackenzie, Diary o f  Frederick Mackenzie, Giving a Daily Narrative o f  His Military Service as 
an Officer o f  the Regiment o f  Royal Welch Fusiliers During the Years 1775-1781 in Massachusetts Rhode 
Island and New York, Allen French, ed., 2 Vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926; reprint 
edition, 1930), 1:299.
22 William Smith, Historical Memoirs, 110.
23 Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 71.
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somehow divide the South Carolina backcountry from the lowcountry, which would 
leave the large slaveholding planters with the choice of submitting to British authority or 
having to either give up their slaves or have their slaves abandon them.24 Beyond that the 
minister was unwilling to proceed. One reason for his reluctance to assign a large role to 
slaves in the southern campaign was the continued denunciation of such a policy by 
members of the opposition in Parliament. During debates on the conduct of the war in 
1778, Edmund Burke warned of “the horrible consequences that might ensue from 
constituting 100,000 fierce barbarian slaves, to be both the judges and executioners of
7 Stheir masters.”
Ironically, British officials showed less hesitation to employ blacks on a large 
scale to bolster the defenses of the West Indies. Slaves built and repaired fortifications on 
the various islands, repaired naval vessels in ports, and performed other tasks to support 
the regular troops, while free blacks and mulattos served in some of the island militias 
and enlisted in the navy. Jamaica also raised a regular regiment of free blacks, although 
Germain refused to grant the unit official status. Nevertheless, the island’s assembly 
authorized the regiment in April 1782, with the support of the king. A second battalion 
was quickly raised, and in November recruiters went to Charleston to enlist a third 
battalion. General Edward Mathew, commanding at St. Lucia, also procured slaves from
7 ACharleston and elsewhere to serve in his command. Perhaps Britons found using blacks 
to fight the French less distasteful than employing them against the Americans.
Necessity was another factor that led to the arming of West Indian blacks, and the 
needs of the West Indies were a major reason for undertaking the southern campaign. The
24 Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 113.
25 Frey, Water from the Rock, 16.
26 O’Shaughnessy, Empire Divided, 175-181.
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war had halted the trade between the islands and the mainland, depriving the West Indies 
of their traditional source of provisions. The recapture of the southern colonies could 
provide needed supplies from the mainland. Germain reminded Clinton in August 1778 
that the West Indies were suffering from shortages of provisions and lumber, which could 
be obtained from the southern provinces once Clinton had subdued them.27
South Carolina and Georgia were also economically valuable in their own right. 
The government was hard pressed to raise the funds necessary to finance the war, and the 
prospect of revenue from the profitable crops raised in the South made the conquest of 
that region particularly appealing to Germain.28 One loyalist reported that the annual 
prewar trade of the two provinces had amounted to £630,000 ($82.75 million) and “in the 
present State of Things” might now be worth considerably more. The possession of the 
southern colonies would thus relieve the strain on Britain’s finances while depriving the 
rebels of valuable resources.29 Charles Jenkinson of the Treasury Department, realizing 
that Britain might lose some of the colonies, believed that it was wiser to sacrifice New 
England than the southern provinces with their abundant crops of rice and indigo.30
Given the power of these arguments, Germain’s instructions, and his own 
inclinations, Clinton dispatched an expedition from New York in November 1778 to 
capture Savannah. He placed Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell, a Scot with extensive military 
experience, in command of the troops. Anticipating success, the peace commissioners 
provided Campbell with a commission as civil governor of Georgia and the authority to
27 Conway, “British Governments and the Conduct o f the American War,” in Dickinson, ed., Britain and 
the American Revolution, 164; Germain to Clinton, Aug. 5, 1778, Clinton Papers, Vol. 38, No. 42, WLCL.
28 Valentine, Lord George Germain, 366.
29 Carl P. Borick, A Gallant Defense: The Siege o f  Charleston, 1780 (Columbia: University o f  South 
Carolina Press, 2003), 5; “Observations on the Trade of America & its Effects in the present Rebellion,” 
May, 1779, Germain Papers, Vol. 9, WLCL.
30 Higginbotham, American War o f  Independence, 353.
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restore that province to the king’s peace if a significant percentage of the inhabitants 
declared their allegiance to Britain. In a burst of optimism, the commissioners also gave 
Campbell a commission as governor of South Carolina in the event he was able to regain 
control of that province as well.31
Germain expected the southern loyalists to turn out in large numbers when 
Campbell arrived in Georgia, and his optimism was shared by loyalists in New York.
“Our late Accounts from that Quarter give us every Reason to expect the Troops will be 
joined by very considerable Numbers of the Inhabitants of the back parts of the 
Carolinas, when they find Georgia will be an Assylum for them,” Germain told Clinton in 
early December.32 Charles Inglis believed that if southern loyalists received “any 
Rational Support,” they would “take a much more active Part hereafter than they done 
hitherto. They have severely felt the Iron Hand of Oppression and Persecution” and now 
realized that they might “lose every Thing unless the King prevails.” Inglis hoped enough 
loyalist volunteers would come forward to require all of the five thousand stand of spare 
arms that Campbell carried with him.33 Another New York loyalist, Daniel Coxe, also 
expected a large number of Georgians to join Campbell, in which case “the three 
Southern Colonies of Georgia & the two Carolinas must be completely subjected this 
Winter.”34 Benjamin Franklin’s loyalist son and former New Jersey governor William 
Franklin predicted that if Campbell’s “Blow is properly follow’d up ... it will soon be all
31 Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels, 239; Carlisle, Clinton, and Eden to Germain, Oct. 16, 1778, Auckland 
Papers, Reel 4, #60, DLAR; Carlisle, Clinton, and Eden to Campbell, Nov. 3, 1778, in Archibald Campbell, 
Journal o f  an Expedition Against the Rebels o f  Georgia in North America under the Orders o f  Archibald 
Campbell Esquire Lieut. Colol. o f  His M ajesty’s 71st Regimt. 1778, Colin Campbell, ed. (Darien, GA: 
Ashantilly Press, 1981), 6.
32 Germain to Clinton, Dec. 3, 1778, Clinton Papers, Vol. 47, No. 32, WLCL.
33 Charles Inglis to Joseph Galloway, Dec. 12, 1778, “Letters to Joseph Galloway, from Leading Tories in 
America,” Historical Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 10, Oct. 1861, 300.
34 Daniel Coxe to Joseph Galloway, Dec. 17, 1778, “Letters to Joseph Galloway,” Historical Magazine, 
Vol. 5, No. 12, Dec. 1861,358.
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over with Congressional Power in the Southern Colonies.”35 Clinton, who was more 
cautious, sent Alexander Innes to accompany the expedition to Georgia, with orders to 
learn “the Situation of the Country and disposition of the Inhabitants” and carry the 
information directly to London.36
Campbell’s rapid success convinced British leaders that the southern strategy was 
sound. Support for the ministry’s policy in America had been wavering in Parliament and 
among the British public since the 1777 defeat at Saratoga, but the easy capture of 
Savannah in December 1778 and the successful defense of the town the following
• 37 *autumn indicated that further success was probable in the southern colonies. One Bnton 
wrote in the spring of 1779 that as a result of the recent victories in the West Indies and 
Georgia, “it is the general prevailing Opinion here that peace will take place in the course 
of this year.”38 Even opposition writers in London began to think that the fortunes of war 
had swung in Britain’s favor. Some of the most vocal antiwar newspapers conceded that 
Campbell had achieved an impressive victory. One opposition paper, while still urging 
the government to grant the colonies independence, nevertheless proposed that only 
twelve provinces be given up, and that Georgia be retained.
When Gen. Augustine Prevost crossed the Savannah River in the spring of 1779 
and marched to Charleston without encountering substantial opposition, it further 
confirmed the belief that South Carolina could easily be retaken. Germain told Clinton 
that Prevost’s campaign, along with “the information I have of the state of South Carolina
35 William Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Feb. 6, 1779, “More Galloway Letters,” Historical Magazine, Vol. 
6, No. 6, June 1862, 177.
36 Clinton to Germain, Nov. 8, 1778, Clinton Papers, Vol. 45, No. 30, WLCL.
37 Ian R. Christie, The End o f  North's Ministry, 1780-1782 (London: MacMillan and Co., 1958), 10.
38 Valentine, Lord North, 2:87.
39 Solomon Lutnick, The American Revolution and the British Press, 1775-1783 (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1967), 118, 130.
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and the disposition of the majority of the inhabitants,” made him optimistic that Prevost 
“will find means to effect the reduction o f Charleston, and that the province will be 
speedily restored to the King’s obedience.”40 The news that Prevost had not taken 
Charleston failed to dampen Germain’s enthusiasm. Seven weeks later, the minister 
urged Clinton to attack the town, observing again that Prevost’s almost uncontested 
advance and retreat presented “indubitable proof o f the indisposition of the inhabitants to 
support the rebel government.” An offensive by Clinton’s troops in South Carolina, 
Germain declared, would almost certainly “be attended with the recovery of the whole of 
that province; and probably North Carolina would soon follow,” allowing Clinton to 
restore both colonies to the king’s peace 41
The ministry’s supporters responded to the capture of Savannah with new plans 
and demands to attack South Carolina. In the summer of 1779 Richard Oswald, whose 
connections gave him a great deal of influence in the government, composed a 
memorandum in which he asserted that the “partial dismemberment of America” was the 
only plan likely to succeed in bringing the rebellion to a successful end. “That prospect is 
now in a good train,” he observed, “by the Recovery of Georgia. And if we succeed in 
South Carolina, we may hope that the Spirit of the Rebellion will So far Subside, as that 
the Outstanding Colonies to the Northward will find it their Interest to listen to terms of 
Amnesty.” Oswald considered South Carolina vulnerable due to the weak American 
forces there, the difficulty of getting reinforcements from the north, and because “the 
nature of the great Estates & Valueable property in Slaves, renders an obstinate 
Resistance more dangerous and alarming to Individuals.” He urged that Prevost’s army
40 Germain to Clinton, Aug. 5, 1779, in Clinton, American Rebellion, 415-416.
41 Germain to Clinton, Sept. 27, 1779, in Clinton, American Rebellion, 423.
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be reinforced so that it would be strong enough to capture Charleston, after which the rest 
of South Carolina would have to submit. Oswald predicted that this would likely be 
followed by the recovery of North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland.42
Several weeks later, Oswald elaborated on his plans for South Carolina in a 
supplementary memo. He now warned that the capture of Charleston would be difficult. 
“The place is ... much stronger than most people imagine,” and the rebel leaders there 
“are violently Inimical” to Britain, he wrote. But Oswald insisted that success would be 
worth the effort. After royal authority had been reestablished, the people would reconcile 
themselves to British rule, so that “the recovery of this single province may be supposed 
to be opening a way to Settling peace, in some shape, over the whole Continent.” Any 
delay in making this effort, Oswald believed, could be fatal; the rebels in South Carolina 
would use the time to improve their defenses, so that “it may never again be in our power 
to make any, or at least so successful an Impression upon them, as we can do now.”43 
Oswald apparently envisioned the recapture of the southern provinces as a strictly 
military operation, for he made no mention of any role for loyalists, Indians, or slaves in 
the undertaking.
Leading Whigs also feared that the British success in Georgia foreshadowed 
worse consequences to come. At the very least, Henry Laurens expected Campbell’s 
troops to strip Georgia of its crops, livestock, and slaves, and then withdraw to St.
42 “General Observations, Relative to the present State o f the War,” Aug. 8, 1779, Richard Oswald Papers, 
WLCL.
43 “Supplement to the Papers o f  August 1779 Relative to the present State o f  the War,” Sept. 1779, Oswald 
Papers, WLCL.
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Augustine. However, Laurens thought it more likely that with aid from “Auxiliary forces 
of Savages and disaffected Persons,” the British would hold their position.44
Clinton remained cautious, the optimism of Britons and the fears of Whigs 
notwithstanding. He recognized that the loss of Georgia had caused the rebels “no small 
Consternation, and to apprehend Consequences in a country where besides Indians blacks 
ye Govt, has many friends.”45 However, the general wavered in his determination to 
follow up on Campbell’s victory. “Our Successes to the Southward, Suggest an attempt 
against Charles town,” he wrote Germain in April 1779. Clinton then went on to state that 
he did want to risk sending reinforcements southward when he did not know the location 
of the French fleet. Furthermore, he had “as yet received no assurances of any favorable 
temper in the province of South Carolina to encourage me to an undertaking where we 
must expect much difficulty.” If he sent only a small force to South Carolina, “it might 
induce a Number of persons to declare for us, whom we might afterwards be obliged to 
abandon; and thus might destroy a party, on whom we may depend if Circumstances will 
permit a more Solid attempt in a proper Season.” He concluded that it would be better to 
wait until October before attacking Charleston.46
Germain also wanted more information regarding the number of loyalists in South 
Carolina and dispatched James Simpson to Savannah to inquire into the matter. After 
reaching the Georgia capital, Simpson encountered many acquaintances, most of whom 
had come to the town under flags of truce seeking “Negroes and other property which 
had been carried away” during Prevost’s raid on Charleston. Some of these people sought 
out Simpson “to inquire after Connections and Relations they had in Europe.” In these
44 Henry Laurens to William Read, Feb. 9,1779, PHL, 15: 55-56.
45 Clinton to Eden, Feb. 14, 1779, Auckland Papers, Microfilm Reel 4, #271, DLAR.
46 Clinton to Germain, April 4, 1779, Germain Papers, Vol. 9, WLCL.
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conversations, Simpson carefully probed for useful information. He learned that while 
“there are still too many amongst them who will use all their influence to prevent a 
restoration of the public tranquility,” many South Carolinians were tired of the war and 
its disruptions. Simpson told Germain that many loyalists had fled the province, that 
others “had found means to make their Peace” with the Whigs after years of “almost 
unremitting persecution,” but that many still hoped that British forces would come to 
their relief. Simpson warned Germain that although significant numbers of loyalists were 
willing to aid the British, many would hesitate until they had absolute assurance that the 
army would protect them.47
Simpson’s report satisfied Germain that the time had come to follow up the 
victory in Georgia with an attack on South Carolina. The initial test had demonstrated 
that the southern strategy had been soundly conceived. Its ultimate success now depended 
on whether it could be equally well executed.
The Invasion of Georgia and the Loyalist Response 
Clinton launched the southern campaign in November 1778, when he sent 
Archibald Campbell with some 2,500 troops from New York with orders to attack 
Georgia. To support Campbell’s force, Clinton instructed Augustine Prevost to advance 
into Georgia from East Florida. The fleet from New York reached Tybee Island on 
December 23.48 Campbell was optimistic; he believed that with additional troops from 
New York and “a Re-inforcement of 6000 Loyalists from the back Countries, in 
Conjunction with the Indian Tribes who were attached to Government,” he could occupy
47 Simpson to Germain, Aug. 28,1779, in Alan S. Brown, ed., “James Simpson’s Reports on the Carolina 
Loyalists, 1779-1780,” JSH, Vol. 21, No. 4, Nov. 1955, 515-517.
48 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 119, 120.
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both Georgia and South Carolina.49 Campbell informed Patrick Tonyn and Prevost that 
after taking Savannah, he planned “to move ... as far up the Country as the Strength and 
Disposition of the Enemy will admit” to unite with the backcountry loyalists. He asked 
the two East Florida officials to notify John Stuart of the plan so that the Indians would 
“make a Diversion in my favour along the Back Woods of Georgia.”50
On the night of December 25, Campbell sent a company of light infantry ashore 
to “pick up some of the Inhabitants” who could provide intelligence of the strength and 
position of the rebel forces. The troops returned the next morning with “a White Overseer 
and a Black named Peter.” The two told Campbell that Savannah was defended by twelve 
hundred Continentals and six hundred militia with ten pieces of artillery; three galleys 
guarded the river approaches to the town. Campbell therefore decided to land at 
Girardeau’s Plantation and try to capture the town in a surprise attack.51
Campbell’s troops went ashore on December 29 and quickly drove off the small 
American force at the plantation. By early afternoon the British army was arrayed 
opposite the strong American defenses a half mile south of Savannah. While Campbell 
pondered his plan of attack, a “confidential Slave from Sir James Wright’s Plantation” 
came to him with information. Campbell, after questioning the man, “found that he could
c'y
lead the Troops without Artillery through the Swamp upon the Enemy’s Right.”
Almost nothing is known about this slave, whose name was either Quash or 
Quamino Dolly. He apparently came to Campbell on his own initiative, perhaps out of 
loyalty to his former owner, Gov. Wright, or from a desire to obtain his freedom by
49 Campbell, Journal o f  an Expedition, 7.
50 Campbell to Tonyn, Dec. 5, 1778; Campbell to A. Prevost, Dec. 5, 1778, in Campbell, Journal, 11-13.
51 Archibald Campbell, Journal, 20-21. Campbell calls the plantation “Sheridoe’s” in his account.
52 Archibald Campbell, Journal, 22-26 (quotation 26).
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assisting the British. Whatever the slave’s motives, Campbell did not hesitate to adopt the 
man’s advice as soon as he determined that his information was accurate. The slave 
guided a part of Campbell’s force through the swamp into the rear of the rebel lines, 
taking General Robert Howe’s troops completely by surprise. The maneuver, which 
Campbell supported with a frontal attack, routed the Whigs. About one hundred 
Americans were killed and 450 captured; the remainder fled. British casualties numbered 
only twenty-six. The slave’s assistance had proven valuable indeed. Campbell’s 
victorious troops then marched to Savannah and occupied the town.53
Meanwhile, Prevost had begun his northward advance, entering Georgia on 
November 20 with about seven hundred British and loyalist troops. A second force of 
over four hundred men moved by sea to Sunbury, capturing the town and its rebel 
defenders on January 10, 1779.54 The threat from the Creeks greatly facilitated Prevost’s 
march. Governor John Houstoun wrote that Georgia’s defenses along its southern border 
had been “particularly weaken’d ... by drawing off the Troops and Volunteers, to the 
Westward, in opposition to the Indians.”55 Andrew Williamson had also taken six 
hundred South Carolina militia into Creek territory to check the anticipated attack, who 
were thus too distant to come to Georgia’s aid.56 The remaining militia in southern 
Georgia made “extraordinary Exertions” to assist the planters in removing their slaves, 
rather than resisting Prevost’s advance.57
53 Archibald Campbell, Journal, 27-28, 110, Note 58; Alexander A. Lawrence states that the slave agreed 
to guide the British for “a small reward,” in “General Robert Howe and the British Capture o f Savannah in 
1778,” GHQ, Vol. 36, No. 4, Dec. 1952, 317. There is no mention of this in the British accounts, although 
it is possible Campbell later compensated the slave for his services; Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 121.
54 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 121.
55 John Houstoun to Henry Laurens, Nov. 25, 1778, PHL, 13:534-535.
56 Rawlins Lowndes to Henry Laurens, Dec. 3, 1778, PHL, 13:554-555.
57 John Houstoun to Henry Laurens, Nov. 25, 1778, PHL, 13:534-535.
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As both the ministers and military commanders had expected, slaves and Indians 
had, directly and indirectly, contributed to the initial British success in Georgia. Those 
aspects of the southern strategy were working, and if the loyalists came forward, it 
augured well for British prospects of regaining control of the southern provinces.
Some loyalists began turning out as soon as they heard reports that British forces 
were en route to Georgia. In late 1778, a group of loyalists assembled under a Captain 
Coleman south of Broad River in South Carolina. The Whigs moved to disperse them, 
but Coleman attacked first, routing the rebels and killing four. By the time the Whigs had 
regrouped, Coleman was in Georgia on his way to join the British. The frustrated Whigs
C O
contented themselves with burning the homes of several of Coleman’s men.
Christopher Friedrich Triebner, the Lutheran minister and teacher in the German 
settlement at Ebenezer, made his way to Savannah the day after its capture and later 
guided Campbell’s troops to his home town. On January 2, in a sermon “against 
Rebellion and Licentiousness,” Triebner urged his congregation to submit to the king’s 
authority.59 Campbell appointed him a magistrate, and the minister soon found himself 
busy administering the oath of allegiance to many of Ebenezer’s inhabitants.60
On January 4, 1779, Campbell and Admiral Hyde Parker issued a proclamation 
calling upon loyalists and any other “well-disposed Inhabitants” to unite under the king’s 
standard. The two officers promised all who joined them “the most ample Protection in 
their Persons, Families and Effects.”61 The rebels resorted to intimidation in an effort to 
prevent people from responding to the summons, which prompted Campbell to issue
58 James Fergus, Pension Application, in Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 177-178.
59 Campbell, Journal, 34.
60 Jenkin Davis to Henry Muhlenberg, March 18, 1783, in Andrew W. Lewis, ed., “Henry Muhlenberg’s 
Georgia Correspondence,” GHQ, Vol. 49, No. 4, Dec. 1965, 435; Campbell, Journal, 34-36.
61 Proclamation by Hyde Parker and Archibald Campbell, Jan. 4, 1779, Auckland Papers, Reel 4, #235, 
DLAR.
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another proclamation on January 8. Angered that “skulking Parties ... under Colour of the 
Night, have the Audacity to rob, and otherways ill treat those true and faithful Subjects of 
His Majesty,” Campbell threatened severe punishment to “such wicked and destructive 
Enemies.” He also offered a reward of ten guineas (the equivalent of nearly $1,400 in 
2002) for every rebel civil or military officer taken prisoner, and two guineas for ordinary 
rebels.62
Despite this harassment, many Georgians took the British oath. On January 9, 
Campbell organized “several Companies of Militia to patrole the Country” between 
Cherokee Hill and Ebenezer.63 Others guarded the crossing of the Savannah River at 
Hudson’s Ferry; several acted as scouts and spies to keep Campbell informed of rebel 
movements.64 Thomas Manson, an Augusta loyalist, took advantage of the confusion 
created by the British invasion “to make his Escape from the Repeated Insults he received 
from the Populace on Account of his Suspected Loyalty to the British Government.” He 
traveled seventy miles through woods and byways to reach Savannah, where he joined a 
company of loyalist volunteers.65 A British deserter reported on January 12 that two 
hundred loyalists had already offered their services to Campbell.66 “The inhabitants of 
this province are coming in daily here in great numbers wishing to give up their arms and 
take the oath of allegiance to the King,” a Hessian soldier wrote a few days later.67 Dr.
62 Proclamation of Archibald Campbell, Jan. 8, 1779, in Campbell, Journal, 38-39. One British guinea in 
1780 was worth the equivalent o f 137.87 American dollars in 2002, based on information at
http ://eh.net/hmit.
63 Campbell, Journal, 39.
64 Col. Lytle to Benjamin Lincoln, Jan. 22, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3; Campbell, 
Journal, 51.
65 Memorial o f Thomas Manson, www.royalprovincial.com/military/mems/ga/clmman.htm. Accessed June 
6, 2002.
66 “Examn. Deserter,” Jan. 12, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
67 “Copy o f a letter from Quarter-Master-Sergeant Kitz ... to one of his friends in New York,” Jan. 17, 
1779, “Correspondence o f  General von Knyphausen, HDAR, Item G.
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Thomas Taylor observed that “people have flocked to the different British posts, have 
freely taken the oaths of allegiance, and many have joined the King’s army, Thomas 
Fleming with 100 horsemen, Henry Sharp with some 200 horse and foot, and many 
others.”68 On January 19, Thomas Robinson asserted that “there is not a Rebbel in Arms 
in the Govemt, all that New them selves to be gilty Run to South Carolina, and the Rest 
Com in, Give up their Arms, many of which tuk up Arms in Govmt Sarvis.”69
When Prevost arrived in Savannah, he brought with him 250 Georgians and South 
Carolinians who had tried to join the British, but “were pursued by the rebels and driven 
into the wilderness,” where “they had to nourish themselves six days with roots and herbs 
until General Prevost rescued them.” The British planned to train these men “to be 
regular soldiers.”70
An exuberant Campbell informed Germain on January 19 that he knew of only 
two men who had refused to accept the terms of his proclamation of pardon, and these 
had “hurried off to the Rebels.”71 “I have got the Country in arms against the Congress,” 
Campbell boasted to peace commissioner William Eden. He asked Eden to press the 
ministry to “hurry out a Proper Govemour for this Province, with every necessary 
arrangement for the Reestablishment of Legal Government. Its effects at this Juncture, 
whilst the minds of the People in the neighbouring Provinces are worn out by
68 Thomas Taylor to unnamed, Jan. 18, 1779, in Davis, ed., “Georgia Loyalist’s Perspective,” 131.
69 Thomas Robinson to Joseph Galloway, Jan. 19,1779, “More Galloway Letters,” Historical Magazine, 
Vol. 6, No. 6, June 1862, 177. For a discussion of this outpouring of loyalist support, see Norton, British 
Americans, 35.
70 S.D.H. to unnamed, Jan. 16, 1779, in Letters From America, 1775-1779, Being Letters o f  Brunswick, 
Hessian, and Waldeck Officers with the British Armies During the Revolution, Ray W. Pettengill, trans. 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1924; reprint, Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1964), 204.
1 Campbell to Germain, Jan. 19, 1779, in Campbell, Journal, 43.
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persecutions, extortions, & apprehensions; must operate more powerfully than twenty 
thousand troops.”72
When Germain received Campbell’s reports, he was ecstatic, praising the colonel 
and predicting that “you will be joined by very considerable Numbers, upon your Arrival 
at Augusta; and be able to form such a Force there, as you may without Hazard, penetrate 
into” South Carolina.73 In March, Germain informed Georgian exiles in England who 
were receiving government pensions that their payments would cease and ordered them 
to return to the province. The government provided funds for their passage. Recent exiles 
who had applied for assistance were also given travel allowances and told to return.74 
Most welcomed the opportunity to do so. Exiled Georgian S.H. Jenkins discussed the 
news with other southern loyalists living in London; all were “confident that Government 
will keep possession of Georgia at all events. -  God grant it may be so!” Jenkins wrote.75
Savannah’s capture also elevated the spirits of New York loyalists, who greeted 
the official announcement with joy. Rumors abounded that Campbell, reinforced by 
Indians and loyalists, was already marching on Charleston.76
As loyalist morale increased, southern Whigs grew pessimistic, since they feared 
that the loss of Savannah, combined with loyalist assistance to the British, might prove 
devastating to the rebel cause. When the news of Savannah’s capture reached the 
backcountry on December 29, George Galphin wrote that it immediately “DisCoreged the 
Inhabitents the most of them Says, thy will Lay Down there armes & the rest is Coming
72 Campbell to Eden, Jan. 19, 1779, Auckland Papers, Reel 4, No. 246, DLAR.
73 Germain to Campbell, March 13, 1779, in Campbell, Journal, 80.
74 Norton, British Americans, 112.
75 S.H. Jenkins to John Inglis, June 26, 1779, John Inglis Papers, GHS.
76 Isaac Ogden to Joseph Galloway, Feb. 6, 1779, “More Galloway Letters,” Historical Magazine, Vol. 6, 
No. 6, June 1862, 178-179; William Smith, Historical Memoirs, 69.
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in” to South Carolina.”77 One rebel warned his commander on January 7 that Campbell’s 
troops were “encamped at one Blyths who from his knowledge of the swamp on this 
[South Carolina] side may probably Introduce a party of the Enemy into our 
neighbourhood -  He being a man long suspected of dissaffection to our great & glorious
78Cause.” Three days later, militia colonel Stephen Bull complained that exchanged 
British officers had, while in rebel custody, “been Allowed to go at large and had an 
Opportunity of Conversing & Enquiring from some Tories & Disaffected,” from whom 
they had probably learned much about the defenses in southeastern South Carolina.79
Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, who had replaced Howe as commander of the 
Southern Department on January 3, also received several reports that large numbers of
Q A
backcountry loyalists intended to join the British. “I have been told, that many of the 
disaffected mean to join the Enemy, if they can get an opportunity,” Andrew Williamson 
wrote on February 1, “but I have taken every Precaution in my Power to Guard against 
their wicked Intentions, by Keeping Spies amongst them whom I can depend upon to 
inform me of their proceedings.” Williamson noted that the loyalists had not yet begun to 
organize and believed that “we shall be able to Keep them Quiet, especially if we can 
prevent the Enemy Crossing the Savannah -  In Case of such an Event I Scarce make a
o 1
doubt of their being joined by Numbers of the Tories.” William Moultrie shared 
Williamson’s concern, telling Lincoln that if the British established a post at Augusta,
87“they would encrease by the disaffected and posibly by the Indians.” Joseph Clay
77 Galphin to Henry Laurens, Dec. 29, 1778, PHL, 15:20.
78 William Stafford to Benjamin Lincoln, Jan. 7, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
79 Stephen Bull to Benjamin Lincoln, Jan. 10, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
80 Bennett and Lennon, Quest fo r Glory, 100.
81 Andrew Williamson to Benjamin Lincoln, Feb. 1, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
82 William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln, Feb. 8, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
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estimated the number of loyalists who had joined Campbell “from Florida the back parts 
of this state [South Carolina] & of the Georgians,” at between “2 & 3000.”83
Henry Clinton was perhaps the only person with an interest in the southern 
campaign who viewed the situation with calm detachment. Although satisfied with the 
results in Georgia, he hesitated to approve any hasty movement northward. “I have as yet 
received no assurances of any favourable temper in the province of South Carolina to 
encourage me to an undertaking where we must expect so much difficulty,” he informed 
Germain on April 4.84 The general’s caution cooled some of Germain’s enthusiasm. 
Germain continued to emphasize the importance of recovering South Carolina in his 
correspondence with Clinton, but agreed that the “Assistance of the Loyal Inhabitants is 
essential to the Success of all Operations” there. Germain also conceded that “it is 
equally necessary, to avoid being deceived in our Expectations from them.” He therefore 
decided to send James Simpson to Georgia to assess loyalist strength in South Carolina. 
Simpson had the “Knowledge of the Country & People” necessary “to detect and prevent 
Imposition” by those who might supply incorrect information, Germain noted. Simpson 
had orders to report the results of his investigation to Clinton to help the general plan his
Of
next moves in the South.
Campbell, meanwhile, prepared to follow up his initial success by organizing a 
temporary government at Savannah and then advancing into the Georgia backcountry. 
Acting in his capacity as governor of Georgia, he created a board of police on January 13 
to function as a temporary civil authority. He appointed Louis Johnston superintendent,
83 Joseph Clay to Messrs. Bright and Pechin, March 23, 1779, Letters o f  Joseph Clay, 130.
84 Quoted in Valentine, Lord George Germain, 435.
85 Germain to Clinton, March [31], 1779, Clinton Papers, Vol. 54, No. 32, WLCL.
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o r
along with two assistants. The board operated until Governor Wright resumed his office 
and the province’s prewar civil government was reestablished.87
With his political task completed and Prevost on hand to manage military matters 
in the capital, Campbell prepared to march to Augusta. Sometime after the capture of 
Savannah, he had dispatched Colonel James (or John) Boyd to the backcountry. A South 
Carolina refugee who had accompanied Campbell to Georgia from New York , Boyd had 
promised to recruit several hundred loyalists in his home region to reinforce Campbell’s 
small army.88
Campbell was eager to get to Augusta because he had learned “that Colonel Boyd with a 
large Body of Loyalists meant to join me.” Reports indicated that Boyd had recruited 
about one thousand men. “Many Loyalists” also came from Augusta to urge Campbell to 
come to the assistance of the king’s supporters there.89 They assured the British 
commander that “the very sight of The King’s troops in that quarter, would be the means 
of collecting a considerable number of loyal Subjects ... that would be willing to 
accompany the King’s troops wherever the Service required.” Campbell also expected to 
meet a large force of Indians at Augusta.90
On January 24, Campbell left Ebenezer with nine hundred men, intending “to 
clear that part of the Province of Rebels, and to protect such Inhabitants as chose to return 
to the allegeance of The King.” At various places along his route, Campbell met
86 “Journal o f the Hessian Regiment von Knoblauch,” HDAR, Item W.
87 Lilia Mills Hawes, ed., “Minute Book, Savannah Board o f Police, 1779,” GHQ, Vol. 45, No. 3, Sept. 
1961,245.
88 Robert S. Davis, Jr., and Kenneth H. Thomas, Jr., Kettle Creek: The Battle o f  the Cane Brakes; Wilkes 
County, Georgia ([Atlanta]: Georgia Department o f  Natural Resources, 1975), 31.
89 Campbell, Journal, 39 (quotation), 45.
90 John Wilson, Encounters on a March Through Georgia in 1779; The Maps and Memorandums o f  John 
Wilson, Engineer, 71st Highland Regiment, Robert Scott Davis, Jr., ed. (Sylvania, GA: Partridge Pond 
Press, 1986), 19.
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numerous people “who promised to form into Companys and give every Assistance 
possible to promote The King’s Service.” These people took the oath of allegiance and 
received arms and ammunition from the British.91 Enough loyalists came forward at Briar 
Creek to enable Campbell to organize a militia force there.92
As the British continued their advance, Campbell learned that the Whigs planned 
to execute three brothers who had recently joined the British and had been captured in a 
skirmish with rebel militia. To alert the Whigs that he would not tolerate such practices, 
Campbell sent a detachment within sight of the rebel camp to prepare for the hanging of 
two rebel leaders “notorious for their cruel Treatment of the Loyalists of Georgia.” At the 
same time, Campbell dispatched an officer to the Whigs with an offer to exchange 
prisoners and a threat to hang six men if the rebels executed their three captives. The 
Whigs quickly agreed to exchange their prisoners for three men of equal rank.93
Whig troops were unable to offer serious resistance to the British. South Carolina 
could not assist the Georgians because their militia had to remain in Ninety Six district 
“to keep the Tories and Indians in subjection.”94 Gen. Samuel Elbert commanded the 
troops who were supposed to oppose Campbell, but Elbert thought himself too weak to 
make a stand and retreated into South Carolina. Although Lincoln believed that Elbert 
had acted wisely, he lamented the dangers that might ensue. Should the British pursue 
Elbert, Lincoln warned, “it is easy to see that many ill consequences will result from such 
a measure; our supplies will be affected, the Indians uncontrouled, and the Tories have an
91 Wilson, Encounters, 19.
92 Campbell, Journal, 48.
93 Campbell, Journal, 48-50.
94 Benjamin Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, Jan. 6, 1779, Lincoln Papers, microfilm, Reel 3.
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opportunity to triumph over & distress the good inhabitants of these States.”95 To 
prevent such problems, Lincoln reinforced Elbert with Andrew Williamson’s militia and 
eight hundred North Carolinians under Gen. John Ashe. “If the enemy are suffered there 
to roam at pleasure, in their arms our disaffected inhabitants will find an asylum, and the 
Indians, who are too much disposed to mischief, will have at hand stimulators thereto, & 
supporters therein; hereby our enemies will augment their force and greatly weaken and 
distress us,” Lincoln predicted.96
Subsequent events showed that Lincoln’s fears were well-founded. Elbert soon 
reported “that the disaffected people are collecting” in the backcountry.97 Joseph 
Kershaw informed Lincoln that some loyalists had “Actualy rose and attempted to 
possess themselves of a quantity of Powder” kept in a fort on Broad River. He predicted 
“that if a speedy stop is not put to them they may soon become formidable.”98
British troops entered Augusta on January 31, where they “found but a few 
families, and some of these had but the female part at home.” But over the next several 
days, large numbers of people came into town and took the oath to George III. Campbell 
organized them into a militia, appointing as officers men who were “most agreeable to 
the generality of the Inhabitants.”99 Eventually fourteen hundred men who “had joined us 
with their Arms; and took the Oath of Allegiance” were embodied in twenty 
companies.100 One of Campbell’s officers complained that the Georgians “could not be 
brought to any regularity; therefore no real, substancial Services from them could be
95 Lincoln to Elbert, Feb. 4, 1779, Lincoln Papers, reel 3.
96 Lincoln to Lowndes, Feb. 4, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 3.
97 Lincoln to Lowndes, Feb. 10, 1779, Lincoln Papers, reel 3.
98 Joseph Kershaw to Lincoln, Feb. 18, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
99 Wilson, Encounters, 42.
100 Campbell, Journal, 54-56, 58-60.
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depended on” for quite some time.101 Campbell actually considered many of his new 
Georgian militiamen a liability, telling Clinton that “it was our misfortune at this period 
to be encumbered with some irregulars from the upper country under the denomination of 
crackers ... whose motions were too voluntary to be under restraint” and who were prone 
to pillage when sent on scouting expeditions. When the Whigs assembled a large force 
north of the Savannah River, “the crackers ... found many excuses for going home to their 
plantations” in spite of Campbell’s entreaties.102
Campbell tried to accommodate these unusual supporters and began to fortify the 
town, intending to establish a post there to support the backcountry loyalists. He told one 
American, who forwarded the information to the Whigs, that he had taken command of 
the Georgia expedition on condition that the country was to be held, and that to abandon 
it would “falsify his honour to the People and deceive them.”103
A steady stream of visitors came to Augusta with information and supplies. 
Loyalist scouts brought Campbell regular reports of rebel activities. An emissary from 
Wilkes County brought a letter from the inhabitants “offering to surrender several 
stockaded Forts on the Frontiers of Georgia” fifty miles from Augusta. Campbell 
immediately dispatched eighty men to take the forts and to find Boyd’s loyalists. The 
officers brought a letter from Campbell, promising that he would protect the frontier 
people from Indian attack. All of the forts were taken without resistance except one, 
which the troops captured by storm.104 Loyalists from nearby Wrightsborough brought 
provisions for the British troops. Campbell also met an Indian leader “who came from his
101 Wilson, Encounters, 42.
102 Archibald Campbell to Clinton, March 4, 1779, DAR, 17:74, 75.
103 “State o f the Enemy in Georgia,” March [15], 1779, Misc. Papers, Series 1, Vol. 1, No. 53, NCSA.
104 Campbell, Journal, 54-56, 58-60.
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Nation to receive and give a Talk.” After the British gave their visitor a generous quantity 
of presents, he returned home.105
In accordance with orders from Gen. Prevost, Campbell dispatched Thomas 
Brown and the Florida Rangers from Augusta to secure Burke County. Brown’s force, 
which included Daniel McGirt’s independent loyalist rangers, numbered four hundred 
men and was reinforced by two hundred Georgians under Col. John Thomas. They 
attacked 250 rebels who occupied the Burke County jail, but were repulsed. Having been 
joined by three more parties of loyalists, Brown renewed the attack but was driven off a 
second time.106
By February 12, notwithstanding the promises he had made to the loyalists, 
Campbell decided to withdraw from Augusta. The anticipated Creek reinforcements had 
not arrived, provisions were scarce in the area, and he was unsure if Boyd’s loyalists 
were coming to join him. With large numbers of rebels gathering across the Savannah 
River, Campbell also worried that he was too distant from Prevost’s forces and might be 
cut off. After waiting two days longer for Boyd and the Creeks, the British troops began
their return march.107 The rebels followed, but McGirt’s loyalists acted as a rear guard,
• • 108“way-laying the roads” and keeping the pursuers away from the mam British column.
On the way to Savannah, Campbell received a letter from Gen. Prevost approving 
the withdrawal. Prevost believed that insufficient loyalist support, rather than the 
combination of factors Campbell had noted, made it necessary to abandon Augusta. “I 
always thought that our being able to keep our Post at Augusta depended on the single
105 Wilson, Encounters, 42.
106 Davis and Thomas, Kettle Creek, 21; Ward, Between the Lines, 204; Cashin, K ing’s Ranger, 85, 88.
107 Campbell, Journal, 64.
108 Lincoln to Williamson, Feb. 16, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 3.
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circumstance of the Back-Country People’s Joining heartily in the cause,” Prevost wrote, 
“as without that we must be certain offinding great difficulty i f  not impossibility in 
preserving a communication to such a distance.”109 In a letter to Clinton, Prevost again 
expressed disappointment at the lack of support in the backcountry, but attributed it to the 
fact that “the rebels were already in arms and in possession of all the passes” which 
prevented the loyalists from “communicating with the King’s troops.” Prevost expected 
greater success in the future, noting that a majority of the backcountry inhabitants “(even 
by accounts of rebels) are loyal in their inclinations.”110
Meanwhile, Boyd, with the aid of Zachariah Gibbes, had enlisted about six 
hundred men and united with a smaller band of North Carolinians. The combined force of 
between seven and eight hundred men made their way across western South Carolina to 
join Campbell at Augusta. After entering Georgia, Boyd defeated a smaller rebel force in 
a skirmish. Whig militia under Andrew Pickens took up the pursuit of the loyalists. 
Unaware that Campbell had left Augusta or that his own force was being pursued, Boyd 
continued his march. On February 14 he halted his men for a rest along Kettle Creek, 
where Pickens with several hundred Whigs attacked them. Although taken by surprise, 
Boyd fought valiantly until he was mortally wounded. Many of the loyalists, however, 
had not been able to reorganize after the initial attack and eventually retreated. Pickens, 
satisfied with what he called “the severest check and chastisement the Tories ever 
received in Georgia or South Carolina,” paroled most of his prisoners.111 Campbell later 
reported that 270 of Boyd’s men finally reached the British.112
109 Augustine Prevost to Archibald Campbell, Feb. 17, 1779, Misc. Mss., WLCL.
110 Augustine Prevost to Clinton, March 1, 1779, DAR, 17:69.
111 Davis and Thomas, Kettle Creek, 33-34, 36-39, 43.
112 Campbell, Journal, 66.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
257
The disaster at Kettle Creek had severe repercussions for the British; afterward, 
most loyalists in “the upper Savannah River region were fearful of showing their true 
colors for over a year, until the British capture of Charleston in 1780.”113
Whig leaders recognized that Pickens’s victory would have a devastating effect 
on the loyalists. Andrew Williamson felt “great pleasure” at the news,114 while Benjamin 
Lincoln told John Rutledge that “the repulse the tories have met with from Colo. Pickins, 
must brighten up our affairs in the upper part of the country. It will give peace and quiet 
to our friends there, open our communication with the Indians, and convince the 
unfriendly that real support cannot be found but in the arms and affections of their 
brethren.”115 Lincoln, however, still feared that the British operations intended to make 
“this part of the country... the seat of war for the ensuing campaign.” Lincoln believed 
that the British “must be encouraged to make the attempt from the small resistance they 
met with in the conquest of so much of Georgia, the expected support from the Indians 
and disaffected in the back parts of these States, and from the little risque, they suppose, 
they should run in holding the possession.”116
With Campbell’s force gone from Augusta and Boyd’s followers routed, the 
Whigs moved troops into Georgia to block any new British effort to seize control of the 
backcountry. As Williamson explained, the rebels’ objective “was to prevent the Enemy 
crossing Savanna River, and keep open our Communication with the Indians, being well 
convinc’d” that if the British army managed to enter South Carolina “their Strength 
wou’d soon become formidable, by the Numbers of disaffected Persons who wou’d
113 Don Higginbotham, “The American Militia: A Traditional Institution With Revolutionary 
Responsibilities,” in Higginbotham, War and Society in Revolutionary America: The Wider Dimensions o f  
Conflict (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1988), 121.
114 Andrew Williamson to Benjamin Lincoln, Feb. 20, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
115 Lincoln to John Rutledge, Feb. 28,1779, Lincoln Papers, microfilm, reel 3.
116 Lincoln to John Rutledge, March 3, 1779, Lincoln Papers, microfilm, reel 3.
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immediately flock to their Standard.” If the British tried to invade South Carolina, Whig 
leaders wanted to force them to attack in the lowcountry, where there were fewer 
loyalists. This would make it “easier to repel them from thence, than from the back
117Country where the greater Part of the Inhabitants would join with, and support them.”
The Whigs moved quickly to eliminate the scattered remnants of Boyd’s force and to
punish the loyalists who had come forward while Campbell was at Augusta. One party of
loyalists who escaped from Kettle Creek was captured by a rebel force under Captain
118Absalom Beddell. The Whigs immediately hanged seven of their prisoners. Captain 
William Few, leading a group of rebels that one loyalist described as a “villainous tribe of 
plunderers,” launched a ruthless campaign to suppress the loyalists. He began “ravaging 
the country for 30 miles above Augusta, without regard to age or sex, the widow or the 
orphans cries. Not satisfied with rapine, they have dragged forth the peaceable inhabitants 
to war, and, worse than the heathen savages of the wilderness, murdered, in cool blood, a 
Mr. -  who refused to join them in their infamy,” an Augusta resident wrote.119
Many people who had declared their loyalty only a few weeks earlier changed 
their allegiance again after Campbell’s departure.120 Whig officer John Dooly reported on 
February 16 “that a number of People that has Taken the oath of alegence to the King” 
now wished to join the rebels, and that some had already done so and fought alongside 
Dooly’s troops in two skirmishes. Most of these men claimed that “thay ware forced to 
Take the oath and there is a Good Many Good Men may be Got in if thay Can be 
pardond.” Dooly asked his superior, Col. Elbert, how to handle such cases, although he
117 Andrew Williamson to John Ashe, undated, enclosed in Ashe to Lincoln, Feb. 16, 1779, Lincoln Papers, 
Microfilm, Reel 3.
118 Hayes, Hero o f  Hornet’s Nest, 59.
119 “Extract o f a letter from Augusta,” Feb. 6, 1779, Royal Georgia Gazette, Feb. 11, 1779.
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1982,318.
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did not hesitate to express his own opinion that it was better to get these men into the 
Whig ranks rather than drive them back into the arms of the British. He asked Elbert to 
reply quickly “as the poor people Seems much Confused at this Time about one party 
Robing and plundering the other.”121
Whig leaders quarreled among themselves over how to treat those who had taken 
the oath to Great Britain. Some residents of Augusta “had openly cheered the arrival of 
British troops,” and many rebels disliked the fact that these men were still among them. 
Whig hardliners wanted Georgia officials to punish suspected loyalists and believed that 
Gov. John Wereat “coddled Tories.” When Wereat and the council released Joseph 
Maddock, a Quaker who had been imprisoned for sheltering Boyd, and then asked South 
Carolina officials to release three other Georgians confined in Charleston for loyalism, 
the more radical rebels became enraged.122 A group of Whig officers in Burke County 
also chose a moderate course and decided to issue a proclamation allowing anyone who 
had taken the British oath, with the exception of nine men considered particularly 
obnoxious, to repudiate their loyalism and receive pardon. Those who failed to comply
123would forfeit their property, “be deemed as Enemies & dealt with accordingly.”
Captured loyalists suffered particularly harsh treatment. Georgia’s civil officials 
claimed jurisdiction over a loyalist prisoner of war named Fleming and wanted him 
imprisoned “untill they could have an opportunity of Punishing him for his Treachery,” 
but finally agreed to his exchange.124 Andrew Williamson convened a court in April to 
try twelve loyalist prisoners for various offenses. Two confessed to having been “with the
121 John Dooly to Samuel Elbert, Feb. 16, 1779, Misc. Mss., John Dooly, LOC.
122 Edward J. Cashin, Jr., “George Walton and the Forged Letter,” GHQ, Vol. 62, No. 2, Summer 1978, 
136-137.
123 Proceedings o f a Council o f War, Jan. 14, 1779, in Robert S. Davis, ed., Georgia Citizens and Soldiers 
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Indians in arms” against the Whigs; nine others admitted having either served with the 
British forces or considering themselves to be British subjects. The court ordered all 
eleven to be held in close confinement. The twelfth prisoner testified that the British had 
forced him to take an oath to the king and was released.125
Reports of the cruel treatment of loyalist prisoners led Augustine Prevost to send 
a protest to Lincoln. Prevost had heard that “many of the Prisoners taken from us are 
treated with a severity by no means justifyable.” Loyalist captives, whether taken in 
battle or while “attempting to join the standard of their lawful Sovereign, ought to be 
consider’d as Prisoners of war,” Prevost stated. If the Whigs insisted on trying loyalists 
“by new-made Laws,” he declared, “you cannot but be sensible that a prior Right intitles 
Great Britain to consider every American as a Subject, and consequently things may be 
brought to a po in t... that will be productive of dreadful consequences.” Prevost warned 
Lincoln that his treatment of captured rebels would be determined by the manner in
1 7Awhich the Whigs treated loyalist prisoners.
Whig officials in South Carolina, believing that harsh punishment would be most 
effective in frightening the state’s loyalists into quiescence, treated those who had joined 
the British with extreme cruelty. Gov. John Rutledge gathered a force of 2,700 militia “to 
crush any Insurgents in our back Country, if the people should still continue so infatuated 
as to attempt to rise.”127 The Assembly passed an “Act to Prevent Persons Withdrawing 
from the Defense of the State to Join Its Enemies,” which authorized Rutledge to punish
125 Court o f Inquiry Proceedings, April 10-12, 1779, Matthew Singleton Papers, SCL.
126 Augustine Prevost to Lincoln, March 28, 1779, Emmet Collection #7404, NYPL.
127 “John Rutledge to Benjamin Lincoln,” Feb. 28. 1779, SCHGM, Vol. 25, No. 3, July 1924, 133-134.
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anyone who had joined the British and did not surrender within forty days; the penalty 
was death and the confiscation of the offender’s property.128
The Whigs held about 150 loyalist prisoners, including twenty of Boyd’s men, at 
Williamson’s plantation. Rutledge ordered them to be brought to Ninety Six for trial in 
hopes “that a speedy Example of the most principal Offenders may have a good Effect, to 
prevent further Insurrection” in that heavily loyalist district.129 The trials began on March 
22 and lasted until April 12. Half of the prisoners were released and the court found the 
remainder guilty of treason. About fifty were reprieved on the grounds that they had 
either been deceived into joining the British or had lacked “proper information on the 
nature of our contest with Great Britain.” The remaining twenty or more were sentenced 
to death.130
To intimidate the numerous loyalists in the vicinity of Orangeburg, Rutledge then 
ordered the prisoners moved to that town. The twenty condemned men joined other 
prisoners in what must have been an extremely overcrowded blockhouse. On April 19, 
Continental Col. John Christian Senf reported that there were forty-three prisoners of war 
and “132 criminals” -  apparently loyalists, since they included eleven officers, at 
Orangeburg.131 Four days later, one prisoner, a free black, was hanged and five other 
loyalists were sent to Ninety Six “to be there executed.”132 Lt. Col. James Prevost 
attempted to intervene, arguing that the men should be treated as prisoners of war and 
exchanged and hinting that the British would retaliate if the men were hanged. This failed
128 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 83.
129 “Rutledge to Lincoln,” 133-134.
130 Robert Scott Davis, Jr., “The Loyalist Trials at Ninety Six in 1779,” SCHM, Vol. 80, No. 2, April 1979, 
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to sway the Whigs, who carried out the execution of the five prisoners. The rest of those 
sentenced to death, however, were reprieved.133
Those hanged at Ninety Six were not the only victims of Whig vengeance. On 
March 17, William Tweed and Andrew Groundwater were hanged in Charleston after 
being captured while attempting to join the British. Tweed had been under suspicion 
since February 20, when his Charleston house burned down; the rebels believed that he 
had deliberately set the fire in an attempt to bum the town.134 The destruction of Boyd’s 
party and the wave of executions which followed undoubtedly deterred many loyalists 
from trying to reach the British army.
After leaving Augusta, the British made a brief stand at Briar Creek, where on 
March 3 they inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebel force that had followed their retreat. 
James Prevost, who had assumed command of the detachment when Campbell returned 
to Savannah, feinted against the front of the American position while part of his force 
made a roundabout march and struck the rebel rear. Routed by the surprise attack, the 
Whigs suffered between four and five hundred casualties, while the British lost only 
sixteen men.135 Prevost, however, made no attempt to remain in the backcountry, so the 
loyalists there remained unsupported.
While British troops held positions to protect Savannah, the area outside their 
lines became a battleground on which loyalists and Whigs contended for control. Col. 
John Thomas took 150 loyal militiamen to Burke Country to strike a Whig party in early 
March, but the rebels defeated Thomas’s advance guard, captured other loyalists in the
133 Davis, “Loyalist Trials,” 175-176, 178-179.
134 Mabel L. Webber, ed., “Extracts from the Journal o f Mrs. AnnManigault, 1754-1781,” SCHGM, Vol. 
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area, and then withdrew before Thomas could catch them.136 Later in the month, a 
combined force of Georgia and South Carolina Whig militia encountered a loyalist unit 
and fought a two-hour battle by moonlight. Each side had about two hundred men, but 
the rebels finally drove off their opponents after killing loyalist Major Spurgin and a few
137 *of his men. Other loyalists took advantage of the South Carolina militia’s absence to 
raid on the north side of the Savannah River. Gattoes, a fugitive slave, guided the raiders 
to Black Swamp and the home of his former master, a Mr. Cowper. On the night of 
March 25, the loyalists attacked the house, capturing several prisoners including Cowper 
and two American officers. One of Cowper’s slaves summoned nearby rebel troops, but 
by the time they arrived the loyalists had gone.138
Such raids worried rebel leaders, who feared that South Carolina was vulnerable 
to a British invasion. Gov. Rutledge labored to assemble a large militia force at 
Orangeburg, where the men would be in a position to move either to the defense of 
Charleston or to attack the British in Georgia. Loyalist and neutral sentiment slowed the 
formation of Rutledge’s force; one thousand men had arrived by mid-April, but two 
hundred others deserted on the march.139 Benjamin Lincoln feared that he might have to 
withdraw his troops from the north bank of the Savannah River unless he received 
reinforcements from the north. He believed that Congress had underestimated British 
strength in the South by considering only the number of British regulars there. That was 
an error, Lincoln asserted, since it ignored the many loyalists aiding the king’s army. He 
noted that “there is not that union of sentiment among the inhabitants of this State I
136 Leonard Marbury to Lincoln, March 6, 1779, Emmet Collection No. 6665, NYPL.
137 Andrew Williamson to [Samuel Elbert?], April 1, 1779, Feinstone Collection, No. 1680, DLAR.
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expected to find; -  in the back parts of the country especially there are many disaffected 
people both in this State and North Carolina, who will be ready to join the enemy the first 
favorable opportunity, and give every aid to the savages in their power.”140 Lincoln noted 
that the South Carolina militia lacked the strength to simultaneously support the 
Continentals, guard the frontier against the Indians, and protect the area “about 
Orangeburgh, Broad & Saluda rivers, from those more unfriendly men, the Tories.”141
Lincoln’s fears, although well justified, were premature. The British preferred to 
consolidate their control of Georgia before undertaking operations in South Carolina. 
Campbell appointed Maj. James Wright, Jr., son of the former governor, to command the 
provincial battalion the British intended to raise, but few men enlisted. The Georgia 
Loyalists, as the unit was designated, remained understrength throughout the war.142 
Given the effects of Boyd’s defeat at Kettle Creek and the fact that their position at 
Savannah isolated the British from their supporters in the backcountry, the lack of 
recruits is hardly surprising.
The British had more success in civil affairs. Campbell had received permission 
to return to Britain once the situation in Georgia was stabilized, and before leaving he 
appointed James Prevost lieutenant governor. Campbell believed that placing the 
general’s younger brother in that office would facilitate cooperation between the civil and 
military authorities. James Prevost assumed his duties on March 4. He called on 
Georgians to assist the British, invited loyalists from other southern provinces to settle in
140 Lincoln to James Lovell, Apr. 12, 1779, Lincoln Papers, microfilm, Reel 3.
141 Lincoln to William Henry Drayton, Apr. 17, 1779, Lincoln Papers, microfilm, Reel 3.
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Georgia, and announced that rebel plunderers would be punished.143 Prevost’s tenure was 
brief; Germain ordered Gov. Wright to return to the province at the beginning of March. 
Wright had instructions to resume his position as governor and call for the election of an 
assembly as soon as possible, so that the inhabitants of other provinces should “see it is 
not the Intention of His Majesty & Parliament to govern America by Military Law; but, 
on the contrary, to allow them all the Benefits of a local Legislature, & their former Civil 
Constitution.”144
Wright arrived in Georgia in July, along with Lt. Gov. John Graham and Chief 
Justice Anthony Stokes, but decided to delay the Assembly elections. He was unsure if 
there were enough loyalists to justify convening the Assembly, and advised Germain that 
the province should remain under military rule until he had time to assess the situation. 
Germain disagreed, telling William Knox that he doubted Wright’s capacity to govern 
Georgia. Like Germain, most royal officials and loyalists in the province favored 
restoring civil government, believing that its success would convince many rebels to 
return to their allegiance.145 Wright, however, continued to resist, arguing that continued 
rebel incursions to within a few miles of Savannah “left the province so much exposed 
and disconcerted me to that degree” that he postponed issuing writs for elections until 
March 1780.146
The governor correctly understood that the most pressing question in the spring of 
1779 was not how Georgia should be governed but whether it could be held. In April,
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Lincoln crossed the Savannah River with five thousand troops and marched toward the 
capital and its outnumbered garrison. Realizing the danger of waiting for Lincoln’s blow 
to fall, Augustine Prevost rapidly assembled his troops, entered South Carolina, and 
drove directly toward Charleston. The move forced Lincoln to cancel his plans and hurry 
back to defend the town.147
Prevost’s invasion force included many loyalists, including seventy under Daniel 
McGirt.148 Supported by Indians, McGirt’s force operated as raiders independently of the 
army. On May 3, William Moultrie reported that McGirt’s “parties of horse and Indians, 
are ravaging the country in a barbarous manner, killing people and burning a number of 
houses as they go on.”149 In June, some of McGirt’s men stopped at a plantation owned 
by Eliza Wilkinson’s family. They behaved far better than the wild tales that preceded 
them had led Wilkinson to expect. “To tell the truth, they behaved to us more like friends 
than enemies,” she wrote. Still, her opinion of them was not high. “Nothing but the hope 
of raising themselves on the ruin of others, has induced them to engage in the war against 
us,” she declared. “I fear principle governs very few. Interest reigns predominant.”150 
Many South Carolina loyalists took advantage of Prevost’s invasion to join the 
British. Robert B allingall reached the army in early May and served until he was captured 
by the rebels at the end of the month. The rebels confined him in “a loathsome crowded 
Gaol” until October, when he was paroled due to ill health.151 Another loyalist who 
joined Prevost, Jeremiah Savage, was also caught and imprisoned. Thomas Fenwicke, a
147 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 126.
148 “Account from Bowman,” May 13, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 3.
149 William Moultrie to John Rutledge, May 3, 1779, in Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:397.
150 Eliza Wilkinson to Miss M. P., 1782, in Caroline Gilman, ed., Letters o f  Eliza Wilkinson (New York: S. 
Colman, 1839; reprint, New York: The New York Times and Amo Press, 1969), 36-37.
151 Memorial o f Robert Ballingall, March 13, 1786, Miscellaneous Manuscripts SC7003/AT7003, Box 2, 
No. 154, NYSL.
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planter on John’s Island, informed the British of the location of a Whig militia camp; 
Prevost’s troops then attacked and virtually annihilated the rebels there. Several other 
loyalists also made their way to the British army, although one group in the Camden area 
who planned to capture a powder magazine were discovered and several of them were
1 <9jailed. Prevost had expected a better response from the loyalists and complained that 
“very few and those of little influence joined the King’s standard.” The problem, he 
asserted, was the same one that Campbell had encountered in the backcountry -  not a 
lack of loyalists, but their fear of persecution. He noted that “the most zealous” loyalists
1 r - j
were afraid to act because they faced punishments “so severe and awful.”
Prevost’s invasion had upset Lincoln’s plans, frightened the Whigs, and enabled 
some loyalists to join the British. But as Lincoln’s army rushed toward Charleston, the 
British general had to withdraw from the vicinity of the town. By the end of June, the 
British were back in Savannah, except for a detachment that Prevost left to hold 
Beaufort.154
While the two armies maneuvered across the South Carolina lowcountry, the civil 
war between Whigs and loyalists flared up anew in Georgia. In late May and early June, 
Benjamin Few led 150 Richmond County Whigs against loyalists gathering in lower 
Burke County. Few dispersed “some parties of the Enemy that was there Embodiing 
against us,” capturing several of their leaders. The rebel militia also defeated a small 
party of Florida Rangers in a skirmish, capturing three. Few believed that these successes 
would keep the loyalists in check. “I Dont think Any number in that Country will Again
152 Berkeley and Berkeley, Dr. Alexander Garden, 299; Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats, 46; Lambert, South 
Carolina Loyalists, 87.
153 A. Prevost to Germain, June 10, 1779, DAR, 17:143.
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R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
268
Attempt to take Up Arms Against us,” he wrote, “as many of them seem Convinced of 
their Error and have again promised their Allegeance to the United States.”155
McGirt made a foray into western Georgia during the summer but was defeated 
by rebel militia under Col. John Twiggs. A short time later, part of McGirt’s force 
suffered another defeat while harassing Whigs along the Ogeechee River. Thomas 
Brown’s rangers, who with some Indians had been raiding in the area, retreated after 
learning of McGirt’s defeat.156
Small victories like these accomplished little as bands of loyalists, often including 
Indians, continued to strike at Georgia’s rebels. John Wereat feared that “the concerted 
Invasions of the Enemy’s Irregulars and Indians, who are at this time making different 
inroads upon us,” might cause large numbers of Whigs to leave the province. Wereat 
warned Lincoln that the British “will aim at a total subduction of Georgia this Fall,” 
which if successful would create “a very dangerous situation” in South Carolina. “The 
great defection of the upper parts of that Country is well known -  a circumstance on 
which the Enemy found the most sanguine hopes,” Wereat wrote. Once the British were 
established at Augusta, Wereat believed that “the greatest part of the Inhabitants” of 
Georgia, “worn out with fruitless opposition and actuated by the fear of loosing their all, 
would make terms for themselves.” Once they had done so, they would proceed naturally 
“from one step of infamy to another” so that “we have not the least doubt of their joining 
the Enemy.” The proximity of Augusta to the Indians, he pointed out, would also make
155 Benjamin Few to Benjamin Lincoln, June 2, 1779, William Few Papers, PERK.
156 Ward, Between the Lines, 205; Lachlan McIntosh to Benjamin Lincoln, Sept. 6, 1779, Feinstone 
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possession of the town of great benefit to the British. He asked Lincoln to send
157Continental troops to Georgia to prevent such a disaster.
In the meantime, Wereat sought to prevent defections by punishing Georgians 
who had joined the British. Upon learning that three such men had been captured and 
were confined aboard prison ships at Charleston, Wereat asked Lincoln to send them to 
Georgia to stand trial. One of the three, James Lambert, had especially angered the 
Whigs, “having been a Member of the House of Assembly & a Captain of Militia,” he 
was charged “with Deserting with his whole Company to the Enemy.” His two 
companions were accused of “crimes of a like nature.”158 The Georgia militia contributed 
by plundering suspected loyalists, “under an idea of what they call distressing of our 
Enemies.” Lincoln asked Lachlan McIntosh to put an end to such behavior because it was 
alienating many Georgians and driving some to seek safety with the British.159
Loyalists in South Carolina proved equally difficult to subdue; some escaped to 
Georgia and others harassed the Whigs when the opportunity arose. In June, Andrew 
Cumming and twenty-three others made their way to Ebenezer, where they joined the 
New Jersey Volunteers. When Lt. Col. Prevost learned of Cumming’s feat, he sent the 
South Carolinian back across the Savannah “to Pilote some Loyalists to Georgia who 
were much distressed by the Rebells.” With five men, Cumming returned to South 
Carolina but found on arriving at Orangeburg that the Whigs had learned of his presence 
and were searching for him. Deciding to return to Georgia, Cumming and his small band
157 John Wereat to Benjamin Lincoln, Aug. 18, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, PERK.
158 John Wereat to Benjamin Lincoln, Aug. 18, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, PERK.
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R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
270
eluded pursuit and burned three wagons loaded with rebel supplies.160 Another group of
loyalists, described as “Two Companys of Out Lyers,” frequently sallied from their
refuge in a swamp near Saltketcher’s to distress the Whigs.161
On September 1, the Comte d’Estaing arrived in Georgia with a French fleet and
army, and Lincoln immediately marched American forces to Savannah to unite with his
ally. Large numbers of “His Majesty’s well-affected subjects” fled to the town as the
French and Americans approached, increasing a population already swollen by refugees
from the backcountry. Others who had sworn allegiance to the British after the capture of
1Savannah, expecting the British to be defeated, joined Lincoln’s army. As the rebels 
approached Savannah, they wreaked vengeance upon the loyalists, taking “prisoners, 
negroes, and horses.” During the siege of the town, both French and American soldiers 
“plundered the country in the most shameful manner,” according to loyalist accounts. 
They carried off “provisions and stock ... robbed poor people of their bedding and 
clothes,” and pillaged the homes of absent loyalists.163
The loyalists fought back with vigor throughout the siege. They had a powerful 
incentive to do so, since John Glen, the Whig chief justice of Georgia, had declared that 
the French and rebels would show no leniency when they captured Savannah. “It was not 
now a time to use gentle & moderate measures, but to make reprisals and to retaliate,” 
Glen told a loyalist prisoner.164
160 Andrew Cumming Loyalist Claim, www.royalprovincial.com/military/mems/sc/clmcumm.htm, 
accessed June 6, 2002.
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In addition to the 350 Georgians who served in the militia defending the town, 
loyalist spies kept Gen. Prevost informed of the situation in the enemy camp. Three South 
Carolinians crossed the Savannah River with Lincoln’s army and then hurried off to 
inform Prevost of the Americans’ numbers and position.165 Some of the soldiers in the 
rebel army were also loyalists and they provided Prevost with a steady flow of 
information. A French officer complained that loyalists serving with the Whig militia 
“continually betrayed us” by giving the British “the most exact account of all our 
operations.”166
Other loyalists operated in the rear of the French and American lines. Rebel 
troops captured five white men and three blacks who had been stealing horses twenty- 
five miles above Midway; some of the prisoners were from the Florida Rangers. Three 
other loyalists were taken at Midway, and an American officer reported that there were 
“Several villains about us, that has taken to the Swamps.” These men also stole horses
i sn
from the rebels at “every opportunity.”
French and American troops attempted to storm the British defenses on October 9 
and were repulsed with heavy losses. The South Carolina Royalists distinguished 
themselves by holding their ground against a furious assault.168 The Royal Georgia 
Gazette praised the spirit displayed by both regular troops and militia in the town’s 
defense, while Anthony Stokes declared that the “conduct of the Militia and Volunteers, 
who went into the lines to defend the town, would do honour to veteran troops.”169
165 Anthony Stokes to Mrs. Stokes, Nov. 9, 1779, Muskets, Cannon Balls, and Bombs, 115; Augustine 
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Governor Wright asserted that the French and Americans had been “defeated by the 
persevering Resolution & Bravery of the Loyalists.” I70In his report to Germain, Prevost 
included the Georgia militia with the regular units of the garrison as deserving praise for 
their service during the siege. Three militiamen were killed and one wounded in the 
campaign; four soldiers of the Georgia Loyalists also died in action.171
After their attack failed, the French sailed to the West Indies and Lincoln 
withdrew his troops to South Carolina. Frustrated by the defeat, rebel troops “exacted 
reprisals throughout Georgia” before crossing the Savannah River.172
Loyalists in South Carolina seized the opportunity offered by the British victory 
to escape to Savannah. Moses Buffington, an ensign in the South Carolina Royalists, 
wrote his father that several of their acquaintances had recently made their way to 
Georgia and that more were said to be on their way. These refugees launched frequent 
raids into South Carolina, often with unfortunate consequences. Conrad Besinger, a 
deserter from the South Carolina Continentals, was captured on Bull Island in November 
wearing a British uniform. The Whigs sentenced him to hang. In January 1780, rebel
* 11 'Kmilitia captured ten South Carolina loyalists who had been raiding in the state.
Georgia loyalists also renewed their raids in the backcountry after the enemy 
armies had left. Daniel McGirt’s troops killed several Whig militia officers in a foray 
from Savannah in October. The rebels managed to disperse one loyalist raiding party in
170 “Case o f Sir James Wright,” 1784, Sir James Wright Papers, GHS.
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early December, but failed to capture any of them.174 Shortly afterward, a rebel officer 
complained of the trouble caused by “these stragling Parties which are always coming 
from Midway settlement.”175 Later in the month the Whigs dispersed another group of 
loyalist raiders, capturing two. Both prisoners were killed while attempting to escape
1 7  f ifrom jail in Augusta.
If circumstances seemed to be improving for loyalists in Georgia and South 
Carolina, their counterparts in West Florida found their situation deteriorating. In the 
aftermath of the Willing raid, many settlers along the Mississippi decided that Britain 
could no longer protect them and moved across the river to Spanish territory, where they 
took an oath of allegiance to Spain. John Fitzpatrick observed in July that “more or less 
of the Men are daily deserting to our Neighbours the Spaniards. The Number the 
Spaniards have now in their Service is 96.”177
This depletion of loyalist strength weakened the province at an inopportune time. 
Spain declared war on Britain on June 21, 1779, but Gen. John Campbell, commanding at 
Pensacola, did not learn of the declaration until September 8. By that time Galvez, who 
had received notice of hostilities earlier, had already invaded West Florida on August 27. 
At Baton Rouge, which surrendered to the Spaniards on September 21, 150 loyalists 
participated in the unsuccessful effort to defend that post. The terms of capitulation 
required the British to surrender the fort at Natchez to the Spaniards as well. This greatly 
angered the people there, who had been prepared to resist a Spanish attack. By the time 
Galvez completed his conquest of the Mississippi River settlements, some five hundred
174 Lachlan McIntosh to Benjamin Lincoln, Dec. 11, 1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, PERK.
175 Richard Parker, Jr., to Benjamin Lincoln, Dec. 11, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 5.
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loyalists had taken up arms to defend their homes. All were allowed to return home and 
remain undisturbed providing they took an oath of allegiance to the king of Spain.178
Gov. Chester and Gen. Campbell quarreled about how to meet the Spanish threat. 
Campbell believed that West Floridians were “in general, self-interested and without 
public spirit.”179 He complained to Clinton of “the little prospect I have of reinforcement 
or aid from either inhabitants or Indians in case of Pensacola or Mobile being attacked.” 
The people “seem averse and backward to military duty,” Campbell wrote.180 Campbell 
wanted Chester to convene the Assembly to pass a militia law, which would facilitate 
future assistance from the loyal inhabitants. But Chester did not want to deal with the 
fractious representatives and refused to summon them. In September, forty-nine residents 
of Pensacola asked the governor and council to allow them to embody as a temporary 
militia, while in October fifty-eight people in the province’s interior requested permission 
to build a fort on the Tombigbee River and organize a company to patrol their district. 
Chester and the council approved both petitions. The governor later created two troops of 
loyalist dragoons to guard the province’s shrunken boundaries.181
The Indian Contribution 
British officials relied upon the Indians to provide crucial assistance when the 
king’s troops finally launched the southern campaign in late 1778. Germain and Clinton 
expected John Stuart to bring a large number of Indians to cooperate with Archibald 
Campbell’s invasion force, which would enable the British to regain control of the
178 Albert W. Haarmann, “The Spanish Conquest o f  West Florida, 1779-1781,” FHQ, Vol. 39, No. 2, Oct. 
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Georgia backcountry and perhaps much of South Carolina as well. Unfortunately for 
Campbell, when he marched to Augusta he found no Indian allies and thus was unable to 
remain there. The failure of the Indians to rendezvous with Campbell’s troops resulted 
primarily from problems in communication, but it caused British leaders to question the 
Indians’ reliability. Later in the campaign, the Indians would provide valuable assistance 
to the British, although never at the levels that Germain had expected. Nevertheless, the 
Indians aided the British cause simply by constituting a potential threat that the Whigs 
could not ignore.
On December 2,1778, Germain wrote to Stuart explaining the plan to seize 
Savannah and march into the backcountry. Germain ordered Stuart “to exert your utmost 
influence with the Indians of your department to supply a constant succession of parties 
to act as the commander of the King’s troops in Georgia shall direct.” Stuart himself, 
Germain said, should accompany the first party to Augusta and establish his headquarters 
there.182 Stuart had not received these instructions by the time Campbell arrived in 
Georgia -  in fact, it was not until December 12 that the superintendent received 
Germain’s dispatches dated July 1 and August 5. These letters indicated that an attack in 
the South had been planned but did not say when. Stuart assured Germain that he had 
informed the Indians that troops were on the way and that “it has greatly contributed to 
secure their affections to the King’s interest.”183
Meanwhile, Campbell had taken Savannah and marched to Augusta, where he did 
not find the large number of Indians that Germain had promised would join him. 
Campbell did not realize that the Indians, albeit indirectly, had already contributed to the
182 Germain to Stuart, Dec. 2, 1778, DAR, 15:277.
183 Stuart to Germain, Jan. 11, 1779, DAR, 17:29.
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success of his operations. Continental commander Robert Howe noted that Georgia’s 
defenses had been “rendered very weak” because he had been forced to detach “a 
considerable number of the Regular Troops to the westward, to prevent the Ravages of 
the Indians.” This reduced the force available to defend Savannah against Campbell’s
1 84attack. After replacing Howe, Benjamin Lincoln chose to divert Andrew Williamson’s 
South Carolina militia to guard against Indian attack, rather than use the troops to oppose 
Campbell’s advance to Augusta. “When we consider that in the back parts of your 
Country and the State of Georgia there are a number of disaffected people and that they 
are stimulating the indians to acts of hostility,” Lincoln told Williamson, it was necessary 
to employ the militia to protect the frontier.185
Waiting at Augusta for Creek reinforcements, Campbell began to wonder if the 
Indians really intended to support the British. If not, he decided that it would be better to 
keep them neutral and wrote to George Galphin in late January asking for help “in ... 
restricting the Indians to a State of Neutrality.” Although Galphin’s reply seemed 
satisfactory, Campbell heard reports that the Whig agent could not be trusted, so he sent a 
loyalist spy to make inquiries about Galphin. The spy soon reported that Galphin “was 
one of the most violent Rebels in America,” and despite the assurances he had given 
Campbell, “he was actually sending a natural Son of his with two Carolina Men to raise 
the Indians against us.” British troops intercepted the three emissaries and found letters to 
the Creeks “full of every Encouragement that could incite them to War.” That same day
184 Robert Howe to President o f  Congress, Nov. 24, 1778, Robert Howe Papers, GHS.
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ninety of Galphin’s slaves escaped to the British. Campbell sent the slaves to Savannah 
as security for Galphin’s future good behavior.186
The failure of the Creeks to join Campbell contributed to his decision to leave the 
backcountry. Shortly after leaving Augusta, he sought to reassure the Creeks by sending 
them a message asserting that he had not left “from Fear of the Rebels.”187 He told them 
that although he was disappointed that they had not met him, he would send troops to 
meet them as soon as he learned they were coming to join him. Meanwhile, they were not 
to harm any frontier inhabitants who supported the king.188
Although the Indians had not joined with the troops as expected, as soon as Stuart 
learned of the plan he had moved quickly to send the Creeks to aid Campbell. Patrick 
Tonyn had sent Stuart the details of Campbell’s proposed operations, but the letter did 
not reach Pensacola until the end of January. On February 1, Stuart dispatched David 
Taitt to the Upper Creek towns to assemble the Indians and proceed to Augusta. Creek 
leaders promised to provide one thousand men by March 9, long after Campbell had left 
the backcountry. Taitt asked Campbell to send troops to meet this party before setting out 
on the scheduled day with only eighty Indians. The number increased to four hundred, 
along with several loyalists, by the time Taitt reached the Ogeechee River. The party 
waited several days for British troops to arrive, only to learn from a loyalist that the 
Whigs had discovered their presence and that at least four hundred rebel militia were 
moving to attack them.189
186 Campbell, Journal, 52-53, 56.
187 “Heads o f  Campbell’s Talk to the Headmen and warriors o f the Creek Nation,” c. March 1779, Clinton 
Papers, Vol. 53, No. 40, WLCL.
188 Campbell, Journal, 87.
189 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 81; Campbell, Journal, 88-90; “Heads o f Mr. Taitt’s Letter,” June 11, 
1779, Clinton Papers, Vol. 60, No. 39, WLCL; William Few, “Autobiography o f Col. William Few of 
Georgia,” MAH, Vol. 7, No. 5, Nov. 1881, 349.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
278
To elude the Whigs, the Creeks divided into at least three parties. Taitt sent one 
group of Indians and loyalists to operate in South Carolina, where they destroyed an 
abandoned fort. Intimidated by the growing numbers of rebel militia, many Indians soon 
returned to their towns, while others made their way to Savannah. On March 29 the 
Whigs caught and attacked one party of about seventy Creeks, killing six Indians, two 
loyalists, and capturing three Indians and three loyalists. The rebels scalped the dead 
Indians and marched with the scalps displayed on a pole. Eventually about 120 Creeks 
reached Savannah; over the next several weeks other parties arrived and increased the 
number to three hundred.190 Whig Joseph Habersham described these operations against 
the Indians as “ a very providential Circumstance, more especially as the Indians were 
given to understand by the Enemy that they wou’d meet with no Opposition in joining 
them.” According to Habersham, the Indians complained that “they have been deceived, 
and are returning in great wrath.” He hoped that this experience would convince other 
Indians not to assist the British.191
Dissatisfied with the Indians’ efforts, Augustine Prevost admonished Taitt, telling 
the agent that he would “expect more punctuality from the Indian Promises than 
formerly, it being their Interest to act in Concert with the King’s Troops.” Despite his 
disappointment, Prevost told Taitt that he still believed that the Indians could “render 
essential Service if they suffer themselves to be guided” by white men. The general 
added that he had instructed loyalists in the interior of Georgia “to give all assistance to
190 Campbell, Journal, 88-90; “Heads o f Mr. Taitt’s Letter,” June 11, 1779, Clinton Papers, Vol. 60, No. 
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the Indians.”192 Gov. Wright shared Prevost’s disappointment at the Indians’ seemingly 
lukewarm support and expressed doubts about their commitment to the British cause.193 
After receiving Prevost’s and Campbell’s reports, Germain also stated that he “was 
surprised to find the Indians not mentioned,” but realized that their delay in responding 
resulted from the difficulties in communication.194 He believed that the presence of 
troops in Georgia would convince the Indians of “His Majesty’s ability to crush his 
Enemies,” which would prompt them to ignore the rebels and commit fully to supporting 
the British.195
One reason for the Indians’ hesitant response to British calls for aid was Stuart’s 
incapacity. Gen. John Campbell warned Clinton on February 10 that the Indian 
superintendent was “in the last stage of consumption” and that his death might lead to 
“great confusion” in Indian affairs.196 Stuart died on March 21 and his brother Charles, 
along with Alexander Cameron, assumed temporary management of the department. 
Gov. Chester attempted to intervene by appointing his own Indian commissioners, but 
Germain settled the matter quickly, so that British relations with the Indians underwent 
no significant change.197 Germain termed Stuart’s death “a Misfortune,” but noted that 
“his long Ill-State of Health had disabled him from discharging the active Duties of his 
Office.” Now that Spain had entered the war, Germain decided to divide the Indian 
department to deal with that nation in the Mississippi Valley and the American rebels 
along the Atlantic coast. Germain therefore assigned Cameron to superintend the 
Choctaws and Chickasaws in West Florida, while Thomas Brown assumed control of
192 “Heads o f Prevost to Taitt,” March 14, 1779, Clinton Papers, Vol. 60, No. 40, WLCL.
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Cherokee and Creek affairs. The minister also determined that the superintendents’ duties 
were “at present, merely Military,” and placed them directly under Clinton’s 
command.198
Lincoln, unaware that Stuart’s illness provided an opportunity for the Whigs to 
increase their influence with the Indians, luckily chose the same time to make a new 
diplomatic effort aimed at detaching the Indians from their alliance with the British. In 
late January, he urged Williamson to arrange a meeting with Indian leaders, because “it is 
much easier to keep them in our interest, than to reduce them to terms of reason and a 
good brotherhood after the hatchet is taken up.”199 The general advised Gov. Lowndes to 
do everything possible to provide supplies for the Indians, and also solicited Galphin’s 
help “to keep the Indians friendly.”200 Williamson agreed to make an effort at 
negotiations, since the Whigs could not afford an Indian attack on the frontiers. If that 
occurred, he warned, it would be impossible to keep the militia “from going Home to 
protect their families.”201
Williamson and Galphin met with Cherokee leaders at Fort Rutledge in March 
and received assurances that the Cherokees would remain at peace. Lincoln expressed 
satisfaction at the successful negotiations, telling Galphin that he was “quite satisfied 
with the measures you adopted.”202 The Chickamauga faction of the Cherokees, however, 
still refused to participate in discussions with the Whigs. Instead, they attacked the 
overmountain settlers along the North Carolina and Virginia frontiers. The overmountain 
militia in return destroyed eleven Chickamauga towns, forcing the Indians to move to
198 Germain to Clinton, June 25, 1779, Germain Papers, Vol. 9, WLCL.
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new areas. Nevertheless, the Chickamaugas continued to raid the frontier, often in 
conjunction with some of the more militant Upper Creeks.203
Those Creeks who had joined the British in Savannah launched frequent raids into 
South Carolina and the Whig-controlled areas of Georgia, further disconcerting the 
rebels. A detachment of Georgia militia pursued one Indian raiding party into South 
Carolina, bringing on a skirmish in which a rebel Major Ross suffered a mortal wound.204 
On April 22 at least thirty Creeks and loyalists, the latter “painted & disguised as 
Indians,” crossed the Savannah River and burned the house of a Whig officer named 
Hartstone.205 Whigs worried that the party, and the fifty other Indians reported to be at 
Abercom, “will do a great deal of mischief.” William Moultrie asked Gov. Rutledge to 
send down some Catawbas who “would be of infinite service” against the Creeks.
Even the Catawbas’ commitment to the Whigs had been called into question, 
however, as Creek raids fed new rumors of a full-scale Indian attack in the backcountry. 
Joseph Kershaw visited the Catawba nation to investigate reports that some of the 
Catawbas had left their lands and joined the British. He found that all but four of the men 
were present, and the Catawbas were able to account for the whereabouts of the missing
907 •men. This did little to mollify Lincoln, who grew increasingly worried that a Creek 
attack was imminent. “I always supposed it would be in the enemy’s plan to bring down, 
if possible, the Indians on our frontiers,” Lincoln told Galphin.208 “I am of opinion that 
the principal design of the enemy in bringing out the Indians, is to divert us from the 
general object, to terrify and keep at home the militia,” the general explained to
203 Dowd, Spirited Resistance, 55, 56.
204 James Fergus, Pension Application, in Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 181.
205 William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln, April 24, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
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Williamson. Without the support of the militia, Lincoln knew that his own army would 
have a difficult time resisting an attack from British regulars.209
The anticipated attack came at the end of April, not in the backcountry but from 
lower Georgia as Prevost began a drive toward Charleston. At least one hundred Creeks 
accompanied the British troops; Prevost employed them, along with loyalist irregulars, as 
scouts in advance of his main force. One Indian and two loyalist scouts were wounded in 
one encounter with the Whigs at the Saltketcher River; in another skirmish, Indians 
pursued and scalped some retreating rebels.210
Such incidents helped Prevost by inducing rebel militiamen to leave the ranks. 
“The terror excited by the Indians, who wore their war dresses, and wantonly displayed 
the instruments of torture, with which they were accustomed to aggravate the sufferings 
of their prisoners, created the most appalling dismay,” one rebel declared. “Whigs, of 
unquestionable patriotism” serving in the militia left their units and rushed home to 
protect their families from Indian “depredations.”211
Creek attacks on the frontier further hindered Whig leaders’ efforts to assemble as 
many militiamen as possible to oppose Prevost. On May 8, Williamson informed Lincoln 
that most of Andrew Pickens’ men had “gone home on Accot of the Indians having made 
some Incursions on the frontier and killed & Scalped some Persons” in the area. 
Williamson thought that the Indian danger was less serious than reported and promised to
209 Lincoln to Williamson, March 29,1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 3.
210 E. Skelly, “Demonstration Against Charleston, South Carolina, in 1779: Journal o f Brigade Major F. 
Skelly,” MAH, Vol. 26, No. 2, Aug. 1891, 152, 153. Skelly’s initial is incorrectly given as “F.” in the title; 
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send five hundred men to assist the army “as soon as the Inhabitants are made Sensible, 
that the numbers of Indians sd. to be coming down is much exagerated.”212
In response to reports that “the Enemy’s Indians are ravaging the Country,” John 
Rutledge “wrote pressingly, for the Catawba Indians to come down, as a Match for those 
of the Enemy.”213 The Catawbas promptly dispatched ninety men to assist the Whigs.214
The Creeks who accompanied Prevost’s troops seized a considerable number of 
slaves in South Carolina and brought many of them to Savannah. They refused Gov. 
Wright’s advice to sell the slaves, although several Creeks traded their plundered slaves 
for horses. Others took slaves to East Florida, where some Seminole Creeks eagerly 
exchanged cattle for them. The Creeks’ demand for slaves grew sufficiently large to 
induce some whites to bring plundered slaves into the nation to trade for horses and 
cattle.215 David Taitt blamed the “Georgia Volunteers” for the Indians’ sudden desire to 
plunder slaves. During the invasion of South Carolina, Taitt said, these loyalist troops had
71“set a bad example to the Indians, who cannot now be restrained from taking Negroes.” 
With Prevost’s troops back in Georgia, exhausted Whig militiamen used the 
possibility of Indian attack as an excuse to demand that they be allowed to return home. 
At the beginning of July, Williamson told Moultrie that it was “impossible to keep his 
men in the field any longer.” Williamson’s militia, Moultrie wrote, “have played the old 
stale game of Cameron’s being in the Cherokees, with a number of white men and
212 Andrew Williamson to Benjamin Lincoln, May 8, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 3.
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Indians, ready to fall on their part of the country.” Moultrie conceded that the militia
217would have to be permitted to leave as soon as Gov. Rutledge gave his approval.
Although the Creeks had been active with Prevost and on the frontier, rebel 
leaders remained uncertain about the Indians’ intentions during the summer. Galphin 
believed that the Creeks preferred neutrality. At the end of May, Lincoln received a talk 
from that nation, accompanied by “Beads and White Wing, emblems of their peaceable 
intentions.” Lincoln advised John Rutledge to send a talk in reply to “confirm them in 
their present good disposition,” and suggested the address might be more effective if 
delivered jointly by himself and the governor.218
At Augusta, however, Lachlan McIntosh saw indications in August that “the 
Enemy mean to Harass us upon every Side by the Savages & themselves untill they get 
the whole state into their possession, & make an Irruption into Carolina from this 
quarter.” Most of the militia who had not joined the British, McIntosh wrote, remained 
“penned up in Little Forts to Secure their Familys from the Savages, to whom they are 
exposed, & harass them Continualy.”219 A few days later, a Whig officer reported that “a 
number of Indians” had crossed the Savannah River into South Carolina, frightening 
local residents.220 The same officer reported on August 19 that another “party of painted 
Villains” had entered South Carolina.221 This group of “twenty Painted White Men & 
Eighty Indians” burned a house and killed and scalped a Whig militiaman. The raiders 
also carried off “Most of the Negroes from One of Mr. Cowpers Plantations,” although 
rebel lieutenant James Moore believed that the loyalist Cowper, who was in Savannah,
217 William Moultrie to John Rutledge, July 3, 1779, in Moultrie, Memoirs, 2:7.
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may have sent the party expressly to recover his slaves. Moore noted that “the Men are so 
much Alarm’d at the Indians coming Over (On Account of their families) that Should 
they make another Attempt & Succeed most every Man will Move their Women & 
Children & many themselves I am Afraid.” The whites accompanying the Indians were 
undoubtedly loyalist refugees who wore Indian costume to avoid recognition and thus 
protect their families from Whig retaliation.
The Creeks continued to make “excursions across the Savannah” as far south as 
Purysburgh, doing “mischief in the predatory way.”223 Whig leaders admitted that they 
lacked the strength to prevent these raids, which John Wereat believed presaged a new 
British attack on the backcountry. Should Prevost retake Augusta, Wereat warned, the 
“great defection of the upper parts” of South Carolina would bring an accession of 
loyalists into the British ranks, and “the Enemy will find not the least difficulty,
• 224whenever they have a mind, of bringing the Savages upon the Frontiers of Carolina.”
To bolster Whig strength in the region, Lincoln dispatched five hundred Virginia soldiers 
to Augusta. He also tried to restrain the Georgians, who had recently killed some friendly 
Creeks. Lincoln urged state officials to do everything possible to mollify the Indians to 
prevent them from assisting the British.
The Creeks might have provided even more assistance to the British had a 
smallpox epidemic not struck their towns in the autumn. Brought south by the Maryland 
loyalists sent to reinforce Pensacola and passed on to Indian visitors in town, the disease 
killed many Creeks and incapacitated others. Those who were uninfected fled to the
222 Lt. James Moore to Barnard Beekman, Aug. 18, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 4.
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woods to avoid contracting the disease, further reducing the numbers of Creeks that 
Brown could employ.226
Those Cherokees who had not signed the 1777 treaty moved southward in August 
and launched their own attacks on the South Carolina frontier.227 Williamson marched 
against them with the militia, and a detachment under Andrew Pickens captured “The 
Terrapin a Principal Headman of the Outlying Cherokees,” who had led the raiding 
parties. Williamson’s militia burned eight Cherokee towns and destroyed at least fifty 
thousand bushels of com. Several Cherokee leaders came to Williamson on August 28 
and “pleaded hard to save their Com and Houses.” Williamson replied that “their bad 
Conduct had obliged me to come into their Country with an Army, I was resolved to 
Carry destruction through their Towns & Settlemts.” Unless the Cherokee raiders 
returned to “the Settled Towns in the Nation and Resided among their Countrymen,” 
Williamson said he would disregard their pleas. The Indians accepted the ultimatum. 
Williamson hoped the blow would “Secure the peace and quiet of our frontiers” by 
intimidating the Creeks as well as the Cherokees.228
Just when Indian raids began to place a strain on the Whigs, Gov. Wright learned 
that Prevost had jeopardized future cooperation by insulting Creek leaders at an early 
August meeting in Savannah. After their talks with the general, the angry Creeks 
announced their intention to “return home immediately,” while some declared that “they 
had been very ill treated.” Wright asked Alexander McGillivray to find out what had 
transpired at the conference. Suspecting that a lack of activity was the root of the
226 Elizabeth A. Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic o f  1775-1782 (New York: Hill and 
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problem, Wright suggested that the Indians “might be of service” if  they joined a group 
of regulars and militia guarding Hudson’s Ferry on the Savannah River, or “if they can’t
229remain inactive, they might amuse themselves, by going over the River into Carolina.” 
Wright later spoke to the Creeks himself and learned that they were eager “to go on any 
duty or Service that might be required of them.”230
Prevost, ignorant of the effects Indian raids had on the Whigs, remained unhappy 
with the level of Indian support. “Instead of the great assistance expected from the 
numerous tribes of allied Indians ... not above eighty Creeks have attended the army or 
appeared in any force anywhere” in the South since the capture of Savannah, he told
* 231Germain. David Taitt disputed this obvious understatement of Creek numbers, 
asserting that the Creeks had been quite effective, given the difficult circumstances under 
which they had to operate.232
Prevost soon moderated his views. Having learned that Cameron was leading a 
large number of Indians to attack the frontier, he was preparing “to make some 
movements in favour of the Indians” when the arrival of the French fleet at Savannah 
forced him to cancel his plans. An estimated eighty Cherokees and Creeks were in 
town when the siege began; the Cherokees were assigned to guard Hutchinson’s Island, 
where a large number of civilians had taken refuge, while the Creeks served in the 
defensive lines.234 Henry Laurens hoped that a French and American victory at Savannah 
might prove fatal to the British alliance with the Indians by bringing “disgrace” on the
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British “in the Eyes of their Savage Connections who will probably take part against 
them in their Disaster.”235
Laurens’s optimism was misplaced, for not only did the British defeat their 
attackers, but many Indians came to the aid of the king’s troops, although they were too 
far away to reach Savannah before the siege ended. Two hundred Cherokees arrived in 
the town on January 6 , 1780, bringing four hundred horses. Later that month, one 
hundred Creeks reached Savannah unmolested by the rebels.
In addition to the French and American attack on Savannah, the British faced 
another threat in the South in 1779 as Spain prepared to enter the war. While still neutral, 
the Spanish sought to gain influence with the Choctaws by lavishing presents on them in 
an attempt to undermine their support for the British. James Colbert, Cameron’s assistant, 
visited the Sixtowns region in November and found nearly every man wearing medals 
and coats provided by Spanish agents. Colbert questioned the Choctaw leaders, who 
assured him of their continued loyalty to Britain. The British subsequently increased the 
quantity of their own gifts, but many Choctaws from the Sixtowns faction shifted their
' J ' l H
allegiance to Spain.
Germain had underestimated the effects of Spanish influence with the Indians; 
instead he had ordered the commander in West Florida, Gen. John Campbell, to 
undertake an offensive against Louisiana as soon as Spain entered the war. The minister 
believed that with the aid of the West Florida militia and “a Number of faithful Indians,”
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Campbell could easily capture New Orleans.238 But the Spanish struck first, invading 
West Florida on August 27 with a force that included 160 Indians from Louisiana.239
The timing of the attack was unfortunate for the British, since a party of Creeks 
had arrived at Pensacola ten days earlier. Campbell had provided them with arms and 
ammunition and the Indians had gone to Savannah. Their appearance impressed Philipp 
Waldeck, a German chaplain, who described them as “most wonderfully developed, large 
and strong.” They would have been a valuable reinforcement for West Florida’s defense 
had Campbell realized that an attack was imminent.240 Shortly after the Creeks left, a 
group of Choctaws arrived. Waldeck described them as “braver in war” than the Creeks, 
but physically less impressive. He noted that there was no Choctaw interpreter in 
Pensacola, so that a Creek had to handle the task. Campbell supplied the Choctaws with 
the arms and ammunition they requested, although his officers angered the Indians by 
telling them “in rather rough fashion that they must control their people so that they cause 
no damage.”241 The Choctaws were still at Pensacola on September 14 when Campbell, 
ignorant of the Spanish invasion, secured their promise to provide two hundred men for 
an attack on New Orleans.242
News of the Spanish attack forced Campbell to adopt a more genial attitude 
toward the Indians, many of whom came to Pensacola upon learning that war had broken 
out in the Mississippi Valley. British officials “clearly see that in the present situation, it 
is more necessary to flatter them [Indians] so as to keep them friendly,” Waldeck wrote,
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noting that the newly-arrived Indians had demanded gifts. “And if it is not to our 
advantage, still we must give them presents so that they will not take up arms against us. 
On the other hand the Spaniards do all they can to draw these savages away from us.”243 
The Spanish efforts achieved some success when a considerable number of Sixtowns 
Choctaws later joined Galvez’s force and fought alongside the Spaniards at Mobile.244
After the fall of Mobile, some loyalists decided that it was unsafe to remain in 
West Florida, and during their emigration they developed a new respect for Indians. 
William Lee hired a trader to guide his family to Georgia through Creek territory. At one 
point during their journey they spent seventeen days with the Creeks, finding them to be 
“a very sensible and intelligent people.” Lee quickly came to admire the Indians’ social 
equality. He concluded that “they are the most happy people in the world” and were not 
to “be pitied, but rather to be envied.”245
The Creeks’ hospitality to loyalist refugees showed their continued commitment 
to the British, but the Spanish did not relent in their efforts to win Creek and Choctaw 
support. Galvez received some Choctaw leaders in New Orleans, one of whom alarmed 
Cameron by later declaring that “whoever gives us the most will be the most 
regarded.”246 Lt. Col. Lewis Fuser, commander of the St. Augustine garrison, learned in 
October that “the Indians reed from the Spaniards presents of great value” and that 
Spanish agents had invited some chiefs to Havana, “with promises to send them soon 
back with three ships loaded with goods for them.” If the report were true, Fuser wrote, it
243 Waldeck, Diary, 134.
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meant that the Spaniards planned to reestablish a post in Florida from where they could 
“be at hand to indispose the Indians against us.”247
African Americans in Arms 
The arrival of British troops in Georgia at the end of 1778 provided slaves with 
the chance to seek freedom by escaping to the king’s forces. Many slaves had awaited 
this opportunity since the start of the war and quickly took advantage of it. Some, such as 
the slave who enabled Archibald Campbell to capture Savannah with ease, made 
significant contributions to the British cause. Others, although their individual efforts 
were less spectacular, also provided valuable support to the British. Their actions 
demonstrated that slave assistance could be a powerful asset in the ministry’s effort to 
regain control of the southern colonies. However, British leaders still did not adopt a 
coherent policy for the use of slaves, and it was left to British military and civil officials 
to determine what role blacks would take in southern operations.
Southern Whigs knew that many of their slaves would flee if the British 
established themselves in the region. When reports arrived that Clinton had dispatched an 
expedition to Georgia, the planters began to worry. “If the Ennemy unfortunately got 
possession of Savannah, there will be an absolute necessity in my Opinion to withdraw 
the hands from those plantations,” John Lewis Gervais informed Henry Laurens.248 
Indian agent George Galphin, who lived far up the Savannah River, thought that if the 
British invaded, he would “be obligd to Send of most of my negros toward the 
Congerees.”249
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The Whigs’ fears were well-founded because large numbers of slaves from both 
Georgia and South Carolina escaped in the weeks following the British capture of 
Savannah. On January 20, South Carolinian Nathaniel Hall complained that “thirteen of 
my Negroes have run away, and are gone over to the Enemy.” Two other slaves he 
owned in Georgia had been taken by the British, while another two had been “carried off 
by an Overseer of Lord Wm. Campbell,” evidently a loyalist who had taken the slaves 
with him when he went to join the British.250 The owner of a plantation in Georgia noted
9 < ion February 5 that “near 50 Negroes” had run away. Georgian Samuel Stiles wrote that 
“when Col: Prevoe came to Georgia the first time two of our most Valuable Carpenters 
named Sampson and Sam went to Mcgerts Scouting party,” while a carpenter named 
Jack, his wife Cumba, and a “Yellow boy” named Swan joined Campbell immediately 
after the capture of Savannah. Stiles, who had fled to South Carolina, could account for 
only three of his slaves.252 Oliver Hart observed in mid-February that since the British 
had arrived in Georgia, “Negroes in abundance” had joined them, including “some 
Hundreds” who had escaped from South Carolina. “Negroes are a very precarious 
Tenure, any where near the Environs of Georgia,” Hart stated.
Many Georgia planters sent their slaves to South Carolina to prevent them from 
falling into British hands.254 They also carried off loyalists’ slaves when they could. 
Campbell tried to prevent this. Shortly after taking Savannah, he learned that Whigs were 
“carrying off a large Body of Negroes to Purisburgh ... which belonged to the Loyalists of 
Georgia.” Campbell rushed troops to Zubly’s Ferry to interrupt the movement, but they
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arrived too late. Seeing many of the slaves on the South Carolina side of the river, 
Campbell devised a stratagem to recover some of them. A “Confidential Mulatto” with a 
musket went to the riverbank “with a Number of Negroes ... to call out to the Rebels for 
God’s Sake to send over the Boats and save his Master’s Slaves from falling into the 
hands of the King’s Troops.” When the rebels crossed the river, the mulatto fired his 
musket as a signal to British troops concealed in the trees, who emerged, seized the boats, 
and crossed the river. They returned with eighty-three blacks.255
Campbell did not explain the reasons for his actions. Undoubtedly he hoped to 
recover slaves belonging to Georgia loyalists and at the same time to deprive the Whigs 
of a valuable resource. But the fact that he had many blacks with his troops and used 
them to execute a complex ruse showed that he considered slaves to be important military 
auxiliaries. Faced with the dilemma of whether to treat slaves as property or as allies, and 
without clear directions from his superiors, Campbell, like other British officers in the 
South, tried to do both.
Unrestrained by such ambiguities, many Whigs tried to recover slaves, either by 
theft or through official channels. In early February, a South Carolina militia captain and 
his men, who were supposed to be guarding Hudson’s Ferry, crossed into Georgia during 
the night, captured “a number of negroes,” then “immediately deserted their post, and 
returned home with their booty.” Benjamin Lincoln received numerous requests from 
slave owners who wanted flags of truce so they could go to Savannah and demand that 
British officials return their human property. Although Lincoln provided the flags, he
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warned one applicant that previous attempts to recover slaves had “proved fruitless,” 
noting that many people had already given up the effort.257
The experience of an unidentified American officer who accompanied two 
women, a Mrs. Heyward and Mrs. Pelot, to Savannah in an effort to regain their slaves 
provides important insight into why British officers refused to return fugitives. When 
they approached the town by boat, a British patrol vessel met the trio and took them to 
Commodore John Henry, commander of the naval squadron in Georgia. The American 
officer told Henry the purpose of their visit, which provoked the latter into a tirade on the 
issue of slavery. The women’s “idea of recovering Negroes was treated as Chimerical, 
especially those that deserted” to the British, the officer reported. Henry insisted that such 
slaves “were free, they were the Kings, he cloathed, fed, & employed them -  we cannot 
answer to return them, there was an idea of Cruelty in delivering of them up to enraged 
Mistresses who no doubt wd. correct them Severely.” The officer attempted to argue, but 
Henry would not listen; “he honestly confessed they had & wd. receive every thing that 
deserted from us.” Henry added that he detested plundering by loyalists who seized and 
sold slaves because it ran counter to “the idea of freedom which they endeavour to 
propagate among the Slaves.” The American officer complained to Lincoln that Henry 
had been adamant to the point of rudeness.258
After getting a glimpse of southern slavery, loyalists in provincial units from the 
northern colonies also expressed sympathy for the slaves. In a letter to his wife, Lt. Col. 
Stephen Delancey of New York described his horror at the treatment of slaves and the 
anger toward slave owners that it inspired. “The Negro’s and Negro Women are
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inhumanly treated, are two-thirds naked, and are very disgusting to the Eye and another 
Sense,” he observed. He could not accept “the great Cruelty made Use of to the poor 
ignorant Wretches,” and in consequence had developed a revulsion toward white masters. 
“These circumstances of Cruelty to these People render the Persons who exercise it 
disagreable, nay odious to me,” Delancey wrote. “When a Set of People can sit down 
enjoying all the Luxuries of Life without feeling the least Sensation or Compunction for 
the Sufferings of those poor Wretches ... I must conclude them Obdurate, Selfish, and 
Unfeeling to the greatest Degree imaginable.”259
The statements of Henry and Delancey indicate that many royal military officers 
in the South felt genuine compassion for slaves and that efforts to take slaves from the 
rebels and to prevent the return of blacks who had fled to the British often arose from 
humanitarian motives. Of course, not all British officers were so generous. One, in a 
statement that reflected widespread opinion in the army, pronounced several slaves taken 
in South Carolina to be “all a Prize & my property.”260 This officer arranged to have a 
loyalist merchant in Savannah sell the slaves for him and asked the merchant to provide 
the same service for several other officers.261
Slaves may not have been aware that British officers harbored such sentiments, 
yet they understood that their chances were freedom were far greater if they reached the 
king’s forces than if they remained with their Whig owners. Thus the exodus of slaves to 
the British army continued throughout the winter and spring of 1779. David George, 
owned by George Galphin, had learned to read and became a preacher at Silver Bluff.
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This marked him as particularly dangerous to the Whigs, so when British troops marched 
into the Georgia backcountry, rebel officials imprisoned George and his wife. Brown’s 
rangers liberated George, who made his way to Savannah, where his wife supported them 
by working as a laundress for British officers. While their situation could hardly have 
been comfortable, George preferred it to slavery and sent his wife and children into 
hiding when the Americans approached Savannah in the fall of 1779.262
Large numbers of South Carolina Whigs living along the lower Savannah River 
and near the coast abandoned their plantations because of the proximity of the British, 
taking their slaves with them. Edward Rutledge believed that removing slaves, “in whose 
Fidelity” the planters could “place very little dependence,” was the only way to prevent 
mass escapes unless rebel authorities could adequately protect the plantations. William 
Moultrie agreed, noting that “a great number of negroes” living along the Savannah River 
escaped to the British in Georgia “in spite of our care.” Moultrie planned to cross the 
river, recover some of the runaways, and then attack the British post at Abercom, which 
acted as a magnet for both slaves and American deserters. The attack, made in early 
April, failed and cost the rebels two galleys.264 The British repaired both vessels and 
added them to their fleet. Because of a shortage of seamen, Commodore Hyde Parker 
assigned twelve blacks to each galley with orders that they be considered as “Ordinary 
Seamen,” as were the white crew members.265 Thus, in an ironic twist, blacks became 
crewmen aboard vessels originally sent to recapture fugitive slaves.
262 “An Account o f the Life o f Mr. David George from S.L.A. given by himself,” 
http://collections.ic.gc.ca/blackloyalists/documents, July 30, 2001.
263 Edward Rutledge to [Thomas Rutledge?], Feb. 17,1779, Edward Rutledge Letters, SCHS.
264 Moultrie to Charles Pinckney, April 6, 1779, in Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:364-365.
265 Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 154.
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The flight of so many slaves raised South Carolinians’ fears of an insurrection. In 
Charleston on the night of March 4, “the town was alarmed by the Ringing of the Bells in 
St Michaels Church Steeple.” Several men climbed the steeple, where they “found a 
Negro man -  pretending to be fast asleep, and apparently drunk.” Most Charleston 
residents believed the bells were “intended as a Signal for the Perpetration of some 
diabolical Plan -  it may be for burning the Town -  or Perhaps something worse.”266
Whenever British forces raided rebel-held territory, they took large numbers of 
slaves. Although Americans uniformly insisted that the slaves had been stolen, 
undoubtedly many blacks accompanied the British voluntarily. When British troops 
landed at Beaufort in February, Gen. Stephen Bull wrote that “they have carried off 
above 300 negroes belonging to different people.”267 The rebels frequently accused 
McGirt’s loyalists, a unit that included several blacks, of stealing slaves. In early 
March, a rebel Captain McCoy “lost a number of his negroes” to McGirt’s rangers.269
To deal with the large number of slaves with the British, Archibald Campbell 
appointed five men to serve as commissioners of claims. Campbell gave the 
commissioners responsibility for managing “all the property, real and personal,” of both 
rebels and absent loyalists who were not represented by local attorneys. He instructed the 
commissioners to appoint overseers to supervise the plantations, slaves, and livestock of 
such persons, as well as to prosecute anyone who stole slaves or livestock from 
plantations under the commission’s management.270 The commissioners began their work 
on March 15. They observed “that a number of negroes and other effects, the property of
266 Oliver Hart Diary, March 4, 1779, SCL.
267 Stephen Bull to William Moultrie, Feb. 12, 1779, in Moultrie, Memoirs, 1:313.
268 Ward, Between the Lines, 205.
269 Williamson to Lincoln, March 11, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3. In his reply, Williamson 
gives the captain’s name as McKay.
270 “Instructions to the Commissioners o f Claims,” March 5, 1779, Germain Papers, Vol. 9, WLCL.
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persons in actual rebellion against his Majesty; as also of others now absent from this 
province, have been seized and detained under various pretences, by persons who have 
no authority for the Same,” and ordered “all persons having possession of negroes or 
other effects, as above described,” to report to their office, where the commissioners 
would assume control of the slaves and determine what was to be done with them.271 
Eventually 250 of these slaves were formed into a pioneer corps for the army.272
Slaves accused of criminal behavior fell under the jurisdiction of Savannah’s 
temporary civil authority, the board of police. When an overseer, Joseph Weatherly, was 
murdered in February 1779, the board suspected that two slaves, Charles and Sandy, had 
committed the crime. The members questioned several other slaves in their investigation 
and the slaves’ testimony, although often conflicting, strongly indicated that the suspects 
had indeed committed the crime. But the board did not find the “direct proof’ it sought 
and asked Maj. Archibald McArthur, the army commandant in Savannah, if the suspects 
should be released or confined until they could be brought to trial. There are no records 
of McArthur’s response or the ultimate disposition of the case.273
The board also took steps to restore Georgia’s plantation economy by assuring 
that many slaves continued to work as agricultural laborers. During its brief period of 
operation, the board appointed sixteen overseers for plantations owned by absentee 
loyalists. The board granted the overseers wages of £40 ($5200) per year from public 
funds.274
271 “Commissioners o f  Claims Office,” March 15, 1779, Germain Papers, Vol. 9, WLCL.
272 Martha Condray Searcy, “1779: The First Year o f the British Occupation o f Georgia,” GHQ, Vol. 67, 
No. 2, Summer 1983, 178-179.
273 Hawes, ed., “Minute Book, Savannah Board o f Police,” Feb. 17, 18, and 19, 1779, 251-253; Betty 
Wood, “‘Until He Shall Be Dead, Dead, Dead’: The Judicial Treatment o f Slaves in Eighteenth-Century 
Georgia,” GHQ, Vol. 71, No. 3, Fall 1987, 384-386.
274 Hawes, ed., “Minute Book, Savannah Board o f Police,” 245-257.
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Some slaves who had fled to the British or had been forcibly taken from Whig 
masters became dissatisfied and returned to their masters. One such slave, owned by 
rebel official John Walton, grew tired “of the hardships of being away from his family & 
connections.” He turned himself in to the Whigs at Augusta, where he gave Gen. John 
Ashe a fairly detailed account of British troop movements.275 Between March 1779 and 
early 1782, when rebel forces surrounded Savannah and made it virtually impossible to 
leave the town, hundreds of dissatisfied slaves left to seek freedom elsewhere. Many 
were believed to have gone to East Florida or South Carolina, while others fled to the 
Georgia backcountry. Some went to or remained in Savannah, where they passed as free. 
Two slaves who escaped from John Williamson in June 1781 wore military clothing.
“Hercules, a black fellow, about 22 years old, wears a soldier’s uniform, red and buff. 
Jacob, about 19 years old, stout made, wears a Hessian uniform,” Williamson stated in an 
advertisement.276 He did not explain how the two men obtained their uniforms, although 
it is most probable that they were issued from army stores. Hercules and Jacob may have 
served with the army before being restored to their master and, unwilling to return to their 
former bondage, escaped.
If some slaves found that the British provided fewer opportunities for freedom 
and independence than they had expected, most knew that they could expect no change in 
their condition from the Whigs. When Campbell’s troops captured Savannah, John 
Laurens had immediately used the emergency to renew his proposal to arm slaves for 
rebel service. In February 1779, Laurens told his father that only Spanish intervention “or
275 John Ashe to Benjamin Lincoln, Feb. 22, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
276 This information is compiled from advertisements for runaway slaves in the Royal Georgia Gazette 
from March 11, 1779 to March 14, 1782, microfilm, LOC. The advertisement quoted was published in the 
June 28, 1781 edition.
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the adoption of my black project” could save Georgia, and asked for the elder Laurens’s 
support for an effort “to transform the timid Slave into a firm defender of Liberty and 
render him worthy to enjoy it himself.”277 Henry Laurens dropped his earlier opposition 
in response to the crisis in the South, and in turn solicited backing from George 
Washington, assuring the general that “had we Arms for 3000. such black Men as I could 
select in Carolina I should have no doubt of success in driving the British out of Georgia 
& subduing East Florida before the end of July.”278
Alexander Hamilton, who had become friends with John Laurens while both 
served on Washington’s staff, lent his support to the proposal. Writing to John Jay on 
March 14, Hamilton stated that the plan to arm South Carolina’s slaves was “the most 
rational, that can be adopted, and promises very important advantages.” Hamilton 
worried that if the rebels did not arm slaves, “the enemy probably will; and that the best 
way to counteract the temptations they will hold out will be to offer them ourselves. An 
essential part of the plan is to give them freedom with their muskets.” As an incentive to 
adopt this plan, Hamilton suggested that South Carolina whites “may be excused from the 
draft on condition of furnishing the black battalions.” However, Hamilton realized “that
• • • 279this project will have to combat much opposition from prejudice and self-interest.”
A week later, a congressional committee appointed to examine the situation in the 
South made its recommendation on the Laurens plan. Observing that lengthy service in 
the field would deplete the numbers of the South Carolina militia and serve as a 
“temptation to Negro Slaves to rise in Rebellion or at least to desert to & strengthen the
277 John Laurens to Henry Laurens, Feb. 17, 1779, PHL, 15:59-60.
278 Henry Laurens to George Washington, March 16, 1779, PHL, 15:66.
279 Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, March 14, 1779, in Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers o f  Alexander 
Hamilton, Vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 17-19.
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hands of the Enemy,” the committee first urged Virginia and North Carolina to send 
assistance to their southern neighbor. Next, the committee recommended that the 
governments of Georgia and South Carolina consider arming blacks to serve either in
existing Continental battalions or in separate units commanded by white officers.
* 280Congress would reimburse the slaveowners for the cost of those slaves who enlisted.
On March 29, Congress approved the committee’s proposal and recommended to 
South Carolina and Georgia that those states arm three thousand slaves for their defense. 
Benjamin Lincoln endorsed the plan, telling Gov. John Rutledge that if South Carolina
“would so far comply with the recommendation of Congress as to raise two Battalions of
281Blacks,” the militia could be relieved from their near-constant duty.
Although John Laurens traveled to Charleston to press the Assembly to adopt 
Congress’s recommendation, South Carolinians refused to give it serious consideration. 
Henry Laurens warned his son that “the pride & the naughtiness ... of too many of our 
fellow Citizens” and “the avarice of others would impel them to revolt from the 
proposition.”282 One of the handful of representatives who supported enlisting black 
troops, David Ramsay, noted that the proposal was “received with horror by the planters, 
who figured to themselves terrible consequences.”283 Christopher Gadsden, the unofficial 
spokesman for Charleston’s artisans, also denounced the measure. “We are much 
disgusted here at the Congress recommending us to arm our Slaves, it was received with
284great resentment, as a very dangerous and impolitic Step,” he wrote.
280 Committee Report to Congress, [March 25, 1779], PHL, 15:72-73.
281 Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, July 24, 1779, Lincoln Papers, microfilm, Reel 3.
282 Henry Laurens to John Laurens, Sept. 21, 1779, PHL, 15:169, 172.
283 Shaffer, “Between Two Worlds,” 181-182.
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Despite John Laurens’s ceaseless efforts to gain support, the Assembly rejected 
the plan by an overwhelming margin when it was finally brought to a vote. Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney suggested an alternative: offering slaves, along with land and cattle, 
as a bounty to British and Hessian officers to induce them to desert to the rebels. Lincoln 
ignored the idea. “Prejudice and private interest will be antagonists too powerful for 
public spirit,” Hamilton consoled Laurens. Hamilton declared that a lack of virtue in the 
southern states “has fitted their inhabitants for the chain, and ... the only condition they 
sincerely desire is that it may be a golden one.”286
Had South Carolinians chosen to arm slaves when Congress first recommended 
doing so, they might have been in a better position to defend their state when Prevosf s 
army invaded at the end of April. Instead, the British received another large influx of 
fugitive slaves as they marched to Charleston, while other slaves fled to Whig-controlled 
areas. Many of Edward Telfair’s slaves escaped when the British entered South Carolina, 
some of them going to Dorchester and others to Charleston. They were taken up by other 
Whigs, who refused to return them until Lincoln ordered it. On May 8 , Capt. James 
Moncrief and a party o f British cavalry came upon several slaves who the rebels had set 
to work felling trees to delay the British. With no apparent difficulty, Moncrief 
immediately employed them to undo the destruction.287
As the British army advanced, South Carolinians struggled to maintain control 
over their slaves. Eliza Lucas Pinckney told her son that the British had plundered and 
burned his house and that his slaves were gone. She did not know “whether they went
285 John Laurens to Alexander Hamilton, July 14, 1779, PAH, 2:102-103; Shaffer, “Between Two Worlds,” 
181; Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to Benjamin Lincoln, June 28, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 4.
286 Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, Sept. 11, 1779, PAH, 2:166-167.
287 Edward Telfair to Benjamin Lincoln, June 1, 1779, Edward Telfair Papers, PERK; Skelly, 
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voluntarily with the Enemy or were taken by force.” The British visited another Pinckney 
plantation, Belmont, “and distroyed every thing in the house but took none of the 
Negroes.” Mrs. Pinckney and a neighbor, who also had an estate in the Belmont area, had 
sent slave emissaries there with instructions that all the slaves should join their masters at 
Santee, but none came. The Pinckneys had more slaves at Beach Hill, and ordered them 
to remain there as the place was deemed safe from the British. Eliza Pinckney had 
doubts, however. “I know not what to do in regard to the Beach Hill and Belmont 
Negroes unless I could hire a white man to go and fetch them away,” she wrote in 
frustration, “or whether it would be best to remove them without if they chuse to come 
away for they all do now what they please every where.” She added that masters on other 
plantations in the path of the British had ordered their slaves to leave and met outright 
refusal. Even if her slaves were not seized by the British, she conceded that they might 
“choose to go to them, and in that case I fear we should not be able to prevent it.”
Hoping to save his family and slaves from Prevost’s troops, Thomas Tudor 
Tucker sent his sister, in company with another family, into the state’s interior. They had 
not traveled far when “the Negroes grew insolent & deserted them.” Of the slaves who 
had remained at home with him, Tucker lost “one valuable Fellow who thought proper to 
look out for a new Master.”289 The presence of the king’s army gave slaves 
unprecedented control over their own destiny. Masters could do little to enforce 
obedience, for any attempt at coercion was likely to send an angry slave fleeing to the 
British.
288 Eliza Lucas Pinckney to Thomas Pinckney, May 17, 1779, in Elise Pinckney, ed., “Letters o f Eliza 
Lucas Pinckney, 1768-1782,” SCHM, Vol. 76, No. 3, July 1975, 158-159.
289 Thomas Tudor Tucker to St. George Tucker, July 10, 1779, Tucker-Coleman Papers, SLSC.
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American officers shared the planters’ concern over the loss of their slaves. 
Moultrie, who was attempting to delay Prevost’s advance, informed Lincoln that the 
British had several vessels collecting slaves along the rivers, and urged his commander to 
“over take them and prevent them carrying away the negroes.”290 Whig officers also 
diverted militia who might otherwise have opposed the British to keep slaves in check. 
One unit ranged “to Willtown, Pon Pon, and other places; where they heard the negroes 
were very unruly, and doing great mischief... in order to quell them,” Eliza Wilkinson 
wrote. She also worried about her family’s slaves; a loyalist riding ahead of Daniel 
McGirt’s rangers told her that McGirt would take the slaves from their plantation when 
he arrived. Some of McGirt’s troops reached Wilkinson’s plantation on June 3. Although 
they did not carry off the slaves, their presence was enough to give her a shock, which 
she pronounced “terrible to the last degree.” The detachment had “several armed negroes 
with them, who threatened and abused us greatly.”291 The entire slavery-based social 
order appeared to be crumbling.
In an effort to curb the flight of slaves and loyalists to the British, John Rutledge 
ordered some of them to be executed. According to loyalist John Wells, in 1779 the 
governor had taken “the lives of his fellow creatures without a trial or hearing, as their 
complexions were a few shades darker than his own.”292 This was probably the same 
incident that rebel soldier James Fergus described in his journal. On May 12, Fergus 
recorded that “[f]our men, two white and a mulatto and Negro, were taken outside the 
lines and brought in supposed to be deserting to the enemy. The governor, coming by at
290 William Moultrie to [Benjamin Lincoln], May 15, 1779, “Revolutionary Letters,” SCHGM, Vol. 38, No. 
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the time, was asked what should be done with them. He said, ‘Hang them up to the beam
293of the gate,’ by which they were standing. This was immediately done.”
Not all slaves aided the British, however. The first news of Prevost’s invasion that 
reached the rebels was brought by slaves who remained loyal to their Whig masters.294 A 
“sensible faithfull Negro” provided Moultrie with a detailed description of the British 
army’s encampment near Charleston on May 15.295 The efforts of one runaway slave to 
aid the British were undone by another slave in an unusual incident that occurred on May 
25. Learning from “a Negroe wench who went to them” that Whig officer Morton 
Wilkinson was nearby with thirty troops, British officers sent a detachment of sixty men 
to surprise the rebels. When the British reached the house of a Mrs. Ladson, two miles 
from Wilkinson’s, one of the Ladson slaves told them that they were four miles from 
their destination, and that Wilkinson and his soldiers had gone to Charleston. The false 
report deceived the British, who “through out great threats against the Wench.” The slave 
then informed Wilkinson of his encounter with Prevost’s troops. Even though the slave 
had saved him from death or capture, Wilkinson concluded from this affair that “our
9 0  ftdomesticks are so treacherous” that the British “never want for information.”
When Prevost withdrew from the vicinity of Charleston, large numbers of slaves 
followed his army, but many fell behind the retreating troops and were retaken by the 
Whigs. “About three hundred negroes have been taken from the enemy,” Lincoln wrote 
on May 17. He ordered the quartermaster general to compile a list of the slaves’ names
293 James Fergus, Pension Application, in Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 183.
294 Dillon to Col. John [Bourganin?], undated, April 1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 3.
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and owners so their masters could reclaim them.297 An American officer posted on the 
Ashepoo River reported to Lincoln on June 25 that British boats were “carrying Negroes 
and other plunder to Georgia.”298 Another Whig, who observed the passage of a British 
column the same day, noted that “Large droves of Negroes march by.”299 Other blacks 
remained in South Carolina with loyalist detachments. After a skirmish, American troops 
captured “four whites and three blacks” near Eliza Wilkinson’s plantation. Another man, 
described by Wilkinson as “one of the enemy’s Negroes,” was caught trying to elude 
rebel guards and beaten so badly that Wilkinson “could not help shedding tears.” 
Sickened by the cruelty, she intervened to halt the beating. She later permitted the man to 
escape, fearing that if British troops returned and “should find the Negro in such a bloody 
condition, they would use us very ill.”300
After Prevost returned to Georgia, both sides resumed raiding and seized slaves 
from one another at every opportunity. In July a party of rebel militia skirmished with a 
British detachment and recaptured about fifty slaves.301 When the British evacuated 
Beaufort in September, rebel officer Joseph Barnwell rushed troops to Port Royal Island 
and “savd about two hundred slaves, whom I have sent of to Return to their respective 
Owners.” Whig militia also crossed the Savannah River to steal slaves from Georgia.
In early August, Lincoln learned that a group of militiamen had plundered slaves there 
and were en route to Augusta with their booty. The general criticized the act as “a mode 
of conduct unjust, impolitic, and if not corrected, will destroy every idea of military 
discipline.” Lincoln asked Gen. Lachlan McIntosh to find the slaves and send them to the
297 Benjamin Lincoln to William Moultrie, May 17, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 3.
298 Capt. Philip Smith to Benjamin Lincoln, June 25, 1779, Lincoln Papers, microfilm, Reel 3.
299 James Hall, Jr. to Benjamin Lincoln, June 25, 1779, Lincoln Papers, microfilm, Reel 3.
300 Eliza Wilkinson to Miss M. P., 1782, Letters o f  Eliza Wilkinson, 62, 67-68, 70.
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quartermaster general “to be disposed of.” The officers who had led the raid, Lincoln 
asserted, were “apeing the enemy in a practice which we reprobate in the strongest 
terms.” At least the British, Lincoln conceded, had made amends “by returning the Slaves 
belonging to the estates of deceased persons, to widows, minors and Orphans.” He feared 
that rebel plundering might jeopardize this arrangement.303
The number of slaves stolen by the rebels was small compared to the thousands 
more that Prevost’s army had brought from South Carolina and who continued to flee to 
the British. This presented a serious problem for Gov. Wright. Having resumed his office, 
Wright’s first inclination was to insure that loyalist slaveowners retain control of their 
bondspeople. Before leaving England, he and other exiles had asked Germain to order 
British naval officers not to transport out of Georgia slaves who fled to their ships. They 
asked the minister to require the navy to turn over the slaves to their owners’ attorneys. 
The loyalists feared that without such a policy, they would never be unable to recover 
fugitive slaves.304 Wright himself apparently failed to understand the slaves’ desire for 
freedom. After returning to Georgia, he noted with pride that “many of his Negroes ... on 
their hearing of the Province being retaken and of his Return, made their Escape from the 
Persons who had bought them, and went back to him.”305 He did not realize that these 
slaves may have returned with expectations other than to resume their bondage.
In July 1779, merchants James Graham and Basil Cowper forced Wright and the 
Council to reconsider the slaves’ situation when they submitted a petition requesting 
permission to use slaves as payment for debts owed to Britons. The petitioners noted that
303 Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan McIntosh, Aug. 2, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Microfilm, Reel 3.
304 Memorial o f Sir James Wright... and several other Gentlemen, n.d., Carleton Papers, Vol. 16, No. 1962; 
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“great Numbers of Negroe Slaves have come in of themselves, and are brought into this 
Province from So Carolina by his Majesty’s Army, Indians and others.” These slaves had 
been formerly owned by debtors of the petitioners and other British merchants, and in 
Graham’s and Cowper’s opinion constituted “the only resource left for securing part of 
their just debts.” Therefore, the petitioners asked that “such property may be delivered up 
or secured for the payment of British debts.”
After extensive deliberation, the governor and Council made what they believed 
to be the best possible decision, given the complexity of the situation. They agreed that 
the constant influx of slaves into the town “seems to be a growing Evil” that required 
prompt action, but the cases of individual slaves were so different that no single solution 
could apply. Slaves belonging to Georgia loyalists or to widows and orphans would be 
restored to their owners, the Council decided, while those owned by loyal South 
Carolinians would be held in trust for them. Slaves taken by the army fell outside the 
bounds of civil authority, and the Council left their disposition to Gen. Prevost. Slaves 
who had fled from rebel masters would be supervised by commissioners, whom the 
Council would appoint, until such time as appropriate laws might be passed to clarify 
their situation. All slaves not returned to loyalist owners would be hired out or employed 
on public works projects. A building would also be designated for the detention of “all 
such Negroes as may prove unruly or Abscond.”307
The problem of Indians claiming slaves proved even more difficult to solve. 
Wright told the Council that “he considers the Indians being thus possest of Negroes is
306 Petition o f James Graham and Basil Cowper, July 23, 1779, in Allen D. Candler, ed., The Colonial 
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attended with very serious and dangerous Consequences.” The governor had met with 
Creek leaders and offered to purchase the slaves, but the Indians refused to sell, asserting 
that Prevost had promised that they could keep any plunder they took during the invasion 
of South Carolina. Seeing British troops “Seize upon all the Negroes they Could get,” the 
Indians stated that they only “did the same” and planned to bring the slaves back to their 
nation. Wright and the Council agreed that they had no authority to interfere with the 
Creeks in this regard.308
These decisions were compromises designed to accommodate the slaves to some 
extent without alienating either loyalist slaveowners or Indian allies. They also solved the 
practical problem of how to obtain some services from the runaways, who had to be 
clothed and fed at government expense. After receiving Wright’s reports, Germain 
approved of his handling of the situation. Germain did, however, remind the governor to 
treat fugitive slaves well in order to encourage others to take refuge with the British.309
Slaves soon proved their value to the British when a French fleet and army arrived 
in Georgia in September. The enemy’s unexpected appearance forced Prevost to make 
every exertion to put Savannah in a defensible condition. He brought in slaves from 
plantations outside the town to work alongside other blacks attached to the army and 
British troops; the fortifications were completed with a swiftness that astonished French 
officers.310
Benjamin Lincoln brought his army to join the French in an attack on Savannah, 
and many of the Americans saw the operations in Georgia as an opportunity to recover
308 Proceedings o f the Georgia Council, July 26, 1779, CRG, 12:444-445.
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fugitive slaves. One Whig officer reported that he had retaken seven of his slaves since 
arriving in Georgia and he hoped to find more when Savannah was taken.311 South 
Carolina officials also tried to convince the French to turn over a former slave named 
Sampson, who had been taken prisoner when French warships captured a royal navy 
vessel off the Georgia coast. Upon learning of the seizure, Charleston printer Peter 
Timothy wrote Lincoln on September 25 that “there was on board a Negro who (tho’ I 
am averse to sanguinary Punishments) it would, in my Opinion, be highly exemplary to 
hang up at a Yard-Arm.” Timothy declared that Sampson, a former harbor pilot, had 
“voluntarily remained with the Enemy, doing them many essential Services to the Injury 
of the States.” These included piloting Sir Peter Parker’s fleet into Charleston harbor in 
1776, piloting Archibald Campbell’s expedition to Savannah, and having piloted British 
naval vessels that had raided rebel shipping along the southern coast. Timothy insisted 
that Sampson’s “Treachery and Ingratitude merit Punishment, and there are others to 
whom he should be made an Example of Terror.”312 John Rutledge described Sampson as 
“very useful” to the enemy, “& hurtful to Us.” The governor asked Lincoln “to get this 
Fellow secured, & sent hither, in safe Custody, that he may receive the Punishment due to
T1 This Crimes.” Lincoln did not act on the matter, despite further prodding from Rutledge. 
The general had already been at odds with D’Estaing and probably wished to avoid 
provoking another dispute.314
While the rebels plotted to recapture and punish slaves, Prevost decided to arm 
some of the blacks in Savannah to strengthen his vastly outnumbered army. When
311 John Jones to Polly Jones, Oct. 3, 1779, Seaborn Jones Papers, PERK.
312 Timothy to Lincoln, Sept. 25,1779, Lincoln Papers.
313 John Rutledge to Lincoln, [Sept. 26, 1779], Lincoln Papers.
314 John Rutledge to Lincoln, Oct. 10, 1779, Lincoln Papers.
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loyalist William Hanscomb volunteered his services, Prevost ordered him to raise a 
company of black pioneers. These men were later armed to defend the town.315 Rev. John
* 316Zubly noted that “during the siege 8, or more of my slaves were constantly in arms.”
One black soldier, Scipio Handley, was a former South Carolina slave who, fearing that 
his life was endangered by his support for the British, had fled Charleston in 1775 with 
Lord William Campbell. After Savannah was retaken, Handley voluntarily went to 
Georgia from Barbados; when the French and rebels arrived in September, he vowed to 
do all he could to help defend Savannah, for he expected no mercy if he fell into the 
rebels’ hands. During the siege, Handley “was Employed at the Armoury Shop, Running 
grape shot and Carrying them out to the Redoubts and Batteries.” While engaged in this
T 1 7duty he was severely wounded by a musket ball in the leg.
An estimated two hundred armed blacks participated in Savannah’s defense; 
many of them, along with the Cherokees, guarded Hutchinson’s Island, where many 
people went to escape the bombardment. Prevost’s decision to arm slaves provoked 
protests from some Georgians who thought the step “unjustified under any 
circumstances.” A writer in the Royal Georgia Gazette excused Prevost’s actions as a 
response to the presence of black troops with the French army, and after the siege another 
writer conceded that the black soldiers had generally behaved well.318
Blacks also contributed to the defense in other ways. Two slaves reached 
Savannah on September 21 with news that Lincoln’s troops had united with the French
315 Petition o f William Hanscomb to Augustine Prevost, March 30, 1780, Vol. 90, No.29; Return o f Loyal 
Refugees who have come into Georgia for Protection and Assistance, April 15, 1780, Vol. 92, No. 44, 
Clinton Papers, WLCL.
316 John J. Zubly to unnamed, Nov. 30, 1779, John J. Zubly Papers, GHS.
317 Petition o f  Scipio Handley, Audit Office Class 13, Vol. 119, #431, 
www.royalprovincial.com/military/mems.sc/clmhandley, Dec. 17, 2002.
318 Lawrence, Storm over Savannah, 81-82.
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and that the combined army was very strong. Loyalist Elizabeth Lichtenstein Johnston 
recalled that when shells fell in the town’s streets, black children would rush to smother 
the fuses with sand, and then bring the shells, along with any solid shot they could find, 
to the British artillerists, who were short of ammunition. For this hazardous service, the 
children received seven pence for every cannon ball and shell they turned in.319
The most important service blacks provided was guiding reinforcements to 
Savannah, without which Prevost could not have withstood the siege. Prevost had left Lt. 
Col. John Maitland of the 71st Regiment with about eight hundred troops at Beaufort 
when the main British army withdrew from South Carolina. Although the Americans 
captured a messenger sent to summon Maitland to Prevost’s assistance, Maitland learned 
of the situation and marched to Savannah. The French and Americans were aware that 
Maitland might make such a move, so D’Estaing ordered French warships to guard the 
Savannah River and prevent Maitland’s detachment from crossing. But twenty miles 
from the town, when it seemed to Maitland that a crossing was impossible, the British 
encountered several black fishermen who told them of a passage through the creeks and 
swamps. This enabled the troops to elude the French blockade and safely reach 
Savannah.320
According to a French account, Maitland brought many blacks to Savannah along 
with the British soldiers. One of Maitland’s officers, Francis Rush Clark, stated that when 
the British crossed the Savannah River, they left their sick troops, women, and black 
baggage handlers on the South Carolina side under the protection of British naval vessels.
319 “An English Journal o f the Siege o f Savannah in 1779,” Historical Magazine, Vol. 8, No. 1, Jan. 1864, 
13; Johnston, Recollections o f  a Georgia Loyalist, 58.
320 Lawrence, Storm over Savannah, 29,49.
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Clark did not indicate whether these were the only blacks with Maitland’s force or if
321there were others who accompanied the troops across the river.
Those left on the north side of the Savannah River were fortunate because the 
heavy French and American bombardment killed and wounded dozens of people in the 
town, the majority of whom were blacks.322 Both races shared the struggle to survive the 
artillery fire. Anthony Stokes, a Mrs. Cooper, and several African Americans waited out 
one night’s cannonade in a cellar so packed with rum and supplies that Stokes “could 
hardly creep in.” On a subsequent night, a shell set fire to the house where Stokes had 
taken up residence. He and two of his slaves escaped, but eight other slaves perished. 
Stokes then moved to a more distant house, which was “crowded, both inside and out, 
with a number of whites and negroes.”323
The town’s defenders and inhabitants withstood the bombardment and repulsed a 
Franco-American assault on the town, after which the attackers began a withdrawal. 
Prevost then sent some black troops outside the lines to harass the enemy. On October 16, 
a British naval officer observed “our armed negroes skirmishing with the Rebels the 
whole afternoon.”324 This action occurred “on Mr. McGillivray’s plantation,” where the 
blacks and Whigs fought for control of several buildings. The buildings changed hands 
several times until a shortage of ammunition “obliged the blacks to retreat in the evening 
with the loss of one killed and three or four wounded, the enemy’s loss is not known,”
321 “Account o f the attack upon Savannah under the orders o f the Comte d’Estaing,” by a French artillery 
officer, Muskets, Cannon Balls and Bombs, 30; Francis Rush Clark to John Strutt, Oct. 27, 1779, Francis 
Rush Clark Papers, Feinstone Collection, No. 2338, DLAR.
322 Lawrence, Storm over Savannah, 77-78; Francis Rush Clark to John Strutt, Oct. 27, 1779, Clark Papers, 
Feinstone Collection, No. 2338, DLAR.
323 Anthony Stokes to Mrs. Stokes, Nov. 9, 1779, Muskets, Cannon Balls, and Bombs, 110, 111-112, 116n.
324 “English Journal o f the Siege o f Savannah,” Historical Magazine, 15.
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another Briton reported.325 Two days later, the naval officer wrote that “the armed 
negroes brought in two Rebel Dragoons and eight horses, and killed two rebels who were 
in a foraging party.”
Both French black troops and American slaves took advantage o f the confusion 
following the attack on Savannah to reach the British. During D ’Estaing’s withdrawal, 
his black soldiers became insubordinate and began deserting to the British, forcing 
officers to station guards around their camp. In November, Philip Porcher, a South 
Carolina merchant and planter, confirmed that he lost 157 of his own slaves, along with 
seven belonging to other masters, to the British.327
Once the French and Americans had departed, many white Georgians decided that 
it was unwise to keep black troops under arms. On October 23, eighteen residents of 
Savannah and Christ Church Parish complained to the Council that “a Number of Slaves 
appear in Arms and behave with Great Insolence, Joined by some white persons.” The 
signers warned of “the dreadful Evils that must arise, if such Proceedings are not 
checked” and asked that “all Slaves may be immediately disarmed” and their white 
companions forbidden to trouble anyone. The Council referred the matter to Gen.
Prevost. Several prominent loyalists also wrote to Germain urging him not to adopt a 
policy of arming slaves to fight the rebels because they had already lost many slaves and
325 “Account o f the Siege o f  Savannah, from a British Source,” in CGHS, Vol. 5, Part 1, 138.
326 “English Journal o f the Siege o f Savannah,” Historical Magazine, 16.
327 Lawrence, Storm over Savannah, 129; Account Book, 1770-1800, typescript pp. 96-97, Philip Porcher 
Papers, SCL.
328 Petition o f sundry Inhabitants o f Savannah and Parish o f Christ Church, Oct. 23, 1779, CRG, 12:451- 
452.
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feared that if the British formed black military units, large numbers of slaves would leave 
their plantations in hopes of earning their freedom by serving in the army.
Prevost ignored the complaints and kept armed blacks in the field. Whig colonel 
Francis Marion learned in December that “several small parties of Negroes” were 
crossing the Savannah River and “pillaging” on the South Carolina side. He tried to 
intercept them with mounted patrols but failed to catch anyone. At the end of January 
1780, a rebel officer sent to procure information on British forces in Georgia reported 
that “some Armed Negroes & 200 Indians was incampt before Savanna.” The British 
garrison, the officer added, “had no fresh provisions but what the Negroes plunder” from 
South Carolina.331 Rebel officer Daniel Horry reported in mid-February 1780 that in 
addition to the black raiding parties, the garrison of Savannah included “four hundred 
Negroes Armed.”332 Prevost also utilized “Black Pioneer Companies” to continue 
strengthening Savannah’s defenses after the siege.333
Like Prevost, officials in the Floridas also made increasing use o f armed blacks in 
1779. An account of the regulars and militia available to defend East Florida that year 
indicated that more than one-seventh of the troops were black.334 Gov. Tonyn, however, 
found that the fourfold increase in the province’s black population since the start of the 
war presented great difficulties. Loyalist slaveowners demanded the return of their slaves 
and Tonyn sought Germain’s advice as to how to resolve the situation.335
329 Jeffrey Robert Young, Domesticating Slavery: The Master Class in Georgia and South Carolina, 1670- 
1837 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1999), 78.
330 Francis Marion to Benjamin Lincoln, Dec. 23, 1779, Lincoln Papers, Reel 5.
331 Francis Marion to Benjamin Lincoln, Jan. 31, 1780, Lincoln Papers, PERK.
332 Daniel Horry to Benjamin Lincoln, Feb. 16, 1780, Lincoln Papers, Reel 5.
333 Augustine Prevost to Henry Clinton, Nov. 22, 1779, RAM, 2:64.
334 Wright, “Blacks in East Florida,” 435.
335 Tonyn to Germain, July 3, 1779, DAR, 17:156-157.
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In West Florida, blacks began to assume a military role as the Spanish threat 
increased. Shortly after Gen. John Campbell assumed command in the province, he 
asked Clinton to send him “a company of Negroes” to strengthen his force.336 Apparently 
he was referring to the pioneer units at New York. When Spain declared war on Britain, 
Adam Chrystie armed and uniformed his own unit of twenty-two blacks to help defend
• 0 - 1 7the province. Upon learning of the Spanish declaration in early September, Campbell 
told Lt. Col. Alexander Dickson that he had authorized an officer to join Dickson at 
Baton Rouge “with as many men as he can collect -  /Regular Inhabitants Indians and 
even Negroes/” to attack the Spanish. Campbell clearly intended to utilize every 
available man, regardless of race, against the Spaniards. Galvez’s offensive forestalled 
Campbell’s planned maneuver, but Dickson did employ armed blacks in his unsuccessful 
defense of Baton Rouge.339
The first stage of Britain’s southern campaign had been generally successful. 
Many loyalists had come forward to support the British, although the defeat of Boyd’s 
party at Kettle Creek and the abandonment of those who had declared their allegiance to 
the king at Augusta, leaving them vulnerable to Whig retribution, prevented many 
loyalists from openly committing to the British. The Indians had disappointed British 
officials by providing far less support than expected, yet despite Spanish tampering most 
of the nations remained committed to their alliance with the king. Perhaps the greatest 
cause for optimism had been the number of slaves who had come to the British and the
336 George C. Osborn, “Major-General John Campbell in British West Florida,” FHQ, Vol. 27, No. 4, April 
1949,319.
337 Wright, Florida in the American Revolution, 108.
338 James Campbell to Dickson, Sept. 9, 1779, Carleton Papers, Vol. 18, No. 2264.
339 James Campbell to Captain Forster, Sept. 9, 1779, Carleton Papers, Vol. 18, No. 2265; Haarmann, 
“Spanish Conquest o f West Florida,” 110,112.
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many contributions they had made of information, labor, and military service. Their 
assistance augured well for future operations, had either Germain or Clinton been bold 
enough to arm slaves in large numbers.
The siege of Savannah had clearly demonstrated the potential of loyalists, Indians, 
and blacks working in cooperation with British troops. Together, these disparate allies 
had defeated a vastly superior force and preserved Georgia as a base for the next phase of 
the campaign. Their victory inspired Britons and loyalists alike; Gen. Charles Grey, back 
in England after serving in the northern campaigns, wrote that “it is the first time I have 
seen day light in this business.”340 The campaign indicated that Britain’s supporters in the 
South, if employed together and in a coordinated manner, might provide the decisive 
force needed to regain control of the region. Unfortunately for their cause, British 
officials in London, New York, and Georgia all celebrated the victory but overlooked the 
significance of how it had been won.
340 Quoted in Paul David Nelson, Sir Charles Grey, First Earl Grey: Royal Soldier, Family Patriarch 
(Madison/Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996), 93.
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CHAPTER V 
THE RECONQUEST OF SOUTH CAROLINA
As soon as Henry Clinton received word that Savannah remained in British hands 
and D’Estaing’s fleet had left the American coast, he immediately launched the long- 
awaited second phase of the southern campaign, the attack on Charleston. Ever since 
Archibald Campbell’s expedition had taken Savannah, Germain had pressed Clinton to 
move against South Carolina. Prevost’s raid to the gates of Charleston had increased 
Germain’s confidence that Clinton could easily take the town. “The feeble Resistance 
Major Genl. Prevost met with in his March and Retreat through so great a part of South 
Carolina is an indubitable proof of the Indisposition of the Inhabitants to support the 
Rebel Government,” he told the general.1
Clinton had intended to dispatch troops to attack South Carolina in early October 
1779, believing that this would give him the winter and spring to follow up on any 
victory he might win. A rumored French attack on Jamaica, however, forced Clinton to 
postpone his plan, and the French and American attack on Savannah caused another 
delay. In late December, Clinton sailed at last from New York with about nine thousand 
troops. Bad weather scattered the fleet and the first vessels did not reach Savannah until 
the end of January 1780. British troops landed in South Carolina in mid-February, 
advancing cautiously toward Charleston, which they surrounded and captured on May 12
1 Germain to Clinton, Sept. 27, 1779, Germain Papers, Vol. 18, WLCL.
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after a lengthy siege. At a cost of less than three hundred casualties, Clinton had captured 
the most important town in the South along with over five thousand American soldiers.
Southern Whigs had been aware that South Carolina was the next British 
objective and realized that its loss might prove disastrous. As early as February 1779,
John Rutledge warned Benjamin Lincoln that all accounts indicated that “this Country 
will be the Seat of War, and the Enemy, from the disaffection of our People ... expect a 
Conquest.”3 A congressional committee informed Lincoln that if the British occupied 
South Carolina, they would “act on a very different plan from what they formerly have; 
i.e. to settle the Country as they Conquer it, by securing all those whom they may 
suppose dangerous and to give the Noted Tories a Considerable command.”4 David 
Ramsay noted that Charleston “binds three States to the authority of Congress. If the 
enemy possess themselves of this town, there will be no living for honest whigs to the 
southward of the Santee.”5
British hopes and Whig fears appeared to be realized after Charleston’s surrender. 
As British columns advanced into the backcountry without opposition, thousands of 
South Carolinians swore allegiance to George III. Clinton took steps to organize the 
loyalists into a militia before leaving the province in early June, and the new commander 
in the South, General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, prepared to advance into North Carolina. 
Meanwhile, Congress appointed General Horatio Gates, the hero of Saratoga, to take 
command of American forces in the Southern Department. Gates promptly chose to
2 Clinton, American Rebellion, 151; Clinton to Germain, Aug. 21, 1779, Clinton Papers, Vol. 66, No. 13; 
Sept. 26, 1779, Vol. 69, No. 14; Clinton to unnamed, c. Oct. 26, 1779, Vol. 73, No. 17; Clinton to Germain, 
Nov. 10, 1779, Vol. 74, No. 35, WLCL; Pancake, This Destructive War, 57, 60, 66.
3 “Rutledge to Lincoln,” Feb. 28, 1779,134.
4 Committee o f  Congress to Benjamin Lincoln, March 19, 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Reel 5.
5 Quoted in David B. Mattem, Benjamin Lincoln and the American Revolution (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1995), 88.
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assume the offensive and marched his army into South Carolina, where Cornwallis 
inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels at Camden on August 16.6 Although Gates’s 
campaign ended in disaster, his approach invigorated the demoralized Whigs, who 
repudiated their oaths to Britain and rallied to partisan leaders Thomas Sumter and 
Francis Marion. These Whig bands resorted to their usual tactic of attacking loyalists, 
complicating British efforts to organize their supporters and establish firm control in both 
Georgia and South Carolina.
Deciding that the occupation of North Carolina would be the best way to secure 
South Carolina, Cornwallis advanced to Charlotte in September. British Major Patrick 
Ferguson, inspector general of the loyal militia, marched into western North Carolina to 
protect Cornwallis’s flank. On October 7, the Whigs attacked Ferguson at King’s 
Mountain, killing or capturing his entire force. Ferguson’s death in the battle, along with 
the deaths of so many loyalists and the rebels’ brutal treatment of the prisoners, deprived 
the loyalists of a respected leader and shattered their morale. While many loyalists 
continued to assist the British, violent Whig persecution, combined with Cornwallis’s 
neglect, seriously undermined their subsequent effectiveness.
Cornwallis also chose not to use Indians, depriving himself of another valuable 
source of support, although the Creeks, Choctaws, and Cherokees all contributed to the 
defense of British posts in Georgia and West Florida. Thousands of slaves who came to 
the British were employed in various capacities, yet once again, Cornwallis devised no 
policy to take full advantage of their assistance. The ministry’s strategy had called for a 
combined effort of British troops, loyalists, Indians, and slaves to subdue the rebels. But
6 Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1976), 218, 220, 222.
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Cornwallis, determined to win in the South with British regulars alone, ignored the plan, 
thus depriving himself of the support on which success had been predicated.
Mobilizing the Loyalists 
Clinton did not call on the loyalists for aid when his army landed in South 
Carolina. He did not want to “expose them to the malevolence of their enemies before I 
was fully certain of success,” he wrote.7 Therefore, he “avoided ... every measure which 
might excite the loyal inhabitants to rise in favour of government, and thus bring danger 
and trouble upon themselves, at a time when the King’s army, being employed in the 
reduction of Charles town, could not assist or second their struggles.”8
Nevertheless, many Americans joined regular British units during and after the 
operations against Charleston. Some of these recruits were rebel deserters, others were 
loyalists. On March 27, the 71st Regiment requested ammunition for ten men who had 
“Joind from the Rebels since our Last Return;” two more rebel deserters enlisted by April 
28. Another man joined the 71st by May 9, and three others joined the 42nd Regiment; 
records do not indicate whether these were rebel deserters or loyalist volunteers. Seven 
loyalists, all of whom were without muskets, enlisted in the South Carolina Royalists on 
June 6.9 Several of these men had been in hiding for several years to escape Whig 
persecution. Because the records do not cover all of the units in South Carolina at the 
time and the information contained in them is limited, it is impossible to know how many 
men the regular regiments enlisted. For example, on May 23 and June 21, officers 
requested a total of eighty-four muskets for the Royal North Carolina Volunteers, a unit
7 Clinton, American Rebellion, 174.
8 “Handbill Issued after the Surrender o f Charles Town,” in Banastre Tarleton, A History o f  the Campaigns 
o f 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces o f  North America (London: T. Cadell, 1787. Reprint, 
Spartanburg, SC: The Reprint Co., 1967), 68.
9 Returns o f Arms and Ammunition, March 27, 1780; Apr. 28, 1780; May 9, 1780; Request o f Joseph 
Robinson, June 6, 1780, George Wray Papers, Vol. 4, WLCL.
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composed of loyal refugees from that province. But there is no mention of whether these 
arms were for new recruits or replacement weapons for the veterans.10 Very probably 
some of the arms were replacements and others were for recruits. Incomplete as they are, 
the records show a small but significant number of American enlistments in both British 
and provincial units in South Carolina.
Other South Carolinians returned to their allegiance when they encountered 
Clinton’s advancing army. Twenty-five inhabitants of Edisto Island came aboard a 
British vessel to ask for protection on February 14; they were promptly dispatched to 
collect horses for the army. Clinton, however, soon announced that he did not wish to 
grant protections unless the applicants demonstrated genuine proof of their loyalty.11
Many loyalists were eager to take up arms with the British regardless of Clinton’s 
hesitance. Thomas Harvy and Moses Eastan wrote to Clinton on March 18 on behalf of 
loyal South Carolinians who were “willing and Ready to Ade and asist In the Behalf of 
his magistye to Defeet the Reabls.” Whig cavalry had been sent to arrest Harvy, Eastan, 
and their comrades and confine them in Charleston, but the loyalists escaped and hid in 
the woods. They asked for troops to assist them, promising that soon they would require 
only ammunition to be able to protect themselves.12
In Ninety Six district, a Colonel Moore assembled 150 men and attacked a log
• 13house where the Whigs kept a supply of ammunition, but the loyalists were driven off. 
William Moultrie, learning of another uprising in Colleton district, ordered the militia
10 Ward, Between the Lines, 174; John Hamilton’s request for arms, May 23, 1780; Donald Campbell’s 
request for arms, June 21, 1780, Wray Papers, Vol. 4, WLCL.
11 Peter Russell, “The Siege o f  Charleston; Journal o f Captain Peter Russell, December 25, 1779, to May 2, 
1780,” AHR, Vol. 4, No. 3, April, 1899,484,485-486; “A List o f  Inhabitant o f Edisto who came on board 
the John to solicit Protection,” Feb. 14, 1780, Clinton Papers, Vol. 85, No. 23, WLCL.
12 Thomas Harvy and Moses Eastan to Clinton, March 18, 1780, Clinton Papers, Vol. 89, No. 9, WLCL.
13 Josiah Culbertson, Pension Application, in Dann, ed., Revolution Remembered, 175-176.
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there “to disperse the disaffected that are in Arms.”14 The Whig commander, Col.
William Skirving, failed to do so because three of his four companies joined the
loyalists.15 From Camden, Joseph Kershaw warned Benjamin Lincoln that the loyalists
there were gathering strength. “We are much threatned here by the disaffected,” he
reported.16 A representative from North Carolina arrived at the British lines on April 19
and informed the officers that many of the inhabitants were “dissatisfied with the
oppression of the rebels.” He offered the assistance of “several thousand armed men.”17
Loyalists gave passive support to the British by refusing to turn out when Whig
officials summoned the militia, while others took a more active role in procuring
intelligence. Hessian Capt. Johann Ewald obtained information about rebel positions on
March 29 from a loyalist whose son was serving in Lincoln’s army. Asked to explain this
paradox, the man told Ewald that the Whigs had forced his son to enlist by threatening
the family with banishment and the confiscation of their property. Elias Ball, a loyalist
who had accompanied a British foraging party and managed to avoid capture when Whig
cavalry surprised the detachment on May 5, rushed to inform Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton
of the incident. Ball told Tarleton that the rebels had gone to Lenud’s Ferry, where the
British officer overtook them with his dragoons. Tarleton’s attack caught the Whigs by
surprise, inflicted over one hundred casualties, and recovered the seventeen British 
18prisoners.
14 William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln, Feb. 26, 1780, Lincoln Papers, Reel 5.
15 Borick, Gallant Defense, 58.
16 Joseph Kershaw to Benjamin Lincoln, March 8, 1780, Lincoln Papers, Reel 5.
17 “Diary kept by Ensign Hartung,” “Hessian Military Reports and Accounts,” HDAR, Item Z.
18 Johann Ewald, Diary o f  the American War: A Hessian Journal, Joseph P. Tustin, ed. and trans. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 216-217; Borick, Gallant Defense, 58; Tarleton, History o f  the 
Campaigns, 19-20.
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Although initial indications of loyalist support augured well for British prospects 
in both South and North Carolina, the situation in Georgia showed that loyalists remained 
vulnerable to rebel harassment without troops to assist them. Clinton had planned to have 
a detachment from his army march from Savannah into the backcountry to create a 
diversion while the main British force attacked Charleston, but later ordered the troops to 
Charleston to assist in the siege. Gov. Wright warned the general that the change in plan 
would leave Georgia vulnerable to rebel incursions, and within a few weeks this 
prediction proved correct.19 “I have received petitions from the very much distressed and 
loyal inhabitants who have been drove from their settlements in St. George’s Parish and 
downwards to St. Phillips ... for assistance & protection” as the result of Whig raids, the 
governor informed Clinton on April 6. Wright appealed to Clinton for aid, warning that 
Georgia “will be broke up and totally ruined if something is not speedily done.”
Clinton remained focused on Charleston. With the town’s surrender imminent, he 
decided that the time was right to call South Carolina loyalists to action. On May 3 James 
Simpson, acting as Clinton’s secretary, relayed the general’s orders to Richard Pearis and 
other loyalists with the army to go “amongst the Inhabitants of the interior parts of the 
province in whose loyalty... there is much reason to confide,” inform them of the army’s 
plans, and summon them to its assistance. The emissaries were to give the loyalists “the 
Strongest Assurances of Effectual Countenance, Protection and Support,” inform them 
that British regulars would soon march into the backcountry, and have the loyalists gather 
arms and provisions so that they would be ready to join the troops when the latter arrived. 
Once they had gathered sufficient strength, the loyalists were also to seize prominent
19 Clinton, American Rebellion, 161-162; Wright to Clinton, March 18, 1780, RAM, 2:104.
20 Wright to Clinton, April 6, 1780, RAM, 2:111.
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Whigs. Should rebel forces block their route of march to join the British troops, the 
loyalists were to fight their way through such opposition, but were not to undertake any 
other aggressive action until they had united with the army and been properly 
organized.21
Charleston surrendered shortly after the emissaries left for the backcountry. In the 
aftermath of victory, events demonstrated that British expectations of loyalist support in 
South Carolina had been sound. Two hundred inhabitants of Charleston signed a 
congratulatory address to Clinton and Arbuthnot.22 Clinton issued a handbill and 
proclamation to the inhabitants, “well calculated to induce them to return to their 
allegiance.”23 In the former, the commander-in-chief asked for “the helping hand of every 
man ... to re-establish peace and good government.” Clinton promised in return “to avoid 
giving them any trouble but what is necessary to secure them peace, liberty, and 
prosperity.”24 On May 22, Clinton sought to assure the loyalists that he would protect 
them by threatening punishment for anyone who continued to oppose British authority or 
who harassed the loyalists. Noting that generous offers of pardon and protection had been 
made to the rebels, Clinton warned that any “attempt to hinder or intimidate, the King’s 
faithful and loyal subjects” would “be treated with that severity so criminal and hardened 
an obstinacy will deserve” and their property confiscated. The general again promised 
loyalists that the army would guarantee their security.25 A subsequent proclamation, 
issued jointly by Clinton and Adm. Marriott Arbuthnot on June 1, offered former rebels 
“a full and free pardon ... for the treasonable offences” they had committed, except the
21 James Simpson to Richard Pearis, May 3, 1780,
www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/scmil/scmletl.htm, Aug. 16, 2002.
22 Borick, Gallant Defense, 231.
23 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 24.
24 “Handbill Issued after the Surrender o f  Charles Town,” in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 69-70.
25 Henry Clinton, Proclamation o f May 22, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 71-72.
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murder of loyalists.26 Clinton and Arbuthnot also pledged that henceforth South 
Carolinians were to be taxed only by their own assembly, not by Parliament, thereby 
removing the original cause of the dispute with Britain.27
The combined effect of the victory at Charleston and the proclamations produced 
immediate results. “A general revolution of sentiment seemed to take place, and the cause 
of Great Britain appeared to triumph over that of the American Congress,” Tarleton 
wrote.28 Only two days after the surrender, a German soldier with Clinton’s army stated 
that “from what we leam of the disposition of the Inhabitants if the war is prosecuted 
with vigor in these Southern Colonies Rebellion will suffer a severe Shock in the Course
I Q
of this Summer.” On May 24, twenty-five loyalists, armed and mounted, arrived in 
Charleston after a ride of one hundred miles from the Orangeburgh district to request 
ammunition “to secure themselves against the rebels’ depredations.”30 They told Clinton 
that the district contained “a great many more friends to government... ready to shew
T1their loyalty by their services against the Rebels by whom they have been persecuted.” 
Others followed them; by May 25, Clinton noted that fifteen hundred armed men had 
come in to offer their assistance, and some of the most prominent leaders of the rebellion 
had submitted. These included former governor Rawlins Lowndes, Charles Pinckney,
• T9Henry Middleton, and Daniel Horry. “From every Information I receive, and Numbers
26 Henry Clinton and Marriott Arbuthnot, Proclamation o f June 1, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the 
Campaigns, 75.
27 Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 131.
28 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 25.
29 Letter from Charleston, May 14, 1780, no addressee or signature, in “Sundry Journals o f  Brunswick 
Troops,” HDAR, Item HZ.
30 “Diary kept by Ensign Hartung,” “Hessian Reports and Accounts,” HDAR, Item Z. Ewald said the group 
numbered sixty men, and that they wanted officers as well as arms and ammunition to “take revenge on 
their neighbors, who had oppressed them very much up to now.” Ewald, Diary o f  the American War, 242.
31 John Peebles, John Peebles’ American War: The Diary o f  a Scottish Grenadier, 1776-1782, Ira D. 
Gruber, ed. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998), 377.
32 Borick, Gallant Defense, 231-232.
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of the most violent Rebels hourly coming in to offer their Services, I have the strongest 
Reason to believe the general Disposition of the People to be not only friendly to 
Government, but forward to take up Arms in its Support,” Clinton wrote Cornwallis on
o - j
May 29. Several days later Clinton made a similar report to Germain. “With the greatest 
pleasure,” Clinton announced, he was able to say that “the inhabitants from every quarter 
repair to ... this garrison to declare their allegiance to the King, and to offer their services, 
in arms, in support of his government.” Those who came in often “brought prisoners, 
their former oppressors or leaders; and I may venture to assert that there are few men in 
South Carolina, who are not either our prisoners, or in arms with us.”34
Confirmation of this opinion came from many other sources. “Since Charleston 
has been in our possession, more than 2,000 men have come from the country who have 
voluntarily offered their services to His Britannic Majesty,” Hessian Maj. Wilhelm von 
Wilmowsky wrote on June 4.35 Some of these people were from the backcountry, but 
almost sixteen hundred lowcountry inhabitants took the British oath in the immediate 
aftermath of Charleston’s surrender. In addition, between June 17, 1780 and July 31,
1781, a total of 1,866 people appeared before crown officials in Charleston to swear 
allegiance to Great Britain.
James Simpson, who at Clinton’s request had made inquiries to determine the 
strength of loyalism in Charleston, at first provided a more cautious assessment. 
“Loyalists who have always adhered to the King’s Government are not so numerous as I
33 Clinton to Cornwallis, May 29, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, No. 54.
34 Clinton to Germain, June 4, 1780, in Elizabeth R. Miller, ed., The American Revolution, As Described By 
British Writers and The Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser (Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 1991), 
14.
35 Wilhelm von Wilmowsky to Baron von Jungkenn, June 4, 1780, in Uhlendorf, ed., Siege o f  Charleston, 
419.
36 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 96; Davies, “Restoration o f Civil Government,” in Wright, ed., Red, 
White and True Blue, 125-126.
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expected,” Simpson reported. However, he did find many loyalists along with numerous 
Whigs who had decided to switch their allegiance. Simpson warned Clinton that the 
loyalists “are clamorous for retributive Justice” and that this would create disruption in 
the province “until those People whose persecuting spirit hath caused such calamities to 
their fellow subjects shall receive the punishment their Iniquities deserve.” Although the 
situation in town was not as good as Simpson had hoped, he believed that once British 
authority had been reestablished, most people would support it.37 By July 1 Simpson 
believed that this prediction had been confirmed. Some zealous Charleston loyalists 
organized militia companies and arrested between 100 and 150 town residents for alleged 
parole violations.38
Reports from the backcountry were equally encouraging. On May 30, Maj. John 
Andre, Clinton’s aide, told Patrick Ferguson that there was “no reason to doubt that the 
inhabitants” of the backcountry “are very well disposed to take an active Part” in support 
of the British.39 Lt. Col. Nisbet Balfour, commanding a British column marching from 
Charleston to Ninety Six, sent Cornwallis favorable reports of the loyalty of the people he 
encountered, particularly in the Orangeburg District, where 294 loyalists organized 
themselves into an association for defense.40 “As to the Militia arming to defend the 
country, I have not the smallest doubt of it,” Balfour declared.41 From Friday’s Ferry on 
the Congaree River, Alexander Innes, now commanding the South Carolina Royalists, 
informed Cornwallis that “the general disposition of the Country” was “as favourable as
37 Simpson to Clinton, May 15, 1780, in Brown, ed., “Simpson’s Reports,” 518-519.
38 Simpson to Clinton, July 1, 1780, in RAM, 2:149; William Hasell Gibbes, “Story o f  His Life,” 65; Daniel 
Stevens, “Autobiography o f Daniel Stevens, 1746-1835,” SCHM, Vol. 58, No. 1, Jan. 1957, 10. Gibbes put 
the number o f those arrested at 100, Stevens at 150.
39 Ferguson to Cornwallis, May 30, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, No. 58.
40 Balfour to Cornwallis, June [3 or 4], 1780, Memorial o f the Companies o f Militia o f Orangeburgh, June 
12, 1780, Ferguson to Cornwallis, June 14, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, Nos. 81, 129, 145.
41 Balfour to Cornwallis, June 6, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, No. 96.
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Your Lordship can wish.” Innes had to intervene to prevent some loyalists from avenging 
themselves against Whigs who had viciously persecuted them in the past.42
Upon learning of Charleston’s surrender, David Fanning abandoned his neutrality 
and joined Robert Cunningham in organizing a group of backcountry loyalists. Fanning 
traveled one hundred miles through the region, distributing Clinton’s proclamations to the 
inhabitants with considerable effect. “We now found ourselves growing strong, and 
numbers flocking daily to us,” he wrote. Fanning and Cunningham took their party to 
Whitehall, the home of Gen. Andrew Williamson, where they found that the Whig leader 
and his militiamen had submitted to a small party under Richard Pearis. The loyalists 
occupied the fort there, taking fourteen swivel guns and the garrison’s arms 43 Joseph 
Robinson of the South Carolina Royalists also returned to the backcountry to announce 
that relief was finally at hand. He praised his former friends and neighbors for 
persevering in their loyalism “notwithstanding all the Vicissitudes, all the exertions of 
Cruelty, and all the institutions jesuitically calculated to alienate the minds of the people 
from their Duty to their Sovereign.”44
Robert Gray, a loyalist from the Cheraws district, wrote that after the British had 
occupied posts in the interior of South Carolina, the “conquest of the Province was 
complete.” He estimated that loyalists were “in a number about one third of the whole” in 
the province, but comprised half of the population in Ninety Six district, while the people 
of Orangeburg district were “almost unanimous” in their loyalty, and “readily took up 
arms to maintain the British government.” Many Whigs also took the British oath, some
42 Innes to Cornwallis, June 8, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, No. 114.
43 Fanning, Narrative, 14; Terms o f Capitulation, June 10, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, No. 133.
44 Joseph Robinson to his Friends, on the Frontiers o f  South Carolina, June 27, 1780, Carleton Papers, Vol. 
24, No. 2842.
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enrolling in the militia, “because they believed the war to be at an end in the Southern 
provinces & partly to ingratiate themselves with the conquerors, they also fondly hoped 
that they would enjoy a respite from the Calamities of war.”45
“Appearances in this Province are certainly very favourable,” Cornwallis 
informed Clinton on June 2. “I shall most earnestly endeavour to regulate the 
Government of S. Carolina to act towards the Inhabitants, & to establish such kind of 
Force as I think most likely to conduce to the essential Good” of the king’s service. 
Cornwallis added “that in a business of such infinite Importance, Regulations must not be 
too hastily made, nor Professions too easily accepted.”46
The repercussions of Clinton’s victory also extended to North Carolina, where 
loyalists inspired by the capture of Charleston began to assemble with the intention of 
joining the British army. Some eleven hundred loyalists gathered in Lincoln County on 
June 15, but were defeated by the rebels after “a warm and obstinate Fight.” Another 
group of loyalists, also estimated at eleven hundred, embodied on June 25 at the forks of 
the Yadkin River, eluded rebel militia, and marched for South Carolina.47
The reports from South Carolina had a significant effect across the Atlantic as 
well. Since early 1780 Britons had waited impatiently for news of Clinton’s operations, 
while the British press announced that the rebellion was near collapse and that the battle 
for Charleston was to be the “Armageddon” of the American war, bringing “instant 
victory” if Clinton succeeded. Public morale badly needed a boost. “We are much in 
want of some Success to keep up the Spirits of the Empire,” a young British employee of
45 Robert Gray, “Colonel Robert Gray’s Observations on the War in Carolina,” [c. Spring, 1782], SCHGM, 
Vol. 11, No. 3, July 1910, 140, 148.
46 Cornwallis to Clinton, June 2, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/72, No. 16.
47 Griffith Rutherford to Richard Caswell, June 29, 1780, Misc. Papers, Series 1, Vol. 1, NCSA.
48 Lutnick, British Press and the American Revolution, 156-158.
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a merchant house in New York wrote in March.49 When news that Clinton had captured 
Charleston reached Britain, “the street celebrations ... were exuberant and wild.” The 
victory appeared to validate the ministry’s American policy, stifling criticism and 
inspiring Lord North to seek new parliamentary elections in hope of further strengthening 
his position.50 Clinton himself instantly became, according to one observer, “the most 
popular man in England.”51
King George III and Germain shared in the exuberance when they read Clinton’s 
dispatches. Now that the loyalists were assured “of effectual & permanent Protection,” 
Germain told Clinton, they “will not hesitate to avow their Loyalty and arm themselves
C"i
for the Defence of their Country.” Satisfied that South Carolina was securely in British 
hands, Germain in July ordered all South Carolinians who were in England and receiving 
financial support from the government to return to the province. Germain’s belief that all 
of the southern colonies would soon return to their allegiance was widely shared by 
British political leaders and much of the public in the summer and fall of 1780.53
The assessments of the situation in South Carolina made by officials in London, 
loyalists, and army officers might be dismissed as mere wishful thinking if they were not 
confirmed by the Whigs. Writing from Camden on May 24, South Carolina governor 
John Rutledge declared that if the British sent troops into the backcountry, “the 
disaffected will certainly flock to them, & those who are not disaffected will either
49 Robert Biddulph to [parents], March 24, 1780, in Violet Biddulph, ed., “Letters o f Robert Biddulph,” 
AHR, Vol. 29, No. 1, Oct. 1923, 93.
50 Kathleen Wilson, The Sense o f  the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 259, 265.
51 Quoted in Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels, 321.
52 Germain to Clinton, July 4, 1780, Germain Papers, Vol. 18, WLCL.
53 Norton, British Americans, 112; See for example Thomas Digges to Benjamin Franklin, July 12, 1780, 
and to John Adams, Aug. 22, 1780, in Robert H. Elias and Eugene D. Finch, eds., Letters o f  Thomas 
Attwood Digges, (1742-1821) (Columbia: University o f  South Carolina Press, 1982), 239, 252-253.
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abscond, if they can,” or be taken prisoner and put on parole.54 William Seymour, a 
sergeant in the Delaware Continentals, heard reports while his unit was encamped in 
North Carolina that the British were overrunning South Carolina and “obliging the 
inhabitants, as they came along, to take the oath of allegiance to the King. In this, indeed, 
they had not much difficulty, for most part of them” joined the British.55 “Vast numbers 
flocked in and submitted; some through fear, some through willingness, and others, 
perhaps, through a hope that all things would settle down and war cease,” Whig James 
Collins remembered.56 Tarleton Brown, a South Carolina militia captain, described the 
gloom that overcame the rebels: “The country now seemed to be almost in complete 
subjugation to the British.” Yet had they not been “aided and abetted by those 
unprincipled and bloodthirsty tools [loyalists]... the enemy would never have gained a 
solid foothold upon our shores.”57 North Carolina governor Abner Nash told Thomas 
Jefferson that British troops posted near at Cheraw Hill were gathering “a considerable
c o
Number of new recruits from amongst the Inhabitants.”
As promising as the situation appeared for the British, affairs in South Carolina 
required careful management because those who had professed their loyalty did so for a 
variety of reasons and therefore many could be easily alienated. Some observers 
recognized this fact. “The greater part of the rural population of this part of America are,
I believe, favorably inclined toward peace, fo r they gain nothing by this war," Hessian
54 John Rutledge to SC Delegates in Congress, May 24, 1780, in Joseph W. Barnwell, ed., “Letters o f John 
Rutledge,” Part 1, SCHGM, Vol. 17, No. 4, Oct. 1916,133-134.
55 William Seymour, “A Journal o f the Southern Expedition, 1780-1783,” Papers o f  the Delaware 
Historical Society, Vol. 15 (Wilmington: Historical Society o f  Delaware, 1896), 3-4.
56 James P. Collins, Autobiography o f  a Revolutionary Soldier (Clinton, LA: Feliciana Democrat, 1859; 
reprint, John M. Roberts, ed., Stratford, NH: Ayer Co., 1989), 24.
57 Tarleton Brown, Memoirs o f  Tarleton Brown, A Captain in the Revolutionary Army (New York: 
privately printed, 1862; reprint, Barnwell, SC: Barnwell County Museum and Historical Board, 1999, 9-10.
Abner Nash to Thomas Jefferson, June 25, 1780, in Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers o f  Thomas Jefferson, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, Vol. 3, 1951,462.
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Captain Johann Hinrichs stated. “The safe rule, according to which one can always 
ascertain whether a man is a loyalist or a rebel, is to find out whether he profits more in 
his private interests, his mode of life, his way of doing things, etc., when he is on our side 
or on that of the enemy.” Hinrichs believed that exceptions to this rule were rare, and that 
only a “small number” of loyalists acted from “love and faithfulness to God and their 
lawful King.”59 Robert Biddulph believed that a large portion of Charleston’s inhabitants 
accepted British rule only because circumstances forced them to do so. “The Peace of this 
Country is fully established,” he wrote, “but there is such a fund of Hatred and Animosity 
in the Hearts of the People, as Time only can extinguish.”60
In the wake of their disastrous defeat, even ardent rebels had little choice but to 
reconcile themselves to the new situation.61 William Moultrie explained that demoralized 
Whigs now sought nothing more than a return to prewar normalcy:
The people quite harassed out and tired of war; their capital fallen, 
and their army prisoners, no place of safety for them to fly to with their 
families and property; the British troops in possession of their whole country, 
and no prospect of relief from the neighboring states; in this situation they 
thought all further resistance was useless, they therefore readily accepted of 
the pleasing offers, in hopes they would have been suffered to remain 
peaceably and quietly at home with their families, and to have gone on with 
their business undisturbed, as before.62
Whig James Collins found the situation to be more complex than Moultrie 
described it, asserting that some rebels remained “determined to fight it out to the last let 
the consequence be what it might,” while others were ready to “give up all for lost” when 
circumstances appeared unfavorable. Collins also classified loyalists as those who “were
59 Hinrichs, “Diary,” inUhlendorf, Siege o f  Charleston, 321-323.
60 Robert Biddulph to [parents], Aug. 26, 1780, “Letters o f Robert Biddulph,” 94.
61 M.F. Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown: The Southern Campaign o f  Nathanael Greene, 1780-1781 (Chapel 
Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1963), 14.
62 Moultrie, Memoirs, 2:209-210.
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Tories from principle,” others who “believed it impossible for the cause of liberty to 
succeed,” and those who “were Tories entirely through fear.” He also identified another 
group who had no principles of their own, but “pretended friendship to a l l ... not knowing 
into whose hands they might fall.” These people, Collins wrote, sometimes acted as 
British informers once the king’s troops had taken control of the province.63
Either unaware of the complex and conflicting motives that had led people to take 
the oath of allegiance or believing that he could satisfy everyone, Clinton issued another 
proclamation on June 3 which later caused the British some difficulty in the province. 
With rebel forces in South Carolina virtually nonexistent, Clinton saw no reason to keep 
large numbers of captured Whigs bound by paroles, the pledges they had given not to 
take up arms again until exchanged. Clinton’s proclamation released from parole 
everyone except those captured in the operations against Charleston. He considered this 
“a prudent measure,” believing it would prevent “inveterate rebels” from subverting 
British authority under the protection of parole. Better, Clinton thought, that all of the 
inhabitants declare their principles so that they could be identified and dealt with.64 He 
therefore announced that “it is become unnecessary that such paroles be any longer 
observed.” As of June 20, all those on parole were to consider themselves “restored to all 
the rights and duties belonging to citizens” and would be expected “to take an active part 
in settling and securing His Majesty’s government.”65 Clinton believed he was making a 
magnanimous gesture that would promote reconciliation, although the Whigs soon came 
to view the proclamation’s terms in a different light.
63 Collins, Autobiography, 23.
64 Clinton, American Rebellion, 181-182.
65 Henry Clinton, Proclamation of June 3, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 73.
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Before departing for New York at the beginning of June, Clinton established a 
board of police in Charleston to handle civil matters, but did not fully restore civil 
government in South Carolina. Although he had promised “the restoration of civil 
government” in his May 22 proclamation and had brought former North Carolina 
governor Josiah Martin on the expedition with the intention of appointing him temporary 
civil governor, Clinton decided that the situation did not yet justify reestablishing civilian 
rule.66 He worried that civil officials would interfere with military policy and also repeat 
the practice of their counterparts in Georgia by treating former Whigs harshly, thus 
hampering reconciliation.67
Clinton’s refusal to restore civil government angered many officials, including 
Germain, Adm. Arbuthnot, and several South Carolina loyalists. Arbuthnot insisted that 
the province’s inhabitants would “continue obstinate from the dread o f remaining under 
Military Law,” but would readily submit to British rule under civil authority.68 Lt. Gov. 
William Bull believed that the restoration of civil rule would “establish the public 
Tranquility on a lasting Foundation,” while James Simpson asserted that reconstituted 
civil authority would demonstrate “the superiour Advantages and Security” of British 
government and win over former rebels.69 On July 4, Germain told Clinton that “the Re- 
establishmt of the Constitution ... cannot fail to have sufficient Influence on the wavering 
and indifferent among the Inhabitants of Charles Town, to fix them in their Submission to 
legal Government.”70 Some Whigs feared the effects that the restoration of civil rule in
66 Henry Clinton, Proclamation o f May 22, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 72; Vemon O. 
Stumpf, Josiah Martin: The Last Royal Governor o f  North Carolina, (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic 
Press, 1986), 185-187; William Smith, Historical Memoirs, 198-199.
67 Willcox, Portrait o f  a General, 313; Clinton, American Rebellion, 182.
68 Arbuthnot to Germain, May 2, 1780, Germain Papers, Vol. 12, WLCL.
69 Norton, British Americans, 108-109.
70 Germain to Clinton, July 4, 1780, Germain Papers, Vol. 18, WLCL.
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South Carolina would have on their cause; Alexander Hamilton declared that it would 
“conciliate the greatest part of the people” and “prepare the minds of their neighbours to 
yield an early submission.”71 Yet Clinton continually found reasons to delay action, so 
that in the end civil rule was never restored in South Carolina and an important 
opportunity to consolidate control was lost.72
With civil government a distant prospect, the town’s military commandant, Brig. 
Gen. James Patterson, and the board of police headed by Simpson as intendant general 
shared authority in civil matters. In addition to Simpson, Clinton had appointed Robert 
William Powell to the board to represent Charleston’s merchants, Alexander Wright to 
speak for the planters, and Lt. Col. Alexander Innes as military representative. Two other 
prominent loyalists, Bull and Sir Egerton Leigh, also served on the board after their 
arrival in South Carolina in February 1781, with Bull replacing Simpson as intendant 
general. The board functioned primarily as a court to settle lawsuits involving debt and 
other civil matters.73 Bull described the board’s work as “business of a very complicated 
and often a delicate nature,” since its decisions had to convince South Carolinians that 
justice was impartially administered.74 He and Simpson believed that the board succeeded 
in this regard.75
As commander in the South, Cornwallis supervised both the board of police and 
the commandant as well as the field army. Clinton had left Cornwallis broad discretion in 
the exercise of his authority, specifying only that the earl should make the defense of
71 Alexander Hamilton to Francois Marbois, Sept. 13, 1780, Vandenberg Papers, Misc. Coll., WLCL.
72 William Smith, Historical Memoirs, 284, 296-297.
73 George Smith McCowen, Jr., The British Occupation o f  Charleston, 1780-82 (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1972), 13-14, 16,18-19; Nisbet Balfour to Germain, Feb. 18, 1781, Leslie 
Letterbook, microfilm, SCDAH.
74 William Bull to unnamed, Feb. 18, 1782, Shelburne Papers, Vol. 68, No. 127, WLCL.
15 Simpson to Clinton, July 16, 1780, RAM, 2:158.
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Charleston and control of South Carolina his first priority, and then, if circumstances 
permitted, advance into North Carolina if it could be done without jeopardizing the 
security of South Carolina.76
Cornwallis took prompt steps to assure that those South Carolinians whose private 
interest outweighed political principles would be drawn back into the royal fold. Loyalist 
exiles “had their property, or what remained of it, restored.” However, the “havoc made 
by the Americans” when they controlled the province “often defeated this intention.” 
Cornwallis also promoted trade, suspending the Prohibitory Act which had banned 
commerce between the rebellious provinces and the rest of the empire, thereby “allowing 
merchants to convey to Charles town a variety of manufactures which had been long 
wanted throughout all the southern provinces, and permitting them to receive payment in 
the produce of the country.”77 The earl, considering trade to be a privilege “exclusively 
enjoyed” by loyal subjects, prohibited rebels from participating in it, which served as a 
powerful incentive for many people to take the British oath.78 Large numbers of South 
Carolinians, from interest or loyalism, also found employment in the army’s civil
70departments. The army quartermaster’s department alone employed 225 civilians.
Believing that lenience would best win the support of the people, Cornwallis 
adopted a surprisingly generous policy. He “attempted to conciliate the minds of the 
wavering and unsteady, by promises and employments.” He ordered the army to avoid
80plundering or otherwise abusing the province’s inhabitants so as not to alienate anyone. 
However, the earl believed that Clinton’s proclamations had been too generous in
76 Clinton, American Rebellion, 186.
77 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 89.
78 Proclamation of Charles, Earl Cornwallis, July 25, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 125.
79 R. Arthur Bowler, Logistics and the Failure o f  the British Army in America, 1775-1783 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press), 1975, 27.
80 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 90.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
338
granting protection to “some of the most violent rebels and persecutors.”81 He also saw 
the danger of allowing disaffected people to serve in the militia, and ordered his 
subordinates to exclude from the militia all those “who are not sufficiently loyal.”82
Some loyalists expressed dissatisfaction with Cornwallis’s leniency, worrying that 
former rebels who declared loyalty without altering their real opinions might endanger 
the British position in South Carolina. Samuel Came saw no evidence that “having been 
steadily Loyal avails more than those Enjoy who shed their fellow Subjects blood, & are 
since admitted,” he wrote. “Allmost all who Apply are made good Subjects ... God grant 
we may never find them otherways.”83 These fears proved well-founded, as the earl’s 
lenient policy created two serious problems. First, many of those whom he had pardoned 
without investigating their principles remained ardent rebels and secretly continued to 
support the rebellion. Second, Cornwallis’s generosity toward former rebels “produced 
not the intended effect: It did not reconcile the enemies, but discouraged the friends.” 
Loyalists “reflected on their own losses and sufferings” at the hands of the Whigs, and 
angrily watched as Cornwallis restored their former persecutors, unpunished, to equality 
with the most steadfast supporters of the British.84
Rallying the genuine loyalists and organizing them into a militia capable of 
holding South Carolina if and when the British army advanced northward was the 
lynchpin of British strategy in the South. To accomplish this task, on May 22 Clinton had 
appointed Maj. Patrick Ferguson of the 71st Regiment to act as Inspector of Militia in the 
Southern Department. Clinton ordered Ferguson, “without loss of time, to form into
81 Cornwallis to Patterson, June 10, 1780, in Ross, ed., Cornwallis Correspondence, 1:46. Ross spells the 
recipient’s name as “Pattison.”
82 Cornwallis to Balfour, June 11, 1781, in Ross, ed., Cornwallis Correspondence, 46-47.
83 Samuel Came to Christopher Rolleston, Oct. 12, 1780, Samuel Carne Papers, SCL.
84 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 90.
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Corps all the Young or unmarried Men of the Provinces of Georgia and the two 
Carolina’s” to serve under Cornwallis’s orders. The men were to be formed into 
companies of fifty to one hundred men, which when possible were to be consolidated into 
battalions; otherwise the companies would serve independently. Ferguson was to allow 
the men of each company to elect their commanding officer and to enforce discipline 
“with great Caution, so as not to disgust the Men, Or mortify unnecessarily their Love of 
Freedom.” Additional measures intended “to Procure the general & hearty Concurrence 
of the Loyal Inhabitants” included limited terms of service (a maximum of six months on 
duty out of twelve) and assurance that militiamen would not be “drawn into the regular 
Service without their Consent.”85
Creating an effective militia in a region that had been under Whig control for five 
years was a daunting task. “The severity of the Rebel government has so terrified and 
totally subdued the minds of the people, that it is very difficult to rouse them to any 
exertions,” Cornwallis later observed.86 As determined as Ferguson was, he could not 
personally organize every unit; officers at some of the British posts had to assist in their 
districts. Even with such aid, Ferguson’s task required “the greatest attention to a 
multitude of details. The area involved was immense, the problems staggering, and the 
time limited.” Qualified officers had to be found, the men’s loyalty vetted, and those
87enrolled given arms and training.
The internal politics of the British army severely complicated Ferguson’s efforts 
to organize an effective militia. During the siege of Charleston, Clinton had learned that
85 “Instructions to Major Ferguson Inspector o f Militia,” May 22, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 
No. 44.
86 Cornwallis to Clinton, Aug. 29, 1780, in Ross, ed., Cornwallis Correspondence, 58.
87 Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats, 137.
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the ministry had denied his request to resign his command, which angered Cornwallis, 
who had expected to replace Clinton as commander-in-chief. With his ambition thwarted, 
Cornwallis took out his frustration on Clinton, refusing to participate further in planning 
operations and requesting a separate command. Clinton obliged, but soon the officer 
corps became factionalized over the issue and Clinton blamed Cornwallis for fomenting
on
this unrest. Because Ferguson had been appointed by Clinton, Cornwallis automatically 
distrusted his inspector of militia. Lt. Col. Nisbet Balfour, a protege of Cornwallis, 
disliked Ferguson and perhaps desired the militia command for himself. On May 22, 
Balfour had visited Clinton and told the commander-in-chief that “it was generally 
reported that Ferguson was violent tempered and treated his men with harshness” and 
should not be given command of the militia. Clinton replied that he had heard no such 
reports and gave no credence to rumors. He attributed Balfour’s remarks to the “infernal 
party” divisions prevailing in the army.89
Clinton had not even left Charleston when Cornwallis and Balfour began plotting 
to replace his militia plan with one of their own, despite the earl’s dislike of 
administrative work. Cornwallis preferred to seek victory on the battlefield, rather than 
devote his energy to organizational tasks that took a long time to produce tangible results. 
“Probably the chief reason” for his failure to fully mobilize loyalist support in South 
Carolina was “his distaste for the matter, which admitted of no soldierly approach.”90 
Intent on advancing his own career, Cornwallis undoubtedly undertook the effort to
88 Franklin and Mary Wickwire, Cornwallis: The American Adventure (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), 
128.
89 Henry Clinton, “Sir Henry Clinton’s ‘Journal o f the Siege o f Charleston, 1780,’” William T. Bulger, ed., 
SCHM, Vol. 66, No. 2, July 1965, 172.
90 Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis, 171.
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create his own plan for a loyal militia so that he, rather than Clinton, could claim credit in 
the event of success.
Meanwhile, Ferguson accompanied Balfour to the interior of the province, where 
the erstwhile inspector of militia received orders from Cornwallis on June 2 “to take no 
steps whatsoever in the militia business” until receiving further instructions; Ferguson 
promised to “pay the utmost implicit Obedience” to the order.91 This left Balfour free to 
begin organizing the militia. “I have employ’d a faithfull person near Orangeburgh, who 
assures me of the loyalty of that district, and propose, empowering him, to raise an 
association to take up arms, and keep the peace untill the militia is formed, which I think 
there is no doubt of effecting,” Balfour informed Cornwallis on June 6. He assured the 
earl that “As to the Militia arming to defend the country, I have not the smallest doubt of 
it,” and noted that “Ferguson remains perfectly quiet, since he rec. your letters,” but still 
appeared eager to organize a militia upon the original plan formulated by Clinton. 
Altogether, Balfour felt satisfied with the progress of the militia, although he observed 
that it was difficult to find “men of property, and consequence” to serve as officers.
Cornwallis recognized the importance of giving commissions to “locally 
prominent persons” whose influence would help sway others to actively support the 
British. Unfortunately, most leading South Carolinians who had not fled the province or 
been banished had cast their lot with the Whigs. Cornwallis therefore chose men like 
James Cary of Camden district to command the militia. An attorney and planter who had 
immigrated to South Carolina in 1764, Cary’s influence was not great, but he was well 
known in the district. Although he had taken the Whig oath, he had never participated
91 Ferguson to Cornwallis, June 6, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, No. 92.
92 Balfour to Cornwallis, June 6, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 96.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
342
actively in the rebellion. Cornwallis found Cary’s loyalty beyond question, but as a 
militia colonel, Cary’s performance was poor.93
Robert Ballingall proved to be one of the better militia officers Cornwallis 
appointed. When the British army arrived in South Carolina, rebel officials imprisoned 
Ballingall. He was released when Charleston surrendered, and on July 20, Cornwallis 
gave him command of the militia south and west of Charleston, an area expanded in 
September to include all of St. George’s, St. James’s, Goose Creek, and St. Andrew’s 
Parishes, along with James Island. While many other militia officers soon came to be 
scorned by British commanders, Ballingall retained the favor of both Cornwallis, who 
acknowledged his success “in raising & training the Militia,” and Gen. Alexander Leslie, 
who praised Ballingall’s “honor, Integrity, and good sense.”94
Despite the lack of qualified officers and Ferguson’s enforced idleness, militia 
matters had “a promising appearance” in late June. The volunteers “equalled the wishes 
of their leaders, both as to numbers and professions of loyalty.”95 Cornwallis informed 
Clinton on July 14 that the organization of the militia in “the lower districts” of the 
province was “in great forwardness.”96 This was particularly true in Charleston, where 
twenty-seven residents petitioned Cornwallis on behalf of the inhabitants for “permission 
to embody, arm and uniform themselves in a volunteer company” to assist in suppressing 
“the most cruel and unnatural rebellion that ever disgraced the historick page.”97
93 Robert S. Lambert, “A Loyalist Odyssey: James and Mary Cary in Exile, 1783-1804,” SCHM, Vol. 79, 
No. 3, July 1978, 168-171.
94 Memorial o f  Robert Ballingall, Mar. 13, 1786; Balfour to Ballingall, Sept. 18, 1780, Affidavit o f 
Cornwallis, Mar. 14, 1786, Affidavit o f Leslie, Jan. 30, 1784, Misc. Mss., SC7003/AT7003, Box 2, 154, 
154a, NYSL.
95 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 90-91.
96 Cornwallis to Clinton, July 14, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 118.
97 Memorial o f Sundry Loyal Inhabitants o f Charlestown, Aug. 13, 1780, Royal South Carolina Gazette, 
Aug. 23, 1780.
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Many loyalists took action without waiting for the arrival of British troops. A 
British detachment marching through St. Matthew’s Parish met twenty of these men on 
June 5, who had with them a notable prisoner, former Georgia governor John Wereat.
The next day rebels arrived “from all quarters” to submit, and on June 10 an entire 
company of armed militia joined the British.98 When troops reached Ninety Six on June 
22, they found that local loyalists had already arrested over forty rebels and confined 
them in the jail. Dr. Uzal Johnson, a New Jersey loyalist, observed that the “friends to 
Government... who have just now got the opportunity to retaliate gladly embrace it.” He 
thought this response understandable, given that many loyalists had been “obliged to hide 
in Swamps & Caves to keep from Prison themselves.”99
Despite this promising start, problems quickly arose with the militia, one of which 
was a shortage of arms, “the most serious” that the British experienced during the war. 
The problem resulted partly from the army’s failure to send adequate supplies of muskets 
to the south, as well as from British officers’ indiscriminate distribution of weapons, 
which often placed muskets in the hands of men who then joined Whig partisan units. 
Thus when Col. Ambrose Mills went to Camden on October 1 to procure muskets for his 
180 militiamen, he found himself competing with two other militia units and a provincial 
regiment for “less than 200 old French muskets.” Mills received only sixty-one of 
them.100 The shortage became so severe by January 1781 that Balfour informed Clinton 
that the army was “much distres’d from their being no small Arms in Store, which must 
be very disadvantageous to the Militia & provincial Establishments & if not soon
98 Anthony Allaire, Diary, June 5, 6, 10,1780, Robinson Family Papers, NBM.
99 Uzal Johnson, Diary, June 22, 1780, SCDAH.
100 Bowler, Logistics and the Failure o f  the British Army, 151-153.
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supplied will preclude the raising any more Levies of the latter in this district.”101 Three 
months later, Balfour again found it necessary to “request in the strongest Manner a 
further Quantity of small Arm’s” for the militia and new recruits in South Carolina and 
Georgia.102 Arms were essential because the Whigs had long ago disarmed suspected 
loyalists. From October to December 1780, British officers issued over seven hundred 
muskets for the militia in Georgetown, Orangeburg, Ninety Six, Beaufort County, and 
Colleton County. Some of these were replacements for damaged or poor quality
1 flTweapons. One officer noted that Ballingall complained “loudly of the last Arms & 
Powder sent to the Country being very bad.”104 With insufficient and poor-quality 
muskets, the militia’s effectiveness was badly impaired.
Some officers also expressed doubts about the sincerity of pledges of loyalty 
made by former Whigs. Evan McLaurin of the South Carolina Royalists wrotb from 
Ninety Six that he was well aware of “the temper the People hereabout are in at present,” 
and declared that “[Andrew] Williamson is the only man of all those formerly active 
against us; on whom we could firmly depend” if rebel fortunes improved. McLaurin was 
particularly worried about dissatisfaction among the inhabitants of the Long Canes 
settlements, where unrest simmered after British troops seized the people’s horses.105
Such actions alienated both loyalists and former Whigs, while the attitude of 
many British officers undermined the commitment and morale of many militiamen. 
Robert Gray reported that “the abuses of the Army in taking the peoples Horses, Cattle & 
provisions in many cases without paying for them ... disgusted the inhabitants.” Gray also
101 Balfour to Clinton, Jan. 31, 1781, Leslie Letterbook, microfilm, SCDAH.
102 Balfour to Clinton, April 7, 1781, Leslie Letterbook, microfilm, SCDAH.
103 Orders, Oct. 7, Oct. 11, Oct. 14, Oct. 29, Nov. 19, Nov. 22, Dec. 13, Dec. 30, 1780, Wray Papers, Vol.
5, WLCL.
104 Major C. Fraser to Major Traille, Dec. 30, 170, Wray Papers, Vol. 5, WLCL.
105 Evan McLaurin to Balfour, Aug. 7, 1780, Emmet Collection No. 6589, NYPL.
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noted that “almost every British officer regarded with contempt and indifference the 
establishment of a militia among a people differing so much in customs & manners from 
themselves” and made no effort to conceal this opinion, which damaged the spirit of men 
who, after years of persecution, lacked the confidence necessary for military success and 
needed encouragement, not derision, from British officers.106
Nevertheless, the organization of the militia continued to go well and gained 
impetus in mid-June when Cornwallis, satisfied that Ferguson had been sufficiently 
chastised, allowed him to assume his assigned duties.107 Unlike his arrogant counterparts, 
Ferguson “cultivated a familiarity with loyalists unusual among British officers.” He 
spent much time conversing “with the country people on the state of [political] affairs ... 
He was as indefatigable in training them to his way of thinking, as he was in instructing 
them in military exercises.” His behavior “went far to secure the respect and obedience” 
of those he encountered.108 On June 27, Balfour reported that he and Ferguson had 
organized militia battalions at Ninety Six, Orangeburg, and adjacent areas with a 
combined strength of five thousand men.109 When Ferguson left Ninety Six on June 23 
with forty provincials to begin operations against Whig partisans, more loyalists came 
“flocking to him from all parts of the Country.”110 Affairs appeared equally good in the 
Camden area, where Lt. Col. Francis, Lord Rawdon, noted that the militia were “not only 
well disposed, but very zealous.”111
By the end of June, Cornwallis informed Clinton that he felt satisfied with the 
progress the militia had made so far. For administrative convenience, Cornwallis kept the
106 Gray, “Observations,” 141, 144.
107 Cornwallis to Ferguson, June 16, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/77, 14.
108 Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis, 203-204.
109 Balfour to Cornwallis, June 27, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 200.
110 Johnson, Diary, June 23, 1780.
111 Rawdon to Cornwallis, July 7, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2,252.
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militia districts that the Whigs had drawn.112 “As the different Districts submitted I with
all the Dispatch in my Power formed them into Militia & appointed Field Officers
according to the old Divisions of the Province,” he reported. “I invested these Field
Officers with Civil as well as Military Power, as the most effectual means of preserving
Order and reestablishing The King’s Authority in this Country.” The earl created two
classes of militia. Men over forty years old “and of certain Property, Family or Service,”
were to remain at home to maintain order except “in Case of an Insurrection or an actual
Invasion of the Province.” Those younger than forty would serve on terms almost
identical to those Clinton had formulated. Cornwallis declared that the militia was
“composed of Men, either of undoubted Attachment to the Cause of Great Britain, or
whose Behaviour has always been moderate.” To prevent prominent former Whigs whose
loyalty was doubtful from adversely influencing others, Cornwallis placed them on parole
and sent them to the sea islands; anyone else believed to be “notoriously disaffected” had
been disarmed, ordered to remain at home on parole, and told that they could provide the
1 11
army with supplies, wagons, and horses in lieu of militia service.
Although loyalist support had met British expectations and the organization of the 
loyal militia was off to a promising start, three factors combined to prevent the loyalists 
from realizing their potential as an effective force. First, many Whigs continued to resist 
and resorted to their old tactics of harassing and brutalizing the loyalists, which, in 
conjunction with defeats inflicted on the loyal militia by these rebel partisans, intimidated 
the loyalists and demoralized the militia. Second, after witnessing the initially poor 
performance of the militia and the treachery of some Whig-infiltrated units, most British
112 Cornwallis to Patterson, June 10, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/77, 3.
113 Cornwallis to Clinton, June 30, 1780, Germain Papers, Vol. 12, WLCL.
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officers lost all confidence in the militia and simply stopped employing it, thus depriving 
its members of the benefits they would have derived by serving alongside regular troops. 
Finally, the approach of Gen. Horatio Gates with an American army in July renewed the 
hopes of many rebels, causing them to break their oaths of loyalty and rejoin the fight, 
which greatly increased the pressure on the loyal militia at a time when its members were 
still inadequately trained and equipped.
Whigs who gathered in the Carolina swamps and forests to plan resistance 
recognized the importance of targeting the loyalists. In the northeastern part of the 
province, partisan leader Francis Marion understood that any delay in striking the 
loyalists could prove fatal to the rebel cause. Given time to organize and gain experience 
and cohesion, the loyal militia might soon become formidable. This, above all, was what 
Marion hoped to prevent. Whigs in northwestern South Carolina adopted a similar 
strategy. In early June, about one hundred rebels under Cols. Edward Lacey and William 
Bratton attacked a party of loyalists commanded by Col. Charles Coleman at Mobley’s 
Meeting House near Winnsboro, killing a few and dispersing the remainder.114
The loyal militia suffered a worse defeat on July 12. Cornwallis dispatched Capt. 
Christian Huck of Tarleton’s British Legion and thirty-five dragoons to operate against 
Whig partisans near the North Carolina border. Huck brought sixty mounted militiamen 
with him and another three hundred joined him during his march. Rebel partisans 
launched a surprise predawn attack on the detachment, inflicting about ninety casualties, 
mostly among the militia. After the battle, the Whigs executed one o f their loyalist
114 William Dobein James, A Sketch o f  the Life o f  Brig. Gen. Francis Marion and a History o f  his Brigade 
from its Rise in June 1780 until Disbanded in December, 1782 (Charleston: Gould and Riley, 1821; reprint, 
Marietta, GA: Continental Book Co., 1948), 64; Richard Winn, “General Richard Winn’s Notes -  1780,” 
Samuel C. Williams, ed., Part 1, SCHGM, Vol. 43, No. 4, Oct. 1941, 202.
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prisoners, a militia major named Ferguson, because some rebels alleged that he had 
murdered a young man without provocation.115 A few weeks later, Tarleton found that 
people in the lowcountry were still “scar’d ” yet some militiamen turned out when he 
summoned them.116
Events in North Carolina compounded the demoralizing effects of Huck’s defeat. 
Continued Whig persecution led hundreds of loyalists there to ignore Cornwallis’s 
instructions to remain quiet until the British army moved north. Instead, eight hundred 
men took up arms, but were quickly beaten by the rebels. The survivors reached the 
British post at Cheraws, from whence reports of their defeat “diffused universal 
consternation amongst the inhabitants of South Carolina.”117
Other events involving the loyal militia inflicted short-term damage to the British 
position in South Carolina and produced long-term harm to the relationship between the 
British army and the loyalists. Col. Mathew Floyd had organized a militia battalion in the 
vicinity of the Ennoree and Tyger Rivers, which the British supplied with arms and 
ammunition. The man who had commanded the rebel militia of that district, John Lisle, 
noted “for his violent persecution of the loyalists,” had fled the province, but was later 
captured. Taking advantage of the terms offered in Clinton’s June 3 proclamation, Lisle 
pledged allegiance to Britain and was permitted to return to his home, where he became 
Floyd’s second-in-command. Shortly after Huck’s defeat, he seized Floyd and led the
115 Charles Bracelen Flood, Rise and Fight Again: Perilous Times on the Road to Independence (New 
York: Dodd, Meade, and Company, 1976), 271, 273; Moore, Life o f  Edward Lacey, 3-4, 7.
116 Tarleton to Cornwallis, Aug. 5,1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/63, 19.
117 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 91.
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entire battalion to join the rebels. This incident, Tarleton stated, “ruined all confidence 
between the regulars and the militia.”118
A second instance of treachery worsened the problem. As British troops 
concentrated at Camden to meet an advancing American army, Maj. Arthur McArthur of 
the 71st Regiment ordered Col. Ambrose Mills of the militia to escort over one hundred 
sick soldiers to Georgetown. After the detachment had marched beyond supporting 
distance from the British regulars, Whig partisans attacked them. Some of the militiamen 
mutinied and took their own officers prisoner, including Mills, Robert Gray, and Col. 
James Cassells.119 The rebels brought the captives to North Carolina, where they “were 
put into a dungeon loaded with Irons & treated in the most barbarous manner.”120 Mills 
later escaped, and although Cornwallis blamed him for failing to properly screen his 
recruits, the earl still considered the colonel “a very good man,” who had simply been too 
credulous regarding people’s professions of loyalty.121 But the incident confirmed the 
belief of many British officers that they had erred “in placing confidence in the 
inhabitants of the country when acting apart from the army.”122
Cornwallis had already reached the same conclusion. “The want of subordination 
and confidence of our militia in themselves, will make a considerable regular force 
always necessary for the defence” of South Carolina, the earl told Clinton in mid-July. “It 
is needless to attempt to take any considerable number of the ... militia with us when we
118 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 93; see also Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 128.
119 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 98; Robert D. Bass, Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns o f  
Francis Marion (Orangeburg, SC: Sandlapper Publishing Co., 1974), 35; Lambert, South Carolina 
Loyalists, 128-129.
120 Cornwallis to Gov. Abner Nash, Aug. 17, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/79, 23. Nash denied the 
accusations, although he admitted that he had been unable to obtain information regarding Gray and 
Cassells, Nash to Cornwallis, Aug. 27, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/63, 70.
121 Cornwallis to Clinton, Aug. 6, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 127.
122 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 98.
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advance;” since Cornwallis expected to be joined by many North Carolina loyalists, he 
decided it was unwise to bring along “too many useless mouths.”123
Efforts to turn the loyal militia into an effective force were further hampered by 
the approach of Gen. Horatio Gates and his Continental Army in late July. Gates’s march 
toward South Carolina emboldened the Whigs, provoking new outbursts of rebellion. 
Gray recalled that Gates’s advance “seemed to be a signal for a general revolt in the 
disaffected parts of the back Country.”124 Many people used Clinton’s June 3 
proclamation, which had released them from parole, as a pretext to claim that they could 
legitimately abjure their oaths of allegiance.125 Rumors that relief was coming “gave a 
turn to the minds of the inhabitants of the southern provinces.” Rebels who had 
reconciled themselves to defeat now plotted a resurgence, “hostilities were already begun 
in many places, and every thing seemed to menace a revolution.”126 Cornwallis feared 
that Gates’s arrival “shall shake the Confidence & consequently the fidelity of our 
Friends.”127 He later told Clinton that Gates’s advance “very much intimidated our 
friends, encouraged our enemies, and determined the wavering against us.”128 In 
Balfour’s opinion, the effect was even worse and undermined his confidence in the 
loyalists. “In vain we expected, loyalty and attachment from the inhabitants,” he wrote, 
but “the moment [Gates] came near,” they “revolted and joined him.” Balfour concluded
123 Cornwallis to Clinton, July 14, 1780, in Ross, ed., Cornwallis Correspondence, 51-52.
124 Gray, “Observations,” 141.
125 Rawdon to Cornwallis, July 7, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 252; Lambert, South Carolina 
Loyalists, 127-128.
126 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 91.
127 Cornwallis to Clinton, July 15, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/72, 30.
128 Cornwallis to Clinton, Aug. 6, 1780, in Clinton, American Rebellion, 448.
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that there was no difference between loyalists and rebels -  “they are the same stuff as 
compose all americans,” he declared.129
Gates did all he could to encourage South Carolinians who had joined the British 
to return to the Whig fold. On July 29, he wrote to rebel militia officers asking them to 
assure the Whigs that his army was marching to their aid and offering pardon to all those 
who “from the Necessity of protecting their persons and property have been obliged to 
profess a temporary acquiescence under the British Government.” The following week, 
Gates issued a proclamation containing his offer of amnesty. The promise of military 
assistance and pardon induced many who had taken British protection to join the rebels. 
So, too, did Gates’s orders that he would not honor the paroles of American prisoners 
unless they had been taken in arms. Any man who had simply given his parole when 
British forces arrived in his district was to be considered liable for service in the Whig
• i inmilitia and those who refused would be punished. By encouraging people to violate 
their oaths and paroles, Gates subjected them to great risk if they fell into British hands. 
British officers believed that those who broke their oaths or paroles had to be punished to 
prevent other South Carolinians from defecting, and thus Gates’s actions inflamed the 
already volatile situation and fed the spiral of violence in the South.
Col. Thomas Sumter, who raised his own force of rebel partisans and had recently 
made unsuccessful attacks against British posts at Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock west 
of Camden, encouraged Gates to seek support from Americans who had taken British 
protection. He assured Gates’s aide that “the Chief of the Militia Downwards are our 
friends Ready to do their Duty.” Although conceding that many of those friends “are in
129 Balfour to [Henry Strachey?], Aug. 30, [1780], Sir Henry Strachey Papers, Vol. 1, LOC.
130 Horatio Gates to Cols. Hicks and Giles, Circular, July 29, 1780; “Copy o f a Proclamation issued by 
General Gates, at Pedee,” Aug. 4, 1780, Horatio Gates Papers, Reel 11, microfilm, DLAR.
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arms against us,” and admitting that two who had been captured by the British after 
switching sides had been hanged at Rocky Mount, Sumter insisted that many South 
Carolinians were eager “for an opportunity to Join the army.”131 After his attack at 
Hanging Rock, Sumter reported that “Both British and Tories are pannick struck” and 
expressed his belief that fifteen hundred men could march across South Carolina “with 
ease”132
Gates’s call to arms had the desired effect. John Lloyd estimated that “at least 
7/8’s of the People returned to their allegiance” before Gates advanced into South 
Carolina. But when the inhabitants were summoned to assist the British in repelling the 
invasion, “great numbers, notwithstanding their professed contrition, and avowed loyalty, 
left the British, for the American standard, under which, they have since done, and 
continue to do infinite mischief.”133
Yet even during this period many loyalists provided valuable service to 
Cornwallis. As Gates’s troops marched through North Carolina, they were harassed by 
loyalists who seemed to have “surrounded them on all sides.”134 Whig officer Charles 
Porterfield reported that the people in the vicinity of Cedar Creek had “gone with the 
Brittish, with all their baggage & Cattle.”135 At Jenning’s Branch, Richard Caswell with 
the North Carolina militia worried that he would not be able to keep his advance a secret 
because loyalists, “which are Numerous in proportion to the Inhabitants of this part of the 
Country,” would inform the British of his movements.136 Caswell’s fears were well-
131 Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, Aug. 12, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 11.
132 Quoted in Flood, Rise and Fight Again, 302.
133 John Lloyd to [Mark Harford, Jr.], Jan. 20, 1781,, John Lloyd Letters, photocopies provided by 
Gloucestershire Record Office.
134 Seymour, “Journal o f  the Southern Expedition,” 4.
135 Charles Porterfield to Gates, Aug. 3, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 11.
136 Richard Caswell to Gates, Aug. 4, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 11.
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founded, for loyalists kept Lord Rawdon, the British commander at Camden, fully 
informed of rebel movements.137 On August 5, Caswell also learned that “a Considerable 
Number of Tories were Collecting” with Rawdon’s army with the intention of attacking 
his North Carolinians.138
Other loyalists created problems in the rear of the American army. From 
Drowning Creek, Continental officer Matthew Ramsey wrote that he was plagued by 
loyalist partisans operating from swamps, who launched raids intended to prevent 
supplies from reaching Gates’s army. The loyalists had recently attacked a rebel party 
and rescued twenty loyalist prisoners; with only fifty men in his command, Ramsey did 
not dare to challenge them.139
One bold loyalist, a Camden resident, rode directly into Gates’s camp, where he 
feigned surprise at finding the American army. The man conversed with Gates, provided 
some accurate but incomplete information about the British at Camden, then departed 
with a promise to return with additional intelligence. Col. Otho Holland Williams and 
other rebel officers suspected the man was a spy and urged Gates to detain him, but the 
general refused. The mysterious visitor never returned, which confirmed Williams’s
• • 140suspicions.
In addition to the contributions of individuals and partisans, the loyal militia also 
played a role in the Camden campaign. As Tarleton marched his troops from Charleston 
to Camden in early August, Col. John Coming Ball joined them with twenty-five 
militiamen, who served as guides and rode ahead to procure intelligence, enabling
137 Flood, Rise and Fight Again, 292.
138 Caswell to Gates, Aug. 5, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 11.
139 Matthew Ramsey to Horatio Gates, Aug. 9, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 11.
140 Flood, Rise and Fight Again, 311, 313.
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Tarleton to reach his destination without interference from the various Whig parties 
operating in the area. The Camden district militia was less successful -  Sumter 
attacked forty men guarding Wateree Ferry on August 15, killing seven and capturing the 
rest, including their commander, Colonel Cary. In other operations Sumter captured more 
loyalists, one hundred British regulars, and forty supply wagons bound for Camden. 
Tarleton recovered all the prisoners, wagons, and supplies three days later when he 
crushed Sumter’s partisans at Fishing Creek.141
Cornwallis relied on the militia, with a small contingent of provincials and British 
convalescents, to hold the town of Camden when he marched to attack Gates on the night 
of August 15. Another three hundred militiamen accompanied the British army. The earl 
placed these men in reserve on his left. During the battle, the Continental troops made a 
bayonet charge against this flank, causing Rawdon to bring up the militia and other 
reserves to hold the line.142 The American attack was checked and the militia evidently 
performed adequately, for while they were not singled out for particular praise after the 
battle, neither did they receive any criticism.
Cornwallis’s troops routed the rebels, and as the scattered Continentals and 
militiamen fled northward, emboldened loyalists pursued and captured significant 
numbers of them. Because many of the fugitives had thrown away their weapons in their
141 Robert D. Bass, The Green Dragoon: The Lives ofBanastre Tarleton and Mary Robinson (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1957), 92-93; Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals, 1776-1783 (Wilmington: 
Historical Society o f Delaware, 1941), 355; Sumter to Gates, Aug. 15, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the 
Campaigns, 147-148.
142 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 104; Flood, Rise and Fight Again, 313, 325, 331. The actual 
number o f loyalist militia who served in the battle o f Camden were fourteen officers, eight sergeants, and 
three hundred rank and file. Their proportion o f casualties was the smallest o f  the units engaged, totaling 
only two wounded and three missing, which indicates that they must have been committed late in the action 
and then in a peripheral role. Field Return of Cornwallis’s Army, Aug. 15, 1780, and Return of Casualties, 
Aug. 16, 1780, Amherst Papers, W 0 3 4 /126/73, microfilm reel 71, DLAR.
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flight, they were often unable to resist.143 “Those who escaped the Dangers of the Field 
knew not where to find protection,” General Williams wrote. “The Wounded found no 
relief from the Inhabitants who were immediately in arms against us, and many of our 
Fugitive Officers and men were disarm’d by those faithless Vallains.” He added that 
other loyalists had stolen horses and seized supplies during the retreat, while “some of 
those desperate Rascals have been daring enough to fire upon parties of our Regular 
Troops.”144 Many of those who captured fleeing rebels and American supplies were 
committed adherents to the British cause, but in other cases, “news of this immense 
British victory caused many armed men to change their loyalties on the spot.”145 
Williams complained that many of the men who captured Gates’s soldiers had previously 
“flatter’d us with promises of joining us against the Enemy.”146 Those who regretted 
having broken their oaths seized the opportunity to ingratiate themselves with the British 
by bringing rebel prisoners into Cornwallis’s camp.
The victory at Camden produced a new surge of loyalist sentiment in South 
Carolina, undoing much of the earlier damage caused by defeat, defection, and Gates’s 
advance. Many inhabitants enlisted in provincial units, including the British Legion, New 
York Volunteers, and American Volunteers. With the Continental Army again removed 
as a threat, other loyalists abandoned their reluctance to serve with the militia. By late 
August, over four thousand men had been enrolled in seven battalions in the backcountry, 
of which fifteen hundred could be brought into action on short notice. Other battalions,
143 Seymour, Journal o f  the Southern Expedition, 7; Ward, Delaware Continentals, 352; Edward Stevens to 
Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 20, 1780, PTJ, 3:558.
144 Otho Holland Williams to Alexander Hamilton, Aug. 30, 1780, PAH, 2:385.
145 Flood, Rise and Fight Again, 336-337.
146 Williams to Hamilton, Aug. 30, 1780, PAH, 2:385.
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although weaker, had been formed elsewhere in South Carolina.147 Cornwallis believed 
that in the wake of his victory, “the internal commotions and insurrections in the province 
will now subside.” He also decided to teach those who had broken their oaths a lesson by 
inflicting “exemplary punishment on some of the most guilty, in hopes to deter others in 
future from sporting with allegiance and oaths.”148
Yet in spite of the great victory at Camden and Tarleton’s destruction of Sumter’s 
force on August 18, the rebels managed to derive some benefits from the campaign. 
Robert Gray, recently exchanged and working to organize the militia in the Cheraw 
district, pronounced his task “impossible,” because “at least three fourths of the 
inhabitants” in the region “had taken active parts” in rebellion when Gates had 
approached. Even among the loyalists, “many had their nearest connections among the 
rebel refugees and could not be trusted,” Gray observed. He did find many reliable 
loyalists “on Black and Lynch’s creek,” and along the Little Pedee River. These, 
however, could not assemble because doing so “exposed their families and property to 
the resentment of the rebels from Cape Fear who have been indefatigable in persecuting 
them upon every occasion.” Once the Cape Fear River became the northern boundary of 
British control, Gray believed, these loyalists could be relied upon. Until then, he 
suggested that a force of mounted regulars, supported by militia drawn from other parts 
of South Carolina and the North Carolina provincials, could maintain “the publick 
peace.”149
Some British and loyalist officers concluded that it would be wiser to abandon 
plans to rely upon the militia and instead recruit men for provincial units. Evan McLaurin
147 Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown, 43, 46; Cornwallis to Germain, Aug. 20, 1780, DAR, 18:145.
148 Cornwallis to Germain, Aug. 21, 1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 135.
149 Robert Gray to Cornwallis, Sept. 30, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/64, 130.
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asked Cornwallis for permission to create a new South Carolina provincial battalion, a 
plan that won the endorsement of Alexander Innes. The latter told Cornwallis that 
McLaurin “had a superior plan to any man of this part of the province.” Innes said that he 
disagreed with those who believed forming provincial units would be “detrimental to the 
Militia.” He considered “every man inlisted to serve in a provincial Corps ... a usefull 
soldier gain’d to the King’s Service,” whereas he was “well convinced the Militia on 
their present plan will ever prove a useless disorderly, destructive banditti.” He asserted 
that men who were of little value in the militia became “different men in a regular 
provincial Corps.” As proof he noted that of thirty-five men he had enlisted in the South 
Carolina Royalists since June, “no Men cou’d behave with greater spirit,” while “their 
late associates” in the militia “behave in so dastardly and cowardly a manner.”150
Tarleton agreed that loyal South Carolinians would be more useful in provincial 
corps than as militia, although he preferred incorporating them into existing units rather 
than organizing new regiments. In veteran units, experienced officers could train and lead 
the recruits, depleted units could be brought to full strength, and “considerable service” 
might be derived from the recruits, Tarleton believed.151 Cornwallis thought the idea was 
worthwhile, and he urged Lt. Col. George Turnbull, commander of the New York 
Volunteers, to incorporate three companies of South Carolinians into his unit. But 
Turnbull demurred, believing that the South Carolinians were too unruly.152
By September, Cornwallis also concluded that provincials should replace the 
militia. He informed Clinton that “as I have found the Militia to fail so totally when put to
150 Innes to Cornwallis, Sept. 5,1780, Cornwallis Papers, 30/11/64, 29.
151 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 98.
152 Turnbull to Cornwallis, June 14,1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 147.
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the Trial... I am determined to try Provincial Corps alone” in the future.153 The earl 
authorized loyalist Maj. John Harrison to recruit five hundred men in the region between 
the Pedee and Wateree Rivers and form them into a provincial battalion. Cornwallis 
thought it “extremely probable” that this plan would succeed.154 Later, he authorized 
Robert Cunningham to enlist a second provincial battalion. Harrison’s efforts failed, and 
while Cunningham appeared “more likely to succeed,” Cornwallis put a stop to the 
formation of Cunningham’s corps “on finding that all the principal officers of the militia 
of Ninety-Six were entering into it, by which means I should have been totally deprived 
of the use of that militia.”155 Two weeks later, Cornwallis’s frustration with the militia 
caused him to reverse himself and order Cunningham to renew the effort to recruit a 
provincial corps. In October, acting on his own initiative, John Harris Cruger, 
commanding at Ninety Six, authorized Moses Kirkland to enlist at least four hundred 
men to serve as provincials for a year.156
The militia’s performance had not been stellar, yet it had not been as poor as 
Cornwallis described it. Capt. James Dunlap of the Queen’s Rangers led fourteen 
provincials and sixty mounted militiamen against what he believed was a small Whig 
party on July 14, only to encounter several hundred rebels. In a charge, Dunlap’s men 
scattered the Whigs, killing and wounding about thirty. But when the rebels regrouped 
and counterattacked, the same militiamen who moments earlier had performed so well
• • 1 ^ 7fled without resisting.
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Patrick Ferguson conceded that the militia had not always met his expectations, 
but he was certain that with time and training an effective militia could be established. He 
stated in late July that the militia was “Daily gaining confidence & Discipline.”158 Shortly 
afterward, he explained to Rawdon that “the Men have been so little accustom’d to 
Military restraints, & become so soon home Sick, that it is almost impossible to assemble 
any Number of them on a sudden call of danger, or to keep them many days together.” 
Ferguson lectured them about their poor behavior, which prompted them to draw up and 
sign a resolution pledging to serve faithfully in the future.159 On August 29, Ferguson 
asked Cornwallis “to observe that the Different bodys of Militia East of broad river that 
have behaved so ill with the Army, were form’d in a hurry, without the assistance of any 
officers of the Army to establish order & Discipline, employ’d immediately on Service,
& no Scrutiny made into the Loyalty of the Officers or Men.” As a result, many rebels 
were permitted to enroll, who immediately joined the Whigs when Gates’s army 
approached. It was “to be expected that a Mungrill Mob without any regularity or even 
organization, without fidelity without officers, without any previous preparation employd 
against the Enemy, would bring the name of Militia into discredit,” Ferguson wrote.160
Although Ferguson’s arguments did not alter Cornwallis’s opinion, the earl had 
no choice but to continue relying on the militia to secure South Carolina. With most of 
the army at Camden preparing to invade North Carolina and recruitment of the new 
provincial battalion progressing slowly, Cornwallis had to depend on the militia and 
garrisons of provincials at Ninety Six and Augusta to defend the backcountry. The
158 Ferguson to Cornwallis, July 24, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 360.
159 Ferguson to Rawdon, [Aug. 14, 1780]; Resolution o f Militia, Aug. 13, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 
30/11/63,95, 97.
160 Ferguson to Cornwallis, Aug. 29, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/63, 81.
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security of the northeastern part of the province between Camden and Georgetown was 
left to the militia alone, with regulars conducting occasional forays to support them.
Along the Little Pedee River, where loyalists were numerous, Maj. Micajah 
Ganey assembled two hundred militiamen in late August to attack Francis Marion, whose 
Whig partisans were operating in the vicinity. Outnumbered four-to-one, Marion relied 
on surprise and attacked a detachment of Ganey’s militia on September 4. The Whigs 
routed and pursued the forty-five loyalists, only to be driven off when they encountered 
Ganey’s main force. After checking his pursuers with an ambush, Marion escaped. His 
victory encouraged over one hundred men to join him, but news that Ganey’s militia had 
reassembled and was to be reinforced by other militia units and British troops from the 
small garrison at Georgetown, forced the Whigs to withdraw into North Carolina.161
Shortly after the skirmish, one of Marion’s officers resorted to the kind of terror 
that had proven so effective at suppressing loyalism. Capt. Maurice Murphy and several 
rebels visited the home of a man named Blackman, and finding that Blackman favored 
the royal cause, gave him 150 lashes with a bullwhip. When Blackman still refused to 
recant, Murphy released him. Murphy’s uncle, Gideon Gibson, rebuked his nephew for 
permitting such cruelty, whereupon Murphy shot Gibson dead.162 Loyalists in the area 
suffered “terrors & great distress” as small parties of rebels assailed them at every 
opportunity.163
Marion soon returned to South Carolina. On September 28, he attacked a post on 
the Black Mingo River held by forty-seven loyalists commanded by Col. John Coming 
Ball. The loyalists retreated after a brief exchange of fire with a loss of three killed and
161 Francis Marion to Gates, Sept. 15, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12; Bass, Swamp Fox, 48-51.
162 Bass, Swamp Fox, 68-69.
163 Cornwallis to Rawdon, Aug. 4, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/79, 8.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
361
thirteen captured; the prisoners were “men of family & fortune” and Marion hoped that 
their loss “may be a Check to the malitia taking arms against us.” Marion planned to 
attack another loyalist detachment at Black River Church, but Cornwallis dispatched Maj. 
James Wemyss with British troops to quell the uprising, which caused so many of 
Marion’s men to return to their homes that the partisan leader had to retreat once again. 
Nevertheless, Marion declared that “the Toreys are so Affrighted with my little 
Excursions, that many is moving off to Georgia with their Effects,” while others had 
taken refuge in the swamps.164 British officers confirmed this. “There are hourly people 
coming in from Peedee, giving dreadful accounts of the depredations committing there by 
the Rebells,” Robert England wrote.165 Wemyss noted that in the vicinity of Georgetown, 
“the whole Country is in Confusion & uproar, all the friends of Government have been 
plundered of their Negroes” and other property.166 Three days later, Wemyss reported 
that the rebels “continue to hunt out, & plunder every friend of Government... The 
people here are exceedingly alarmed.”167
Assisted by fifty militiamen, Wemyss and his regulars chastised the Whigs, 
sending the armed bands fleeing and burning about fifty houses owned by men who had 
broken their oaths to serve with the rebels. He believed that if two hundred regulars were 
left on the Pedee, they could secure the region against Marion with the aid of the 
Georgetown and Cheraws militia.168 Turnbull disagreed, asserting that if “Wemyss cou’d 
not Establish a Militia when he was there with a Force,” a detachment in the vicinity 
could not rely on militia support. “Depend upon it Militia Will never do any good
164 Marion to Gates, Oct. 4, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12.
165 Major Robert England to Cornwallis, Sept. 14, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/64, 57.
166 Wemyss to Cornwallis, July 28, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 377.
167 Wemyss to Cornwallis, July 31, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 395.
168 Wemyss to Cornwallis, Sept. 20,1780 and Oct. 4, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/3, 80, 184.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
362
Without Regular Troops,” Turnbull declared.169 Balfour advised sending the militia from 
Orangeburg, which he considered the most reliable, to secure the Pedee region.170
In the backcountry, Whigs also repeatedly harassed the loyalists. On August 17, 
two hundred Georgians, South Carolinians, and overmountain men assembled to attack 
an equal number of loyal militiamen at Musgrove’s Mills. Reinforced the next evening by 
two hundred South Carolina provincials under Alexander Innes and another one hundred 
militia, the loyalists attacked the rebels, who were posted on a wooded ridge. Innes was 
wounded and his troops forced to retreat after suffering heavy casualties.171
Despite frequent Whig incursions, Ferguson’s work with the militia in Ninety Six 
district had begun to pay dividends; “his intensive training of some of his Tory 
companies had turned them into competent soldiers” and earned him the respect of the
1 77men. On September 12 he led one hundred militiamen and forty provincials to strike 
three hundred rebels from the overmountain region under Joseph McDowell. Ferguson 
caught up with the rebels later that day, and the militia fought well in an attack that 
routed the larger Whig force. The victory had immediate repercussions; two days later
1 77many people in the area came in to take the oath of allegiance to Britain.
Unable to gain the upper hand in the backcountry against the provincials and 
militia, the Whigs terrorized individual loyalists whenever the opportunity arose. On 
September 9 a rebel party captured John Hutchison and Gardiner Williams of Jackson’s 
Creek. Williams had participated in the defense of Rocky Mount, while Hutchison, 
loyalist Col. John Phillips believed, had been specifically targeted because “he had been
169 Turnbull to Cornwallis, Oct. 4, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/3, 178.
170 Balfour to Rawdon, Oct. 26, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/3, 289.
171 Report o f James Williams, Sept. 5, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12.
172 Flood, Rise and Fight Again, 351-352.
173 Allaire, Diary, Sept. 7, 9 ,12 , 14, 1780, NBM.
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very Active with Us in his duty Since the Surender of Charlestown.” Phillips begged 
Cornwallis to arrange Hutchison’s exchange, fearing that the rebels “will do him Every 
Injury in their power” and perhaps even hang him.174
Gov. John Rutledge encouraged the harsh treatment of loyalists. In a proclamation 
issued on September 27, he offered pardon to South Carolinians who had taken the 
British oath, provided they joined the Whigs within thirty days and agreed to serve six 
months in the militia. Those who held British commissions or had signed congratulatory 
addresses to the British commanders were not eligible, however. Rutledge threatened all 
who refused his offer with banishment and confiscation of their property.175 A few days 
later, Rutledge instructed Sumter to deal sternly with the loyalists. “It will be expedient to 
apprehend & secure every Subject of the State, who holds any office or Commission 
under his Britannick Majesty,” Rutledge wrote; “you are not, on any Account whatever to 
put any Prisoners whom you take that owe Allejiance to the State o f So. Carolina ... on 
Parole, but have them properly confined to be tried, as soon as Courts of Law can be 
held, for so capital an Offence as taking Part with the Enemy.” Rutledge did offer to 
forgive those “compelled to do Duty, as Militia-Men,” if  they proved that they were 
actually Whigs and had not committed “atrocious” acts while in British service.176 The 
governor justified his policy by accusing the British of having committed atrocities 
against South Carolina’s Whigs.177
When Cornwallis advanced northward at the beginning of September, he assigned 
two tasks to the militia. The majority were to guard key posts in the army’s absence and
174 Col. J. Phillips to Cornwallis, Sept. 13, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/64, 54.
175 Barnwell, “Rutledge, ‘The Dictator,’” 221-222.
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to protect the army’s supply line between Camden and Charlotte.178 A Whig prisoner who 
escaped from Camden reported that the town’s garrison consisted of five hundred 
militiamen, and those men not currently on duty “were all ordered into Camden” to serve 
for three months.179 Other accounts indicated that there were between three and six 
hundred loyalists at the Waxhaws and about five hundred at Fishing Creek, most of them
1 Rfinewly enlisted provincials. The backcountry militia had a more active role: Ferguson 
was to lead them into western North Carolina to protect the army’s left flank. The earl 
had some doubts about the militia’s ability to carry out this task. He told Clinton that 
while Ferguson believed that his men were reliable, “I am sorry to say that his own 
experience, as well as that of every other officer, is totally against him.”181 However, 
Cornwallis also believed that the militia might perform better if used offensively; “if ever 
those people will fight it is when they attack & not when they are attacked,” he told 
Balfour.182
Unfazed by Cornwallis’s skepticism, Ferguson set out with five hundred militia 
and about one hundred provincials in early September. Learning that a Whig force was 
nearby, Ferguson with forty provincials and one hundred militia attacked and routed the
1 Ol
220 rebels on September 11. They collected recruits as they marched, so that the force 
numbered eight hundred when it reached Gilbert Town, North Carolina, on September
178 Cornwallis to Balfour, Sept. 13, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/80, 20; Pancake, This Destructive 
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23. There five hundred people took the British oath.184 “The Tories were flocking to his 
standard from every quarter,” one Whig stated.185
This marked the zenith for the loyal militia and collapse swiftly followed. The 
threat Ferguson posed to the overmountain settlements aroused the inhabitants, hundreds 
of whom turned out to attack the loyalists. Joined by other rebels from the Carolinas, they 
moved to attack Ferguson’s detachment. Ferguson learned of their approach and 
withdrew, maneuvering until he reached King’s Mountain, just south of the North 
Carolina border and twenty-five miles west of Charlotte, where Cornwallis lay with the 
main army. He dispatched messengers to the earl requesting support but none came. 
Instead, on October 7 the rebels surrounded King’s Mountain and attacked the loyalists. 
In a battle lasting less than an hour, the Whigs killed Ferguson and 150 of his men and
i o r
captured the remainder.
The defeat in itself was enough to shake the loyalists’ confidence, but the cruelty 
with which the Whigs treated their enemies shattered loyalist morale. On their march to 
King’s Mountain, the rebels had begun to display their savagery by attacking four 
unarmed loyalists, “butchering two young men” and leaving two elderly men “most
i  o -y
barbarously maim’d.” During the battle, the rebels had refused to cease fire when the 
loyalists tried to surrender, shooting down two men who were waving white flags and 
wantonly increasing the loyalists’ casualties. When they withdrew from King’s Mountain
184 Allaire, Diary, Sept. 15, 20, 23, 24, 30, 1780, NBM; Davidson to Gates, Sept. 24; 1780, Sumner to 
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with their prisoners after the battle, the overmountain men left over 160 badly wounded 
loyalists untreated on the field.188
The families of loyal militiamen who lived near the battlefield were the first to 
witness this carnage. The day after the battle, “the wives and children of the poor Tories 
came in, in great numbers,” wrote Whig soldier James Collins. “Their husbands, fathers, 
and brothers, lay dead in heaps, while others lay wounded or dying; a melancholy sight 
indeed!” Collins himself “could not help turning away from the scene ... with horror, and 
... could not refrain from shedding tears.”189 As reports of the slaughter circulated, many 
loyalists feared that it was too dangerous to provide further support to the British. Most of 
the men in David Fanning’s small detachment of loyal militia on the western frontier of 
South Carolina deserted after learning of Ferguson’s defeat.190 Rawdon noted that the 
disaster had “so dispirited” the loyalists in Ninety Six district that Cruger suspected that 
they “had determined to submit as soon as the Rebels” arrived in the backcountry.191
The rebels’ treatment o f the prisoners further demonstrated the risks loyalists 
faced if  they openly supported the king. On October 14, twelve Whig officers formed a 
tribunal “to try the Militia Prisoners Particularly those who had the most Influence in the 
country.” Thirty men were condemned to death for alleged crimes and the executions 
began in the evening. Nine men, including Lt. Col. Ambrose Mills, “fell a Sacrafice to 
their infamous Mock jury,” a loyalist prisoner declared. The remaining twenty-one were
1 07reprieved. The pleas of relatives failed to save the lives of their loved ones. Another 
prisoner stated that “words can scarce describe the melancholy scene” that transpired
188 Flood, Rise and Fight Again, 356-357.
189 Collins, Autobiography, 52-53.
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when the two daughters of one victim learned of their father’s death; they “swoon’d away 
and continued in fits all night. -  Mrs. Mills with a young child in her arms sat out all 
night in the rain with her husband’s corps[e]”.193
The next day, perhaps fearing that they too might soon be executed, about one 
hundred prisoners made their escape during a lengthy march. Three more tried to escape 
on October 17, two succeeding while a third was wounded in the attempt. The wounded 
man was executed the following morning.194 Given the conditions of the march, it was 
not surprising that many men risked their lives trying to escape. “Many of our Prisoners 
were so wearied out that many of them were obliged to give out on the road,” two 
officers of the New Jersey Volunteers later stated; “they then roll’d them down in the 
mud -  and many of them they left there were trod to death and many of them cut to 
pieces.”195 The Whigs denied the wounded medical treatment until November 1, nearly a 
month after the battle, when Dr. Uzal Johnson finally received permission to treat the 
injured captives. He was bandaging a man named Catchum when Whig Col. Benjamin 
Cleveland came on the scene and rebuked Johnson, saying that Catchum “was a Damnd 
Villain & deserved the Gallows.” The infuriated Cleveland then “struck me over the 
Head with his Sword, and levild me, he repeated his stroke & cut my Hand,” Johnson 
wrote.196
Such treatment inspired further attempts to escape, so that eventually about six
i  (\n
hundred of the captives succeeded in fleeing their confinement. Among them was Lt.
Anthony Allaire, who escaped with two other prisoners on the night of November 5 and
193 Quoted in Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels, 284.
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reached safety at Williams’s Fort after a seventeen-day journey, during which loyalists 
provided the fugitives with food, shelter, and guides.198 Alexander Chesney, a militia 
lieutenant who had served with Ferguson throughout the summer and fall, also escaped. 
The Whigs had offered to parole Chesney if he would drill their militia in Ferguson’s 
manner and threatened him with death when he refused. After reaching his home with aid 
from loyalist families, “I was obliged to conceal myself in a cave dug in the branch of a 
creek” with two loyalist cousins, Chesney wrote, since the Whigs controlled the area. 
When Maj. Jonathan Frost tried to assemble the remaining loyalist militia in the district, 
the rebels appeared at the rendezvous and captured Chesney and several others. Frost 
pursued the rebels with other loyalists, hoping to free the prisoners, but was killed in the 
unsuccessful effort.199
The escape of so many prisoners actually benefited the rebels, as the returned 
captives spread word of the harsh fate awaiting any loyalists who fell into Whig hands. 
These reports, as much as the defeat at King’s Mountain, discouraged many loyalists 
from assisting the British.200 Accounts of the prisoners’ sufferings circulated widely; the 
Royal Georgia Gazette published a detailed description of the rebels’ “base and infamous
0Ci\proceedings.” Tarleton observed “the depression and fear” that such reports 
“communicated to the loyalists upon the borders, and to the southward.” The loyalists’ 
demoralization was also evident to American officers. “Many of the Tories seem 
disposed to return to their Allegiance, and would submit to any Terms which might be 
offered to obtain a Pardon,” Col. William Smallwood informed Horatio Gates in late
198 Allaire, Diary, Nov. 5-22, 1780.
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October. Smallwood believed that a proclamation offering amnesty to loyalists “would 
effectually draw at this Crisis numbers from the British Interest.”203
Cornwallis, angered by the reports of abuse and recognizing that Whig cruelty to 
prisoners undermined loyalist morale, threatened to retaliate. He told Smallwood that 
“the cruelty exercised on the Prisoners taken under Major Ferguson is shocking to 
Humanity; and the hanging poor old Colonel Mills, who was always a fair, and open 
Enemy to your Cause, was an act of the most Savage barbarity.” The earl added that he 
had heard that a Captain Oates of the loyal militia “was lately put to Death without any 
Crime being laid to his Charge.” Cornwallis demanded that Smallwood put an end to 
“these most cruel Murders.” Otherwise, the earl declared, it would be necessary for him, 
“injustice to the suffering Loyalists, to retaliate on the unfortunate Persons now in my 
power.” Anticipating that the Whigs would blame him for initiating the violence toward 
prisoners, Cornwallis asserted that he had never permitted any rebels to be executed, 
except two or three who had enrolled in the loyal militia and then joined the Whigs.204 
The earl later made another protest to Gates, stating that “the officers and men taken at 
King’s Mountain, were treated with an inhumanity Scarce credible,” and he therefore felt 
himself “under the disagreeable necessity of making some retaliation for the unhappy 
men who were so cruelly and unjustly put to death.”
The Whigs ignored Cornwallis’s complaints. Although Gates privately 
disapproved of the harsh treatment of the King’s Mountain prisoners, he expressed 
“astonishment, at Lord Cornwallis’s finding fault with a cruelty, he and his Officers are
203 William Smallwood to Horatio Gates, Oct. 27, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12.
204 Cornwallis to Smallwood, Nov. 10,1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12.
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• ,  ,  “JOf i 'continually practicing.” John Rutledge had no sympathy at all for the loyalist captives. 
He described the men Cleveland had executed as some “of the most noted horse Thieves 
& Tories,” implying that their fate had been well deserved. The governor insisted, 
without a shred of proof, that the British “have hanged many more of our People” and 
remarked that “his Lordship has mistaken the Side on which the Cruelty lies.”207
The treatment of the prisoners taken at King’s Mountain became the norm for 
captured loyalists. Robert Gray noted that a militia prisoner was usually considered “a 
State prisoner ... who deserved a halter” rather than a prisoner of war, “& therefore” the 
Whigs “treated him with the greatest cruelty.” If not “assassinated” immediately after 
capture, loyal militiamen were usually confined “without friends, money, credit, or 
perhaps hopes of exchange.” As a result of such treatment and the murders committed by 
rebel partisans, the loyalists “became dejected & timid,” Gray noted. Many joined the 
Whigs because it was the only way a man could “go to sleep without danger of having his 
throat cut before morning.” Gray believed that if the Whigs had treated captured loyalists 
as prisoners of war, which was how the British treated rebel militiamen, “many more 
would have sided with the royal Standard.”208
In addition to driving many loyalists into inactivity or even into the rebel ranks, 
the defeat at King’s Mountain had other important consequences for the British. 
Ferguson’s death deprived Cornwallis of the officer most capable o f making the militia 
an effective force. One British soldier stated that Ferguson possessed great intelligence
206 Horatio Gates to President o f Congress, Nov. 26, 1780, Gates Letterbook, Gates Papers, Reel 11. 
William Smallwood, in his reply to Cornwallis, said that while it was his duty “to discountenance Acts of 
Inhumanity,” those who had abused the prisoners were volunteers, and thus fell outside the Continental 
Army’s jurisdiction. Smallwood to Cornwallis, Dec. 8, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/91, 19.
207 John Rutledge to SC Delegates in Congress, Nov. 20, 1780, in “Letters o f John Rutledge,” Part 1, 143- 
144.
208 Gray, “Observations,” 144-145.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
371
and military skill, and declared that Ferguson’s death “frustrated a well concerted scheme
for strengthening our army, by the co-operation of the well affected inhabitants, whom he
had undertaken to discipline and prepare for active service.”209 Gray considered the loss
of Ferguson a catastrophe for the loyalist cause. “Had Major Fergusson lived, the Militia
would have been completely formed,” Gray wrote. “He possessed all the talents &
ambition necessary to accomplish that purpose .... the want of a man of his genius was
soon severely felt.” Ferguson’s defeat also forced Cornwallis to abandon the invasion
211of North Carolina and retreat from Charlotte. The army’s withdrawal compounded the 
dispiriting effects of King’s Mountain on the loyalists while bolstering rebel morale.212
Georgia loyalists also came under increasing rebel pressure in the autumn of 
1780; they had in fact enjoyed little respite from harassment except for a brief period 
during the late spring and summer. In February, Governor Wright had informed Clinton 
that Whig parties continued to raid with impunity. Partisans struck in areas nominally 
under British control, capturing loyalists and carrying off hundreds of slaves. One group 
routed a loyalist detachment and killed its commander, while others penetrated within
91^fourteen miles of Savannah.
The arrival of Clinton’s army failed to stop Whig incursions, despite the presence 
of the garrison at Savannah and 104 men of the Georgia provincials at Abercom. After an 
April raid in which the Whigs burned bams and rice and carried off many slaves, 
Augustine Prevost proposed forming Daniel McGirt’s irregulars into a corps of provincial
209 Roger Lamb, An Original and Authentic Journal o f  Occurrences During the Late American War, From 
Its Commencement to the Year 1783 (Dublin: Wilkinson & Courtney, 1809; reprint, New York: Amo Press, 
1968), 308.
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cavalry, believing they were ideally qualified to conduct partisan warfare, but Clinton 
ignored the suggestion.214 As late as May 20, Wright reported that rebel parties from 
South Carolina were still “plundering, killing, and carrying off the inhabitants within 5 or 
6 miles” of Savannah.215 Nevertheless, Wright managed to hold elections for the 
provincial assembly in April. Whig control of the backcountry prevented some parishes 
from sending representatives, so that only fifteen members attended the opening session 
on May 9. Wright assured them that the tumults of recent years would vanish under 
beneficent British rule. The Assembly passed an act barring 151 named rebels from 
holding civil or military office, and as a gesture of loyalty enacted a duty on exports to be 
paid to the British treasury. However, the province’s ravaged condition left it unable even 
to support itself. Parliament provided an annual subsidy of £3000 ($390,000), which 
proved insufficient to meet Georgia’s expenses.
After the capture of Charleston, Clinton ordered Thomas Brown to occupy 
Augusta with his rangers and secure the backcountry. Brown reached the town about June 
8, having advanced part of the way on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River. On 
his march, Brown accepted the surrender of hundreds of Georgia and South Carolina 
Whigs and paroled them. Many other Georgians came to Augusta and surrendered to 
Brown there. The inhabitants of the town and surrounding area then petitioned Gov.
9 1 7Wright, asking that he restore the king’s peace in the district.
214 Return o f Georgia Loyalists, Feb. 1780, Clinton Papers, Vol. 87, No. 25, WLCL; A. Prevost to Clinton, 
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Brown organized the Augusta loyalists into a militia under Col. James Grierson, 
while Cols. Matthew Lyle and Thomas Waters assumed command of the militia in St. 
George’s Parish and the Ceded Lands, respectively. By mid-August, Gov. Wright 
described the situation in the backcountry as “peaceable and quiet,” and he rejected 
Balfour’s proposal to send British troops to the Ceded Lands to disarm former rebels.218 
Brown, however, did not share the governor’s confidence; he worried that “unless a 
considerable number of the most obnoxious” Whigs in the Ceded Lands “are removed, 
the loyalists in the neighbouring parishes will not be able to live in peace.”219
Events soon demonstrated the accuracy of Brown’s assessment. Elijah Clarke, 
whose Georgia Whigs had been operating farther north, attacked Augusta on September 
14. By threatening Georgians who had taken the British oath with death if they refused to 
join him, he assembled about six hundred men and struck so swiftly that Brown did not 
have time to call out the loyal militia. Brown, his rangers, and several hundred Indians 
took position in and around a stone house and withstood a siege until September 18, 
when John Harris Cruger approached with a relief force. Cruger had left the militia to 
hold Ninety Six and marched to Brown’s aid as soon as he learned of the rebel attack.
The Whigs retreated upon learning that Cruger was nearby; Cruger’s troops captured 
many of the fugitives and the loyal militia captured sixty-eight. Forty-five of the latter 
group took the oath to Britain and were released, while prominent rebels John Wereat and 
Samuel Stirk were sent to prison in Charleston. Brown hanged thirteen prisoners found to 
have previously taken British protection, and Cruger’s troops marched to the Ceded 
Lands, where they burned the homes and carried off the cattle of some of the men who
218 Robertson, “Second Occupation o f Augusta,” 428,431.
219 Brown to Cruger, Aug. 6, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, 30/11/62, 6.
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had joined Clarke. Governor Wright, having earlier recommended that “an Arm y... 
march without Loss of time into the Ceded Lands ... to lay Waste and Destroy the whole 
Territory,” approved of the destruction. The inhabitants, Wright declared, “have by their 
late conduct forfeited every claim to any favour or protection.”220 When Cruger returned 
to Ninety Six, he left “between 2 & 300 Georgia Militia on the Ceded Lands” to stamp 
out the last vestiges of rebellion. Cruger considered them “very equal to the task, & 
exceedingly well inclined.”221
After Clarke’s defeat, Lt. Gov. John Graham traveled to Wilkes County to assess 
the relative strength of the loyalists and Whigs there. Of 723 male inhabitants, he found 
255 (thirty-five percent) to be committed loyalists. Fifty-seven men were neutral, and the 
remainder were rebels.222
Overall responsibility for securing Georgia and East Florida rested with Lt. Col. 
Alured Clarke, who replaced Gen. Prevost when the latter returned to England shortly 
after the fall of Charleston. Before assuming command at Savannah, Clarke visited St. 
Augustine to inspect the defenses there. He found the fortifications adequate, but the 
garrison too small to withstand a powerful attacking force. Governor Tonyn assured him, 
however, that at least 150 inhabitants could be counted on to join in defending the 
town.223
In West Florida, the loyalists’ fortunes continued to decline as Bernardo de 
Galvez pressed his offensive. Recognizing the danger, Gen. John Campbell tried to 
bolster the province’s defenses by authorizing Adam Chrystie to form two troops of light
220 Robertson, “Second Occupation o f Augusta,” 432-436; Cashin, King’s Ranger, 114-115, 118.
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dragoons. However, Chrystie had barely begun recruiting when the Spaniards attacked 
Mobile in late February. Militia from the surrounding settlements evaded the Spanish 
besiegers and reinforced the garrison. Their arrival raised the defenders’ morale but failed 
to prevent Galvez from capturing the town on March 14. Seventy militiamen and twenty- 
eight provincial dragoons from the Royal Foresters who had participated in Mobile’s 
defense were among the prisoners. Other militiamen accompanied Campbell and a force 
of British regulars and Indians that marched from Pensacola to assist the defenders, but 
Mobile surrendered before the relief force arrived. Campbell then withdrew, and a 
detachment of the Royal Foresters that he left behind to protect the settlers and collect
224cattle was surprised and captured by the Spaniards shortly afterward.
The Indians’ Role
Britain’s Indian allies made few significant contributions to operations in Georgia 
and South Carolina in 1780. This resulted largely from Cornwallis’s reluctance to employ 
them, although many British officers expressed a desire for Indian assistance against 
Whig raiders in the backcountry. The Creeks and Choctaws, however, played an 
important role in the defense of West Florida and could have been even more valuable 
had Maj. Gen. John Campbell adopted a wiser policy toward them.
Once they learned of the impending British attack on Charleston, Whig leaders 
feared that Indian cooperation in the backcountry might doom their efforts to hold the 
South Carolina capital. Benjamin Lincoln worried that rebels on the frontier might 
provoke an Indian war, so on January 18, 1780, he instructed George Galphin to make 
sure that the settlers did not attack the Indians and told the Indian agent to prevent the
224 John Campbell to Clinton, Feb. 10, 1780, Carleton Papers, Vol. 21, No. 2565; Starr, Tories, Dons, and 
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Georgians from committing “barbarities” against the Creeks, as they had done in the
225past. In March, Lincoln received encouraging news from Andrew Williamson that the 
Spanish attack in West Florida had drawn the attention of the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and 
Creeks in that direction. Those Creeks in the vicinity of the Georgia and South Carolina 
backcountry, Williamson believed, “are in our Interest except a few Restless fellows ... 
On the whole I believe we have little to fear from that Quarter.”226
Williamson’s assessment regarding West Florida was generally correct, but he 
underestimated the Creeks’ commitment to the British and failed to consider the 
Cherokees. There were about three hundred Cherokees at Savannah, “holding themselves 
in readiness” to serve with Clinton’s army, when_the British fleet arrived there.227 Had 
Clinton followed his original plan to send troops from Savannah into the backcountry, the 
Cherokees were to have accompanied the British detachment. However, when Clinton 
ordered those troops to Charleston instead, their commander, Gen. James Patterson, 
decided to leave the Indians in Georgia.228 A few Indians chose to go with the British 
anyway; Uzal Johnson noted that one evening during the march, “two Indian Captains 
John & James” visited his battalion’s camp. The loyalists seemed amused by their guests, 
and “smoak’d tobacco & drank grog with those Devils Incarnate.”229
Many British officers shared Johnson’s low opinion of the Indians. According to a 
German officer, Patterson had chosen to leave the Indians in Savannah “because of their
225 Lincoln to Galphin, Jan. 18, 1780, Lincoln Papers, BPL.
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barbarity.”230 Hessian Capt. Johann Hinrichs, having encountered only one Indian since 
arriving at Savannah, had no personal knowledge of them and apparently based his views 
on talk he heard in camp. “As soldiers, they are anything but dangerous to one 
accustomed to balls, lead, and hand-to-hand combat,” Hinrichs asserted. “Hiding in 
bushes and behind trees, waiting to take a shot at someone, and upon meeting with the 
slightest resistance taking flight with amazing agility, but showing up at another place 
just as quickly -  these are their principal military virtues.” Such tactics did no impress 
Hinrichs, who declared that Indians “cost many times more than real soldiers and do 
more harm than good.”231
Bored with enforced idleness and in “great dread of the small pox” which had 
broken out in coastal Georgia, at the beginning of March the Indians told Augustine 
Prevost that they wished to leave Savannah and return to their homes. Prevost told 
Clinton that the Indians could not be prevented from leaving “if  we wish them to remain 
our friends.” He added that their departure would not affect his ability to defend 
Savannah, because the Indians “are not people to be employed in the diffence of a place; 
they can not suffer the appearance of being shut up.” He also advised Clinton that 
messages should be sent to halt other Indian parties en route to the town.232 Clinton 
agreed with Prevost’s suggestions and instructed his subordinate to retain the Indians’ 
“goodwill & let them understand they are to be called upon shortly.”233 In mid-March the 
Indians left Savannah after promising to return when summoned.234 On their homeward
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journey, one group of Indians was attacked by a Whig party that “kill’d four men and one 
woman and took one man two boys and a girl prisoners.”235
Gov. Wright appreciated the Indians more than most army officers did and 
expressed displeasure at their departure. Believing that Clinton’s cancellation of the 
march into the backcountry left Savannah vulnerable to attacks from rebels based in 
Georgia’s interior, Wright urged Clinton to pay closer attention to Indian relations.
British officers might consider the Indians “useless in the field,” the governor wrote, but 
if the Cherokees left Savannah “in disgust, and the Creeks being stop’t and sent home 
again, most like may be disgusted also,” they might decide to cast their lot with the 
Whigs. If so, Wright warned, the Indians “would harrass the King’s Troops ... & receive 
the Rebels amongst them,” and in that case “we could never subdue the rebellion.” In 
his reply, Clinton ignored Wright’s comments about the Indians and assured the governor
• 7^7that the rebels would be too occupied in South Carolina to menace Georgia.
Clinton did in fact hope that the Indians would cooperate with his forces; at the 
start of the campaign he had told Thomas Brown that “it was not his intention to expose 
the Indians unreasonably by incursions into the different provinces in rebellion but to 
reserve their services for some more decisive blow” when they could receive assistance 
from British troops.”238 Later, Clinton asked Alexander Innes to bring “an old sachem 
and Creek young warriors with you” from Savannah to visit the army’s camp at 
Charleston. “I wish them to see our army,” Clinton wrote, but reminded Innes to keep the 
Indians under control on the march northward. Brown, Clinton added, was to remain in
235 Augustine Prevost to Clinton, March 30,1780, RAM, 2:108.
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Georgia and keep the Indians there “in good humour.” When Charleston fell, Clinton 
promised to immediately send Brown orders on how to employ the Indians.239 In late 
April, a Lower Creek chief, accompanied by loyalist William McIntosh, finally arrived at 
the British lines outside Charleston and met Clinton. Johann Ewald wrote that the chief, 
“Ravening Wolf,” had been sent “by several Indian tribes” to learn whether the British 
were strong enough so “that it was worth the trouble for these nations to venture further 
into an alliance” with them. 240The rebels had told the Creeks that the British army “was 
in very bad condition in order to get his nation away from supporting the English.” 
Clinton therefore ordered that the chief be given a tour of the British camp and siege 
lines.241 The general regretted that no Cherokee leaders had come;\“it would have been of 
consequence,” he stated, perhaps believing that the sight of a powerful British army 
would encourage them to cooperate more actively in the future.242
After Charleston surrendered, Clinton ordered Thomas Brown to march into the 
backcountry and take post at Augusta. Brown welcomed the opportunity, since it would 
place him nearer to the Cherokees and Creeks; he estimated that 360 of the latter were 
actively assisting the British on the frontier and believed that the pro-Whig Creek faction 
could now be convinced to align themselves with the British. He appointed Charles Shaw 
to act as his representative in Savannah, where Lt. Col. Alured Clarke had replaced 
Augustine Prevost as commandant.243
Once he had established himself at Augusta, Brown informed Cornwallis that he 
had dispatched messengers to the Creeks and Cherokees with orders to end hostilities
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against the inhabitants of Georgia and South Carolina. Brown asked the earl for 
permission to demolish Fort Rutledge, which had been a source of irritation to the 
Cherokees because it was located on their land. He also told Cornwallis that he had 
promised the Indians that all settlers illegally residing on Indian land would be 
removed.244 Brown intended to remedy Whig injustices to the Creeks and Cherokees by 
enforcing the Indian boundary, regardless of how frontier settlers might react.
In addition, Brown proposed an ambitious plan to attack the overmountain 
settlements. Wishing to prevent the Creeks and Cherokees “from seeking satisfaction for 
any losses they may have sustained” at the hands of Georgians and South Carolinians, 
Brown suggested that “I should order the indians to drive the Virginia & Nth. Carolina 
Banditti who have forcible possession of their lands at Wattoga, Caen Tuck, & c - 1 mean 
Henderson’s settlement as it is generally called.”245
Brown discussed these matters with Balfour, who endorsed the destruction of Fort 
Rutledge in a letter to Cornwallis. Balfour believed that dismantling the fort would allow 
the Indians to move freely on the frontier, where there were many rebels, and “the nearer 
the Indians are brought to these gentry the better.” With regard to the proposed attack on 
the overmountain settlements, Balfour elaborated on Brown’s earlier arguments, but did 
not offer his own opinion. The overmountain settlers were “a sett of Banditti, who have 
settled by force upon the lands of the Creeks & Cherokees,” Balfour explained, and “had 
been allways complained of by the indians, as a grievous encroachment.” Brown had told 
Balfour that the British had promised to resolve that problem at the first opportunity, and 
that if they did not take action now, the Indians would be disappointed. Brown therefore
244 Brown to Cornwallis, June 18, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 166.
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planned “to wame the people, to leave, these lands in a certain time, and in case of non 
compliance to take the consequences.”246
Brown repeated his request to move against Watauga, telling Cornwallis on June 
28 that the Cherokees, who with the Creeks were sending a delegation to Augusta, would 
press the issue when they arrived. “At this juncture it perhaps will be more politic to 
secure the affections of our indian allies than to employ them on such services where 
there is a difficulty of discriminating between friends & foes,” Brown suggested. There 
would be no such problem at Watauga, because all the settlements there were “the 
asylum of plunderers & robbers” committed to the rebel cause. Brown also asked for 
money to assist almost seven hundred Indian families, who were in a “distressed 
miserable condition.”247
Before answering Brown, Cornwallis ordered Balfour to “explain to Col. Brown 
in the most positive Manner, that I wish to keep the Indians in good humour, but on no 
Account whatever to bring them forward or employ them.”248 The earl finally found time 
to reply to Brown on July 17 with a letter that must have shocked its recipient. “I will in a 
few words tell you my Ideas & wishes in regard to the Indians,” the earl bluntly 
announced. They were to be “kept in good humour by civil treatment & a proper 
distribution of such presents as are sent from England for that purpose, but I would on no 
Account employ them in any operations of War.” Although he approved the destruction 
of Fort Rutledge, Cornwallis dismissed the Cherokees’ complaints about the 
overmountain settlers as “too intricate for us to enter upon” at present; he advised Brown 
to placate them with a promise to rectify the matter in the future. Nor would Cornwallis
246 Balfour to Cornwallis, June 24, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 191.
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provide funds for the Indian department; Brown would have to make do with whatever 
presents had been allocated by the government. Since he did not intend “to make any 
Military Use of the Indians,” the earl declared, he could not “think myself justifyed in 
suffering the Publick to be put to any considerable Expence about them.” In any case, 
there was no need for charity. “If their Houses have been destroy’d, the Rebuilding an 
Indian Hut is no very expensive Affair, and I dare say they will get their usual Crops of 
Com this Year.” Cornwallis closed his harsh letter by citing a report from Gen. Campbell 
in Pensacola that the Creeks there “staid only as long as they could extort presents,” 
feasted on British provisions, and left just at the time Campbell thought a Spanish attack
249was imminent.
In an uncharacteristically rude manner, Cornwallis had made it clear that he 
considered the king’s Indian allies to be barely worth the expense required to maintain 
their allegiance. Although his decision undoubtedly saved the British treasury a few 
thousand pounds, Cornwallis’s shortsighted refusal to adopt Brown’s proposal to attack 
the overmountain settlements had serious consequences. Had he dispatched Brown to 
lead the Creeks and Cherokees against the Whigs there, Cornwallis would have removed 
a dangerous threat to his subsequent operations. Under Brown’s skillful leadership, a 
series of determined raids, even if unsuccessful in dislodging the setters, would have 
prevented the overmountain men from harassing the frontiers of Georgia and South 
Carolina; more importantly, the Wataugans would not have been able to act against 
Patrick Ferguson’s detachment in the autumn, which had such fatal consequences for the 
British and loyalists. As Isaac Shelby, who commanded some of the overmountain militia 
at King’s Mountain, later noted, reports that “these Indians were preparing for a
249 Cornwallis to Brown, July 17, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/78, 22.
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formidable attack upon us” at the time he marched against Ferguson, made him 
“unwilling that we should take away the whole disposable force of our counties.” The 
threatened Cherokee attack thus reduced the size of the force Shelby employed against 
Ferguson; an actual attack might have kept all of the overmountain rebels at home.250
Cornwallis had several reasons for choosing to keep the Indians idle. In Britain, 
the opposition in Parliament had again assailed the ministry for its Indian policy in the 
spring of 1780. Members especially criticized the Indian Department’s heavy 
expenditures. Lord Shelburne accused John Stuart of having reaped enormous personal 
profit from contracts to supply goods to the southern nations, without any substantial 
return to the government in the form of Indian assistance. This forced Germain, who was 
himself concerned with spiraling costs in the Indian department, to order officials in 
America to reduce expenses.251 Cornwallis also believed that Indians could contribute 
little to his military operations. He may have been influenced in this regard by James 
Simpson, with whom he had worked closely in Charleston. Simpson made it widely 
known that in his opinion and that of many other southern loyalists, the Indians “are not 
wanted .... With the Troops they are of no Use. To let them loose they would injure 
Friends as well as Foes.” Finally, Cornwallis recognized that assigning the Indians an 
active role might alienate many backcountry inhabitants, both loyalists as well as former 
Whigs who had taken the oath to Britain. Acting on Cornwallis’s instructions, Ferguson 
issued a proclamation when he entered North Carolina in September designed to reassure 
the inhabitants by denying rebel claims that the British planned to use Indians against
250 Isaac Shelby to the Public, April 1823, “Battle o f King’s Mountain October 7, 1780,” MAH, Vol. 4, No. 
5, Nov. 1880, 353.
251 Valentine, Lord North, 2:213; O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 102.
252 William Smith, Historical Memoirs, 155.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
384
them, pointing out instead that “the only Indians employ’d since the Invasion of Carolina 
are those of Catawbaw by the Rebels.”253
If Cornwallis did not wish to use the pro-British Indians, neither did he want the 
Catawbas to aid the Whigs. Lord Rawdon, arriving at the Waxhaws settlements on June 
11, noted that people there feared that “they shall be troubled by the Catawba Indians.” 
Rawdon reported that the Catawbas had “retired into North Carolina with their families” 
and movable property after hearing reports that the British troops were accompanied by a 
party of Cherokees. To prevent the Catawbas from raiding, Rawdon told local loyalists to 
inform them that if they returned and behaved well, they would receive protection, but if 
they molested the loyalists, “their settlement shall be utterly destroyed.”254
Despite Rawdon’s threats, Thomas Sumter used Catawba territory as the base 
where he organized his partisans in the summer of 1780. In addition to supplying 
Sumter’s men with food, the Catawbas contributed many volunteers to the rebel force. 
According to one estimate, two hundred Catawbas served with Sumter in his attacks 
against British posts at Rocky Mount and Hanging Rock. Some served with Sumter 
throughout the southern campaign and others joined William R. Davie’s partisan unit.255
Cornwallis thus deprived the British of Indian assistance while the Catawbas 
continued to aid the Whigs, and it was not long before South Carolina and Georgia felt 
the effects of the earl’s policy. In August, Evan McLaurin informed Balfour that “a Body 
of about 300 mountaineers from Wataga” were plundering the South Carolina frontier -  
the same men against whom Brown had intended to employ the Indians. McLaurin
253 Declaration o f Amnesty to Rebels, Sept. 9, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/64, 62.
254 Rawdon to Cornwallis, June 11,1780, Cornwallis Papers 30/11/2, No. 123.
255 Brown, Catawba Indians, 266-267, 270; Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: The Life and Campaigns o f  
General Thomas Sumter (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), 55.
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warned that the Wataugans “will be a Thom to us” unless the British built a fort near 
their settlements, which would provide a secure base from which the Indians could harass 
them. This, McLaurin believed, would keep the Wataugans home “for fear of exposing 
their families to the Indians.” If such a step were not taken “we shall not have either a 
quiet or an honest back Country,” McLaurin declared. “The Indians God knows are good 
for Little but still they are a Bugbear & then would ly between the Province & the 
Overhill Settlements so as to interrupt the Intercourse between them.”256
The vulnerability of the frontier posts became painfully evident on September 14, 
when Elijah Clarke attacked Augusta with six hundred men. The rebels opened their 
assault by striking the camp of several hundred Cherokees and Creeks outside the town; 
the Indians had come to confer with Brown. The surprise attack drove off the Indians 
before Brown arrived with his troops to assist them, but the rangers and Indians managed 
to recapture and occupy a stone house. The next day, fifty Cherokees crossed the 
Savannah River to reinforce Brown’s besieged force. The Indians and provincials held 
out until troops from Ninety Six relieved them on September 17. Joining the soldiers and 
militia in pursuit of the fleeing Whigs, the Indians seized and reportedly scalped several 
of Clarke’s men. Cruger praised the Indians’ performance in his report to Cornwallis.257
The sudden attack on Augusta, and the Indians’ valorous performance in the 
defense of that post, convinced Balfour that it was necessary to use Indians to protect the 
frontier. “I own the best mode, of at once stopping all these kind o f expeditions, appears 
to me to be, the employing the Indians, to clear certain districts, where these people 
retreat to, & resort,” he advised Cornwallis. Balfour noted that Andrew Williamson, who
256 Evan McLaurin to Balfour, Aug. 7, 1780, Emmet Collection # 6589, NYPL.
257 Cashin, K ing’s Ranger, 114-118; O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 103-104; Cruger to Cornwallis, Sept. 19, 
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had taken protection and was now providing the British with advice, agreed that allowing 
the Indians to attack rebel partisans, within “certain boundarys ... would certainly effect 
the purpose.” Balfour urged Cornwallis to act quickly, before the backcountry revolt 
“gains head, and becomes perhaps too powerful for any of our posts.”258 Cornwallis 
chose not to act, depriving himself of an excellent opportunity to convince the 
backcountry loyalists to cooperate with the Indians, since the latter’s contribution to the 
defense of Augusta was widely known.
British success in South Carolina had failed to secure the frontiers of that 
province or Georgia, but placed the rebels at too great a distance to threaten East Florida. 
Yet Governor Tonyn carefully watched the progress of the Spanish offensive in West 
Florida. With many troops having been transferred from his province to Georgia, Tonyn 
relied more than ever on Indians to defend St. Augustine. In July 1780, Germain gave the 
governor direct authority over the Seminoles, who remained steadfast despite British 
inability to provide them with adequate supplies and the efforts of Spanish agents to win 
their allegiance.259
British officials in West Florida were in even greater need of Indian assistance as 
Galvez continued his offensive by attacking Mobile in February. Hundreds of Choctaws 
had been camped near Mobile until early in the year, “but official stinginess and their 
own boredom drove them home,” so that only eighteen were present when the Spanish
Ofi(\arrived. The British also had problems with the Creeks. In January, Gov. Chester had 
made an unauthorized grant of Creek lands “to himself and others his Favorites and 
Dependents,” which provoked the Creeks to plunder some of the province’s inhabitants.
258 Balfour to Cornwallis, Sept. 20, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/64, 83.
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Furthermore, Campbell’s low opinion of Alexander Cameron hampered coordination 
between the army and the Indian department. Campbell considered the superintendent 
“no wise qualified ... to act but in a subordinate Degree” and asserted that Cameron was 
“lost, bewildered ... and unequal to the Task” assigned him.261
Despite this turmoil, the Indian agents responded quickly to the Spanish attack. 
Charles Stuart ordered Farquhar Bethune to bring as many Choctaws as possible to 
relieve Mobile; six hundred Indians were en route when they learned of the town’s 
surrender, whereupon most returned home. Bethune brought the remaining two hundred 
to Pensacola. Stuart had remained at Mobile, was captured by the Spaniards, and died of 
an illness soon afterwards. Alexander Cameron blamed Campbell for the loss of Mobile, 
complaining that the general’s habit of summoning the Indians every time a Spanish 
attack was rumored and then dismissing them when the threat failed to materialize had 
alienated the Indians to a point where they would soon refuse to assist the British at all.262
Cameron’s assessment of the potentially harmful effects of Campbell’s policy was 
correct, although the superintendent underestimated the Indians’ tolerance. The Choctaws 
who went to Pensacola participated in Campbell’s unsuccessful effort to relieve Mobile, 
covering the flanks of the British column and roving ahead to gather intelligence.263 
When Campbell withdrew after learning of Mobile’s surrender, he left fifty Choctaws to 
keep watch and send warning if the Spaniards marched to Pensacola. Again, however,
261 John Campbell to Clinton, Feb. 10, 1780, Carleton Papers, Vol. 21, No. 2565.
262 Alexander Cameron to Clinton, July 18, 1780, RAM, 2:159; Cameron to Germain, July 18, 1780, DAR, 
18:124; O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 96-97.
263 Waldeck, Diary, 149, 152-153.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
388
Campbell grew tired of the expense for provisions and presents and dismissed the 
Indians, thus depriving himself of information on Spanish activity around Mobile.264
In late March, believing that Galvez intended to attack Pensacola, Campbell 
called upon the Indians for aid. By early April, at the same time that Germain was 
frantically composing orders for Campbell to unite the Chickasaws, Cherokees, and 
Creeks to defend what remained of West Florida, nearly sixteen hundred Creeks and 
Choctaws had arrived in the town. Germain distrusted the Choctaws, whom he suspected 
harbored pro-Spanish sympathies 265 Some officers shared Germain’s suspicions. “We 
can trust the Creeks a bit more than the Choctaws,” Philipp Waldeck wrote, because the 
latter “tend to favor the Spanish.” Nevertheless, the Choctaws’ martial appearance 
impressed him. “What a wonderful regiment could be made of them,” Waldeck stated. 
“But would they accept discipline? Discipline is something about which they know 
nothing. Even the chief does not control them.”266
Campbell expressed his appreciation for the Indians’ support at a meeting with 
Creek leaders on April 12 and promised them presents, but he could not restrain himself 
from criticizing the Creeks for killing some livestock. The Creek leader replied that his 
people had come to fight the Spaniards, not to get presents. He declared that his people 
had killed livestock “in youthful exuberance” rather than from hunger. Apparently aware 
that his remarks had upset the Creeks, Campbell said nothing about the Indians’ behavior 
at a meeting the next day with the Choctaws. Campbell’s patience must have been 
severely strained by May 1, when Waldeck noted that the Indians were committing “all
264 Alexander Cameron to Clinton, July 18, 1780, RAM, 2:159.
265 John Campbell to Germain, May 15, 1780, DAR, 18:93; O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 98; Osbom, 
“John Campbell,” 329.
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sorts of excesses. They get drunk and then are unmanageable. Today they even attacked 
our own outpost.”267 Cameron had hoped to keep the Indians active by sending them to 
harass the Spaniards around Mobile, but Campbell disapproved, fearing they would 
commit “indiscriminate murder.” With nothing to do, the Indians “sold most of their 
provisions for rum ... and when very drunk they were very insolent and obstreperous,” yet 
Campbell, needing their aid against the Spanish, chose to ignore their behavior.268
If the Indians created problems for Campbell, they created greater difficulty for 
Galvez, who realized that they represented a serious obstacle to an attack on Pensacola.
In an effort to remove the advantage the Indians provided the British, Galvez wrote to 
Campbell in April suggesting that neither side employ them. Reviewing what he 
considered the brutal aspects of Indian warfare, Galvez argued that in the interest of 
humanity the Indians should not be allowed to take part in the conflict. Campbell replied 
that Indians in British service always acted “under proper leaders” who prevented the 
cruelties that Galvez described. He rejected the Spaniard’s proposal as “insulting and 
injurious to reason and common sense.” Galvez’s proposal convinced Campbell that the 
Indians were indeed an asset to the British. Reluctantly, Campbell conceded that the 
Indians’ presence had prevented Galvez from launching his attack.270
Cameron agreed, telling Gen. Clinton that British retention of Pensacola “is 
entirely owing to the great numbers of Indians that speedily repaired hither to our 
assistance.” The superintendent remained dissatisfied with Campbell’s treatment of the 
Indians; he complained to Germain that Campbell “thinks they are to be used like slaves
267 Waldeck, Diary, 160-166.
268 Alexander Cameron to Germain, July 18, 1780, DAR, 18:120-121.
269 Osborn, “John Campbell,” 332-334.
270 Galvez to John Campbell, April 9, 1780, Carleton Papers, Vol. 22, No. 2681; John Campbell to Galvez, 
April 20, 1780, Carleton Papers, Vol. 22, No. 2692.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
390
or a people void of natural sense.”271 As Cameron noted, the Indians’ role in protecting 
Pensacola certainly had not improved the general’s opinion of them. The general sent 
Germain a litany of his grievances, which included the “unbounded waste” in the Indian 
department and the need to civilize “these barbarians” by teaching them English concepts 
of property ownership and settling them in English-style towns.272
Continued disagreements between Cameron and Campbell threatened to paralyze 
the Indian department. When Cameron asked the general to enlist fifty white men to lead 
the Indians in battle, Campbell allowed Cameron only four, and soon afterward decided 
that the expense was unnecessary and told Cameron to dismiss them. Campbell also was 
parsimonious when Cameron requested presents for the Indians, disgusting the 
superintendent and his deputies who believed that gifts were essential to keep the 
Indians’ allegiance. Cameron’s request that one hundred Indians be placed on duty as 
scouts was refused, and Campbell further advised the superintendent not to receive Creek 
visitors but to send them to Thomas Brown at Augusta, since Brown was the Creeks’ 
agent. Cameron believed that Campbell’s actions jeopardized the British-Indian 
alliance.273
While Campbell and Cameron feuded, many Indians left Pensacola and others 
listened to the importunities of Spanish agents. The Upper Creeks at Pensacola had begun 
“to grow sickly” by mid-June and decided to return home, promising that they would be 
“relieved by fresh parties from different parts of the Nation.” Charles Shaw ordered 
Alexander McGillivray to accompany the Creeks to their towns to counter growing 
Spanish influence. According to Shaw, the Spaniards had gained a foothold in two towns
271 Quoted in Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 177.
272 Osborn, “John Campbell,” 334.
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whose inhabitants had been “in the Rebel interest” and “seduced a few of them to Visit 
Governor Galvez at Mobile, who has promised to load them with Presents and Rum.”
One of George Galphin’s sons was also urging the Creeks to visit the Spanish governor. 
Shaw advised Thomas Brown to invite “the Chiefs that may lean toward the Spanish 
interest to visit him at Augusta,” where Brown’s influence might “fix them firmly in His 
Majestys interest.”274
Growing Spanish influence among the Choctaws also troubled British officials. In 
the fall, Campbell informed Clinton that reports indicated that the Choctaws were “in the 
greatest torment, tumult, and confusion, from the contest between the British and Spanish 
parties.” Campbell believed that the British would maintain the Choctaws’ loyalty, but 
conceded that “our success is far from being clear and certain.”275
Unfortunately, Campbell himself remained the most serious obstacle to the 
maintenance of good relations between Britain and the Indians. On August 26, a party of 
Choctaws arrived in Pensacola to report that they had met with Galvez and “received 
presents ... but were dissatisfied with them.” Believing that the Choctaws intended to 
auction their allegiance to the highest bidder, British officials told them that because they 
had gone to the Spaniards, they would receive nothing. When the Choctaws apologized 
and pledged to support the British, they were given presents. Then, to demonstrate their 
sincerity, the Choctaws killed and scalped three Spanish soldiers they found east of 
Mobile. The Choctaws brought the scalps to Pensacola, “but received no reward, and for 
their cruelty... were treated with contempt.”276
274 Charles Shaw to Germain, June 19, 1780, Germain Papers, Vol. 12, WLCL.
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The Spaniards had been part of a truce party en route to Pensacola, and their 
deaths prompted Galvez to send a letter of protest to Campbell, in which he threatened to 
allow Spain’s Indian allies to retaliate in kind. Campbell in turn reprimanded Mingo 
Pouscouche, the Choctaw leader. Angered by what he considered a ridiculous 
consideration for the Spanish enemy, Pouscouche replied that in the future his followers 
would kill any Spaniard they encountered, regardless of age or sex. In the autumn, 
Choctaw parties attacked the Spanish near Mobile and brought three scalps and a 
captured family to Pensacola in a defiant display of their independence. Having learned a 
lesson, Campbell refrained from comment and obtained the family’s release in exchange 
for presents.277
Farther west, beyond the reach of interference from Campbell or Cornwallis, the 
Chickasaws guarded the Mississippi River and blocked rebel plans to expand in that 
direction. They frequently seized rebel vessels trading with New Orleans, boarding the 
boats and “knocking the crew on the head.”278 When Virginia soldiers constructed Fort 
Jefferson below the mouth of the Ohio River on Chickasaw territory in April 1780 and 
settlers built homes nearby, the Chickasaws refused to tolerate the incursion. Led by 
loyalist James Colbert, they drove the settlers into the fort, burned the houses, and 
harassed the garrison. With their supplies cut off, the defenders faced surrender before 
the arrival of a relief force saved them. The Chickasaw reaction, however, convinced 
Virginia officials that the post was untenable. It was abandoned in June 1781. The
• • 279Chickasaws also rebuffed Spanish efforts to undermine their attachment to Britain.
The Diverse Experiences of African Americans
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The arrival of Clinton’s army in South Carolina gave slaves there the opportunity 
that they had long awaited to seek freedom with the British troops. Thousands of slaves, 
sometimes with the encouragement of British officers, escaped to the army. Many did 
find freedom, although they still spent their days at hard labor, while others found 
themselves back in bondage under new masters. Despite such disappointments, African 
Americans contributed consistently and significantly to the British army’s success.
Realizing that fugitive slaves would strengthen the British in their operations 
against Charleston, Whig John Laurens sought to preempt this by renewing his efforts to 
arm South Carolina’s slaves. He received considerable support from Benjamin Lincoln, 
who reminded state officials that the British army’s successful use of black troops at the 
siege of Savannah proved that slaves could fight effectively. That argument failed to 
sway the governor and Council, although they agreed to assign slaves to work on 
Charleston’s fortifications. Lincoln then demanded a reinforcement of two thousand 
militia for the defense of Charleston, and said that if the state could not provide them, 
they would have to arm an equal number of blacks instead. Governor Rutledge ignored 
the request.280 At the end of February, a frustrated Lincoln insisted that Rutledge 
immediately reinforce his army with “Black Volunteers” or the general would withdraw
981the Continental troops from Charleston. Officials refused to bend to Lincoln’s threat, 
correctly assuming that he would not carry it out. As the siege progressed, it became 
increasingly difficult to procure slaves to work on the defenses; one observer noted that
280 Lincoln to John Rutledge, Jan. 30,1780; Feb. 14, 1780, Lincoln Papers, BPL; Mattem, Benjamin 
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“the few Negroes remaining in Town are obliged to be pressed daily, & kept under guard, 
as the masters as well as the Slaves, were unwilling they should work.”282
The Whigs did permit a handful of blacks to serve aboard the state’s armed row 
galley Revenge because a shortage of white seamen left them no other option.283 In 
addition, a German officer recorded that his detachment was ambushed four miles from 
Charleston on March 30 by three hundred rebel “light infantry and Negroes.” If he was 
correct, the blacks were not part of an official unit. More likely, he mistook black 
laborers and officers’ servants with the Whigs for soldiers, although there is a slight 
possibility that a rebel officer may have armed some slaves on his own initiative.284
While the Whigs risked the success of their cause rather than tamper with the 
institution of slavery, large numbers of slaves threw off their bondage. To them “the 
arrival of the British army was a liberating moment.”285 One of Clinton’s officers, Lt.
Col. James Webster, sent patrols into the countryside to post “placards encouraging 
Negroes to come into the English lines.”286 Most slaves could not read these notices, but 
that was not necessary. “Great hordes of Negroes followed the army partially for want of
987 •food and partially to escape from their masters,” one observer noted. Clinton’s aide, 
Maj. John Andre, wrote on March 4 that five hundred blankets were needed for blacks 
who had come to the army.288 Slave women as well as men fled to the king’s troops.
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Fifteen of fifty-three runaways on John Ball’s plantation were women. One, a slave 
named Charlotte, escaped on May 10, was returned to Ball, and soon escaped again with 
fourteen other slaves. Many slave women took their children with them. More than one- 
third of the slaves evacuated from Savannah in 1782 were women, and nearly one-fourth 
were children.289
Some slaves who came to Clinton’s army brought prisoners with them. At the end 
of February, three blacks arrived with a British deserter; they had ignored the soldier’s 
efforts to persuade them to bring him to Charleston. The deserter’s commanding officer, 
Maj. James Wemyss, permitted the blacks to testify at the man’s court martial.290 An 
astute black man helped the British capture two Whig officials, Council member Edward 
Rutledge and the Marquis de Malmedy, a French officer in American service, on May 3. 
Rutledge, Malmedy, and two other men had fled Charleston by boat, but encountered 
British troops when they came ashore. Rutledge and Malmedy eluded the soldiers, then 
met the slave and asked him to lead them past the troops. Instead the man took them to 
the British lines, whereupon the enraged Malmedy drew his sword and attacked the 
guide, who defended himself with a knife. Both men were wounded, but the altercation
9Q1attracted British soldiers who seized the two Whigs.
Not all blacks went to the British voluntarily; officers repeatedly sent out 
detachments to gather slaves to assist the army. Many of these slaves had been left behind 
by their masters, sometimes under the supervision of wives and children, but often
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without any white supervision at all.292 The army’s seizure of slaves aroused the enmity 
of white South Carolinians, who, a Hessian officer wrote, “hated us because we carried 
off their Negroes and livestock.”293 Loyalists as well as Whigs resented the loss of their 
slaves, especially when their attempts to recover them failed.294
British officers remained uncertain of how to deal with the large number of 
fugitives flocking to them. Slaves represented a large and valuable pool of laborers for 
the army and simultaneously diminished the rebels’ labor resources. However, far more 
slaves came to the army than it could possibly employ, and all of the fugitives, whether 
employed or not, needed to be fed and clothed. Clinton also worried that any attempt on 
his part to fundamentally change the slave system would alienate white loyalists and 
make it harder to reconcile former rebels.295
Before the army left New York, the British had given some consideration to how 
they should handle the slave issue once they had control of Charleston. An unnamed 
official suggested that Clinton “publish a Proclamation relative to Negroes; ordering all 
such as may come in, to give their Names, together with their Masters Names, and former 
places of Abode,” to the newly appointed civil officials, who would then designate a 
person to enroll the blacks and provide them with certificates proving that they had 
voluntarily offered their services. Those blacks who did not have such certificates, except 
for slaves whose masters resided in Charleston, “must be imprisoned; this will prevent 
the bad effects found at New York, and put it in the Generals power to make the proper
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use of them in labouring for the different departments.”296 The author intended that the 
British should make use of African American volunteers, but avoid the difficulties that 
would ensue if large numbers of slaves fled to the army and then remained in Charleston, 
or followed the troops, without employment. Having numerous unidentified and 
unregulated slaves in the vicinity of the army, the author believed, would create problems 
both for the army and for civilians and could impede the pacification of South Carolina.
Patrick Ferguson submitted his own proposal for using the slaves to fortify key 
posts, which would enable a limited number of regulars, supported by loyal militia, to 
maintain control in South Carolina and Georgia. Ferguson suggested that blacks already 
with the army, along with others seized from rebel owners, could construct the 
fortifications. These slaves could be “allow’d rebel lands to Cultivate for their 
Subsistance & half their time for that Purpose,” and spend their remaining time fortifying 
the posts at little expense to the British.297
Clinton had already devised a plan before he received Ferguson’s suggestions. On 
February 13, the general appointed Lt. Col. James Moncrief and two civilians, George 
Hay and James Fraser, to act as commissaries of captures. Their duty was to gather 
“Negroes, Cattle, Rice, Forage, and other Articles serviceable to the Army” from 
abandoned plantations and distribute them for “the use, Convenience & benefit of the
90STroops.” In little more than a month, the commissaries reported that they had taken up
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317 blacks and assigned them to various military departments. Seventy were employed 
by the quartermaster general, ninety-six with the engineers, thirty-five with the 
commissary general, sixty with the artillery, six with the provost marshal, and five in the 
hospital. The commissaries retained the other forty-five to assist in gathering supplies.299
In early April, Clinton issued additional orders stating that “Negroes will also be 
Wanting and as their employment will save the Troops much Toyl & Fatigue -  The 
General orders whenever they may be taken from the Enemy they be sent immediately” 
to one of the commissaries of captures. These slaves would then be apportioned “to each 
Corps as soon as there shall be enough Collected for the Publick Service.”300 By April 28, 
the number of blacks assigned to the royal artillery as carpenters, collar-makers, and 
laborers had increased to 154.301
As Clinton intended, black labor freed hundreds of British troops from fatiguing 
duties and allowed them to participate in the siege operations. He had brought two 
companies of black pioneers from Savannah and assigned them to repair roads and 
bridges.302 The slaves who joined the army in South Carolina helped British soldiers and 
sailors carry supplies forward as the army advanced. When the British crossed the Ashley 
River at the end of March, “Negroes moved the cannons, munitions, and provisions” to 
the new position.303 Blacks also fortified the many positions the army occupied during 
Clinton’s cautious approach to Charleston. On April 9, 134 African Americans used a
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1, WLCL.
300 Captain [Abraham] Depeyster Orderly Book, Misc. Microfilms Reel 29, NYHS.
301 Return o f Negroes employ’d in the Service o f the Royal Artillery, April 28, 1780, Clinton Papers, Vol. 
95, No. 27, WLCL.
302 Bauer, “1780 Siege o f Charleston,” Part 1, SCHM, Vol. 88, No. 1, Jan. 1987, 28; John Wilson, 
“Lieutenant John Wilson’s ‘Journal o f the Siege o f Charleston,”’ Joseph I. Waring, ed., SCHM, Vol. 66, 
No. 3, July 1965, 176.
303 Bartholomai, “Diary,” Diaries o f  Two Anspach Jaegers, 127.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
399
specially designed cart to haul four British gunboats and two flatboats overland from the 
Ashley to the Cooper River. Other blacks accompanied British and Hessian foraging 
parties, helping to round up cattle and bring them to the army’s camps. After Charleston’s 
surrender, Clinton assigned black workers the task of dismantling the British siege works 
outside the town, and within ten days they completed the bulk of the w ork.304
The British corps that marched from Savannah to Charleston also employed 
blacks in various capacities, such as driving cattle and sheep collected from rebel 
plantations, but they were kept under strict supervision.305 All African Americans with 
the detachment were required to carry passes and “March regularly with the Baggage of 
their Several Battalions.”306 The troops were also prohibited from allowing refugee slaves 
to join them; orders stated that “every Negroe Vagabond & Stragler is Positively forbid to 
follow the Army under pain of the most severe and Immediate punishment.”307
As important as slaves’ labor was to British success in the Charleston campaign, 
the information that blacks provided was of even greater value, even if it was sometimes 
inaccurate. An escaped slave who left Charleston in mid-February gave British officers a 
fairly precise estimate of rebel strength, but mistakenly reported that the Whigs planned 
to attack the detachment marching north from Savannah. Another slave who reached the 
British a few days later brought an accurate report of Lincoln’s position. As the siege 
progressed, escaping through the American defensive lines became extremely dangerous, 
yet blacks continued to make the effort. Duncan, the slave of a Charleston artisan, fled
304 Ewald, Diary o f  the American War, 203, 221, 225; Bauer, “1780 Siege o f Charleston,” Part 2, 64, 70; 
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from the town and gave Major Andre a detailed report on the situation of the rebel army 
and the quantity of provisions in the town. Several blacks reached British lines on April 3 
with news that reinforcements from North Carolina had recently arrived in Charleston; 
they also provided information on Whig casualties. On May 3, five slaves arrived with a 
report that supply shortages had reduced the defenders to half rations.308
Some information from slaves enabled the British to surprise and defeat various 
Whig detachments. A black man informed Maj. Gen. Johann Christoph Von Huyn on the 
night of March 22 that five rebels were lurking less than a mile away. Von Huyn 
promptly dispatched a patrol to the place his informant had indicated. The Hessians 
captured four of the five Americans, who had been sent to seize a sentry in order to 
obtain information.309
While marching to attempt a night attack on Whig cavalry posted at Monk’s 
Comer, Banastre Tarleton’s troops captured a slave whose information enabled Tarleton 
to win a crushing victory on April 13. The prisoner, Thomas Johnston, was carrying a 
military dispatch for the rebels and from the information it contained, along with 
Johnston’s report, which Tarleton “purchased for a few dollars,” the British commander 
obtained complete information of the American position. Tarleton put this knowledge to 
good use in an assault that surprised and routed the rebels. He then sent a detachment 
forward to capture a second American post at Biggin’s Bridge. The British captured one
T 1 0hundred prisoners, four hundred horses, and fifty wagons loaded with supplies. The 
following night, “two Negroes came in” to Patrick Ferguson’s camp at Monk’s Comer
308 Bartholomai, “Diary,” Diaries o f  Two Anspach Jaegers, 111, 113; Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 
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with information that twenty rebel cavalrymen were concealed in a nearby swamp. Capt. 
Abraham Depeyster and twenty men found and attacked the Whigs, killing two and 
capturing one man and five horses.311
British officers recognized that blacks’ ability to travel between the lines with 
relative ease could be a problem if some slaves were acting as spies for the rebels. On 
March 14, Captain Hinrichs warned Cornwallis that “it was very easy, especially for 
Negroes,” to pass between British outposts. Cornwallis promptly tightened security
- j i j
around the army’s camps. Two slaves accused of being rebel spies were tried by a 
British court martial on March 24. Twelve days earlier, a black man had told Hessian 
guards on James Island that three Whigs were coming that night to spy on the British 
army. Following their informant’s directions, the Hessians found a boat and two slaves 
named Fortune and May. Shortly afterward, the troops captured two Charleston residents, 
John Witta and William Sterling. The whites insisted that they had come to the island to 
check on their families, but a Hessian standing guard at Sterling’s house testified that a 
second black informant had warned him that he was in danger of being captured or killed 
by the two Whigs. Sterling and Witta were probably imprisoned, while Fortune and May 
won acquittal by testifying that “they were obliged by order of their Master to row [the
TITwhites] over, which they did, or they would have been severely beat.” British officers’ 
willingness to allow blacks to testify at courts martial, in their own defense or against 
whites, indicates a growing respect for slaves, who had demonstrated their intelligence 
and reliability by consistently providing the army with reliable information.
311 Uzal Johnson, Diary, April 14, 1780, SCDAH.
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Blacks also assisted the British in other ways. In February, “a captured Negro 
boy” acted as a guide for Lt. Col. Webster’s detachment on its march to Stono Ferry.314 
Hessian Capt. Johann Ewald noted that the boy “spoke such a poor dialect that he was 
extremely hard to understand.” When Ewald’s troops received orders on February 19 to 
form three parties and “collect information about the enemy and to hunt up Negroes and 
livestock,” each party had a black guide, but again problems arose because the troops 
could not understand the slaves’ dialect. However, during their excursion, the troops 
found a household slave “who agreed quite sensibly to tell the truth about everything.” 
Ewald brought the slave to Gen. Alexander Leslie, who found him “to be a great 
treasure” when he provided detailed information on American strength and positions.315
Finally, slaves fulfilled the role Germain had originally envisioned for them by 
reducing the number of men available to defend Charleston. When Gov. Rutledge 
ordered Col. Benjamin Garden to send reinforcements to the town at the beginning of 
March, he instructed Garden to retain half of his militia “for keeping the Negroes in 
Order.”316
While blacks’ contributions to the success of the British campaign earned them 
the respect of many army officers, their plight as slaves won them sympathy as well. 
During and after the siege of Charleston, Clinton’s troops had an opportunity to observe 
the conditions of slavery, and often they did not like what they saw. Sgt. Roger Lamb of 
the Royal Welsh Fusiliers was amazed to find “almost every white man, in this boasted 
land of liberty, keeping a great number of slaves!” Lamb believed that South Carolinians 
would be targeted for divine punishment because they promoted “that abominable and
314 Hinrichs, “Diary,” in Uhlendorf, ed., Siege o f  Charleston, 185.
315 Ewald, Diary o f  the American War, 197, 199, 202.
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notorious traffic, the slave trade. How any people pretending, as the Americans do, to the 
profession of Christianity, can dare to drive on an horrible traffic in the blood of their 
fellow creatures ... is a dreadful solecism, at which a Pagan may laugh.” Lamb added that 
his revulsion at this “deplorable evil” was widespread in the army.317
German observers were particularly vociferous in their criticism of slavery. Carl 
Bauer of the Grenadier Battalion Platte found that slaves who worked as personal 
servants were “kept well,” but that field slaves were treated “contrary to all humanity.” 
He described them as naked, underfed, forced to dwell in “miserable huts,” and subject to 
horrifying punishments. “For little faults they are hung up, tied by both hands, and 
whipped dreadfully on their bare backs,” Bauer wrote. “In proportion to their crime an 
iron nail is sometimes tied to the whip.” However, Bauer also believed that slaves were 
“as obstinate as undomesticated cattle.”318 Lt. Christian Bartholomai expressed “great 
sympathy” for the slaves’ misery and “asked why the negroes on the land are treated so 
hard and miserably here.” South Carolinians replied that they could only “insure their 
safety from insurrection and destruction by employing the whip and fear” and declared 
that blacks were lazy “and must always be driven to work with a whip.” Hessian units 
recruited at least forty-seven blacks in South Carolina, most of whom served as 
drummers. This was a more consequential contribution than may appear, since the 
addition of a black drummer allowed a white soldier to return to the combat ranks. Other
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former slaves worked as servants, teamsters, and equipment porters. In general, German 
soldiers showed a “tolerant attitude” toward blacks.320
Not all of the king’s soldiers looked as kindly upon slaves. When the Queen’s 
Rangers, a provincial unit, returned to New York after the Charleston campaign, the 
troops smuggled a slave man and woman aboard ship. When one of their officers,
Stephen Jarvis, discovered the slaves, he sold them in New York and distributed the 
proceeds among everyone in his unit. When Lt. Col. John Graves Simcoe learned of the 
transaction, he convened a court of enquiry, which reprimanded Jarvis.321
Like the men of the Queen’s Rangers, neither Clinton nor Cornwallis showed any 
particular sympathy for the slaves. After appointing the commissaries of captures,
Clinton took no further action in regard to slaves until May 20, when he informed 
Cornwallis that he would leave orders to “prevent the Confusion that would arise from a 
further desertion of them to us.” The commander-in-chief believed that blacks could best 
be employed “on abandoned Plantations, on which they may subsist.” Until he could 
devise a better plan to deal with refugee slaves, Clinton authorized Cornwallis to “make 
such Arrangements as will discourage their joining us.”322 Clinton had no intention of 
issuing a southern version of his Phillipsburg Proclamation, which he had issued in New 
York on June 30, 1779. In that document, Clinton announced that “any Negro the 
property of a Rebel, who may take refuge with any part of this army,” would not be sold 
or given up to any claimant. Furthermore, he promised “every Negro who shall desert the 
Rebel Standard, full security to follow within these Lines any occupation which he may
320 George Fenwick Jones, “The Black Hessians: Negroes Recruited by the Hessians in South Carolina and 
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think proper.” Since slaves were far more numerous in South Carolina than in New 
York, Clinton probably thought that the army could not employ all those who might 
come in and preferred them to remain at home where they would not complicate the 
army’s movements or require management and subsistence.
Clinton did permit some of the fugitives to accompany the army to New York. He 
allowed each regiment to take along ten blacks to be employed as pioneers, as long as 
their masters had been in rebellion at the time the slaves fled to the army. Clinton also 
ordered that none of the former slaves were to be taken to New York without their 
consent. About five hundred South Carolina slaves sailed north with the army in early 
June.324
Before leaving Charleston, Clinton took further steps to deal with the slaves. On 
May 27, he issued a proclamation appointing Robert Power, William Carson, and Robert 
Ballingall custodians of all fugitive slaves. The proclamation ordered everyone “who may 
have any slaves belonging to the Inhabitants of this Province in their custody or 
possession” to “forthwith deliver them” to the three commissioners. Clinton, however, 
did not explain what the commissioners were supposed to do with these slaves.325 A week 
later, Clinton sent Cornwallis and Patterson some suggestions for dealing with slaves. 
After conceding that the issue was so complex that “it is impossible to settle any thing 
positive,” Clinton reminded the two generals that priority should be given to putting the 
province’s lands back into productive cultivation. He recommended that slaves owned by 
loyalists should be returned, on the master’s pledge that they would not be punished for 
fleeing. If masters broke their word and punished slaves, the slaves would be forfeited to
323 Proclamation o f Sir Henry Clinton, June 30, 1779, Clinton Papers, Vol. 62, No. 28, WLCL.
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the government. Clinton was more generous toward rebel-owned slaves. These, he said,
“belong to the Public; and after serving it faithfully during the war are entitled to their
Freedom.” Until the war’s end, these slaves would work in the various military and civil
departments and be provided with “adequate Pay, Provision, and Cloathing.” Clinton then
offered an intriguing idea: “Why not settle the Negroes on Forfeited Lands after the
war?” he asked.326 In spite of his reluctance to deal directly with the difficult issue of
emancipation, Clinton clearly recognized the value of slaves’ services and showed a
willingness to free at least some slaves and give them the means to support themselves
once the rebels had been subdued.
Dissatisfied with these instructions, for reasons he did not express, Cornwallis
asked the commander-in-chief for further directions. “All I can do about Negroes is
already directed to be done,” Clinton replied. “But Care must be taken that they are not ill
treated -  Something is now in Contemplation.”
Whatever else Clinton had in mind, he never communicated it to Cornwallis, thus
forcing the earl to devise his own policy. Determining the disposition of thousands of
slaves was one of the most complex of the many problems Cornwallis faced; Tarleton
described the difficulties involved in formulating a policy in a situation where loyalist
slaveowners and freedom-seeking slaves were entirely at odds:
It is here necessary to observe, that all the negroes, men, women, and 
children, upon the approach of any detachment of the King’s troops, 
thought themselves entirely absolved from all respect to their American 
masters, and entirely released from servitude: Influenced by this idea, 
they quitted the plantations, and followed the army; which behaviour 
caused neglect of cultivation, proved detrimental to the King’s troops,
326 Clinton to Commandant o f  Charlestown and Cornwallis, June 3, 1780, Carleton Papers, Vol. 23, No. 
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and occasioned continual disputes about property of this description.328
Tarleton, whose father had amassed a fortune in the slave trade, was less 
sympathetic to slaves than many other British officers, but he accurately pointed out the 
complexity of the issue. The southern army could not be fed unless slaves raised the 
necessary crops, and many slaves would not work on the plantations without white 
supervision. Keeping the slaves in bondage thus served one of the army’s essential needs, 
yet the British could not be expected to retain the loyalty of people who had come to 
them seeking freedom only to be returned to their plantations. It was a dilemma that 
British leaders never solved.
Cornwallis decided to instruct the board of police to appoint three commissioners 
of claims to settle questions of slave ownership and to manage the slaves who had taken 
refuge with the British. The board selected Carson and Ballingall, whom Clinton had 
appointed in May, along with Thomas Inglis, and the trio set about returning some 
fugitives to loyalist owners, while assigning others owned by Whigs still in rebellion to 
John Cruden, the commissioner of sequestered estates. Many more blacks were put to 
work on Charleston’s fortifications or hired out to various departments of the army. Some 
eight hundred slaves were assigned to the engineer and ordnance departments.329 Tarleton 
approved of Cornwallis’s solution, noting that the commissioners soon “produced 
arrangements equally useful to the military and inhabitants.”330 James Simpson agreed.
He pronounced the earl’s plan “perfectly Satisfactory,” but complained that as intendant
328 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 89-90.
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of the board of police he was still “almost pestered to Death with Vexatious Complaints 
about the Negroes.”331
Cruden, a North Carolina loyalist, had his share of problems as well. He held 
responsibility for some one hundred plantations that belonged to people in rebellion or 
absent from South Carolina. These properties were sequestered, which meant that Cruden 
held them in trust until the government determined whether or not they should be 
returned to their owners. Meanwhile, Cruden had to manage more than five thousand 
slaves assigned to put the lands into production to support the army. He had more slaves 
than he could usefully employ on the plantations, so he hired some out to various army 
departments and assigned one to carry messages to Cornwallis. Nevertheless, Cruden 
tried to induce more blacks to join the British by paying cash rewards to those “most 
forward in coming to the lines.”332
Fugitives who found themselves assigned to plantation work or to menial tasks 
with the army often disliked their new status as much as their previous bondage and 
rebelled or fled. In July, Nisbet Balfour had to send British regulars to suppress an 
insurrection on the sequestered plantation of Ralph Izard. Balfour ordered the troops to 
punish those responsible for the uprising.333
Slaves employed by the army departments were assigned separate living areas, 
received poor quality rations in comparison to white troops, and lacked access to medical 
care. “Overworked and undernourished, they fell easy prey to disease.”334 The result, as a 
Briton attached to the army hospital observed, was that many blacks assigned to work
331 McCowen, British Occupation, 101,103.
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there “have taken the first opportunity of Deserting from their Duty.” Other slaves 
serving on British naval vessels also fled when sent ashore to get supplies.335
Several of Henry Laurens’s slaves had been taken by the British, but deserted and 
returned home. These slaves disliked their overseer, and on their return notified James 
Custer, Laurens’s manager, that they would not serve under that individual again. Custer 
believed that he had no choice but to grant their request and promised that the slaves 
could choose the plantation at which they would work.336 Laurens’s literate slave Samuel 
Massey informed his master that more than fifteen slaves on one plantation had left “with 
the kings people,” although one had since returned. Massey added that most of the slaves 
there “can hardly be purSwaided to Stay,” but those at another plantation “are all for 
Staying at home.” 337The ability to go to the British gave these slaves a great deal of 
leverage in negotiating the terms of their bondage.
Many blacks simply did not want to remain slaves or live in conditions similar to 
slavery, regardless of whether their masters were loyalist or Whig, British or American. 
From the capture of Charleston until the American army surrounded the town and cut off 
all escape routes in the spring of 1782, large numbers of South Carolina slaves continued 
to escape white control in search of freedom. George Turnbull complained in September 
1780 that work on the fortifications of Camden had been slowed by the slaves’ frequent 
desertions.338 The fugitives included field hands, artisans, and personal servants, some of 
the latter belonging to loyalist officers. Most were men, although many women and 
children also escaped. Some mingled with free blacks, slaves, and refugees in Charleston;
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others sought passage to New York or went to rural areas. The risk of flight was so great 
that one man advertising thirty slaves for sale boasted that they had “never quitted the 
plantation or their work in the most alluring times.”339
In an effort to stop blacks from fleeing, British officials made concessions to 
placate them. The board of police took the first step in June 1780, ruling in accordance 
with Clinton’s orders that slaves who had escaped from loyalist owners would be 
returned, but that they would not be punished. As the army grew more dependent on 
black labor, Balfour went a step further, issuing an order on February 9, 1781 that no 
slave “attached to any of the publick departments” could be returned to an owner without 
the slave’s “own, free consent.” Instead, the government would compensate the owners 
of slaves who refused to return, paying them one shilling six pence per day for skilled 
workers and eight pence for laborers. The British army would also feed and clothe these 
slaves.340 Even William Bull, who declared that blacks had become “ungovernable,” 
recognized that they could no longer be treated with the harshness practiced before the 
Revolution. He personally pardoned two slaves sentenced to death for robbery and 
suspended the death sentence of a free black convicted of burglary.341
Some of the slaves who left the state were carried off by their masters in the 
weeks following Charleston’s surrender. Both John Lewis Gervais and Gov. Rutledge
339 This information is compiled from advertisements for runaway slaves that appeared in the South 
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attempted to send their slaves to North Carolina, but the evacuation was “Stoped ... by the 
Tories” and the slaves sent “back to our respective plantations,” Gervais stated.342
Among the reasons loyalists tried to prevent slaves from leaving the province was 
their desire to reclaim slaves previously confiscated by the Whigs, as well as to alleviate 
a shortage of labor on their own plantations. William Ancrum, manager of the Colleton 
estate at Wadboo, informed the family’s heirs in Britain that a shortage of slaves hindered 
his efforts to make the plantation profitable. The problem, he said, arose “from the 
desertion of the Negroes, which they have been too much encouraged to, by the smallpox 
spreading among them & their being under little or no Subjection to the Overseers.”343 
Besides smallpox, a “malignant Fever” also broke out in July among blacks in and near 
Charleston. This disease, which James Simpson said did not appear to affect whites, 
killed blacks “in great numbers,” further worsening the labor shortage.344
Other loyalists simply wished to seize slaves for themselves. In Ninety Six 
district, Evan McLaurin reported that there were not enough slaves to work on the 
sequestered estates because loyalists who had acquired slaves belonging to abandoned 
rebel plantations “are encouraged to keep them by Persons now in Authority.” He advised 
Balfour to issue a proclamation that would “enable us to discharge our Duty ... without 
Irritating those friends who are as fond of Negroes as of the Laws -  as the surest method 
of keeping the Negroes we have together -  & of inducing the others to return.” McLaurin 
also asked Balfour for money to purchase clothing and tools for the slaves, since most of
342 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, July 6, 1780, PHL, 15:311-312.
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them received no pay for their labor. Unless the slaves’ basic needs were met, McLaurin 
declared, “they may be so neglected that they run away.”345
While some loyalists thought themselves entitled to take slaves from rebels as a 
reward for their fealty, many Whigs took the oath of allegiance to Britain solely in hopes 
of regaining their slaves. In May, British troops seized thirty-seven slaves owned by John 
Lloyd, a rebel who had been captured and later released. Although he considered himself 
“a capital Sufferer by the British,” Lloyd took protection so that he could initiate legal 
proceedings “to get back some of my Negroes.”346 However, five months later Lloyd 
gave up all hope of recovering his slaves.347
In rare cases, some South Carolinians preferred not to reclaim slaves for fear that 
service with the British army had ruined them. Charleston resident Peter Bounetheau 
owned a black named William, who was “very expert in blowing the French Horn.” Maj. 
Charles Cochran of the British Legion, having heard of William’s talent, borrowed him 
“for the purpose of blowing a Horn on some particular occasion.” However, Cochran did 
not return the slave as promised and instead William accompanied the Legion during its 
operations in the interior of the province, which culminated in Tarleton’s victory at the 
Waxhaws on May 29. When Cochran finally returned to Charleston, he told Bounetheau 
that William “was so serviceable to the Legion that he positively could not spare him” 
and offered to provide another slave in exchange for him. Bounetheau demurred, 
asserting that William was worth much more than a field hand. Bounetheau then accepted 
Cochran’s offer to purchase William for £100 sterling ($13,000), but Cochran left for 
England without paying. Finally, Bounetheau petitioned Cornwallis, requesting the
345 McLaurin to Balfour, Aug. 7, 1780, Emmet Collection No. 6589, NYPL.
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promised payment and adding that he did not want William returned, “for as he has been 
now a long time engaged in a sphere widely different from that of a domestick Servant.... 
Your Memorialist is apprehensive he may be rendered unserviceable in that line.”348
Bounetheau’s fears may have been justified, for many slaves turned against their 
masters. One man came to Camden and informed Rawdon that his master had been 
making suspicious excursions into the woods, which led to the capture of two rebel 
parties who had been stealing “Negroes & Horses belonging to the Army.” The slave 
must have enjoyed the twist of fate that placed his master “in Gaol; & in Irons.”349
Another slave, Boston King, left his master, found employment with the British 
army, and later wrote a memoir of his experiences. King’s owner hired him out to a man 
who abused him badly. On one occasion, the man beat King so violently that he could not 
work for two weeks; later, King “was beat and tortured most cruelly, and was laid up 
three weeks,” which led King’s owner to intervene to halt the abuse. Shortly after King 
recovered, his employer took him from Charleston to the country to avoid the 
approaching British army. Sometime after the town’s surrender, another slave took a 
horse King had borrowed from a white man. Since the horse’s owner “was a very bad 
man, and knew not how [to] shew mercy,” King did not dare confront him. “To escape 
his cruelty,” King wrote, “I determined to go to Charles Town, and throw myself into the 
hands of the English. They received me readily, and I began to feel the happiness, liberty, 
of which I knew nothing before.”
King encountered many difficulties in his new life, including loneliness and a 
bout with smallpox. The disease raged among the black refugees, killing at least two
348 Peter Bounetheau to Cornwallis, Aug. 3, 1780, Peter Bounetheau Papers, LOC.
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thousand of them.350 To prevent their troops from becoming infected, the British moved 
all of the infected blacks to an open area a mile from their camp. “We lay sometimes a 
whole day without any thing to eat or drink,” King stated. But he soon met a soldier from 
the New York Volunteers with whom he was acquainted, and the man provided King 
with supplies until he recovered. The British then transported King and two dozen other 
black convalescents to Camden by wagon, where they were assigned to the New York 
Volunteers. King proudly referred to the unit as “our regiment.” When his benefactor was 
wounded in the battle of August 16, King repaid the soldier’s earlier kindness by tending 
him for six weeks. King then became the servant of a captain in the regiment.
One day King left camp to go fishing and returned to find his regiment gone and 
replaced by a few loyal militia. King was “greatly alarmed,” but the militia commander, a 
Captain Lewes, reassured him that he would soon rejoin his unit. Later, Lewes, hoping to 
gain a slave, asked King if he would accept him as his new master. King refused, 
whereupon Lewes declared that he had “been long enough in the English service” and 
was “determined to leave them.” The statement “roused my indignation,” King wrote, 
and acting on principles of loyalism stronger than those of Lewes, the former slave 
“spoke some sharp things to him.” Lewes threatened to put King in irons and whip him, 
so King decided to escape. The next day, Lewes sent King with a boy to get about fifty 
horses that the captain had stolen from the British garrison at Rocky Mount. LewCS left 
after the pair brought him the horses, giving King an opportunity to flee. He found his 
regiment the following day and informed his captain of Lewes’s actions; the British
350 Fenn, Pox Americana, 127-128, 274.
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dispatched a mounted force which recovered forty of the horses and burnt Lewes’s house. 
King remained with the New York Volunteers for another year.351
King’s devoted service to the British and his courage in rebuking a white man 
indicated the extent to which the war had allowed blacks to challenge the boundaries of 
slavery. Another black or mulatto man who challenged these limits did so by leading his 
own band of loyalist partisans against the Whigs in northeastern South Carolina. 
Described only as “Gibson, a coloured man and his party of tories,” his conduct, 
according to the rebels, was “shocking to humanity.” Among the alleged atrocities they 
attributed to Gibson were the murder of a militia colonel and several other Whigs and the 
burning of houses. But perhaps Gibson’s biggest offense in their eyes was the fact that 
he was a black man who not only dared to use force against whites, but had gotten other 
whites to follow him in so doing.
The valor of men like Gibson and King did nothing to change Cornwallis’s poor 
opinion of blacks. The capture of twelve black soldiers, probably Continentals from the 
Maryland and Delaware regiments, at Camden on August 16 angered Balfour. He asked 
Cornwallis if it would “not be worth while, to convince Blacke that he must not fight 
against us -  to sell them” into slavery.353 Cornwallis approved the proposal.354 The earl 
also tried to keep blacks with the army under strict control; on September 27, he repeated 
orders, issued at an unspecified earlier date, “for Marking all Negroes belonging to the 
Army, with the Number of the Regt. or the Initial Letters of the Department that Employs 
them,” probably in the form of a cloth badge. Cornwallis instructed his officers to inform
351 Boston King, Memoirs o f  Boston King, http://collections.ic.gc.ca/blackloyalists/documents, July 30, 
2001 .
352 James, Life o f  Marion, 68.
353 Balfour to Cornwallis, Sept. 22, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/64, 96.
354 Cornwallis to Balfour, Sept. 27, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/80,48A.
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all blacks that the Deputy Provost Marshal had orders “to take up, & flog out of the 
Encampment all those who are not Mark’d agreeable to Orders,” and that those “found
i c e
quitting the Line of March in search of plunder” would be executed immediately.
The situation of blacks in Georgia and East Florida changed little during this time. 
Until the imminent surrender of Charleston forced the Whigs to abandon the lowcountry, 
rebels occasionally plundered slaves from loyal Georgians’ plantations. In late March, for 
example, Whig party attacked farms belonging to Gov. Wright south of the Ogeechee 
River and carried off “as many of the negroes as they could.”356 British officials may 
have attempted to counter such raids by arming slaves, although the evidence is sketchy. 
John Lewis Gervais heard a report that Whigs under Andrew Pickens “killed about 60 
Negroes in Arms, & some white Men with them,” in an April battle five miles from 
Savannah.357 Wright did recognize the need to arm blacks to strengthen the weak forces 
defending Georgia; in the fall he convinced the Assembly to pass legislation authorizing 
him “to order out Negroes to construct such fortifications and works as may be thought 
necessary for the security of the town or in any other parts of the province, also in case of 
necessity to arm and employ Negroes for our defence.” Unlike the Whigs, Georgia’s 
loyalists accepted the risk of altering the slave system for the sake of their own security.
After taking command in Savannah, Alured Clarke was plagued by slave owners 
from South Carolina seeking the return of their property. Former Whigs who had taken 
British protection, these people claimed that they were thus entitled to reclaim their 
slaves. The blacks objected, telling Clarke that their services “in the defence of Savannah,
355 “Lord Cornwallis’s Orders 27th. Septr. 1780,” in A. R. Newsome, ed., “A British Orderly Book, 1780- 
1781,” Part III, NCHR, Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1932, 276, 280.
356 Augustine Prevost to Clinton, March 30, 1780, RAM, 2:107-108.
357 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, April 28, 1780, PHL, 15:287.
358 Wright to Germain, Oct. 27, 1780, DAR, 18:211.
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and on many other occasions,” along with “the apprehensions they are under of being 
treated with cruelty in consequence of it,” entitled them to remain with the British. Clarke 
referred the matter to Cornwallis, although he made his own sympathies clear. Whatever 
the merits of the masters’ arguments, Clarke wrote, “an attention to Justice, and good 
faith, must plead strongly in behalf of the Negroes.”359
British officers in West Florida, faced with an even greater threat, did not hesitate 
to use slaves to assist in the defense of Mobile. At the town’s surrender on March 14, the 
Spanish counted fifty-five armed blacks among the prisoners.360
The capture of Charleston had laid the foundation for the reestablishment of 
British control in South Carolina and Georgia. The loyalists’ response had fulfilled 
Germain’s expectations, thousands of slaves had flocked to the king’s troops, and the 
Indians had expressed willingness to attack the Whigs. Lincoln’s army no longer existed, 
and the defeat of Gates and Sumter in August had removed much of the remaining rebel 
opposition. If Cornwallis capitalized on these advantages, King George stood to retain at 
least two of his rebellious American provinces.
Unfortunately, Cornwallis squandered many of these advantages. He refused to 
use the Indians, thus giving the growing Whig partisan forces free rein to operate against 
the backcountry loyalists. He delayed the organization and training of the loyal militia 
because of his dislike of Ferguson, then failed to cooperate with Ferguson during the 
invasion of North Carolina, thus leaving the loyalists to be slaughtered at King’s 
Mountain. The defeat, along with constant Whig harassment, weakened loyalist morale
359 Alured Clarke to Cornwallis, July 10, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 258.
360 Haarmann, “Spanish Conquest o f West Florida,” 119.
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and reduced the militia’s effectiveness. And while the earl accepted the use of blacks in 
noncombat roles with the army, he showed no inclination to tap the potential of slaves to 
serve effectively as soldiers, which they had demonstrated during the siege of Savannah.
None of this boded well for Britain’s ability to secure the southern provinces, nor 
did the Spanish attack on West Florida. Nevertheless, the foundation for success, albeit 
damaged, was still solid. The question was whether Cornwallis would repair and build 
upon it or whether his future actions would result in its destruction.
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PRECIPICE
During the period from November 1780 to the end of June 1781, the outcome of 
the British effort to maintain control of South Carolina and Georgia hung in a precarious 
balance. Despite the demoralizing effects of Ferguson’s defeat and the cruelties inflicted 
upon the prisoners taken at King’s Mountain and other loyalists, many supporters of the 
British remained steadfast in their allegiance. The arrival of Gen. Nathanael Greene to 
replace Horatio Gates as commander of the American southern army, the destruction of a 
loyalist party at Hammond’s Store in late December, and Daniel Morgan’s victory over 
Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens the following month inspired the Whigs. But Morgan’s 
and Greene’s subsequent retreat across North Carolina with Cornwallis in close pursuit 
shifted the situation in favor of the British. Many Whigs and neutrals, believing the rebel 
cause to be lost, took British protection; meanwhile some dispirited Whig partisans left 
the field entirely or prepared to abandon the fight in South Carolina and withdraw 
northward to unite with Greene.
But with Cornwallis and his army far to the north and the British and loyalist 
troops in South Carolina and Georgia generally tied to fixed positions, some rebels took 
advantage of the opportunity to raid throughout the countryside. Lord Rawdon, who held 
the field command in Cornwallis’s absence, skillfully employed detachments to keep the 
rebels in check, while the apparent successes of Cornwallis, first in driving Greene into 
Virginia and then defeating him at Guilford Court House, North Carolina, in mid-March,
419
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
420
seemed to promise ultimate British success. Yet continued rebel activity demonstrated 
that the loyalists were still not secure and took a steady toll of the militia. The situation, 
though fluid, remained precarious for both of the contending parties -  whichever side 
received significant assistance first was likely to gain the upper hand.
In late April, the balance began to tilt in the Whigs’ favor. Cornwallis had 
withdrawn his troops, who were exhausted from endless marching, lack of supplies, and 
heavy losses at Guilford Court House, to Wilmington, North Carolina. While the earl 
pondered his next move, Greene marched his army back to South Carolina. Cornwallis 
rejected the options of pursuing Greene on land or bringing his troops back to South 
Carolina by sea; instead, he chose to march into Virginia and unite his depleted command 
with British forces operating in the Chesapeake. Greene’s return, Cornwallis’s departure, 
and the realization that the lightning British march through North Carolina had been little 
more than a dazzling show that had brought the royal cause no substantial benefit, 
revitalized the rebels. Greene threatened the key British position at Camden, while Whig 
raiders, inspired by the hope of victory, struck at the posts that guarded the town’s 
communications with Charleston.
Rawdon fought back capably, defeating Greene at Hobkirk’s Hill on April 26, but 
he was unable to prevent the Americans escaping with their army intact. The only way 
Rawdon could create a mobile force strong enough to pursue Greene and destroy the 
Continental Army was by stripping the British posts of troops, which would then leave 
those positions vulnerable to partisan attacks. The army might then be cut off from 
supplies and reinforcements. Rawdon had no alternative except to abandon the interior of 
South Carolina and Georgia and try to defend a more compact position closer to the
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coast. Loyalists wishing to relocate within the shrunken boundaries of British-held 
territory had to accompany the troops in their retreat. Those who decided to remain at 
home would have to make their own peace with the rebels. Even John Harris Cruger’s 
valiant defense of Ninety Six in June did not prevent the evacuation of the town, while 
Augusta fell to Whig forces. The loss of the backcountry cut off direct communication 
with the Indians, who had remained relatively inactive except in West Florida, where 
they fought stoutly in the unsuccessful defense of Pensacola. Blacks continued to support 
the British with labor and information, but still constituted an underutilized resource. By 
the autumn of 1781, control of the southern backcountry, and with it the balance of power 
in the Deep South, had shifted decisively in favor of the Whigs.
Loyalist Persistence 
Despite the disaster at King’s Mountain, the subsequent suffering of the prisoners, 
and the demoralizing effects of Cornwallis’s retreat from Charlotte, many loyalists 
persisted in supporting the royal cause. With the army in winter quarters at Winnsboro, 
British officers relied upon the militia to secure most of South Carolina. Balfour assigned 
two militia regiments to guard the line of communication between Charleston and 
Camden in late October. He considered the units’ combined strength of about four 
hundred men inadequate, “but we must do the best we can With them,” he wrote.1 
Balfour doubted that these men were capable of performing strenuous duty, but believed
•y
that they “will surely be enough to guard ferrys, which is the most easy of all services.”
In the northeastern part of the province, Francis Marion continued his efforts to 
destroy the loyal militia. He attacked a party of loyalists near Georgetown in mid-
1 Balfour to Capt. Blucke, Oct. 25, 1780, John Saunders Papers, HCIL.
2 Balfour to Blucke, Oct. 31, 1780, Saunders Papers, HCIL.
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October, killing a Lieutenant Evans and mortally wounding a Captain Gamer, who 
Marion described as “the most active persons against us & the head of all the torrys on 
the Lower part of Peedee.” The Whigs then raided Georgetown, where Colonel Cassells 
with seventy militiamen occupied a redoubt and refused to surrender. Marion withdrew 
after paroling several prisoners and noted with satisfaction that most of the loyalists in the 
region had moved across the Santee River in search of greater security. But Marion’s 
gains were partially offset by the defection of one of his officers to the British; Col. John 
Ervin had assumed command of several loyalists and was busily engaged burning the 
homes of Whigs. Nevertheless, Marion’s success attracted more followers, increasing 
his force from seventy to two hundred men within a month.4
Balfour responded by ordering Col. Samuel Tynes to embody his militia at the 
High Hills of Santee. Tynes assembled between 150 and 200 men and posted them at 
Tearcoat Swamp, where he felt so secure that he neglected to station guards around his 
camp. Marion’s slightly smaller force attacked the loyalists on the night of October 25, 
achieving complete surprise. The loyalists fled without offering significant resistance. 
Tynes escaped but was captured shortly afterward. Six of his men were killed, 14 
wounded, and 23 captured. The Whigs also seized 80 horses and a large quantity of arms. 
Many of the demoralized survivors joined Marion’s force.5
British officers realized that immediate action had to be taken against Marion and 
the Whig bands who followed in his wake exacting vengeance. The cruelties of the latter 
so angered Balfour that he told the commander at Georgetown to look for “an 
Opportunity of retaliating, upon those Scoundrels, who hang our Friends so freely.”
3 Marion to Gates, Oct. 15, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12.
4 Marion to Gates, Oct. 15, 1780; Nov. 4, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12.
5 Marion to Gates, Nov. 4, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12; Bass, Swamp Fox, 15-11.
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Balfour hoped to capture some of these people “to make an immediate example of before 
their Eyes.”6 Cornwallis was just as angry: “Colonel Marion had so wrought on the minds 
of the people, partly by the terror of his threats and cruelty of his punishments, and partly 
by the promise of plunder, that there was scarcely an inhabitant between the Santee and 
Pedee, that was not in arms against us.” The earl ordered Tarleton to take his cavalry and 
suppress the rebels.7
Marion planned to greet Tarleton with a surprise attack, but found the British too 
well posted. Tarleton moved through the area burning homes and crops; Marion noted 
that “he spares neither Whig nor Tory.” The partisan leader had no choice but to retreat, 
since his men were “in great Dread of Tarleton’s Horse” and many refused to turn out.8
Tarleton’s presence had the opposite effect on the loyalists. Although Cornwallis 
recalled him to deal with Sumter before Tarleton had an opportunity to bring Marion to 
battle, the Legion commander found that his operations “had taken very desirable effect.” 
At Singleton’s Mills on November 12, the “militia flocked to Lieutenant-colonel 
Tarleton, and assured him of their friendly dispositions, which they durst not manifest 
before Marion’s retreat.”9 Loyalists emerged from their refuges in the swamps and 
offered Tarleton their services. Unable to provide material assistance, he encouraged 
them to persevere. Col. Tynes, who had recently escaped from rebel custody, also began 
assembling his militia to cooperate with another British force in the area.10
6 Balfour to Blucke, Oct. 31,1780, Saunders Papers, HCIL.
7 Cornwallis to Clinton, Dec. 3,1780, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 200.
8 Marion to Gates, Nov. 9, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12.
9 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 174.
10 Tarleton to Cornwallis, Nov. 11, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 96; Tarleton, History o f  the 
Campaigns, 174; Marion to Gates, Dec. 6, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 13.
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After Tarleton withdrew, Marion planned another attack on Georgetown, but was 
thwarted by the arrival of “two hundred Torrys under the Command of Captns. Barefield 
& James Lewis.” The rebels and loyalists skirmished, with some losses on each side. In 
one encounter, Barefield’s men captured Marion’s nephew, Gabriel Marion. A loyalist 
killed the prisoner upon learning his identity. The next day, some Whigs captured a 
loyalist mulatto named Sweat and executed him, believing that it was he who had killed 
Gabriel Marion.11 But the rebels soon left the area when they realized that no support 
from the Continental army was forthcoming. “Many of my people has Left me & gone 
over to the Enemy,” Francis Marion told Gates in late November, “for they think that we 
have no Army coming on & have been Deceived, as we hear nothing from You.” Marion 
added that unless he received support from the army or other militia units, “the Enemy 
will have the Intire Command of the Country on the North of Pedee.”12
The invigorated loyalists acted to realize Marion’s fears. Colonel Tynes and 
several of his officers joined a small British detachment and Tynes promised to assemble 
150 men to secure the High Hills of Santee. James Cassells promised to bring his militia 
back into action, while three hundred militiamen from Orangeburgh and Pedee took the 
field against the Whigs.13 By the end o f November, Tynes assured British officers that 
“he could keep matters quiet with his Militia” in the region.14
With Tarleton’s help, the loyalists in the northeastern part o f the province had 
withstood the Whig attacks, but their counterparts in the backcountry also faced severe 
pressure. Cornwallis took prompt steps after Ferguson’s defeat to strengthen the militia in
11 Bass, Swamp Fox, 89-90.
12 Marion to Gates, Nov. 21, 1780, Gates Papers, Reel 12.
13 Capt. M. Coffin to Cornwallis, Nov. 23, 1780; Balfour to Cornwallis, Nov. 24, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, 
PRO 30/11/4, 183, 193.
14 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Nov. 27, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 215.
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Ninety Six district, asserting that they needed “considerable Encouragement.” He 
confided to Balfour that “should the Militia of this Country absolutely refuse to Serve, 
the Consequences would indeed be fatal.” As an incentive, Cornwallis ordered that three 
months back pay be given to those militiamen who “have been in Constant Service.” He 
also sought a competent commander for them and considered appointing Robert 
Cunningham, “who by all Accounts is the most popular Man amongst them.”15 Since 
Cunningham had decided a few days earlier to abandon his attempt to recruit a provincial 
battalion, Cornwallis sought some way to take advantage of his influence with the people. 
Cornwallis also believed that the militia would be more effective if it was supported by a 
force of provincial cavalry and assigned James Dunlap to raise and command the unit.16 
The earl hoped that a revitalized force might be able to “strike some blow” at the Whigs
17to avenge the loyalists “who have been everywhere seized and most cruelly treated.” 
Moses Kirkland agreed, asserting that “Without giving the Rebells a Suden 
Check” the backcountry militia would not recover their confidence. Kirkland had 115 
reliable men in his regiment, he reported, but confessed that they were still frightened and 
demoralized after King’s Mountain.18 Two days later, having received accounts that the 
rebels planned to attack Ninety Six district, Kirkland stated that most loyalists “think it 
Needless making any resistance, and the Greater part incline to be hiding in Swamps,” 
while others intended to make peace with the Whigs.19
15 Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 4, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82, 6.
16 Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 1, 1780, Cornwallis to Cruger, Nov. 4, 1780, Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 
16, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82, 1, 8,48.
17 Cornwallis to Tarleton, Nov. 8, 1780, Cornwallis Correspondence, 65.
18 Kirkland to Cornwallis, Nov. 8, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 67.
19 Kirkland to Cornwallis, Nov. 10, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 82.
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These pessimistic assessments convinced Balfour that militia was useless. He 
suggested that if Cunningham would not attempt to raise a provincial corps, Evan 
McLaurin should be allowed to try. “The idea of militia, being of consequence, or use, as 
a military force - 1 own I have now totally given up,” Balfour told Cornwallis. However, 
Balfour hoped that Cunningham might be able to make the militia more effective, just as 
Ballingall had done with his regiment. Balfour also urged Cornwallis to find a role for 
Robert Gray, who “seemes to me, by much the best Militia man I have seen” and “would 
yet make something” of the militia.20
While Cornwallis struggled to restore the militia’s effectiveness, Sumter’s 
partisans and smaller groups of Whigs took advantage of the situation by terrorizing the 
loyalists.21 Sumter’s foray into Ninety Six district, Cornwallis wrote, resulted in “our 
friends terrified beyond expression either flying down the Country or submitting tamely 
to the insults & Cruelties of the enemy.”22 In the northwestern part of the province, a 
group of rebels led by William Kennedy, all of whom lived in the woods for fear that 
they would be captured if they remained at home, waged a brutal campaign against local 
loyalists. Kennedy was reputed to be so violent that each time someone heard him fire his 
rifle, they would proclaim “there is one tory less.” In one encounter with his loyalist 
opponents, Kennedy killed a fleeing man with a rifle shot at 140 yards. “More than half 
the party of tories were killed” in that skirmish, “'not one taken prisoner -  for that occured 
but seldom, the rifle usually saved us that trouble,” a Whig observed. On another 
occasion, Kennedy was among a party that captured several loyalists, among them a man 
accused of killing one of Kennedy’s friends. Kennedy and his followers wished to hang
20 Balfour to Cornwallis, Nov. 5, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 27.
21 Bass, Gamecock, 102.
22 Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 17,1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82, 55.
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the man, but an officer insisted that the loyalist be given a trial first. The captive was sent 
under guard to a nearby rebel camp, only to find that Kennedy was one of his escorts.
The loyalist protested that Kennedy would kill him on the way, a prophecy that was 
fulfilled when the loyalist allegedly tried to escape and Kennedy shot him down.23
The militia’s inability to defeat the raiders cost them Cornwallis’s sympathy, as it 
had Balfour’s. “The Accounts I receive ... of the Supineness and pusillanimity of our 
Militia takes off all my Compassion for their Sufferings,” he wrote; “if they will allow 
themselves to be plundered & their families ruined by a Banditti, not a third of their 
numbers, there is no possibility of our protecting them.”24 He denounced the loyalists as 
“dastardly and pusillanimous” in a letter to Gen. Alexander Leslie, who had brought a
9 cBritish detachment from Chesapeake Bay to reinforce the army in South Carolina. The 
earl decided to accept Balfour’s advice and authorized McLaurin to begin recruiting a 
provincial corps as a substitute for the militia.26
Meanwhile, Cornwallis dispatched Maj. Wemyss and 250 British regulars to drive 
Sumter from the backcountry. A rapid march enabled Wemyss to reach Sumter’s camp at 
Fishdam Ford undetected in the early morning hours of November 9. Wemyss ordered an 
immediate attack, which drove off the rebels, but they regrouped and began firing into the 
British from the darkness. Wemyss was wounded and in the confusion that followed his
97 •troops withdrew. Both sides claimed victory. Sumter, however, resumed his attacks on 
loyalists after the battle, creating “the utmost horror” in the backcountry, so that “all the
23 Daniel Wallace, “Incidents of the Revolution in Union York & Spartanburgh Districts,” undated 
manuscript, South Carolina Box, NYPL.
24 Cornwallis to Cruger, Nov. 11, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82, 24.
25 Cornwallis to Leslie, Nov. 12, 1780, Cornwallis Correspondence, 69.
26 Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 16, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82,46.
27 Pancake, This Destructive War, 126; Cornwallis to Kirkland, Nov. 11, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 
30/11/82, 28.
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loyal Subjects instead of thinking of self defence are running as fast as possible to 
Congarees.” The panic caused Cruger to join the list of officers who had lost confidence 
in the militia. “A few of the Inhabitants on Long Cane have been plunderd many more 
deserved it for their pusilanimous behaviour,” he wrote, noting that “about forty to fifty 
rebels frighten’d the whole regiment, two or three Loyalists are kill’d, & many disarm’d.
I think I shall never again look to the Militia for the least support.”29
This forced Cornwallis to order Tarleton to suspend his operations against Marion 
and move against Sumter instead. Tarleton set about the task with his usual energy, 
pursuing the Whigs and catching them at Blackstock’s on November 20. Another 
confused battle followed as the rebels attacked Tarleton’s advance guard, other British 
troops counterattacked without orders, and Tarleton had to lead a cavalry charge to 
extricate his outnumbered infantry. The battle ended in a draw, but Sumter suffered a
A
severe wound and withdrew afterwards, so that calm was restored in the backcountry.
Cornwallis hoped that Tarleton’s success “will give our friends more Spirit” and
•3 1
his wish was granted. Two days after the battle, Cunningham reported to Cornwallis’s 
headquarters at Winnsboro, “full of Zeal,” and accepted a commission as brigadier 
general commanding the backcountry militia.32 The earl had again reversed himself and 
decided that the militia in Ninety Six district were the only militia in the province “on 
which ... we could place the smallest dependence,” but they had been “so totally
28 Cornwallis to Rawdon, Nov. 13, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82, 38.
29 Cruger to Cornwallis, Nov. 23, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 181.
30 Pancake, This Destructive War, 126-127; Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 22, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 
30/11/82, 81.
31 Cornwallis to Rawdon, Nov. 20, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82, 71.
32 Cornwallis to Balfour, Nov. 22, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82, 81.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
429
disheartened since the defeat of Ferguson that, of that whole district, we could with 
difficulty assemble 100.”33
Cunningham made rapid strides in restoring the militia’s morale. About one 
hundred militiamen joined provincial troops in suppressing the Whigs in Long Canes 
district and remained behind to secure the area. In December, Cunningham’s brigade 
mustered a greatly increased strength of 91 officers and 464 men, although many lacked 
arms. Among them were several veteran officers and men who had been captured by 
Sumter and escaped during the chaotic November battles. Cunningham’s promotion did 
cost the militia one officer -  Moses Kirkland, who felt he had been slighted and refused 
to serve any longer.34
Cornwallis ordered Tarleton to position his troops near Ninety Six to prevent 
Whig interference with Cunningham’s efforts.35 The earl asked Cruger to send “as many 
of the Militia as possible” to serve with Tarleton. “If any body can put spirit into them he 
will,” Cornwallis wrote.36 The loyalists soon felt confident enough to retaliate against the 
Whigs; “a strong Party of Tories” plundered rebel settlements along the Pacolet River in 
early December.37
Largely through Tarleton’s efforts, the British had restored a degree of control in 
the backcountry as well as in northeastern South Carolina. However, loyalists in the 
Camden area did not fare so well, despite the presence of a strong British post in the 
town. In early November, the militia destroyed much of their remaining credibility with
33 Cornwallis to Clinton, Dec. 3, 1789, in Clinton, American Rebellion, 476.
34 Cruger to Cornwallis, Nov. 27, 1780 and Dec. 3, 1780; Cunningham to Cornwallis, Dec. 3, 1780, 
Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 217, 173, 275; Chesney, Journal, 113-114; Sumter to Gates, Dec. 1, 
1780, Gates Papers, Reel 13; Moses Kirkland to Cornwallis, Feb. 22, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 
30/11/67, 83.
35 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 181.
36 Cornwallis to Cruger, Nov. 25, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82, 101.
37 Thomas Brandon to Thomas Sumter, Dec. 4, 1780, Sumter Papers, Vol. 1, LOC.
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the British when twelve men allowed themselves to be overpowered by sixteen rebel 
prisoners, with created new suspicions of treachery among Cornwallis’s officers. At the 
same time, Whig harassment grew so severe in the vicinity of Lynch’s Creek and the 
Waxhaws that many loyalists there prepared to move to Camden for greater security. 
Whig officers learned of the plan in early November and dispatched some mounted
no
militia to seize the loyalists’ property and use it to supply the American troops. Rawdon 
showed little sympathy for the loyalists’ plight, sarcastically noting that “at least a dozen 
terrified Militia Men” had come to Camden, fleeing from a battalion of North Carolina
nq
provincials that one of Rawdon’s officers had dispatched to drive off the rebels.
Rawdon devised his own plan to make the Camden district loyalists more 
effective by forming “a kind of Fencible Regiment,” which would be more professional 
than the militia but not have to perform the long-term duty required o f provincials.40 He 
intended to form several companies of thirty men each, all volunteers, who would enlist 
for six months to serve within their home district. The men would be paid for their 
services, and Rawdon named loyalists Isham Moore and Henry Richbourg as ideally 
qualified to command the unit41
While Rawdon waited for Cornwallis’s reply to this proposal, the some parties of 
loyalists marched to Lynch’s and Cane Creeks to intercept rebel supply wagons and 
gather provisions. William Smallwood dispatched Gen. Daniel Morgan with five hundred 
infantry and Col. William Washington’s one hundred cavalry to protect rebel supplies
38 Turnbull to Cornwallis, Nov. 5, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 25; William Smallwood to 
Morgan, Nov. 3, 1780, Theodorus Bailey Myers Collection, No. 1022, microfilm, DLAR.
39 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Nov. 19, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 234.
40 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Dec. 8, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 291.
41 Plan for a Corps o f Voluntiers, [Dec. 8, 1780]; Rawdon to Cornwallis, Dec. 9 and 18, 1780, Cornwallis 
Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 294, 298, 355.
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and attack the loyalists if possible. This force forced the loyalists to fall back, and 
Washington then moved against a strong force of militia at Col. Henry Rugeley’s 
plantation north of Camden.42
Ignoring Rawdon’s order to withdraw to Camden, on November 28 Rugeley 
placed his men in a fortified building and prepared to resist the Whigs, since reports 
indicated that they had no artillery. But Washington mounted a pine log on a wheeled 
carriage, and in the darkness deceived Rugeley into thinking the contraption was a 
cannon. Washington then demanded Rugeley’s surrender, and the loyalist colonel 
reluctantly capitulated; he and over one hundred militiamen were taken prisoner 43 
Rugeley was perhaps more intimidated by the Whigs’ threat to put all the defenders “to 
immediate death if they did not give up” than he was by the spurious cannon.44
Some rebel militia officers wished to exact vengeance against three of the 
prisoners taken at Rugeley’s, whom they described as “Notorious Offenders.” Fortunately 
for the captives, Continental officers intervened to prevent any abuse, asserting that the 
men were prisoners of war and could not be put on trial for treason 45
While the loyalists in the area surrounding Camden suffered most from the 
Whigs, those living near the British army’s main encampment at Winnsboro enjoyed 
more security because the rebels seldom ventured too close to so many regular troops. 
Local people “peaceably supplied” abundant food for men and horses, and the position 
was so secure that Cornwallis dispersed his sick soldiers to nearby plantations to
42 William Smallwood to Nathanael Greene, Dec. 6, 1780, PNG, 6:538-539.
43 Joseph Brown Turner, ed., “The Journal and Order Book o f Captain Robert Kirkwood o f the Delaware 
Regiment o f the Continental Line,” Papers o f  the Historical Society o f  Delaware, Vol. 56 (Wilmington: 
Historical Society o f  Delaware, 1910), 12-13; Stephen E. Haller, William Washington, Cavalryman o f  the 
Revolution (Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 2001), 68; Cornwallis to Rawdon, Dec. 2, 1780, Cornwallis 
Papers, PRO 30/11/83, 3; Rawdon to Cornwallis, Dec. 1, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 261.
44 Seymour, Journal o f  the Southern Expedition, 10.
45 John Marshel to Greene, Dec. 22, 1780; Greene to Marshel, Dec. 25, 1780, PNG, 6:606, 612.
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recuperate.46 The earl himself became ill, and Rawdon, who assumed temporary 
command of the army, received a steady flow of intelligence from loyalists that enabled 
him to monitor rebel activities. When a dependable spy found it too dangerous to go into 
the rebel camp because too many people there knew him, he sent his niece to obtain 
information. When rebel plunderers captured loyalist David George and two wagons 
bound for the British army, George took the opportunity to observe the rebel army and 
upon his release sent the British a report of its strength and position 47
Cornwallis’s army might not have even reached Winnsboro without loyalist 
assistance. During the retreat from Charlotte, “only the exertions of the loyalist militia 
kept the army wagons moving.” Yet instead of appreciating the efforts of the men who 
wrestled heavily-laden wagons through mud and across rain-swollen streams, British 
officers frequently abused the loyalists. “In return for their exertions, the militia were 
maltreated, by abusive language, and even beaten by some officers in the quarter-master 
general’s department,” wrote Pennsylvania loyalist and commissary of captures Charles 
Stedman. He reported that “several of them left the army” in response to such treatment
A O
and cast their lot with the rebels.
Like his officers, Cornwallis refused to recognize the loyalists’ contributions. 
Instead, he maintained that they were not doing enough to help him, complaining that 
“the friends hereabouts are so timid & so stupid that I can get no intelligence.”49 He was 
exaggerating; David George provided him with another fairly accurate report of rebel 
strength, positions, and intentions on December 30, and other loyalists also sent a steady
46 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 184.
47 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Dec. 3, 1780; David George to Cornwallis, Dec. 11, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, 
PRO 30/11/66, 25, 33.
48 Wickwire and Wickwire, Cornwallis, 233.
49 Cornwallis to Tarleton, Dec. 18, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/83, 55.
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stream of information to headquarters.50 Cornwallis also rejected a request to supply 
muskets to the militia. “I have lost so many Arms by the Militia that I am much afraid of 
trusting them,” he wrote to explain his decision.51
Cornwallis’s criticism notwithstanding, the loyalists had begun to recover and to 
hold their own against the Whigs. Even Rugeley’s defeat resulted from the colonel’s 
determination to make a stand against a far superior force. The backcountry militia fought 
well in a battle on December 12 against Elijah Clarke’s four hundred rebels. Lt. Col.
Isaac Allen led 150 provincials and 250 militia from Ninety Six, caught Clarke at Long 
Cane, and routed the Whigs. A month later, Ballingall’s militia dispersed rebel partisans 
who had been harassing British posts and loyalists southwest of Charleston.52
John Rutledge, who received accurate intelligence from Whig sympathizers, 
calculated in early December that some 1,040 loyal militiamen were on duty at various 
posts in South Carolina, not including the militia in Charleston.53 Rutledge worried that 
Cornwallis would consolidate his hold on the province by sending “every disaffected 
person, out of the State with his family, & apply his property to publick use.”54 Thomas 
Jefferson was similarly pessimistic. “Georgia and South Carolina are annihilated, at least 
to us,” he told Maryland governor Thomas Sim Lee in mid-January.55
50 David George to Cornwallis, Dec. 30, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/66,44. For a sampling of 
additional intelligence provided by loyalists, see also Rawdon to Cornwallis, Jan. 1, 1781 and Jan. 5, 1781, 
Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/67, 3, 12; Rawdon to Cornwallis, Nov. 22,1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 
30/11/4, 175. These are only a fraction o f the references to loyalists’ intelligence reports in the collection.
51 Cornwallis to Cruger, Dec. 7, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/83, 25.
52 H. Barry to Robert Ballingall, Jan. 18,1781, Misc. Mss, SC7003/AT7003, Box 2 , 154a, NYSL.
53 Cornwallis to Rawdon, Dec. 19, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/83, 57; Account o f British and 
American forces, enclosed in John Rutledge to SC Delegates in Congress, Dec. 8, 1780, in Barnwell, ed., 
“Letters o f  John Rutledge,” Part 3, SCHGM, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 1917, 59-60.
54 John Rutledge to [SC Delegates in Congress], Jan. 10, 1781, in “Letters o f Rutledge,” Part 3, 67.
55 Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Sim Lee, Jan. 15,1781, in Helen Lee Peabody, ed., “Revolutionary Mail 
Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee’s Correspondence,” MHM, Vol. 49, No. 3, Sept. 1954, 223.
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As Whigs began doubting their ability to regain the southern provinces, many 
Britons came to believe that the situation had finally shifted in their favor. Frederick 
Mackenzie, an officer in the New York garrison who had always doubted that the 
southern campaign could succeed, experienced a surge of optimism in December 1780. 
He and his fellow officers now had “the most sanguine hopes” that once Cornwallis took 
the offensive, the war would be brought to a quick end. “I do not see how the Rebellion 
can possibly exist much longer,” Mackenzie stated.56 George III was similarly hopeful. 
“The signal Successes which have attended the Progress of my Arms in the Provinces of 
Georgia and Carolina ... will, I trust, have important consequences in bringing the War to 
a happy conclusion,” he declared in an address to Parliament.57
The improvement in the British and loyalists’ situation was only temporary, 
however. On December 2, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene arrived in Charlotte to supersede 
Horatio Gates as commander of the Continental army in the South. Seeking a location 
where he could better supply his troops and simultaneously threaten the British, Greene 
marched into South Carolina with most of his troops and camped at the Cheraws. He then 
dispatched Henry Lee’s Legion to cooperate with Marion. The remainder of his army, 
under Morgan, moved west to threaten Ninety Six.58
Greene found the provisions he sought at the Cheraws, but he received little 
support from local Whigs, who “were naturally very hesitant to leave their homes to join 
the army even for a short period of service” because of the large number of loyalists in
56 Mackenzie, Diary, 2:447.
57 Valentine, Lord North, 2:238.
58 Pancake, This Destructive War, 128,130-131.
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the area.59 “The people are two thirds Tories,” an American officer asserted,60 and Greene 
himself soon concluded that his army was in the midst of a predominantly loyalist 
region.61 “This is really carrying on a war in the enimy’s Country,” he informed 
Alexander Hamilton. “For you cannot establish the most inconsiderable Magazine or 
convey the smallest quantity of Stores from one part to another without being obligd to 
detach guards for their security.” Loyalists seized Greene’s couriers so frequently that 
the general did not dare to express himself fully in his correspondence, and they 
threatened a mill Greene relied on to supply grain for his troops.63 Rawdon had “so many 
persons watching Greene, that I think he cannot make any movement without my 
receiving early notice of it.”64
The newfound aggressiveness of the loyalists around Greene’s army impressed 
Robert Gray. Previously, he noted, the approach of rebel troops would send loyalists 
fleeing great distances or to the swamps to hide. As they recognized that they would have 
to rely on themselves rather than the British army for protection, however, they became 
bolder. Now the loyalists “kept hovering round” the Whig camp “in small parties, picked 
up stragglers & fired upon them from every swamp.” Near Georgetown and along the 
Pedee River, they “cut to pieces” small rebel detachments, “killed their sentries,” and 
otherwise harassed the enemy.65
59 Theodore Thayer, Nathanael Greene: Strategist o f  the American Revolution (New York: Twayne 
Publishers, 1960), 290.
60 Ichabod Burnet to unnamed, Jan. 23, 1781, Ichabod Burnet Letter, SCL.
61 Greene to John Cox, Jan. 9, 1781, PNG, 7:82.
62 Nathanael Greene to Alexander Hamilton, Jan. 10, 1781, PAH, 2:529.
63 Nathanael Greene to Catharine Greene, Dec. 29, 1780; William Pendergast to Greene, Jan. 23, 1781, 
PNG, 7:16, 179; Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil o f  a Whipping: The Battle o f  Cowpens (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1998), 8.
64 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Jan. 11, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/67, 14.
65 Gray, “Observations,” 148-149.
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Elsewhere the loyalists were equally active. The militia defeated a group of 
partisans at Long Canes in early December, and a few days later, when the Whigs 
attacked a camp of provincials and militia near Ninety Six, the king’s troops rallied and 
routed the rebels. The militia pursued the fleeing Whigs for two miles, taking about ten 
prisoners and capturing a large number of wagons and cattle. At least thirty rebels died in 
the battle.66 Isaac Allen praised the militia’s behavior, noting that they “have been with 
me in two excursions and behaved extremely well.” He told Cornwallis that he had “a 
good opinion of their Loyalty and Spirit.”67 In late January 1781, a Whig officer reported 
that many loyalists “have embodied within 30 Miles of Head Quarters and for two days 
have been so troublesome” that Greene had to detach two hundred troops to deal with
ro
them. Rebel major Frederick Kimball wrote that in the Camden district, loyalists 
frequently captured members of his militia, while Rawdon noted that on one occasion 
sixty loyal militiamen arrived at Camden and requested to be employed against the 
Whigs. Rawdon had 214 militiamen on duty at Camden on January 1, 1781, of whom 53 
lacked arms.69 Morgan’s troops also found that they had entered a loyalist stronghold 
when they reached the Pacolet River. “With a few exceptions, the Men are all Tories & 
the Women all Whores,” one of Greene’s officers wrote.70
Greene realized that he had to do everything possible to sustain the Whigs and 
check the loyalists, or many of the rebels’ lukewarm supporters would revert to neutrality
66 Cruger to Cornwallis, Dec. 9, 1780, Dec. 16, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 300, 335.
67 Allen to Cornwallis, Dec. 19, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 359.
68 Ichabod Burnet to unnamed, Jan. 23, 1781, Ichabod Bumet Letter, SCL.
69 Frederick Kimball to Greene, Jan. 16,1781, PNG, 7:135; Rawdon to Cornwallis, Dec. 29, 1780, 
Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 419. State o f the Troops ... at Camden, Jan. 1, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, 
PRO 30/11/103, 3.
70 Edward Giles to Otho Holland Williams, Dec. 29. 1780, Robert Gilmor, Jr. Papers, MHS.
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or perhaps even take British protection.71 “The enemy are now recruiting in all parts of 
this state,” he wrote, “and the command of gold, aided by the public distress and loyal 
feeling, has been too successful in making one conquest the stepping-stone to another. At 
present they are in possession of all the fertile and populous parts of South Carolina.”72 
Greene therefore instructed Marion to remain active so that “you may frighten the Tories 
by these movements to desert the British and lay down their arms.”73 Greene likewise 
told Morgan that the latter’s main objective would be to inspire the rebels and annoy the 
enemy.74 Later, he advised Morgan that “the impudence of the tories who are collecting 
in different quarters” indicated that the “enemy and the tories both will try to bring you 
into disgrace if possible to prevent your influence upon the Militia especially the weak 
and wavering.”75
Emboldened by the presence of Continental troops, Whigs moved quickly to 
suppress the loyalists with yet another campaign of terror. When rebel militia approached 
the High Hills, all but twenty of Col. Tynes’s militiamen fled from their post.
Abandoning his remaining troops, the “exceedingly frightened” Tynes took refuge in
n(\Camden. A few miles south of the Ennoree River, fifty rebels attacked twenty-five
7 7militiamen, seriously wounding four and capturing seven or eight. With the militia 
unable to protect the loyalists, Greene’s aide Lewis Morris, described the violence that 
ensued: “The tories, who after the defeat of Genl Gates had a full range, are chased from 
their homes, hunted thro’ the woods and shot with as much indifference as you would a
71 Ward, Delaware Continentals, 367.
72 Greene to unnamed, Jan. 1-23, 1781, PNG, 7:176.
73 Greene to Marion, Dec. 24, 1780, PNG, 6:607.
74 Greene to Morgan, undated, Myers Collection, No. 867, microfilm, DLAR.
75 Greene to Morgan, Jan. 8, 1781, Myers Collection, No. 869, microfilm, DLAR.
76 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Dec. 8, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 291.
77 Major Archibald McArthur to Cornwallis, Dec. 16, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 339.
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buck.” As a result, “they were daily returning to their allegiance and petitioning for
78protection.
The carnage horrified Gen. Charles O’Hara, who had arrived in South Carolina in 
December 1780 with Leslie’s reinforcements, witnessed the effects of the Whigs’ 
brutality on the march to join Cornwallis. O’Hara wrote that the sights he saw “are 
beyond discription wretched, every Misery which the bloodiest cruel War ever produced, 
we have constantly before Us .... the violence of the Passions of these People, are beyond 
every curb of Religion, and Humanity, they are unbounded, and every Hour exhibits, 
dreadfull, wanton Mischiefs, Murders, and Violences of every kind.” O’Hara noted that 
many loyalists had been forced to flee to the vicinity of Charleston or to Georgia in 
search of safety.79 “Desolation and Ravage make rapid progress,” loyalist John Lloyd 
noted, “and notwithstanding every Military effort and attention, the Loyalists are 
frequently surprised, killed, taken, or plundered by the incursions of their Neighbours.”80 
No one was exempt; on the night of December 4, some Whigs found two loyalists ill with 
smallpox, “shot both the Sick Men in their Beds, tho’ they were incapable of making the 
least defence; & afterwards murdered the old Man of the House in the same Manner.”81
Like O’Hara, Cornwallis was stunned, not only by the Whigs’ ruthlessness, but by 
their insistence that the British were responsible for the violence. “The accounts of the 
cruelty of those rascals is really shocking,” he told Rawdon, “and if  it is capable of
• • 87aggravation their impudent accusation of us makes it the more provoking.” In response
78 Lewis Morris, Jr. to Lewis Morris, Dec. 29. 1780, in “Letters to General Lewis Morris,” Collections o f  
the New York Historical Society fo r  the Year 1875, Vol. 8 (New York, 1876), 475.
79 Charles O’Hara to the Duke o f Grafton, Jan. 6, 1781, in George C. Rogers, Jr., ed., “Letters o f Charles 
O’Hara to the Duke o f Grafton,” SCHM, Vol. 65, No. 3, July 1964, 171.
80 John Lloyd to [Mark Harford, Jr.], Jan. 20, 1781,, John Lloyd Letters.
81 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Dec. 5, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 281.
82 Cornwallis to Rawdon, Dec. 7, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/83, 27.
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to a letter from Clinton in which the commander-in-chief informed the earl that George 
Washington had protested British acts of cruelty in the South, Cornwallis replied that 
although he had been “provoked by the horrid outrages and cruelties of the enemy in this 
district, I have always endeavoured to soften the horrors of war.” Cornwallis noted that 
Gates and other rebel officers had acknowledged his humane treatment of captured and 
wounded Whig soldiers. This, he said, sharply contrasted with “the shocking tortures and 
inhuman Murders which are every day committed by the enemy, not only on those, who 
have taken part with us, but on many who refuse to join them.”
Robert Gray warned Cornwallis that if the Whigs were permitted to “continue this 
outrage it will be productive of the worst effects.” The loyalists, Gray declared, “will lose 
all confidence if they find themselves doomed to the halter when captives, whilst the 
rebels” received humane treatment when taken prisoner. Gray noted that one of his best 
officers, a Captain Oates, had been promptly hanged after the rebels captured him. 
“Several others have met with the same fate while others have been subjected to rigorous 
corporal punishments,” Gray added.84
The earl responded by writing Greene and threatening retaliation if the Whigs 
continued their ruthless behavior. “If Truth could be heard, the Feelings of Mankind 
would decide that in the Southern Provinces, the Rights of Humanity have been invaded 
by the Enemies of Great Britain,” Cornwallis asserted. He pointed out that Whigs had 
altered some of his letters that they had intercepted to make it appear that he had 
endorsed a policy of brutality. This was untrue, Cornwallis declared, as “no man abhors 
Acts of Cruelty more than myself.” However, if the rebels continued their savagery, he
83 Cornwallis to Clinton, Dec. 4, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/72, 65.
84 Gray to Cornwallis, Nov. 5, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 98.
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warned that he would respond in kind. “The proving to the suffering Loyalists that I am 
in earnest to protect them, & to retaliate on their inhuman Oppressors, is a duty which I 
owe to my Country,” Cornwallis stated.85 Greene did not respond.
Privately, Greene held both sides responsible for the situation. “There is nothing 
but murders and devastations in every quarter,” he wrote.86 “The whole country is in 
danger of being laid waste by the Whigs and Torrys, who pursue each other with as much 
relentless fury as beasts of prey,” Greene observed while at the Cheraws. “People 
between this and the Santee are frequently murdered as they ride along the road.” But 
Greene did nothing to halt the savagery, probably because it worked to his advantage. He 
had noted that some loyalists “are now coming in, in many parts; being tired of such a 
wretched life.”87
Greene’s own troops soon demonstrated that they could match the militia in 
atrocious behavior. When Morgan began his westward movement, 250 Georgia loyalists 
under Col. Thomas Waters had begun attacking Whigs in the vicinity o f Fair Forest 
Creek.88 According to some reports, the loyalists planned to fortify a house near the creek 
and “establish there a Magazine of provisions,” but they retreated on learning of
Q Q
Morgan’s approach. Morgan ordered William Washington to pursue Waters with his 
cavalry and some mounted militia. On December 27, Washington encountered the 
loyalists at Hammond’s Store. Although in a strong position atop a hill, the loyalists 
broke and fled when Washington’s cavalry charged them.90 In the ensuing melee, 150
85 Cornwallis to Greene, Dec. 27, 1780, PNG, 7:5-6.
86 Greene to Alexander Hamilton, Jan. 10, 1781, PAH, Vol. 2:529.
87 Greene to Samuel Huntington, Dec. 28, 1780, PNG, 7:9.
88 Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, 124.
89 Edward Giles to Otho Holland Williams, Dec. 29, 1780, Gilmor Papers, MHS.
90 Haller, William Washington, 80-81.
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loyalists were killed or wounded -  “hacked to death or badly mutilated” -  and forty 
captured, while the rebels did not suffer a single casualty.91 The death toll was 
exceedingly high given the fact that, as Morgan noted, the loyalists scattered at the start 
of the engagement “without making any Resistance.”92 The reason for the large number 
of loyalist dead was that the rebels murdered both fleeing men and those who tried to 
surrender. “Washingtons men had in remembrance Some of Mr. Tarltons former Acts and 
Acted accordingly,” Capt. John Davidson of the Maryland troops wrote, referring to the
Q -J
alleged massacre of Continental troops at the Waxhaws.
The day after the battle, the Whigs put one of the prisoners on trial. He was 
“found guilty of desertion to the enemy and piloting the Indians on our army, they 
making great havoc among them; upon which he was hanged on a tree the same day.”94 
When or where this Indian attack occurred was not specified, but its description does not 
correspond to any actual events at that time.
Sixty loyalists managed to escape the slaughter and reached Fort William with 
news that Washington was in pursuit. The garrison then abandoned the post and fled to 
Ninety Six, which was only fifteen miles distant.95
Morgan believed that Washington’s victory had been “fatal to the disaffected. 
They have not been able to embody since,” he wrote on January 15.96 Greene, too, 
recognized the importance of the battle. “Nothing could have afforded me more pleasure 
than the successful attack of Lt Coll Washington, upon the Tories,” he told Morgan. “I
91 Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, 124.
92 Morgan to Greene, Dec. 31, 1780, PNG, 7:30.
93 John Davidson to Mordecai Gist, Jan. 10, 1781, Mordecai Gist Papers, MHS.
94 William Seymour, Journal o f  the Southern Expedition, 12-13.
95 Ward, Delaware Continentals, 370; Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown, 77. Ward mistakenly calls the stream 
“Fairfort Creek.”
96 Morgan to Greene, Jan. 15, 1781, PNG, 7:127.
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hope it will be attended with a happy influence upon both Whig & tory, to the reclaiming 
of one, and encouragement of the other.”97
Pondering how to capitalize on the victory, Morgan decided that it was essential 
to maintain his position. “To Retreat will be attended with the most fatal Consequences,” 
he declared. “The Spirit which now begins to pervade the People, & call them into the 
Field will be destroyed -  The Militia, who have already joined, will desert us, & it is not 
improbable, but a Regard to their own Safety will induce them to join the Enemy.”98 But 
a few days later, with provisions growing scarce and hearing rumors that Tarleton was 
approaching, he decided to rejoin Greene and leave militia under Andrew Pickens and 
William Davidson to check the loyalists. Morgan hoped that Tarleton would ignore the 
rebel militia and focus his attention on the Continentals.99
Cornwallis had indeed ordered Tarleton to pursue Morgan and drive the rebels 
from the backcountry. The earl planned to march northward with his own troops to 
prevent Morgan from reaching Greene’s army. After the two forces cut off and destroyed 
Morgan’s detachment, Cornwallis intended to deal with Greene.100
Loyalists greatly facilitated Tarleton’s pursuit of Morgan. Capt. Alexander 
Chesney, who had been exchanged, arrived from Ninety Six about January 12 to guide 
the British troops. Tarleton sent Chesney to find Morgan’s force, and when this was 
done, the British commander sent several loyalists as spies into Morgan’s camp.101 Other 
valuable information came from a Whig militia colonel who had been captured by a
97 Greene to Morgan, Jan. 8, 1781, Myers Collection, No. 869, microfilm, DLAR.
98 Morgan to Greene, Jan. 4, 1781, Myers Collection, No. 944, microfilm, DLAR.
99 Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, 129.
100 Pancake, This Destructive War, 132-133; Cornwallis to Tarleton, Jan. 3, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 
30/11/84, 39.
101 Babits, Devil o f  a Whipping, 51; Chesney, Journal, 21; Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 214.
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“party of determined loyalists.”102 At least fifty loyalists accompanied Tarleton’s 
detachment, serving as guides and messengers. While the British regulars rested on the 
night of January 16, loyalists searched for Morgan and brought Tarleton a steady stream 
of information. The next morning, when Tarleton encountered Morgan’s troops deployed 
for battle in a field locally known as the Cowpens, loyalists familiar with the area 
provided him with a detailed description of the terrain.103
Believing that Cornwallis’s troops must now be coming up behind the rebels, 
Tarleton promptly attacked. British troops drove back Morgan’s soldiers, but broke ranks 
to pursue when they thought the Whigs were fleeing the field. However, Morgan rallied 
his men, counterattacked, and overwhelmed Tarleton’s force. The survivors and their 
commander escaped and rejoined Cornwallis.104
Contrary to Tarleton’s assumption, the earl had been nowhere near the Cowpens. 
That was not the fault of the loyalists; Cornwallis noted that “the great assiduity of 
Phillips and his Militia” and wagons provided by loyal civilians had enabled his army to 
begin its march on schedule.105 Loyalist guides had also done an efficient job leading 
Leslie’s reinforcements forward. Cornwallis, however, had delayed his march without 
informing his subordinate.106
Infuriated by news of Tarleton’s defeat, Cornwallis decided to pursue Morgan in 
hopes of retaking the British prisoners. Morgan, who was already retreating as fast as his
102 Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 214.
103 J. B. O. Landrum, Colonial and Revolutionary History o f  Upper South Carolina; embracing for the 
most part the primitive and colonial history o f  the territory comprising the original county o f  Spartanburg. 
(Greenville, SC: Shannon Printers, 1897), 289; Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown, 99; Babits, Devil o f  a 
Whipping, 53, 81; Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, 135.
104 Pancake, This Destructive War, 135-138.
105 Cornwallis to Tarleton, Jan. 7, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/84, 29.
106 Cornwallis to Leslie, Jan. 14, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/84, 61; Babits, Devil o f  a Whipping, 
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troops could march, linked up with Greene’s force, and the combined American army 
fled across North Carolina and into Virginia with Cornwallis in hot pursuit. The earl left 
Balfour in command of South Carolina, with Rawdon to exercise actual control of the 
troops in the field.107
Unlike the defeat at King’s Mountain, the Battle of Cowpens did not demoralize 
most loyalists. Instead, Greene’s rapid flight and Cornwallis’s pursuit had the appearance 
of a British victory. Balfour noted that “the effects of Tarletons misfortunate action, were
greatly counteracted & the country saw the decided superiority o f our army -  who in
108several skirmishes was successful to a great degree.” Loyalists therefore continued 
actively to support the British, while many Whigs believed their cause in the South had 
been lost beyond retrieval and accepted royal authority.
Some loyalists struck back at the Whigs on the night after the battle, killing Maj. 
James Dugan of the rebel militia, his brother, and two other men. Chesney gathered his 
own followers, who had scattered during the battle, and found Robert Cunningham 
encamped at Fair Forest. Despite Chesney’s urgent appeals for action, “we could not 
prevail on General Cunningham to use any exertions to embody his brigade of Militia.109 
This caused Balfour to consider reinforcing Ninety Six with more regulars, which would 
enable Cruger to operate more effectively against the rebels. Balfour believed that 
Cruger’s “being able to detach two hundred men on an emergency effectualy gains the 
assistance of the Militia who without the aid of troops ... are of no sort of use.”110
107 Pancake, This Destructive War, 157-161.
108 Balfour to Jeffery Amherst, March 28, 1781, Correspondence and Papers o f Amherst, Microfilm, 
DLAR.
109 Chesney, Journal, 22.
110 Balfour to Cornwallis, Feb. 2, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/70, No. 26.
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The situation in the backcountry, however, was not as bad as Balfour feared.
Some loyalists did consider theirs to be a “hopeless cause” after Cowpens and joined the 
rebels, but most persisted in the struggle.111 A rebel militiaman declared that after 
Cowpens “it was now almost Fire & Faggot Between .Whig & Tory, who were
119contending for the ascendancy” in a conflict that raged until late May.
To many Whigs, including some of the most prominent men in the province, it 
was their cause that appeared hopeless and they took the oath to Britain. John Rutledge 
noted that the British “make a great Parade of Mr. [Arthur] Middleton, ‘formerly Presidt 
o f the Conti Congress, ’ & old Mr. [Gabriel] Manigault having applied to be admitted as
113British Subjects, wch they have been -  Indeed, I fear many will follow their Example.” 
Several did. On January 16, 1781, Balfour informed Germain that “many of the principal 
Inhabitants of the Province, & some who held the Chief Office under the late Rebel 
powers have reverted to their Loyalty & Declared their Allegiance to His Majesty’s 
Government.”114 Between February 16 and April 9, 1781, a further 210 men swore 
allegiance to Britain.115
British officers took advantage of the promising situation to strengthen the militia 
and to create provincial cavalry units. Rawdon devised a new plan of “raising Militia 
Corps upon Pay, which I think will answer well.”116 In Charleston the militia impressed
111 O’Hara to the Duke o f Grafton, April 20, 1781, in Rogers, ed., “Letters o f  Charles O’Hara,” 173.
112 Babits, Devil o f  a Whipping, 138, 141.
113 John Rutledge to SC Delegates in Congress, Dec. 8, 1780, in Barnwell, ed., “Letters o f John Rutledge,” 
Part 2, SCHGM, Vol. 18, No. 1, Jan. 1917,44-45.
114 Balfour to Germain, Jan. 16, 1781, Alexander Leslie Letterbook, 1781-1782, microfilm, SCDAH.
115 South Carolina Loyalists Oath o f Allegiance, 1781, South Carolina Loyalists, South Carolina Box, 
NYPL.
116 Rawdon to Cornwallis, Jan. 14, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/67, 20.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
446
observers as being both smartly uniformed and “well disciplined.”117 Officers in Camden 
district were busily enlisting men for two troops of dragoons. Stephen Jarvis, a 
Connecticut loyalist serving in the Queen’s Rangers, use a generous enlistment bounty to 
recruit twenty-six men at Charleston. Maj. Thomas Fraser marched his South Carolina 
dragoons through Ninety Six district, enlisting several men who had previously served
1 1 Q
under Ferguson.
At the beginning of February, Cornwallis sent Rawdon a warning from North 
Carolina that this respite would not last long. “Some Georgia refugees & other Banditti 
are assembling at Gilbertown, & Sumpter is again in the field,” the earl wrote.119 He was 
soon proved correct, as rebel partisans took advantage of the army’s absence to launch a 
new campaign against loyalists and British posts. Moses Kirkland reported on February 
22 that the roads in the Congarees region were “so Infested with small parties of the 
Rebells” that he had to cancel his intended journey to join Cornwallis.120 These were 
units from Sumter’s command, which crossed the Congaree River a few days later to 
attack British supply lines and raise recruits. Sumter issued a proclamation promising 
pardon to loyalists who joined him and threatening anyone who refused. “To give weight 
to these threats,” Rawdon wrote, “several persons known to be friendly towards us, were 
inhumanly murdered; tho’ unarmed, & remaining peaceably at their own houses. Either 
thro’ fear or inclination, many joined the Enemy.” Rawdon added that “the savage cruelty
117 William Charles Wells to James Currie, March 18, 1781, “Letter from Wm. Charles Wells to Dr. James 
Currie,” SCHGM, Vol. 26, No. 1, Jan. 1925,43.
118 Cornwallis to Balfour, Jan. 12, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/84, 51; “Narrative o f  Colonel 
Stephen Jarvis,” inTalman, ed., Loyalist Narratives, 196, 201; Bass, Gamecock, 153.
119 Cornwallis to Rawdon, Feb. 4, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/85, 1.
120 Kirkland to Cornwallis, Feb. 22, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/67, 83.
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of the Enemy, who commit the most wanton murders in cold blood, upon the Friends of 
Government,” made it nearly impossible to hire couriers “at any price.”121
Dividing his forces into three detachments, Rawdon planned a concerted 
movement to trap Sumter. While these troops maneuvered, Sumter attacked and captured 
a wagon train. After the militia escort “laid down their arms,” more of Sumter’s men 
reached the scene, and complaining that “they had not discharged their pieces,” opened 
fire and killed seven prisoners. British Lt. Col. John Watson, commanding one of 
Rawdon’s columns, captured six of Sumter’s men shortly afterward and retaliated in 
kind. Watson believed this was the only way to deal with the rebels after finding that so 
many people, “without arms, and taking side with neither contending party, but residing 
peaceably in their own houses, have been murdered.”
The capture of the wagon train marked the limit of Sumter’s success. Sumter 
decided to send his booty down the Santee River by boat and ordered loyalist Robert 
Livingston to pilot the little convoy. Livingston guided the boats directly under the guns 
of a riverside fort, enabling the British to recover the supplies and capture the rebel 
guards. The Whigs went on to attack a small post garrisoned by South Carolina 
provincials, only to be repulsed. Meanwhile, Rawdon’s three columns converged on 
Sumter’s force, but the commander of one British detachment disobeyed Rawdon’s 
orders and changed his route of march, allowing the rebels to escape the trap. In his 
flight, Sumter encountered other British troops and the Whigs were dispersed with a loss 
of eighteen killed. On March 6, other South Carolina provincials defeated Sumter yet 
again, killing ten. By the end of the month, Rawdon was able to report that he had put an
121 Rawdon to Cornwallis, March 7,1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/69, 7.
122 John Watson to Marion, March 9, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:34.
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end to Sumter’s threat, while simultaneously quelling Marion’s activities with a surprise 
attack that captured and destroyed the latter’s base.123
During the campaign the Whigs had continued to abuse loyalist prisoners, 
prompting Balfour to protest to Marion. Noting that he had received continuous reports of 
“the very ill treatment which such of the King’s militia whose misfortune it is to be 
captured by you are daily receiving,” Balfour declared that he had no choice but “to put 
in force retaliation of all severities imposed by any of your people on such prisoners of 
war; and for this purpose, I have directed the militia to be separated from the continental 
prisoners, that they may experience those hardships and ill usages in their full degree, 
which too many of ours labor under.” Nevertheless, Balfour stated that he would gladly 
put an end to such policies as soon as he was assured that captured loyal militiamen were
humanely treated.124 Rawdon evidently did not bother waiting for dubious assurances; in
/
March, Marion accused him of having “hanged three men of my Brigade for supposed 
Crimes” and vowed to retaliate against an equal number of British prisoners.125
Marion also responded to a complaint from Watson by indicating that he hoped 
the war could be fought according to civilized principles. Watson in turn asserted that if 
Marion personally adhered to the laws of war, he must be “ignorant of numberless 
transactions” carried out by the Whigs, such as the case of Thomas Wise of the loyal 
militia, who had been “whipped almost to death” after being captured. Another prisoner, 
Watson wrote, had handed over his pistol “and was instantly shot through the body with
123 Bass, Gamecock, 130-131; Bass, Swamp Fox, 156-157; Rawdon to Cornwallis, March 7, 1781; March 
24, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/69, 7, 21.
124 Balfour to Francis Marion, March 2, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:27.
125 Marion to Balfour, March 7, 1781, Emmet Collection No. 6625, NYPL.
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it,” then “cut through the skull in five or six places with his own sword.” He died two 
days later.126
Even Gen. William Moultrie, a prisoner since the fall of Charleston, was 
sufficiently disturbed by Whig cruelties to join in the protests. After Balfour convinced 
him that the rebels had murdered three loyalists, Moultrie wrote Marion that such actions 
“cannot answer any good purpose,” and urged him to halt “such unwarrantable 
practices,” which disgraced the rebel cause.127
Although it was difficult for the British to identify the perpetrators of these 
crimes, Sumter and his troops were apparently greater offenders than Marion and his 
followers. Sumter believed that anyone who did not bear arms in the Whig cause should 
be considered an enemy and “treated as their baseness and perfidy authorize.”128
The most brutal of the Whigs, however, were the overmountain men, as they 
again demonstrated by murdering a British officer. On March 23, Elijah Clarke with 180 
rebels attacked a British and loyalist force only half as large near Ninety Six. Many of the 
British and loyalist troops were killed in the American charge; the remainder took refuge 
in nearby houses but soon surrendered. An estimated thirty British and loyalist soldiers 
were killed, and forty captured, including their commander, James Dunlap.129 Not content 
with this victory, some rebels “forced the Guard” escorting the prisoners and killed 
Dunlap. Andrew Pickens, the Whig partisan leader, described the crime as an “inhuman 
action.” He dispatched a flag of truce to Ninety Six to inform Cruger of the murder, 
relating “with what horror and detestation American Officers looked on the act.” Pickens
126 Watson to Marion, March 15, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:39.
127 Moultrie to Marion, April 16, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:52.
128 Sumter to Marion, March 28, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:45.
129 Benjamin Ford to Mordecai Gist, April 15, 1781, Gist Papers, MHS; Andrew Pickens to Nathanael 
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offered a $10,000 reward for the apprehension of the murderer, identified as “Cobb an 
over Mountain Man.” Yet at the same time Pickens tried to justify the crime as retribution 
for the “many barbarous massacres” of Whig prisoners taken by loyalists.130 Despite 
Pickens’s obvious sincerity in repudiating Dunlap’s murder, most Whigs seemed to have 
approved of the crime, as the lucrative reward never led to Cobb’s capture. The apparent 
ease with which the murderers overpowered Dunlap’s guards also hints at their possible 
collusion with the killer.
Although the loyalists’ determination and Rawdon’s skillful operations against 
the partisans had checked the Whigs’ ruthless onslaught, events took a sudden and 
decisive turn against the British at the end of April. After three months of marching and 
fighting, Cornwallis withdrew his depleted army to Wilmington, North Carolina. While 
the king’s troops recuperated, Greene decided to ignore the British army and march his 
Continentals back to South Carolina. The 5,200 British, German, and provincial troops in 
the province greatly outnumbered Greene’s force, but the Whigs had two offsetting 
advantages. First, the partisans augmented Greene’s force by several thousand men, and 
second, most of the British troops were tied to fixed posts to protect the communications 
between Charleston and the interior. The only way Rawdon could assemble enough 
troops to challenge Greene in the field was by weakening the numerous garrisons, which 
would then be easy prey to the partisans.131
Cornwallis proceeded to compound Rawdon’s problems. Rather than follow 
Greene, the earl decided to march to Virginia and unite his troops with the march larger
130 Pickens to Greene, April 4, 1781, in “Letters to Greene and Others,” 102.
131 Pancake, This Destructive War, 190; State o f  the Troops left in South Carolina under... Lord Rawdon, 
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southern district.
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British force in the Chesapeake. Recognizing that this move endangered royal control of 
South Carolina, Cornwallis convinced himself that if he pursued Greene, he would still 
arrive too late to assist Rawdon, consoled himself by remarking that “if we are so 
unfortunate as to lose some of the Outposts and the Country o f S. Carolina ... Charleston
* * 1 T1?is not in danger.” Capt. Johann Ewald believed that Cornwallis’s decision would prove 
fatal to the loyalists. “Why not operate out of one point and use all our force there to be 
the master of at least one province?” he asked. Ewald declared that the loyalists had been 
“constantly deceived” and now would be made “miserable” by being left without
1 TTprotection, “yet we still want to find friends in this country!”
Loyalists reacted in different ways to the news of Greene’s approach. Some fled 
to British posts for refuge; others hid in the swamps and woods to escape the rebels. The 
South Carolina Royalists brushed aside Whig partisans and marched from Ninety Six to 
Camden to reinforce Rawdon.134 Large numbers of militiamen likewise showed “great 
zeal and fidelity, in coming from considerable distances to offer their services” at 
Camden. Unfortunately, the supply of provisions there was so limited that Rawdon was 
unable “to benefit by their assistance, excepting only those whose particular situation 
exposed them to suffer from the enemy, and who were on that account received within 
the post.”135 Loyalists also kept Rawdon fully informed of Greene’s maneuvers.136
Greene immediately concluded that aggressive action was required to prevent the
137loyalists from making a decisive contribution to the defense of South Carolina. “More
132 Cornwallis to Balfour, April 24, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/85, 49.
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of the Inhabitants appear in the Kings interest than in ours,” He informed Samuel 
Huntington, president of the Continental Congress. Greene added that the rebel militia 
“can do little more than keep Tories in subjection, and in many places not that.”138
Greene decided to take a position near Camden, where he could hold the British 
garrison in place while the partisans moved to suppress the loyalists and cut Rawdon’s 
supply lines. In the northeastern part of the province, Marion, Henry Lee, and other 
Whigs attacked British posts, militia units, and individual loyalists. Micajah Ganey 
assembled the loyal militia at Drowning Creek to oppose them, but Whigs under Col. 
Abel Kolb dispersed Ganey’s men and hanged a loyalist prisoner named Caleb Williams. 
Marion sent Col. Hugh Horry and seventy men to intercept a group of loyalists 
attempting to link up with Watson’s regulars, who were operating in the area; instead the 
Whigs encountered a foraging party and killed two British soldiers and captured thirteen 
others, along with two loyalists and two blacks. A few days later, forty loyalists attacked
1 TOKolb’s home, killing him and two other men in retaliation for the hanging of Williams. 
Rawdon dispatched 150 loyalist volunteers from Camden to relieve the pressure on 
Ganey and Watson by attacking the Waxhaws settlements. They burned buildings and 
killed several rebels, then eluded troops that Sumter sent to capture them. In reprisal, 
Sumter’s men rampaged through loyalist settlements at Mobley’s Meeting House and 
Sandy Run, “burning and killing.”140 Rawdon showed his determination to punish such 
offenses by hanging “One Smith, for murdering a friend of Government.”141
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Amidst this inconclusive fighting, Marion and Lee won a significant victory, 
capturing Fort Watson on the Santee River. The garrison of 130 British regulars and loyal 
militiamen held out for nearly a week, until the Whigs constructed a log tower that 
enabled them to fire into the fort.142 Among those who surrendered on April 23 were 
forty “principal torys” whose capture Lee hoped would demoralize other loyalists.143
Whig operations in the backcountry also produced mixed results. When Andrew 
Pickens reached the Ennoree River with his militia, he found loyalist parties active in the 
area and said that if  he had not arrived when he did, many disheartened rebels would 
have evacuated the area.144 Pickens attempted to attack various detachments of the loyal 
militia in the area, but all of them managed to elude him and reach Ninety Six. He then 
planned an attack on Cunningham’s militia, who were near the town, but two Whig 
parties blundered into each other and mistakenly opened fire, alerting Cunningham. The 
loyalists then withdrew.145
Sumter had more success along the Broad River. On April 25 he reported that 
many loyalists in the vicinity appeared ready to give up the struggle and were “hiding out 
until they Know what terms may be offered.”146 To force them to submit, he sent rebel 
militia “through the Tory Settlements in Both forks” of the river to “Disperce parties of 
Tories that are Lying out,” although other loyalists were “embodying West of Saluda 
River.” He prepared to attack them, believing that the defeat of those loyalists would 
“leave all the Back Country open and Secoure, quite to 96.”147
142 Pancake, This Destructive War, 191-192.
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Whig attacks extended even into the lowcountry, where the partisans enjoyed 
some success despite the proximity of the Charleston garrison. “The enemy in partys of 
two & three hundred have over run all the country to the southward” of Charleston, 
Balfour wrote.148 He ordered British troops and the provincial cavalry to assemble at 
Dorchester, summon the militia, and then move against the rebels, but Whig Col. William 
Harden struck before this force was ready. Harden’s party captured a loyalist captain and 
twenty-five militiamen at Four Holes, and a day later killed four loyalists and captured 
three. The rebels then moved against Fort Balfour at Pocotaligo. After capturing militia 
Cols. Edward Fenwick and Nicholas Lechmere at a nearby house, Harden demanded the 
fort’s surrender, threatening that he would give the defenders no quarter if they resisted. 
Col. Fletcher Kelsall of the militia, who commanded the fort, capitulated; the Whigs took 
about one hundred prisoners. Other loyalists in the area fled to the swamps. Robert 
Ballingall arrived shortly afterward with 130 regulars and 40 militia and forced Harden to 
withdraw.149
Greene’s plan to suppress the loyalists succeeded to a considerable extent.
William R. Davie, the army’s quartermaster general, noted that the Whigs had “overawed 
the Loyalists who were numerous” in the province.150 As always, Whig brutality had its 
effect. “We are astounded to hear of the most terrible cruelties, that are perpetrated on 
those who will not be false to the King again,” a Hessian officer wrote.151 Balfour noted 
that the Whigs “have adopted the System of murdering every Militia Officer of ours as
148 Balfour to Cornwallis, April 20, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/5, 231.
149 Balfour to McArthur, April 10, 1781, Leslie Letterbook, microfilm, SCDAH; William Harden to 
Marion, April 18, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:53-55.
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well as every man (although unarmed) who is known to be a loyalist, the terror this mode 
of conduct has struck you will easily suppose,” he told Cornwallis, “some immediate stop 
must be put to it, or the consequences will be very fatal.”152
Rawdon realized that if he did not take action, the partisans would sever his 
supply lines and force him to evacuate Camden, with devastating consequences for 
loyalist morale. Balfour had already recommended that the British abandon their posts in 
the interior and consolidate their forces east of the Santee River. Deciding that it would 
be better to decisively defeat Greene, Rawdon left Camden in the hands of the militia and 
some armed blacks and marched out to attack the Continentals on April 25. His force 
included the South Carolina Royalists as well as a many militiamen. Rawdon borrowed a 
favorite rebel tactic and positioned loyalist riflemen on the flanks of his army as snipers 
to harass Greene’s troops and pick off their officers. After a hard-fought battle, the 
British and loyalists drove Greene’s troops from their position on Hobkirk’s Hill. When 
Watson’s detachment arrived on May 7, Rawdon advanced again in an effort to inflict 
another defeat on the rebels, but Greene withdrew to avoid combat.153
With Greene’s army still intact and British supply lines threatened by partisans, 
Rawdon felt he had no choice but to order the evacuation of Camden on May 9. His 
troops destroyed all the supplies they could not carry with them, leveled the fortifications, 
and “brought off not only the militia who had been with us at Camden, but also the well- 
affected neighbors on our route,” with their families, slaves, and possessions.154 Many of 
the loyalist refugees went to Charleston, where “they built themselves huts, without the
152 Balfour to Cornwallis, April 26, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/6, 29.
153 Balfour to Cornwallis, April 20, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/5, 231; Pancake, This Destructive 
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lines, which was called Rawdontown: many of these unfortunate women and children ... 
died for want, in those miserable huts.”155
The evacuation of Camden left the backcountry isolated and Sumter quickly 
moved to strike the loyalists there. Some of his troops attacked a loyalist party at Bush 
River, killing three and capturing twelve. “The Tories are Very uneasee & Will Numbers 
of them Disert if oppertunity Serves,” Sumter wrote, noting that sixteen loyalists deserted 
from a British fort in one night. Others were “Coming in fast from the Country & Will in 
my oppinion Cheifly Give up if We Can hold our Ground a little longer.”156 When 
Sumter marched to the Congarees, he found that small loyalist parties were “Troublesom 
in different parts of the Country,” but their operations were little more than a nuisance
• 157and more than offset by the number of men in the area who joined the Whigs. 
Cunningham struck back later in the month, sending some of his militia on a raid north of 
Ninety Six. They destroyed Wofford’s iron works along with other buildings and killed
1 S8several rebels.
Although the loyalists were “very troublesom over Peedee & Waccomaw” in 
early May, they lost any hope of direct British support when Balfour ordered the 
evacuation of Georgetown.159 The garrison withdrew on May 23, which, Marion asserted, 
prevented the loyalists “from destroying our friends.”160 Yet some loyalists continued to 
harass the Whigs around Georgetown, forcing Marion to dispatch troops in mid-June to 
suppress them.161
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The actions of a few such bands of hardy loyalists could not prevent the collapse 
of British control in the province. The surrender of the British post at Orangeburg on May 
11, of Fort Motte near the confluence of the Wateree and Congaree Rivers on May 12, 
and of Fort Granby on the Congaree three days later smashed the British hold on the 
interior of South Carolina. One of Greene’s aides calculated the total of prisoners taken at
the three posts to be 10 British officers and 205 men, and 22 loyalist officers and 375
162men. The loss of manpower left the British too weak to even attempt to regain control 
of the lost territory.
With British forces confined to the vicinity of Charleston, Greene took his army 
to attack Ninety Six while Whigs and loyalists battled each other across much of the 
province. He could do nothing to stop the bloodshed, lamenting that “not a day passes but 
there are more or less who fall a sacrafice to this savage disposition. The Whigs seem 
determined to exterpate the Tories and the Tories the Whigs. Some thousands have fallen 
in this way in this quarter, and the evil rages with more violence than ever.” Greene 
feared that if “those private massacres” were not ended soon, “this Country will be 
depopulated ... as neither Whig nor Tory can live.”163 A Hessian officer reported that 
“mounted bands of rebels scour the whole neighborhood” on both sides of the Santee 
River, “drive the loyalists from their homes -  which they destroy after carrying 
everything away -  make all the roads insecure, and have murdered many people.”164
162 Sumter to Greene, May 12, 1781; Greene to Abner Nash, May 14,1781; Ichabod Burnet to Robert 
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Balfour also deplored the cruelty, but like his Hessian colleague, he found the 
Whigs to be chiefly responsible for it. “The enemy have uniformly murdred in cold 
blood, all our Militia whom they have been able to get at,” he wrote, noting that the 
surviving loyalists were terrified and did not dare turn out to support the British. Greene’s 
march to Ninety Six, Balfour added, aroused his sympathy “for the miserable districts of 
Loyalists in the back country... those poorer people who are indeed our only friends.”165 
Cornwallis showed no concern whatsoever for the loyalists; he advised his subordinates 
to abandon both them and the backcountry. “The perpetual instances of the weakness and 
treachery of our friends in South Carolina, and the impossibility of getting any military 
assistance from them, makes the possession of any part of the country of very little use,” 
he told Rawdon.166 To insure adequate provisions for the Charleston garrison, Cornwallis 
suggested that Balfour might find it wise to “turn out of Town all parole Men & 
disaffected People, with their families & many Negroes, & to shut your Gates against
i fnmany of the poor country people, & all Negroes.”
Instead, Rawdon and Balfour sought to bolster loyalist morale by issuing a 
proclamation on May 24 in which they exhorted those in evacuated areas “to stand firm 
in their Duty and Principles” against “the insidious artifices” of the Whigs. They 
promised pardon to anyone who had “been force to join the Enemy, as the only Means of 
preserving themselves and their Families from the savage Cruelty of the Rebel Militia.”
1 /JO
Loyalists who came to British posts were promised “every Support.”
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Rawdon and Balfour meant what they said and took steps to assist and protect the 
loyalists. Balfour, aided by generous donations from lowcountry loyalists totaling nearly 
three thousand guineas ($400,000), created a force of provincial cavalry from the South 
Carolina Royalists and new volunteers to counter the rebels’ raids. In May, Alexander 
Chesney, who had abandoned his backcountry home after Cowpens, took three newly 
raised companies to Dorchester, where a soldier noted that the majority of people 
remained loyal. Chesney’s troops were assigned to protect sequestered plantations that 
supplied Charleston. Balfour also ordered loyalist Alexander Stewart to create an 
independent company on James Island.169
Even more important than these measures was the arrival at Charleston on June 3 
of three British regiments with a combined strength of over three thousand rank and file. 
The reinforcement enabled Rawdon to take his own troops, along with the newly arrived 
grenadier and light infantry companies, and march to the relief of Ninety Six. Rawdon set 
out on June 7, and Balfour sent loyalist messengers ahead of the troops to inform the
i nr\
garrison that relief was on the way.
Greene’s army had been skirmishing with loyalists throughout its march to Ninety 
Six. After reaching the Wateree River, Otho Holland Williams observed that “we are now 
farther advanc’d into South Carolina, and particularly that part which is most attach’d to 
the Kings interest.”171 On May 21, the American advance guard “killed about twelve 
Tories,” while the main body of Continentals came upon a loyalist encampment and
169 Rawdon to Cornwallis, June 5, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/6, 174; Chesney, Journal, 23-24, 
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killed another eleven men.172 Greene also dispatched his light infantry and cavalry “to 
Surprise a party of tories,” but the loyalists withdrew before the Whigs arrived. Shortly 
after the cavalry set off in pursuit, another group of loyalists mistook the rebel infantry 
for British troops and emerged from a swamp, “& being undeceived” captured a Whig 
soldier. One loyalist was killed in the subsequent exchange of fire. Returning to the 
scene, Greene’s cavalry killed four more loyalists and captured six. The next day, rebel 
troops “Surprised a party of Tories within sight of Ninety Six, killing four.173
After reaching Ninety Six and beginning siege operations, Greene and his officers 
found themselves in the midst of hostile territory. Williams asserted that “the Enemy 
have had such footing and influence in this Country that their Success in puting the 
Inhabitants together ... has Exceeded even their own Expectations.”174 Greene wrote that 
while he was already aware that “a very large majority of the People from inclination 
were in the Enemys interest” in the province, he believed that in the backcountry “there 
are five for one against us. The Tories swarm around us and render it extreme difficult to 
get either forage or subsistance for our Troops.”175 As many as five hundred loyalists 
were reported to be concealed in swamps and forests near the American lines. Greene 
tried to induce them to surrender by offering them pardon, but few accepted.176 Civil war 
continued to rage across much of the backcountry. “The Daily deliberate murders 
committed by pretended whiggs and reputed Tories ... are too numerous & too shocking 
to relate,” Williams observed.177
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Inside the fortifications, Cruger’s 350 New York and New Jersey provincials, 
aided by 200 militia under Cunningham, resisted stoutly. Another hundred loyalists -  
women, children, and the elderly -  took refuge inside the stockade. Despite his inability 
to obtain any information from outside, Cruger steadfastly believed that Rawdon would 
come to his aid.178
As Rawdon marched to relieve Ninety Six, large numbers of loyalists joined the 
British troops. “The Tories join fast,” Henry Lee informed Greene.179 Another Whig 
officer reported that people flocked to Rawdon when his troops reached Orangeburg. On 
June 18, the rebels captured “15 or 18 Arm’d Tories” who had been on their way to meet
1 SOthe British. With Rawdon’s army shielding them from the Continentals, other loyalists 
assembled and attacked the Whigs, causing so many of Sumter’s men to return home to
i n i
protect their families that the corps temporarily became too weak to take the field.
On June 17, a bold loyalist rode among Greene’s troops, pretending to be nothing 
more than a curious farmer until he reached a point opposite the gate in the stockade 
around Ninety Six, whereupon he raced toward it under a barrage of Whig gunfire. He 
brought Cruger a message that Rawdon was fast approaching. Realizing that he had no 
time to await the outcome of his siege, Greene launched a desperate attack the next day, 
which failed to breach the British fortifications and cost him 150 men. The rebels
retreated, and Rawdon arrived on June 21. He tried to bring the Continentals to battle, but
182Greene took advantage of his head start to keep a safe distance from the British troops.
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Rawdon returned to Ninety Six, where an examination of its circumstances 
convinced him that the post had to be abandoned. “But that no proof of attention to our 
friends might be omitted,” Rawdon explained, “I ordered the principal Inhabitants to be 
convened; & desired that they should state their wishes.” He suggested that if the 
loyalists were willing to defend the district against the Whigs, he would leave behind a 
small force of troops and occasionally send larger detachments to assist them. If the 
loyalists preferred to leave the area, he promised to settle them on abandoned rebel 
plantations within the contracted sphere of British control. Most loyalists chose to leave 
with the British to “be secure against the savage cruelty of the Rebel Militia.” Once they 
had been resettled, the men promised Rawdon that they would “embody, & make 
incursions into the disaffected Settlements.”183
More than eight hundred men who had served in the Ninety Six district militia 
were among those who evacuated the area. Other loyalists joined the column as it made 
its way across the province, while some loyalists sought safety in Georgia or among their
1 84Indian neighbors. Before leaving, loyalists in the Long Canes district burned several
• 18^ Whig-owned houses and drove off all the livestock they could not bring with them.
Most loyalists, however, chose to remain at home and make the best of their
situation. An informant told Otho Holland Williams that many people around Ninety Six
were “averse to going to Cha: Town.”186 Whig Col. William Henderson noted that very
few loyalists along the Pacolet River seemed willing to relocate closer to Charleston.
After the evacuation of Ninety Six, Greene expressed satisfaction that the number of
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loyalists who accompanied the British was far less than he had expected.187 Yet if many 
loyalists did not persist in the fight, neither did they abandon their principles. When the 
Delaware Continentals marched through a settlement along the Broad River on June 24, 
William Seymour found that the inhabitants made no secret of the fact that they were “all 
Tories,” although they made no effort to harass the rebels.188
Throughout the final campaigns in the South Carolina interior, the Whigs 
continued their relentless persecution of the loyalists and, when possible, the latter 
retaliated in kind. After capturing Fort Motte, rebel troops prepared to hang the captured 
German militiamen from Orangeburg until Col. William Thomson intervened and 
ordered the men released. Near Camden, the Whigs captured Capt. Francis Tidwell of the 
loyal militia, hanged him, and to increase their enjoyment of the spectacle did not tie 
Tidwell’s hands. The rebels roared with laughter at Tidwell’s vain struggle against the 
noose; when their entertainment ended with Tidwell’s death, they left the body hanging 
for three days as a warning to other loyalists. Several loyalists captured in a skirmish near 
Georgetown were also hanged. Across the province, individually or in small groups,
189loyalist prisoners suffered death at the hands of the Whigs.
Levi Smith, an officer in the loyal militia, managed to survive his captivity and 
tell of the savagery that prisoners encountered. In a “grisly” narrative of his experiences 
in May and June, Smith recounted how after his capture he was stripped and “forced to 
run for a mile ahead of his mounted captors” in his underclothes. “When he collapsed, the 
rebels beat him with the flat sides of their swords.” During his confinement, he watched
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the Whigs hang an officer and two privates of the loyal militia for having collaborated 
with the British. A Whig officer accused Smith of burning a tavern and ordered him 
hanged, despite Smith’s protestations of innocence. A rebel soldier, who feared that his 
brother in British captivity might be executed in retaliation, secured Francis Marion’s 
intervention to spare Smith. Soon afterward, the Whigs placed fourteen other prisoners in 
irons and sent them under militia guard to Greene’s camp. The prisoners had not gone far 
when the militia commander ordered them shot. Thirteen died, and the fourteenth, Joseph 
Cooper, survived although a rebel stabbed him in the throat with a sword to insure that he 
was dead. Cooper escaped from the murder scene after the militia left, dragging the 
corpse of his companion who was still chained to him. Sympathetic women found and 
freed Cooper, who eventually made his way to Charleston. The Whig militiamen returned 
to camp and boasted of their deed, frightening most of the remaining prisoners into 
joining the Whigs. Smith clung to his principles, however, and was later paroled by 
Greene. He too sought safety in Charleston.190
Rawdon and Balfour could do little to halt the persecution, although they were 
fully aware that rebel cruelty drove many loyalists into taking up arms with the Whigs. “I 
am well convinced, that numbers have joined the enemy merely to shield themselves 
from the atrocious barbarity of the rebel militia, which has been beyond what I have ever 
heard of among the most savage nations,” Rawdon wrote.191 Balfour renewed his threat 
to retaliate against the rebel militia prisoners in Charleston. Addressing the captives, 
Balfour declared that he had repeatedly protested to Whig leaders regarding “the outrages
190 Janice Potter and Robert M. Calhoon, “The Character and Coherence o f  the Loyalist Press,” in Bernard 
Bailyn and John B. Hench, eds., The Press and the American Revolution (Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1981), 263-264.
191 Rawdon to Cornwallis, June 6, 1781, in Tarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 481.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
465
committed by the American Troops” and “the rigourous treatment, in many cases 
extending to Death, which the Loyal Militia, when made Prisoners, most invariably 
experience.” Since American officers had “wholly Neglected” his pleas, Balfour 
announced that he had no alternative except to use the prisoners he held “as Hostages for 
the good usage of all the Loyal Militia, who are or may be made Prisoners of War.”192 
The prisoners answered that they were willing to accept the threatened punishments for 
the good of their cause, but a day later sent a more moderate reply in which they 
expressed mortification at the treatment some captured loyalists had received. However, 
they insisted that such cruelty was not sanctioned by American officers and attributed the 
violence to ignorance of the laws of war on the part of Whigs and loyalists alike.193
Unlike the Whigs, many loyalists held Greene responsible for the savagery. “The 
deliberate murders committed in cold blood, under your influence and direction in the 
Carolinas in the space of two months, exceed the number ever committed in any war 
recorded in the history of Europe,” a writer in the Royal Gazette asserted in an essay 
addressed to the American commander.”194
Greene, in fact, had been trying to halt the carnage, albeit with little success. In 
early June he learned that Col. Leroy Hammond’s regiment of Whig militia was 
“murdering and plundering the Inhabitants not in arms in a most barbarous and cruel 
Manner” along the Saluda River. Greene assured the victimized people of his “detestation 
of such a practice” and promised to stop it.195 He then ordered Andrew Pickens to take 
“proper Measures” to halt Hammond’s depredations and suggested “capital punishment”
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for anyone guilty of plundering and murder. “The Idea of exterminating the Tories is not 
less barbarous than impolitick; and if persisted in, will keep this Country in the greatest 
confusion and distress,” Greene stated. He urged Pickens to set an example by attempting 
to win over loyalists to the rebel cause, even if it angered “the most worthless part of the 
Whigs.”196
Greene’s intentions were good, yet he could not always control even his own 
Continental troops, let alone the militia. Henry Lee’s Legion contributed significantly to 
the carnage, despite Lee’s own criticism of South Carolinians as worse than “the Goths 
and Vandals” in plundering and murder. The “bloodletting” practiced by the Legion in 
retaliation for alleged British atrocities “blurred the distinction between policy in war and 
cruelty for its own sake.”197
Faced with a choice of death or switching allegiance to the Whigs, most loyalists 
opted for the latter, especially after the British evacuated the interior of South Carolina. 
By the end of June, loyalist morale was on the verge of complete collapse, and British 
hopes of retaining control in the South were evaporating along with it.
The situation in Georgia was equally bad. Small Whig parties continually raided 
the backcountry; in November the provincial council complained of “the many cruel 
murders and depredations which are daily committed on His Majesty’s peaceable and 
loyal subjects.”198 Gov. Wright himself noted that rebel galleys were raiding along the
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coastal rivers, plundering property and slaves at every opportunity. Since the army had no 
troops to spare, he did his best to counter the attacks with militia.199
Whig activity intensified in January 1781 as the rebels attempted to interrupt the 
flow of supplies to Augusta by attacking vessels on the upper Savannah River. Thomas 
Brown dispatched a force of Rangers and militia to the South Carolina side of the river to 
drive off the Whigs, but the rebels ambushed this detachment. The militia fled and the 
Rangers surrendered. The Whigs then executed the provincial officer and five other 
prisoners. One man escaped and informed Brown, who sent a larger force of forty 
Rangers, thirty Indians, and more militia to strike the rebels.200 Brown followed with 
forty more Rangers and an equal number of militia and Indians, and was later joined by 
another one hundred militiamen. This force camped at Wiggan’s plantation, where about 
five hundred rebels assaulted the militia posted on Brown’s left flank. The militia, 
“without returning a shot... fled into camp in the greatest disorder & confusion 
imaginable,” but the rangers and Indians still repulsed the rebel attack. Later the Whigs 
attacked again, and once more the militia fled, except for ten men. Again the rangers and 
Indians restored the situation with a charge that dispersed the rebels. Five Indians and 
five Rangers were killed. Brown then scoured the surrounding area, recovering many 
of the goods plundered from the supply ships and burning the houses where he found 
such items. He asked Balfour to assist him by sending the South Carolina militia to patrol 
the north bank of the Savannah, and Balfour promised to send what aid he could.202
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Brown received a small reinforcement in late January when thirty loyalists from 
the overmountain settlements made their way through Cherokee territory to Augusta, but 
this was not enough to enable Brown to halt Whig raids.203 In mid-February, South 
Carolina rebels entered upper Georgia and “assassinated eleven people, some of them in 
their beds.” Those murdered, Wright noted, “were such as had very early shown their 
loyalty and ... had been most active and useful in reducing the rebellion.”204 Brown sent 
two parties of militia, each numbering one hundred men, under Col. James Grierson and 
Maj. Henry Williams, to find the rebels, but the raiders escaped, leaving only a few 
stragglers to be captured by the militia.205
The elusive rebels continued to launch attacks on Georgia throughout March and 
April, inflicting grievous losses on the loyalists. Whigs murdered several people in the 
Ceded Lands, as well as thirty-five others in the environs of Augusta, where the garrison 
proved unable to protect the region’s inhabitants.206 The Quaker settlement at 
Wrightsborough, “known to be prosperous, largely pro-British, and unwilling to defend 
itself, became a favorite target.” The rebels killed several of the pacific Quakers, killed or
907carried off two thousand cattle, and burned a plantation and grist mill.
With some understatement, Wright reported in late April that the situation in 
Georgia had “taken a very unfavourable turn,” as the Whigs continued to murder “Pickt 
Men and such as they thought were most firm in their loyalty.” The attacks, Wright 
observed, came without warning so that the militia had no time to assemble to protect the
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people. The “unheard of Cruelty of the rebels was so shocking that the generality of the 
people took to the Swamps for shelter against these worse than Savages, who say they 
will Murder every loyal Subject in the Province.” Wright asked Cornwallis for troops to 
protect the loyalists, remarking that if left undefended, they were “doomed to death and 
distinction,” which was “poor encouragement for them to persevere in their loyalty.”208 
Many loyal Georgians also hoped that Georgia’s defenses could be strengthened; they 
told the governor that “our means of Defence have been considerably lessened by the 
cruel and wanton Murders of near one hundred Men, who have fallen a Sacrifice for their 
Loyalty.” The land communication with Charleston had been severed and rebel parties 
were “daily making Inroads to within a few Miles of Savannah,” they observed. They 
suggested that Wright reinforce the militia at Ebenezer and raise two troops of provincial 
cavalry to improve the situation.209
The Whig raids were followed by a full-scale attack on Augusta in May. When 
Greene moved to besiege Ninety Six, he ordered Henry Lee’s Legion to unite with militia 
under Elijah Clarke and Andrew Pickens and drive the British from the Georgia 
backcountry. On May 21, Lee captured Fort Galphin and its garrison of loyal militia at 
Silver Bluff on the South Carolina side of the Savannah River, then joined Pickens and 
Clarke who had already surrounded Augusta. Brown, with his rangers, militia, and 
several Cherokees, Creeks, and Chickasaws, gallantly defended the town until June 5, 
when rebel artillery emplaced in a tower overlooking Fort Cornwallis made further 
resistance hopeless. After Brown surrendered, Lee sent him to Savannah with an escort of
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Continentals to prevent the rebels from murdering their longtime nemesis. Nevertheless, 
Brown’s guards received so many threats en route that they feared for their own lives.210
Col. Grierson was not so fortunate as Brown. Pickens had sent most of the loyalist 
prisoners across the Savannah River for their own protection, but confined Grierson in an 
Augusta dwelling. On June 6, a Whig rode up to the door of the house “and without 
dismounting Shot [Grierson] So that he Expired Soon after.” The murderer rode away, 
and shortly afterward Henry Williams, who was also in the house, “was Shot at and badly 
Wounded in the Shoulder.”211
Dr. Thomas Taylor, a loyalist, believed that Grierson’s murder could have been 
prevented and the killer caught. On the day of Grierson’s death, Taylor endured “bitter 
curses” from the Whigs when he brought the colonel some water. Grierson told Taylor 
that “his Life was threatened & if not remov’d from the Place where he then was he was 
certain the Threat would be executed.” Taylor passed this information to Brown, who in 
turn informed Lee. Lee did nothing. After the murder, rebel troops undertook what Taylor 
described as “a sham Pursuit... for a few Minutes after the Murderer but he was 
permitted to escape.” Taylor added that many other loyalists shared Grierson’s fate, “ft 
would transcend Belief were I to recount the Murders committed by these Wretches upon 
the unhappy Tories all over the Country,” he wrote. The barbarity of the rebels, Taylor 
asserted, was four times worse than anything Indians were capable of doing. Grierson 
and Williams were not the only intended victims; Richard Pearis later wrote that he too
9 1 T
“had been nearly assassinated by the Rebels” after his capture at Augusta. Greene
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denounced the murder and offered an exorbitant reward of one hundred guineas (nearly 
$14,000) for the killer’s capture. Not surprisingly, however, none of the many rebel 
witnesses identified the criminal.214
The fall of Augusta sent hundreds of loyalist refugees fleeing to Savannah, where 
Wright armed as many as he could and sent them to garrison the fortifications at 
Ebenezer. Other loyalists hid in swamps, while a few continued to fight the Whigs.215 On 
June 19, Elijah Clarke reported that he had to divert some of his militia to Wilkes County 
because “Outliers & Indjans” were “Burning Robing & Destroying” the Whigs there.216
The loyalists’ actions paled in comparison to the onslaught the Whigs unleashed 
once they had regained control of the interior of Georgia. William Lee, a loyalist who had 
fled West Florida after the Spanish captured Mobile and bought a farm in Richmond 
County, about one hundred miles from Savannah, found himself in the midst of the 
rebels’ campaign of vengeance. The Whigs “committed great depredations upon the 
loyalists, by plundering their houses, and very frequently killing them,” he wrote. Many 
people escaped to Savannah or Charleston, while “others sheltered themselves in the 
woods, and were many of them caught and killed, even when begging for life, upon their 
knees!” Reluctant to leave his pregnant wife, Lee remained peaceful and hoped the rebels 
“would let me alone.” The Whigs soon disabused him of that notion when a party called 
upon him, carried off much of his property, and left after warning him that if he did not 
join them or leave the province within a day, they would kill him. Lee hid in the woods
217until his wife safely delivered their daughter, then made his way to Savannah.
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East Floridians, despite fears of a possible Spanish attack, remained immune to 
the hardships encountered by loyalists to their north and west. The province actually 
prospered, becoming self-sufficient in the production of both grain and cattle. East
Florida produced more naval stores than there were ships available to export them, and
0 1 8Patrick Tonyn planned to build a town and fort on the St. Mary’s River.
While East Florida thrived, West Floridians faced the loss of the remainder of 
their province to Spanish conquerors. Gen. John Campbell knew that Bernardo de Galvez 
would move against Pensacola after seizing Mobile and did everything possible to 
strengthen his position. In addition to improving Pensacola’s fortifications, Campbell 
bombarded British officials with pleas for assistance.219 When aid failed to arrive, 
Campbell decided to disrupt Galvez’s plans by attempting to recapture Mobile in January 
1781. The loyalist Royal Foresters participated in the campaign, which resulted in a 
failed assault on Mobile after which the British force returned to Pensacola.220
Galvez arrived at Pensacola with a powerful force of Spanish and French troops 
and warships on March 9, and by the end of the month had begun siege operations. 
Hoping to create a diversion that might force Galvez to lift the siege or at least to detach 
part of the Franco-Spanish army, Campbell took steps to instigate a loyalist uprising at 
Natchez. Three Natchez residents, John and Philip Alston and John Turner, wished to 
oust the Spaniards from the area and had sent an emissary to Campbell asking for his 
support. Although some people at Natchez believed that the three secretly planned to turn 
control of the district over to the Americans once the Spanish were defeated, Campbell
218 Tonyn to Germain, Dec. 9, 1780, DAR, 18:253.
219 Campbell to Germain, Nov. 26, 1780, DAR, 18:232-234.
220 Haarmann, “Spanish Conquest o f West Florida,” 120.
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authorized the trio to resist the Spanish and provided their emissary with commissions to 
raise a force among the Natchez inhabitants.221
Many people along the Mississippi had come to accept Spanish authority and 
were reluctant to participate in a rebellion, but the Alstons and Turner convinced two 
influential settlers, John Blommart and Jacob Winffee, to support the revolt. Blommart 
and Winfree helped to assemble some two hundred loyalists and a few Indians to attack 
Spanish Fort Panmure at Natchez. The fighting began on April 22 and lasted until the 
Spanish commander surrendered his seventy-six troops on May 4.
Meanwhile, Galvez had tightened his noose around Pensacola. Despite the efforts 
of the defenders, whose number included over forty of the Royal Foresters and about one 
hundred of the town’s inhabitants serving as militia, Campbell surrendered on May 10.223 
When the victorious loyalists at Natchez learned that Pensacola had fallen, they realized 
that they could not resist the large force that Galvez would undoubtedly bring against 
them and surrendered to a small Spanish detachment that arrived at Natchez on June 22. 
The Spaniards treated the rebels with leniency. Galvez granted amnesty to most of them, 
but imprisoned Blommart, Winffee, and other leaders. Blommart was tried and convicted 
of rebellion and had his property confiscated.224
With the entire province in Spanish hands, West Floridians had to choose between 
submission to Spanish authority or flight. Some took refuge with the Choctaws; a larger
221 Robert V. Haynes, The Natchez District and the American Revolution (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1976), 134-135; Campbell to Germain, May 7, 1781, DAR, 20:136; John Caughey, “The 
Natchez Rebellion o f 1781 and Its Aftermath,” LHQ, Vol. 16, No. 1, Jan. 1933, 57-59.
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number made their way to Chickasaw territory, where they cooperated with the Indians in
225operations against the Americans and Spaniards along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.
West Florida loyalists, although few in number, had fought hard to defend the 
province and suffered much as a result. As some later stated in a petition to Parliament, 
they had contributed funds to build fortifications, “formed themselves into volunteer 
companies for their defence,” sortied to sea to attack rebel privateers, and “joined and did 
duty with his Majesty’s troops ... formed themselves into provincial corps, and were 
employed upon the most dangerous services, till the reduction of the province.” Many 
“had their plantations plundered and burned” by Willing’s raiders; “others had their 
properties laid waste, and large stocks of cattle destroyed” during the fighting against the 
Spanish. Many lost property to the Spaniards as a penalty “for having contributed to the 
public defence,” while those who fled the province after the Spanish conquest forfeited 
their lands.226 Altogether, they paid a high price for their loyalty to king and country.
The Indians Rejoin the Battle 
Despite being ignored by Cornwallis and alternately courted and mistreated by 
John Campbell, the southern Indians stood ready to assist the British when needed. 
Thomas Brown and Alexander Cameron had done an excellent job of assuaging the 
Indians’ hurt feelings, which was fortunate because Cornwallis finally took the advice of 
his subordinates and called upon the Indians for aid in December 1780; Campbell also 
needed their help to defend Pensacola. The crisis in West Florida reduced the number of 
Indians available to serve in Georgia and South Carolina, since the Creeks divided their 
efforts between the two areas.
225 Gibson, The Chiclcasaws, 73; Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 217-218.
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If Cornwallis had seen no value in using Indians during the summer and fall of 
1780, John Rutledge remained aware of the threat they posed. When Daniel Morgan 
marched into the South Carolina backcountry in December, Rutledge advised him to send 
a “confidential person” to George Galphin, who, Rutledge said, still possessed great 
influence with the Creeks. Rutledge wanted Galphin to warn the Creeks that the Spanish 
were moving against the Floridas and that American forces with French aid would soon 
recover South Carolina and Georgia. Therefore, the Creeks should “get all the Goods 
they can from the British, but, by no Means ... take up the Hatchet, or kill any of our 
People, for if they do so, as soon as the English are beat, We shall fall upon them.” 
Rutledge hoped that this message would intimidate the Creeks, since reports indicated 
that a large number of them were with Brown at Augusta and intended “to act agst. our 
people.” The governor suggested that if Morgan recaptured Ninety Six, he should then 
move against Augusta because the British “will hold their Influence over the Indians, 
whilst they keep that place.”227
Rutledge’s information was correct; Cornwallis had already authorized Brown to 
order the Indians to attack the overmountain settlements to prevent the inhabitants from 
reinforcing Greene. Brown informed the earl on December 17 that the Cherokees and 
many Upper Creeks “have chearfully agreed to attack the plunderers & banditti” in that 
region. Cherokee leaders promised Brown that they would move against the rebels 
immediately and continue to fight as long as they were supplied with arms and 
ammunition. Brown assigned “a proper number of whitemen & traders to head the 
different war parties,” which would be under the overall command of Brown’s deputies. 
Brown added that some Cherokees had recently attacked rebel boats on the Ohio River
227 John Rutledge to Morgan, Dec. 22, 1780, Myers Collection, No. 1017, Microfilm, DLAR.
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that were headed to New Orleans for supplies, “killed the guard,” and sent the captured 
women and children to Augusta.228
Cornwallis had evidently made his decision with great reluctance, since it was not 
until December 29 that he told Balfour that the time had come to inform Clinton “of my 
having employed the Indians, as there will be a considerable expense attending it.” 
Cornwallis himself wrote to Clinton the same day, explaining that he had “directed 
Lieut.-Colonel Brown to encourage the Indians to attack” the overmountain settlements. 
“The good effects of this measure have already appeared,” the earl noted. “A large body 
of the mountaineers marched lately to join the Rebels ... but were soon obliged to return 
to oppose the incursions of the Indians.” Cornwallis pointed out that if Brown’s reports of 
their behavior were accurate, the Indians’ “humanity is a striking contrast to the shocking 
barbarities committed by the mountaineers.”230 Cornwallis was pleased with the Indians’ 
help, telling Rawdon that Brown “seems to have cut out work enough for the Back 
Mountain men with his Indian friends.”
The Indian attacks did succeed in preventing many militia units from joining 
Greene’s army. In late December, Greene learned that the Cherokees had “murdered a 
number of Inhabitants on the frontiers of N. Carolina” and that the militia of that state 
had “marched against their lower towns.”232 Some Cherokee attacks struck South 
Carolina as well. “The Cherokees ... have lately killed some people on the Frontiers of
228 Brown to Cornwallis, Dec. 17, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/4, 345.
229 Cornwallis to Balfour, Dec. 29, 1780, Cornwallis Correspondence, 75-76.
230 Cornwallis to Clinton, Dec. 29, 1780, Cornwallis Correspondence, 76.
231 Cornwallis to Rawdon, Dec. 28, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/83, 89.
232 Greene to Samuel Huntington, Dec. 28, 1780, PNG, 7:9
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No. & So. Carolina, which has prevented, & will prevent, them from turning out,” John 
Rutledge wrote.233
Although the Cherokee attacks deprived Greene of reinforcements, they resulted 
in another catastrophe for that nation. The Whigs received advance notice of the 
impending attack from Joseph Martin, Virginia’s agent to the Cherokees, and state 
officials decided to launch a preemptive strike. Col. John Sevier assembled two hundred 
militia in December and marched against the Cherokee towns. After routing a Cherokee 
party in a battle in which sixteen Indians were killed, Sevier advanced to the Tennessee 
River and burned a Cherokee town. Joined by another four hundred men under Arthur 
Campbell, the rebels continued their march, burning Hiwassee Old Town and Tellico, 
killing a few Cherokees and suffering a handful of casualties before returning home. 
Altogether, the Virginians destroyed at least ten Cherokee towns and several smaller 
villages totaling over one thousand dwellings, along with over fifty thousand bushels of 
com. They reported killing twenty-nine Cherokee men and capturing seventeen prisoners, 
mostly women and children.234
By February 8, Campbell was able to inform Greene that the Cherokee threat to 
Virginia had ended. The militia had, Campbell boasted, “dealt out to them, not a few of 
the miseries that were designed for us. The Over Hill Country were chiefly made a Field 
of desolation, the Families dispersed in the Mountains to starve.” Not surprisingly,
235Campbell reported that “the Cheifs were greatly humbled” and wished to make peace.
233 John Rutledge to SC Delegates in Congress, Dec. 30, 1780, “Letters o f  Rutledge,” Part 3, 63. See also 
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Greene replied that he welcomed the opportunity to make peace “on the most generous & 
liberal principles.”236 He promptly appointed commissioner to meet with the Chickasaws 
as well as the Cherokees and to arrange a settlement.237
Campbell’s assessment proved to be overly optimistic. The Cherokees renewed 
their attacks in March, but again paid a high price and achieved little. Once again their 
operations limited the reinforcements available to Greene. On March 10, a Maryland 
officer noted that some of Campbell’s overmountain militia had recently joined Greene, 
“but the indians having lately done mischief in his country was not joined by many of his 
countrymen from the mountains indeed it has prevented a greater number o f fine fellows 
from joining us.”238 In April, Greene found that his army was short of lead because 
supplies expected from North Carolina had been diverted for that state’s militia to use 
against the Cherokees.239 Campbell himself apologized on April 23 because he could not 
send the militia Greene had requested since his county was “Pressed hard by the Indians.” 
In Campbell’s opinion, this was part of a deliberate “scheme of the British General... to 
employ some of our best Militia in opposing the Indians, in order to facilitate his 
operations in the low Country.” Unless Greene could cut off the Cherokees’ access to 
Brown at Augusta, Campbell warned, that nation would never keep the peace.240 Indian 
attacks also prevented some South Carolina militia from joining Greene at the siege of 
Ninety Six. On May 24, Col. Robert Anderson said they he could not aid Greene because 
most of his men had been sent to the frontier in the wake of Indian attacks there.241
236 Greene to Arthur Campbell, Feb. 26, 1781, PNG, 7:351.
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The Whigs responded with another invasion of Cherokee territory. Sevier burned 
fifteen Middle Cherokee towns in March, which convinced some Cherokee leaders to 
undertake peace negotiations.242 Two months later, other Cherokees announced their 
desire for peace to North Carolina officials and asserted that only a few of their people 
still wanted to assist the British. Some Whigs, however, thought it might be advantageous 
to ignore the peace offer and continue to attack the Cherokees in order to “make them 
cede lands.”243 Brown learned of the rebels’ campaign from Indian refugees and 
denounced the savagery of the Whig militia. “Men, women and children thrown into 
flames, impaled alive or butchered in cold blood!” he recounted.244 As usual, these 
draconian tactics had demonstrated their effectiveness by forcing the Cherokees to 
submit.
Brown received some Indian help in his operations against rebel partisans in 
January, but his messages of encouragement in the spring failed to convince the badly 
beaten Cherokees to continue fighting. He sought assistance from the Creeks, who could 
provide little support because most were engaged in the defense of West Florida. A few 
Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws participated in the defense of Augusta and were 
taken prisoner when the garrison surrendered.245
Britain’s Indian allies were not alone in their suffering during this period; the pro­
rebel Catawbas also experienced hunger and the destruction of their homeland. In 
December 1780, “General” New River, the Catawba leader, visited Greene’s 
headquarters with a letter of introduction from Gates, which testified to that nation’s
242 Calloway, Revolution in Indian Country, 205.
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loyalty to the Whigs. New River asked Greene for supplies because his people were in 
great want and complained that the Catawbas had been mistreated by whites in upper 
South Carolina. New River wanted Greene’s permission to settle his people in the 
vicinity of Charlotte. But before Greene could consider the proposal, Cornwallis’s 
advance into North Carolina forced the Continental army to retreat. Unwilling to face 
British wrath for their support of the rebels, the Catawbas accompanied Greene in his 
flight to Virginia. They returned to South Carolina a few months later, only to find that 
the British had burned their homes and carried off their livestock.246
In East Florida, Patrick Tonyn did all he could to maintain good relations with the 
Seminoles so that he could rely on their aid if the Spanish attacked the province. To 
discover Spanish intentions, Tonyn sent a loyalist to Havana, ostensibly to discuss a 
prisoner exchange. The emissary learned that after the Spaniards captured Pensacola, “it 
is determined to attack this province, for which purpose preparations are making.”247 The 
governor wished to retain the Seminoles’ goodwill by supplying them with provisions, 
but he lacked the funds to purchase them.248 He had to apply repeatedly to Alured Clarke 
for bread, meat, and rum from government stores, along with the wine, coffee, and sugar 
that Cowkeeper personally favored. “I have no fund whatsoever for Indian 
contingencies,” Tonyn complained, despite the fact that Germain had made the governor 
responsible for relations with the Seminoles and that it was essential to give them “the 
usual hospitable and friendly reception.”249 Clarke, who was in St. Augustine, shared 
Tonyn’s fear of Spanish attack and therefore agreed to provide the requested goods, but
246 Gates to Greene, Dec. 10, 1780, and note, PNG, 6:560; Brown, Catawba Indians, 266-267, 270; Merrell, 
Indians’ New World, 216.
247 Tonyn to Cornwallis, Jan. 29, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/67, 35.
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249 Tonyn to Clarke, April 30, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/5, 274.
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noted that provisions were in such short supply that little could be spared “without 
manifest Risk to the security of the Garrison.” Tonyn then appealed to Clinton for the 
supplies and funds required to preserve the Seminoles’ allegiance.250
Clinton approved the expense for the Indians without complaint, particularly in 
West Florida where he told Campbell that “it is absolutely necessary to keep those people 
in good humor,” regardless of the cost.251 Yet Campbell continued to deny the Indians 
presents and supplies “unless he calls them upon actual service,” Alexander Cameron 
complained. Cameron noted that the Choctaws had been acting on their own initiative 
against the Spaniards, which prevented them from hunting, and therefore they believed 
they were entitled to food, clothing, and presents. Campbell, however, denied Cameron’s 
request for these items, telling the superintendent to purchase the goods with his own 
funds. Campbell, said Cameron, “does not understand anything of Indians or their affairs
• • 959he thinks they are to be used like slaves or a people void of sense.”
Despite Campbell’s stubborn stinginess, the Choctaws continued to provide 
valuable service in the fight against the Spanish. Cameron proudly reported at the end of 
October that those Choctaws who had flirted with Galvez had come to Pensacola, turned 
over all their Spanish flags, commissions, and medals to Cameron, and recommitted 
themselves to the British alliance. To demonstrate their sincerity, they harassed the 
Spanish around Mobile. The Choctaws were so effective, Cameron stated, that “not a 
Spaniard can venture out of sight of the fort but they knock up and carry off his scalp,” 
forcing the Spanish to cross the bay to obtain fresh water.253 Upon learning of the
250 Clarke to Tonyn, May 1, 1781, Tonyn to Clarke, May 4, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/6, 17,43.
251 Clinton to Campbell, Oct. 21, 1780, Carleton Papers, Vol. 26, 3079.
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Choctaws’ activities, Campbell sent eight loyalists from the Royal Foresters to lead 130 
Indians in an attack on one of the Spanish posts at Mobile. This party assaulted the fort 
on October 28, but the loyalists fled when the Spaniards opened fire with cannon. The 
Choctaws showed more courage, advancing close to the fort, killing several Spanish 
soldiers, and burning nearby houses before retreating.254
In mid-November, Campbell learned that a Spanish attack was imminent and 
wrote to Cameron and Brown requesting that they immediately send as many Indians as 
possible to Pensacola. Explaining the strategy he intended to use against the Spaniards, 
Campbell told Brown that the Indians “have it still in their power, by frequent attacks & 
constant alarms, in short by continually harrassing & hanging on the enemy’s rear, in 
case of siege, greatly to impede the operations, if not totally defeat & disconcert the
* 9 «designs of any force they can send against us.”. When a hurricane devastated the 
Spanish invasion fleet, Campbell sent word to the agents to have the Indians return home. 
Campbell again asked for Creek help against a rumored Spanish attack in January 1781, 
and again canceled the request when British officials promised to dispatch reinforcements 
from Jamaica. Campbell’s actions angered the one thousand Creeks who were on their 
way to Pensacola when they learned they were no longer wanted.
Rather than wait for the Spanish to attack Pensacola, Campbell decided to disrupt 
Galvez’s plans by seizing Mobile. Over 400 Choctaws joined 160 British and German 
regulars, 200 Pennsylvania and Maryland provincials, and a handful of West Florida 
loyalists in an assault on January 7, 1781. The attack broke the Spanish lines, but the 
commanding officer, Col. Johann von Hanxleden, was killed, other German and British
254 Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 182; O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 104.
255 Campbell to Brown, Nov. 15, 1780, Carleton Papers, Vol. 26, 3149.
256 Starr, Tories, Dons, andRebles, 178-179; O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 105.
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officers were killed or wounded, and the ranking officer, a Maryland loyalist, called off 
the assault. With the command system disrupted, no one signaled the Indians to join the 
attack, but led by Cameron’s deputies, John McIntosh and Farquhar Bethune, the 
Choctaws fired on the Spaniards from concealment, which covered the withdrawal of the 
regulars and provincials. Their fire drove back some of the defenders, who tried to reach 
a boat and escape, but the Choctaws pursued the Spaniards into the water and took at 
least forty scalps before breaking off the action. Ignoring the pleas of Choctaw leaders to 
renew the attack, the white officers decided to return to Pensacola. Some British officers 
later blamed the Choctaws for the failure of the expedition, although there was not a 
shred of evidence to support their allegation.257
The long-awaited Spanish attack on Pensacola finally materialized in March 
1781, when Galvez arrived with a powerful fleet and four thousand troops; he would later 
be joined by an additional three thousand Spanish and French soldiers, and a few 
Choctaws from the Sixtowns faction. Campbell could muster only fifteen hundred 
British, German, and provincial troops, along with some armed blacks, militiamen, and 
Choctaws and Creeks. One Spanish officer estimated the Indians’ strength at one 
thousand, although the actual total was probably half that number. Yet Campbell chose to 
conduct a passive defense with his own troops, relying on the Indians to oppose the 
Spanish advance.258
The knowledge that their security depended on the Indians made some loyalists 
uneasy. James Bruce, the collector of customs at Pensacola, understood that if the Indians
257 Haarmann, “Spanish Conquest,” 120-121; Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels, 183; O ’Donnell, Southern 
Indians, 112; Cameron to Germain, Feb. 10, 1781, DAR, 20:58-59.
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did not come to West Florida’s defense, “the consequences to us will soon be fatal.”259 
Yet when the Indians arrived to aid in the town’s defense, Bruce complained that the only 
alternatives to leaving Pensacola’s noncombatants exposed to Spanish bombardment 
were to “trust our women & children etc. to the power of the merciless savages in the 
woods,” or accept Galvez’s offer to provide them with sanctuary during the siege.260 
While Bruce valued the military assistance of the Indians, he could not overcome fears of 
their alleged barbarism.
The Indians began proving their worth shortly after Spanish troops came ashore. 
On March 19, a group of Indians led by a British officer captured a Spanish boat, killing 
ten of the crew and bringing one survivor to Pensacola.261 Three days later, the Indians 
struck the Spanish camp in the evening, shooting “at the troops that were around the fires, 
killing three and wounding four of our soldiers,” wrote Galvez, “not leaving us at peace 
until morning.” After a raid behind Spanish lines on March 25, Indians brought 
twenty-three captured horses and two scalps into Pensacola; two days later they drove off 
five boatloads of Spaniards attempting to land. On March 28 the Indians again attacked 
Galvez’s troops, but were driven off after some skirmishing in which four Indians were 
wounded. Galvez reported that three of his troops had been seriously wounded in the 
affair.263
Galvez advanced his army closer to Pensacola on March 30 and again met fierce 
Indian resistance. Soon after the Spanish began their march, “a large group of Indians
259 James Bmce to Messrs. Clarke & Milligan, Sept. 19, 1780, in Robin F. A. Fabel, ed., “Ordeal by Siege: 
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emerged from their hide-outs in the woods, firing rapidly.” Galvez brought up artillery 
and attacked, driving the Indians back.264 Seeing an opportunity to defeat the Spaniards, 
Campbell dispatched some of his own troops and fifty armed blacks with artillery to 
reinforce the Indians. A four-hour battle ensued, after which the mixed British force 
withdrew. Spanish casualties were three killed and twenty-eight wounded, while British 
losses totaled one Indian killed and two Indians and one black wounded. The Indians 
returned to town with several trophies, including drums, scalps, and the head of a Spanish 
soldier. Choctaw leader Franchimastabe believed that the foray could have been more 
successful had Campbell given the Indians more substantial support.265
The near-constant Indian attacks delayed Galvez’s operations and forced his 
troops to undertake additional work “to construct the entrenchment that was necessary for 
all camps because of the Indians.”266 As one Spanish officer noted, “being in the midst of 
woods and surrounded by savages who hid in the forest and insulted us at all hours, this 
operation was indispensable.”267 However, fortifications did not prevent the Indians from 
attacking the camps. They struck again on the night of April 5, wounding two soldiers 
and “disturbing the whole army” throughout the night.
Skirmishing continued throughout the month, with the Indians continuing to play 
the major role for the British, receiving only occasional assistance from regular troops 
and armed blacks. Several groups of Indians made their way through Spanish lines to 
reinforce Pensacola, including a small Creek party that on its way to the town captured a
264 Galvez, “Combat Diary,” 182.
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Spanish boat and killed three crewmen.269 Fifty Chickasaws attacked Galvez’s camp 
before entering British lines on April 27 with “a great number of scalps, firelocks, and
970bayonets” as trophies.
In a final, desperate effort to drive off the Spaniards, Campbell dispatched all of 
his Indian auxiliaries on May 7 with orders “to endeavour to get upon the rear of the 
enemy’s encampment.”271 However, the warriors were unable to pass around the lines 
and instead attacked a Spanish outpost. A short skirmish ensued in which the Indians 
were driven off; they returned to Pensacola with ten scalps and one prisoner. It was their 
last battle. On May 8 a Spanish artillery shell struck the powder magazine in the redoubt 
that anchored Campbell’s defenses, virtually annihilating the defenders. Spanish troops 
seized the position, and Campbell opened surrender negotiations. The Indians did not 
wait to be taken prisoner; they simply disappeared into the forests outside the town and 
returned home.272
Although the Indians had bome most of the burden of Pensacola’s defense, 
Campbell downplayed their contributions. When the Spanish landed, Campbell wrote, 
“no Indians could be got to oppose them,” yet at the same time he observed that the 
Spanish force was too strong to attack with his own troops. Campbell described the 
Indians’ attacks upon the Spanish as producing “more noise than advantage.” Overall, 
Campbell declared that the Indians were “of very little use,” and during the siege he even 
suspected that they intended to betray the British. “I fear much they are secretly and
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184.
270 Farmar, “Journal,” 323.
271 Farmar, “Journal,” 326.
272 Farmar, “Journal,” 326; Miranda, “Diary,” 190-191; John Campbell to Germain, May 12, 1781, DAR, 
20:138-139.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
487
underhand instigated and encouraged to this conduct in short there is no dependence on 
the present set of our savage auxiliaries,” he asserted.273 In subsequent reports, Campbell 
continued to blame the Indians for his inability to hold Pensacola.274
Cameron defended the Indians against Campbell’s criticism and instead blamed 
the general for the defeat. If Campbell had followed his advice, Cameron insisted, two 
thousand Indians would have been on hand to defend Pensacola, rather than five hundred. 
Campbell’s habit of repeatedly summoning and dismissing the Indians, along with his 
refusal to provide them with the goods they requested, convinced many of them that the 
general did not respect them or value their contributions.275 Cameron expressed pride in 
the Indians’ behavior during the siege. “The Indians in general... behaved with great 
spirit and attachment,” he told Germain, “and had we but as many more of them ... we 
would have driven the whole Spanish army into the sea. No men could behave better than 
they did.”276 Most of Galvez’s officers probably would have agreed. In the entire 
campaign, a Spaniard wrote, the body of an Indian killed on the battlefield was “the only 
one dead or alive that we have been able to take during the siege.”277
The loss of Pensacola, and the Whigs’ capture of Augusta a month later, “signaled 
the end of effective functioning of the Southern Indian Department.” St. Augustine, 
Charleston, and Savannah were the only remaining British posts in the South, and except 
for the Seminoles in East Florida, the Indians could not reach these places without 
undertaking a long and hazardous journey through rebel-controlled territory. No means
273 Campbell to Clinton, April 9, 1781, in Rush, Spain’s Final Triumph, 94-96.
274 Campbell to Clinton, May 7,1781, and May 12, 1781, in Rush, Spain’s Final Triumph, 97, 101.
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277 Miranda, “Diary,” 194.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
488
existed by which the British could provide their allies with arms and supplies.278 At the 
end of May, the Indians were already “in the utmost distress for goods among them and 
particularly ammunition,” Cameron reported.279 Whether the British could derive further 
support from the Indians under such conditions, or even maintain the alliance, was an 
open question.
African Americans: Steady Support
During the last months of 1780 and the first half of 1781, blacks continued to aid 
the British in a variety of ways, providing labor, intelligence of Whig movements, and 
sometimes armed assistance. The British withdrawal to Charleston and Savannah limited 
slaves’ opportunities to join the king’s troops. Some blacks were unhappy to find that 
fleeing to the British had not improved their condition and escaped again or rebelled. In 
general, however, most African Americans remained a reliable source of support to the 
British, although neither civil nor military officials had yet devised an official policy for 
dealing with the slave issue.
Information provided by slaves kept the British informed of rebel plans and often 
enabled British troops to defeat the Whigs. Slaves provided Cornwallis, Rawdon, 
Tarleton, and other officers with useful intelligence throughout the fall and winter of 
1780. The British thwarted Francis Marion’s plan to capture six British schooners which 
were transporting supplies on the Santee River when some blacks informed the British of 
Marion’s intentions. In January 1781, a slave informed a detachment of the Queen’s 
Rangers of the location of Col. Peter Horry’s rebel partisans. The Queen’s Rangers
278 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 114,116.
279 Cameron to Germain, May 27,1781, DAR, Vol. 20:150.
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promptly marched to attack Horry, routed the Whigs’ advanced guard, and then dispersed 
the main rebel force.
Blacks ran great risks when they procured intelligence for the British, as the fate 
of one man captured in the vicinity of Greene’s army made clear. “Yesterday the famous 
Majr. Gray, the infamous Spy, and Notorious Horse thief, lost His Mullatto Head, it is 
exhibited at Cherraw Hill as a terror to Tories,” an American officer reported.281
Most slaves, however, continued to perform the more mundane tasks of laborers 
on fortifications and plantations. At Ninety Six, slaves worked to strengthen the defenses, 
a process hampered during the winter of 1780-1781 because, Isaac Allen noted, the “Poor 
naked Blacks can do but little [in] this cold weather.”282 When Greene began his siege of 
the post several months later, Cruger organized slaves into “a sort of labor battalion.”283 
Their duties included improving the fortifications and, on at least one occasion, following 
the provincials in a sally against the American siege lines, where they gathered up the 
Whigs’ entrenching tools after the troops drove off Greene’s soldiers. After the rebels cut 
off the defenders’ water supply, Cruger sent naked blacks on nightly forays to a stream 
outside the fortifications to get water for those besieged in the fort. This desperate 
measure enabled the defenders to hold out until Rawdon relieved them.284
In October 1780, Balfour ordered the commanding officer at Georgetown to 
fortify the town “by callg. in all the Negroes, you want” to construct defenses. When the
280 For examples, see Cornwallis to Tarleton, Nov. 14,1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/82,45A; 
Tarleton to [Turnbull?], Nov. 5, 1780; Rawdon to Cornwallis, Nov. 13, 1780; Rawdon to Cornwallis, Dec. 
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work was completed, Capt. John Saunders returned the slaves to their masters.285 Work 
on the defenses at Savannah proceeded “very fast” in November, since the governor and 
Council had ordered planters to provide four hundred slaves for the work.286 At Augusta, 
Thomas Brown took advantage of a law passed by the Georgia Assembly in the spring of 
1781 to impress slaves to strengthen the forts there. Some of these blacks remained in 
Fort Cornwallis during the subsequent siege, repairing damage inflicted by the attackers. 
One slave was killed during the battle, and the Whigs kept the remainder after Brown 
surrendered.287
As important as the slaves’ efforts were in bolstering British defenses, blacks 
would have contributed much more had not a variety of factors limited their usefulness. 
Disease, Whig raids, the slaves’ own opposition to performing plantation labor, and the 
continued failure to establish any kind of consistent policy toward blacks prevented the 
British from taking full advantage of their slave supporters.
Epidemic disease claimed the lives of numerous slaves and incapacitated others. 
An outbreak of smallpox at Camden in late 1780 killed many slaves, caused others to 
flee, and greatly delayed the construction of fortifications.288 In February 1781, loyalist 
William Burrows wrote that thirty slaves on his lowcountry plantation had died from
289smallpox and camp fever and worried that he was “in danger o f losing several more.”
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Rebel raiding parties carried off slaves whenever they could. Robert Muncreef, who had 
already found it “impossible to employ the Negroes to advantage” for want of a boat to 
carry products to Charleston, complained in February 1781 that his situation had grown 
even worse: his estate’s “Stock is much exposed as well as the negroes to a sett of 
Plunderers who go about in parties & distress the different plantations exceedingly.”290 A 
month later, Sampson Neyle reported that Whig raiders “took off 41 of my Negroes,” 
although twenty-four escaped and returned to him.291 “The rebels carried off above 160 
of the best of my Negroes and many belonging to other loyal subjects” near the 
confluence of the Santee and Wateree Rivers, William Bull lamented in June. These raids 
prevented the lowcountry plantations from producing an appreciable quantity of crops in 
1781, which forced John Cruden to purchase food for the slaves, overseers, and loyalist 
refugees living on the sequestered estates.
Slaves assigned to plantation labor often resented their situation, having expected 
more than a simple change of masters when they fled to the British. This dissatisfaction 
led to an insurrection on John’s Island in January 1781. Several slaves, angered when a 
white overseer took com they believed was theirs, attacked him with farm tools. In the 
ensuing altercation, the overseer killed one slave and injured two others before escaping. 
Balfour dispatched the loyal militia to restore order. Seven of the slaves were tried for 
their part in the revolt; one was sentenced to death, a second to branding, and the 
remaining five to severe whippings.293 Such punishments did nothing to improve 
relations between blacks and loyalists or to strengthen the slaves’ attachment to the
290 Robert Muncreef to Allen Swainston, Feb. 17, 1781, Margaret Colleton Papers, SCL.
291 Sampson Neyle to John Sandford Dart, March 3, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/105, 5.
292 William Bull to Germain, June 28, 1781, DAR, 20:165; Cruden to Col. Stewart, Oct. 28, 1781, 
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British cause. Unrest among plantation slaves persisted; in March, Bull noted that with so 
many white men having left their plantations for military service, “all attention to the care 
of their Negroes was relaxed, the slaves became ungovernable” and “the code of laws 
calculated for the government of that class of people could not be carried into
,,294execution.
Without guidance from London, civil and military officials did not consider 
themselves authorized to establish a slave policy of their own. They continued to devise 
solutions as problems arose, which never seemed to fully satisfy either slaveowners or 
slaves. James Simpson told Germain in December 1780 that the board of police in 
Charleston had been inundated with demands from loyalists that their slaves be returned. 
Some of the slaves in question had been seized by the Whigs to penalize recalcitrant 
loyalists; others had been taken by rebel raiders. Simpson declared that the board “should 
have been glad to have been excused interfering in a matter of so much moment if it 
could have been delayed.” However, the loyalists were “urgent and clamorous” and had 
evidence to back their ownership claims, so the board finally relented and ordered all 
such slaves returned to their owners. Simpson never explained the reasons for the board’s 
reservations, although they probably hesitated to return some slaves who were serving 
with the army; they may also have been reluctant to alienate the slaves themselves.295
Civil officials also encountered problems with ship captains and military officers 
over the disposition of slaves. Many of the former carried off slaves when they sailed 
from Charleston, a practice the board of police tried to halt by fining a captain who had 
concealed eight blacks aboard his Jamaica-bound vessel in March. Cruden criticized
294 Bull to Germain, March 22, 1781, DAR, 20:94-95.
295 Simpson to Germain, Dec. 31, 1780, DAR, 18:264.
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army officers for continually requisitioning slaves from sequestered estates for duty with 
various military departments, thus making it more difficult to make the plantations 
productive.296
Army officers could not even agree among themselves on how to deal with 
blacks. In November 1780, when Col. William Mills and his loyal Cheraws militia 
accompanied Maj. James Wemyss in an expedition along the Black and Peedee Rivers, 
Wemyss ordered that “all the Captured Negroes were to be put under the Care of Colonel 
Mills.” According to a witness, “all the Negroes that were taken on that Expedition were 
either Captured by the Troops or came in of their own Accord.” Wemyss ordered Mills to 
send the slaves “southward out of the reach of their Rebel Masters.”297 Either Mills could 
not control the slaves or he used them to harass suspected rebels. Balfour informed 
Cornwallis that Mills had “three hundred negroes he is carrying across the country 
pillaging & robbing every plantation he comes to” and asked the earl to put a stop to the
70Splundering. Mills insisted that Wemyss had given him one hundred slaves as 
compensation for losses suffered at the hands of the Whigs; he said that the other 160 
slaves he had with him were intended for Cruden’s sequestered estates.299 Cornwallis, 
however, declared Wemyss’s action “null & void,” observing that while Mills’s 
“sufferings maybe great... He does not deserve from us any distinguished favour.”300 
The large number of blacks with the army in the field also troubled Cornwallis. 
On December 15, 1780, he informed Tarleton that “there were rather more black
296 Bull to Germain, March 22, 1781, DAR, 20:94; Cruden to Capt. McMahon, Feb. 2, 1781, Cornwallis 
Papers, PRO 30/11/7, 8.
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attendants, both male and female, than I think you will like to see,” with the British 
Legion’s convalescents at Winnsboro.301 In early January, Cornwallis repeated his orders 
of September requiring blacks with the army to wear identification badges. At the same 
time, however, he declared that he did not wish to inconvenience the troops by enforcing 
the restrictions “relative to Negroes” and asked only that battalion commanders insure 
that all blacks with their units were placed under the direction of an officer who would be 
responsible for their conduct. The officers must have complied slowly and reluctantly, 
because Cornwallis thought it necessary to repeat the orders on January 24.302
When Gen. Alexander Leslie arrived in South Carolina to reinforce Cornwallis, 
his detachment included a large number of blacks, some of whom had joined the British 
during their foray in the Chesapeake. These blacks accompanied Leslie’s troops on their 
march to join Cornwallis and were joined by other slaves along the way. The numerous 
blacks impeded Leslie’s progress, so on December 27 he issued orders that “All Blacks, 
or people found in the Camp, not belonging to Offrs. or Deptmts.” were to be 
immediately placed in confinement.303
At Charleston, army officers had fewer reservations about employing blacks and 
hired many to work in the various departments. A list published in March 1781 showed 
652 blacks employed by the army as laborers, artisans, teamsters, and nurses. Others 
found work with the navy repairing and maintaining ships. Fifty-six blacks were 
employed in the Royal Artillery Department in April 1781, 60 the following month, and 
74 in June. All were classified as laborers except a handful who were listed as non­
commissioned officers. Of these, there were two sergeants in April and one in May and
301 Cornwallis to Tarleton, Dec. 15, 1780, inTarleton, History o f  the Campaigns, 206.
302 Newsome, ed., “British Orderly Book,” Part III, NCHR, Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1932, 276, 277, 280, 287..
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June; King Staniard held that rank each month. Two blacks held corporal’s rank in April 
and May and four in June; Ned Garorie (or Arorie) and a man named Washington held 
that rank throughout the period.304 Clearly, some British officers believed that a few 
blacks could be trusted in positions of responsibility.
Rumors reached Greene in February that the British had “ordered two Regts of 
Negroe’s to be immediately embodied,” but in fact British officials made little use of 
armed blacks despite the deteriorating military situation.305 To hold Camden while he 
marched to attack Greene’s army outside the town, Rawdon “had the redoubts all manned 
with Negroes & Tories,” but this was only a temporary expediency. At Pensacola, John 
Campbell augmented his force with an estimated fifty black “foot soldiers.”306 When the 
town surrendered to the Spaniards, the articles of capitulation stipulated that all “free 
Negroes, mulattoes, and mestizos will be maintained in their status” and that all slaves 
who had worked on the British fortifications would be returned to their masters. Any 
blacks “who during the siege have been absent through fear” were to be returned to their
• jf l7
owners when found.
The assemblies in Georgia and East Florida both passed bills that allowed the 
governors to arm slaves. Georgia representatives authorizing Wright to do so should an 
emergency arise, yet even after the fall of Augusta no attempt was made to arm blacks. 
The first Assembly ever elected in East Florida convened in late March, and the next 
month they approved a slave code based on those of Georgia and South Carolina.
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Believing that the code’s provisions for the trial of slaves were too oppressive, Tonyn and 
the Council withheld their assent. The Assembly refused to conduct any further business 
until its version of the code was approved, but finally agreed to refer the matter to 
officials in London, who eventually ruled in favor of the Assembly.309
In May, representatives passed a militia law that permitted the provincial 
government to draft slaves to serve as either laborers or soldiers. Owners would be 
compensated one shilling per day for drafted slaves; Tonyn considered this a burdensome 
tax on slaveholders, since he calculated the actual value of a slave’s labor at four or five 
shillings per day. Masters who refused a request to provide slaves would be fined £50 
($6500). Slaves serving in the militia were to be whipped for minor breaches of 
discipline, whereas whites guilty of the same infractions would be fined. However, no 
racial distinctions were made for capital offenses, such as sleeping on duty. The law 
provided rewards in the form of clothing, medals, and money for slaves who 
demonstrated particular valor, but made no promise of freedom in exchange for 
service.310
While British slave policy remained ambiguous, southern Whigs stubbornly clung 
to their belief that blacks were nothing more than property and deserved to be treated as 
such. When Daniel Morgan marched toward Ninety Six in December 1780, Gov. 
Rutledge saw an opportunity to recover some of his slaves who were in the area. He 
suggested that if Morgan moved nearer the town, the slaves could be recaptured and sent
309 Troxler, “Refuge, Resistance, and Reward,” 591; Wright, “Blacks in East Florida,” 436-438; Siebert, 
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to Charlotte. After Morgan’s victory at Cowpens, Rutledge again raised the issue. “I 
am in great Hopes,” he wrote Morgan, that the general’s success “will afford a good 
opportunity of bringing away my Negroes.” Rutledge indicated that Andrew Pickens and 
other rebel militia officers would help Morgan recover the slaves and prodded the general 
to act “as soon as possible.” If he did not regain his slaves quickly, Rutledge declared, it 
would be too late for them to plant a crop and he would be unable to earn any profit from 
their labor for the year.312
At Cowpens the Whigs did capture about seventy blacks who had accompanied 
Tarleton’s detachment. Pickens distributed eight slaves, five men and three women, as 
booty to some of his militiamen: three rebels received two slaves each for their services
-3 i
and two others were each awarded a single slave. Other blacks were captured in the 
days following the battle when Whig militia seized part of the British baggage train, 
including “horses, negroes, wagons and all other property” east of Broad River. A second 
band of militia captured twenty-seven blacks and twenty-two whites.314 The former were 
undoubtedly returned to bondage as spoils of war.
Thomas Sumter took the use of slaves as booty a step further in May 1781, when 
he decided that slaves seized from loyalist owners should be given as bounties to men 
who enlisted in South Carolina military units. Sumter considered this an ideal method of 
gaining recruits for his force and Rutledge concurred. Sumter set the value of a healthy 
adult slave at $400 and the worth of those over forty or under ten years of age at half that 
amount. A private would receive a bounty of one prime slave for a ten-month enlistment,
311 John Rutledge to Morgan, Dec. 22, 1780, Myers Collection, No. 1017, microfilm, DLAR.
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313 Higginbotham, Daniel Morgan, 142; Receipts given by Andrew Pickens as agent for the American 
troops, Jan. 24, 1780 (misdated, should be 1781), Andrew Pickens Papers, SCL.
314 Babits, Devil o f  a Whipping, 134, 135.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
498
while lieutenants would receive one and a half slaves, captains two, majors three, and a 
colonel three and one-half.315 Nathanael Greene approved the plan, observing that “it will 
have its advantages” so long as care was taken to insure that the slaves used as bounties
1 1  r
came only from loyalists. He immediately authorized Sumter to take the blacks 
captured at Fort Granby “belonging to the Tories or disaffected” and apply them “to the 
fulfilling your contracts with the ten months Troops.”317 Francis Marion, however, feared 
that awarding slaves to recruits would promote plundering and increase the violence of 
the loyalist-Whig conflict. He therefore refused to implement the policy in his brigade.
In the eight months following the Battle of King’s Mountain, the British position 
in the Deep South had deteriorated dramatically. Nathanael Greene’s invasion of South 
Carolina, combined with partisan attacks on British supply lines, made it impossible for 
Lord Rawdon to hold the backcountry. Thomas Brown’s surrender at Augusta similarly 
broke the British hold on the interior of Georgia. The loyalists, who had persisted 
admirably in their support for the British despite defeat and violent persecution, either 
had to withdraw to the coast with the British or submit to the rebels. Not surprisingly, 
loyalist morale underwent a precipitous decline in the wake of this disaster. Little help 
had come from the Indians, even though Cornwallis had finally authorized their use. The 
Creeks and Choctaws fought well in a losing effort at Pensacola but were not available to 
take part in the battle against the Whigs. Alone, the Cherokees could do little more than 
distract the rebels. And the loss of both Augusta and Pensacola, which isolated the
315 Bass, Gamecock, 144.
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Indians from the British, raised doubts as to whether the Indians would remain 
participants in the struggle. Neither the ministry nor army officers were yet ready to arm 
slaves to meet the emergency; blacks continued as usual to perform dutifully in 
supporting roles. Rather than tamper with the institution of slavery, British civil and 
military officials looked to Cornwallis for a victory that would save the situation in the 
South. The earl, too, wanted to bring on a decisive battle and had marched to Virginia to 
seek it.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
CHAPTER VII 
BRITISH COLLAPSE
The last eighteen months of the war in the South saw continued fighting between 
the king’s supporters and their Whig opponents, but no reversal of the decline in British 
fortunes. On the contrary, the surrender of Cornwallis’s army at Yorktown, Virginia, in 
October 1781, and Parliament’s subsequent decision to end the American war insured 
that defeat was inevitable, no matter what efforts loyalists, Indians, and slaves might 
make. Yet in spite of their all-but-hopeless circumstances, all three groups stood firm in 
their allegiance to Britain until the very end.
Loyalist morale, which had plummeted in the spring of 1781 after British troops 
withdrew from the southern backcountry, recovered in the summer. In both Georgia and 
South Carolina, loyalists within the British lines provided important service in the militia 
and emerged to launch punishing raids against the Whigs. Those loyalists who had not 
withdrawn to Savannah or Charleston with the British also attacked the rebels when 
opportunity offered, challenging Whig control in both provinces and straining rebel 
resources. Only after the British government made clear that it would make no further 
effort against the Americans did loyalist resistance begin to subside, and even then some 
loyalists were willing to continue the fight had British officials permitted them to do so. 
Whig offers of pardon, in combination with continued persecution and threats to 
confiscate loyalists’ property, did induce some people to submit to the rebels. However,
500
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thousands preferred to leave their homes when the British evacuated the southern 
provinces rather than sacrifice their principles.
The loss of Pensacola and Augusta severed the lines of communication and trade 
between the British and their Indian allies. Nevertheless, the southern Indians persisted in 
their commitment to the alliance. Choctaws and Creeks traveled hundreds of miles across 
rebel-controlled territory, fighting when necessary, to pursue cooperation, while the 
Chickasaws continued to fight the king’s enemies in the west and the Cherokees raided 
the Georgia and Carolina frontier. The great distance separating the British and Indians, 
however, along with the passive military policy adopted after Cornwallis’s surrender, 
made effective British-Indian operations impossible. Thus the Indians’ efforts were 
wasted, serving only to bring down Whig retribution on the southern nations. Even 
worse, the ministry ignored the Indians’ interest at the peace negotiations and ceded all of 
the land between the Appalachians and the Mississippi to the new United States, so that 
the Indians would be forced to seek accommodation with their vengeful enemies.
Those slaves who had committed themselves to the British rarely considered the 
question of changing allegiance; for them, the choice between returning to bondage under 
rebel masters or gambling on the possibility of freedom with the British was no choice at 
all. They continued to serve wherever royal officials assigned them. The dire military 
situation in late 1781 even gave a few South Carolina slaves the chance to take a new role 
in the conflict. As members of a cavalry unit commonly known as the “Black Dragoons,” 
former slaves served in combat, providing an effective auxiliary force that horrified the 
Whigs. The Dragoons and thousands of other blacks left South Carolina and Georgia in 
the British evacuation, some to find freedom and others to continue in bondage.
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The Loyalists: Destruction, Accommodation, or Flight
As British officials struggled to salvage their position in South Carolina in the 
summer of 1781, they remained uncertain as to whether they could still rely on loyalist 
support. Nisbet Balfour believed that it was possible to establish a defensive perimeter 
from Lord’s Ferry on the Santee River to Orangeburg and from there south along the 
Saltketcher River to the Savannah River. “By this it is conceived that we may be able to 
cover the richer Parts of the Province & it is also proposed to place the Loyalists from the 
back Country upon the Lands of those, who have so often revolted against us,” he wrote. 
However, Balfour questioned the reliability of the loyalists, declaring that “the Efforts of 
our Friends” were “so Pusillanimous, that I fear that Country must be totally ruined & 
tom to pieces without one single advantage here after to be reaped from the boasted 
Loyalty” of the South Carolinians.1 John Cruden did not think Balfour would reap the 
expected benefits from the plantations within the proposed zone of British control, 
declaring that Whig raids had already mined the sequestered estates, while many 
overseers “and other persons employed ... on These Estates have been murdered,” and 
many others had fled to escape the Whigs’ wrath.2 James Simpson had lost confidence in 
the loyalists and blamed them for the recent military reverses. The loyalists’ desire to 
avenge the wrongs they had suffered earlier, Simpson declared, had driven large numbers 
of South Carolinians, who might otherwise have accepted British mle, to take up arms 
with the Whigs.3
Yet others found reason for optimism. William Bull told Germain at the 
beginning of July that “there is great reason to hope that the gloomy representations of
1 Balfour to [Wright?], July 20, 1781, Carleton Papers, Vol. 31, 3633.
2 Narrative and Observations o f  John Cruden, June 1, 1781, Misc. Mss. SC7003/AT7003, Box 2, NYSL.
3 James Simpson to William Knox, July 28, 1781, DAR, 20:199-200.
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the state of the province ... will soon clear up and open a more pleasing prospect.” Bull 
noted that many loyal and neutral South Carolinians had abandoned the rebels, so that 
Greene’s army “begins now to melt away.”4 A few days later, the Royal Gazette 
published the names of 211 men who desired to take the oath to King George. They were 
instructed to report to the board of police on July 12 to “receive certificates” of their 
loyalty, which would entitle them to their full rights as British subjects.5
Whig observers also found it difficult to assess the loyalists’ attitude. In mid-July, 
Andrew Pickens had to dispatch some of his militia to check a mixed force of loyalists 
and Indians that had been raiding in the Long Canes area, while some of his other troops 
sought another loyalist force commanded by William Cunningham. Pickens also worried 
about the large number of loyalists who were escaping to Indian territory, evidently to 
join the Creeks and Cherokees in attacking the rebels.6 Less than a week later, Pickens 
noted that some loyalists had launched raids from Indian territory and expressed concern 
that “the Tories from Orangeburgh” might also launch attacks; however, he also stated 
that loyalists in the Ninety Six area “are giving up very fast.”7 Gen. Isaac Huger did not 
think that the Orangeburg loyalists posed much of a threat, reporting that they “are much 
displeased, several have sent to me saying they would come in” if Huger could assure
o
their protection. Some of these people also provided Huger with useful information. 
Henry Lee believed that if Greene offered the loyalists full pardon, their resistance would
4 Bull to Germain, July 2, 1781, DAR, 20:168-169.
5 South Carolina Royal Gazette, July 7-11, 1781, microfilm, LOC.
6 Pickens to Greene, July 19, 1781, PNG, 9:49.
7 Pickens to Greene, July 25, 1781, PNG, 9:77.
8 Isaac Huger to Col. Lewis Morris, Jr., July 26,1781, PNG, 9:86.
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evaporate. Greene agreed and ordered his subordinates to give loyalists every incentive to 
join the Whigs, including pledges of protection and the right to keep their arms.9
Other rebel leaders did not notice any decrease in loyalist resistance, despite the 
violence the Whigs employed against their opponents. “Such scenes of desolation, 
bloodshed and deliberate murder I never was a witness to before!” Continental Maj. 
William Pierce wrote. “Wherever you turn the weeping widow and fatherless child pour 
out their melancholy tales to wound the feelings of humanity. The two opposite principles 
of whiggism and toryism have set the people of this country to cutting each other’s 
throats, and scarce a day passes but some poor deluded tory is put to death at his door.”10
To retaliate against the Whigs for their cruelty, and also to send a message to 
those who had taken British protection about the dangers of deserting to the rebels, the 
British hanged Col. Isaac Hayne of the Whig militia on August 4. Hayne had commanded 
a rebel party that captured Andrew Williamson near Charleston a month earlier; although 
Williamson had not taken an active role with the British, the very fact that he had taken 
the oath to George III made him a traitor in the eyes of most rebels. Balfour had sent a 
detachment of loyalist cavalry in pursuit of Hayne and these men had defeated the Whigs, 
killing ten or twelve, released Williamson, and captured Hayne. At his trial, Hayne 
argued that he had taken the British oath only because the illness of his family placed him 
under duress, and furthermore, that the oath became invalid after the Whigs regained
9 Henry Lee to Greene, July 29, 1781; Greene to Lee, July 29, 1781; Greene to Pickens, July 30, 1781, 
PNG, 9:102, 103, 109.
10 William Pierce to St. George Tucker, July 20, 1781, in “Southern Campaign o f General Greene 1781-2, 
Letters o f  Major William Pierce to St. George Tucker,” MAH, Vol. 7, No. 6, Dec. 1881, 434.
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control of the area in which he lived. Rejecting these arguments, Balfour, with Rawdon’s 
concurrence, sent Hayne to the gallows.11
With unabashed hypocrisy, the rebels denounced the execution of Hayne as an 
“open violation of all the laws of humanity and justice.”12 Greene vowed to retaliate as 
soon as the Whigs captured a British officer of high rank.13 In response to Greene’s 
threat, Balfour asserted that any such action by Greene could not be justified, since 
Hayne’s situation was far different than that of military prisoners of war. Therefore, 
Balfour stated, Greene would only provoke the British to retaliate in kind and a cycle of 
vengeance might begin. Balfour also reminded Greene that British officers had shown 
great forbearance by refusing to retaliate in kind “when Lieut: Tulker of the Loyal Militia 
was publickly executed” and “when Colonel Grierson & Major Dunlap fell, without 
attempts to secure them, by the hand of Licensed & protected Murderers.”14 Upon 
learning that some members of Parliament had described Hayne’s execution as murder, 
several South Carolina loyalists wrote to King George expressing support for the decision 
to hang Hayne, and enclosed a list of 299 South Carolina loyalists murdered by the 
Whigs to show which side was guilty of greater cruelty.15
As Balfour had hoped, Hayne’s execution did intimidate many men who had 
joined the Whigs after taking protection to return to the loyalist fold. John Rutledge 
reported that Hayne’s death “had the Effect wch the Enemy foresaw, & expected ... 
indeed, a much greater Effect than you can conceive.” Most of the “Protection Men” in
11 Balfour to Clinton, July 21, 1781, Leslie Letterbook, microfilm, SCDAH; Lambert, South Carolina 
Loyalists, 204-205.
12 William Pierce to St. George Tucker, Aug. 26, 1781, in “Southern Campaign o f Greene,” 436.
13 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 205.
14 Balfour to Greene, Sept. 3, 1781, PNG, 9:284-285.
15 Thomas Fletchall, Joseph Robinson, Evan McLaurin et al to King George III, April 19, 1782, C 05, Vol. 
82, http://sc_tories.tripod.com/list_of_murdered_loyalists.htm, July 11, 2002.
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Col. Harden’s regiment of Whig militia “again submitted themselves, to the British 
Government,” reducing Harden’s force to less than fifty. Fortunately for the rebels, 
Rutledge wrote, Greene’s proclamation threatening retaliation had “removed the 
Apprehensions” of the remaining militiamen. But if Greene did not keep his promise to 
execute a British officer, Rutledge warned, “our Militia will be dispirited, & fall off -  
Indeed you cannot suppose, if the British offer ’em Pardon, for having joined us, (wch. 
they do, if they will quit us,) that they will adhere to our Cause, if We refuse to support 
’em, by Retaliation.”16
Inspired by the defections from the Whig militia, the loyalists continued to resist, 
complicating Greene’s situation. In early August, sixty men attacked a detachment of 
Lee’s Legion near Orangeburg and freed seventeen prisoners; accounts indicated that an 
increasing number of loyalists were coming to the town to cooperate with Isaac Allen’s 
battalion of New Jersey provincials. Another party of 150 loyalists began attacking the 
rebels in the Drowning Creek-Pedee River area.17 Greene complained in frustration that 
the southern war was far different from that in the north, where “most of the people are
1 o
warm fnends, here the greater part are inveterate enemies.” He told Washington that the 
southern army was too weak to regain control of South Carolina, in part because the 
British had the aid of “near 1000 Militia Tories,” who, “being such exceeding good 
marksmen, will not be the least useful.”19 Later, Greene revised his estimate and asserted 
that at least two thousand loyalists were serving in the militia in the fall of 1781.
16 John Rutledge to [SC Delegates in Congress], Sept. 18, 1781, in Barnwell, ed. “Letters of John 
Rutledge,” Part 5, SCHGM, Vol. 18, No. 4, Oct. 1917, 156-157, 158.
17 Lee to Greene, Aug. 8, 1781; Thomas Wade to Greene, Aug. 9, 1781, PNG, 9:150-151, 156.
18 Greene to Joseph Reed, Aug. 6, 1781, PNG, 9:136.
19 Greene to Washington, Aug. 6, 1781, PNG, 9:139, 140.
20 Greene to Washington, Dec. 12, 1782, PNG, 12:281.
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Greene decided that aggressive action might improve his circumstances, so in late 
August he left his encampment in the High Hills of Santee and advanced toward 
Charleston. At the same time the British army under Lt. Col. Alexander Stewart, who had 
assumed command when illness forced Rawdon to return to England, marched to the 
Santee River. Learning of Greene’s approach, Stewart fell back, but Greene caught up 
with the British and attacked them on September 8. After a hard-fought battle in which 
both sides suffered heavy losses, Stewart held the field and forced Greene to retreat. The 
next day, however, Stewart withdrew and shortly afterward abandoned Orangeburg and 
other advanced posts to concentrate his forces around Charleston.21
Stewart’s withdrawal allowed the Whigs to claim victory. Gov. Rutledge 
therefore considered the time opportune to punish anyone who refused to commit to the 
Whig cause. “Every man who refuses serving when called upon must be deemed an 
enemy and taken prisoner and sent to the British ... and must not be permitted to return,” 
he ordered. “All their property must be taken care of for the use of the State.” Individuals 
holding British paroles, but who had not been under the command of an American officer 
at the time such paroles were issued, were to join the rebel militia or be classified as 
enemies and punished. Anyone entering the British lines without permission from Whig 
officials “must be treated as carrying intelligence to the enemy and suffer accordingly.” 
Rutledge exempted no one. “Any woman who will go to town or in the enemy’s post
99without leave, must not be permitted to return,” he declared. His punitive measures also 
included “the wives and families of all such men as are now with and adhere to the 
enemy.” All of these people were to be forcibly removed from their homes and sent into
21 Alexander Stewart to Cornwallis, Sept. 9, 1781, DAR, 20:227; Pancake, This Destructive War, 216-217, 
220-221 .
22 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, Sept. 2, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:131.
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the British lines. Although he was aware that this policy would cause much suffering, 
Rutledge asserted that the “blame can only be imputed” to their relatives who supported 
the British “and to the British commanders, whose conduct... justifies this step.” There 
was to be no middle ground in the final phase of the struggle.
Some Whigs believed that unnecessary cruelty toward loyalists, particularly the 
seemingly endless murders, would prove counterproductive. If everyone who took the 
oath to Britain was “punished with death,” Christopher Gadsden wrote, “the natural 
consequence will be, that they w ill... either withdraw with their effects from the 
Continent, or being driven to dispair will become our determined enemies.”24
Rutledge partially relented in late September, deciding that an offer of pardon to 
loyalists “would be well-timed at this juncture.” He hoped the offer would convince 
“many, to return to their allegiance and behave well, which would not only deprive the 
British of their services, but turn those services to our advantage.” The governor excluded 
those who held royal commissions or had signed addresses congratulating Clinton and 
Cornwallis on their victories.25 Loyalists who took an oath of allegiance to the Whigs and
agreed to serve six months in the militia would be fully pardoned, preserve their property,
• 26and their wives and children would not be forced to go within the British lines.
Loyalists within the rebel lines who did not swear the rebel oath within thirty days, 
however, were nonetheless to be compelled to serve in the militia. Rutledge instructed 
Sumter that anyone who might “insist on their being British Subjects, & therefore, refuse
23 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, Sept. 3, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:134.
24 Christopher Gadsden to SC Delegates in Congress, Sept. 17, 1781, Writings o f  Gadsden, 176.
25 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, Sept. 15, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:162.
26 Proclamation o f John Rutledge, Sept. 27, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:175-178.
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to do Militia Duty, may take their choice, either of doing it, or going into the Enemy’s
* • 27Lines, & if they will not go, & refuse to do Duty, they must be tried, & fined.”
Henry Lee believed that neither pardon nor threats would induce the loyalists to
submit unless they were convinced that the Whigs held firm control in the state. “In a
contention for the confidence of a people, alternately the subjects of each contending
power, it is a matter of the highest consequence to preserve the appearance of superiority,
if in reality inferior,” Lee declared, “for such decisive weight has interest in the
conclusions of the heart, that the man must believe he will ultimately receive protection
* 28from your arms before he can persuade himself to become your avowed assistant.”
Even without British support, however, loyalists effectively challenged the rebels 
in many parts of South Carolina, making it impossible for the Whigs to maintain more 
than a semblance of control. One rebel officer wrote on September 20 that he had “been 
much alarmed by the Tories” who had recently raided along Lynch’s Creek, “where they 
had made robberies and shed blood.” The Whigs failed to locate that loyalist band, so 
they set off in search of another two hundred loyalists said to be “in full march to destroy 
or carry our stores at Black Mingo.” These loyalists proceeded as far as Waccamaw, did 
“a deal of mischief,” and withdrew before the rebels arrived. Yet another party “came 
down Britton’s neck, and carried off some horses,” which forced the rebels to leave a 
detachment to guard “against the Tories” in the area.29
Along the border between North and South Carolina, other loyalists continued to 
plague the rebels. “Upwards of 300 hovers” near Little River, Col. Peter Horry reported
27 John Rutledge to Thomas Sumter, Oct. 9, 1781, Sumter Papers, Vol. 2, LOC.
28 Henry Lee to unnamed, Oct. 2, 1781, in George F. Scheer, Jr., ed., “Henry Lee on the Southern 
Campaign,” Virginia Magazine o f  History and Biography, Vol. 51, No. 2, April 1943, 147.
29 John James to Francis Marion, Sept. 20, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:171.
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in late September, adding that they had recently driven off one militia unit sent to check 
them and put heavy pressure on others. Hector McNeil was said to have between 1,000 
and 1,500 men in the field in North Carolina. A few days later, Francis Marion 
informed Greene that the “Cheraw Regt is so Disturbed with the torrys I am afffaid they 
will not come out” and many rebel inhabitants had fled the area. McNeil, Marion added, 
had recently given the Whigs “a flogging, killed 11 and wounded & took 30.”31 On 
September 27, Marion sent more bad news; loyalists in the Saltketcher region had also
7^become “very troublesome.” Fortunately for the Whigs, the next day Horry announced 
that their militia had defeated McNeil’s loyalists and killed their commander, greatly 
reducing the loyalist threat in the northeastern part of the state.33
If McNeil’s defeat and death damaged the loyalists’ position, Cornwallis’s 
surrender to a combined Franco-American force at Yorktown on October 19 devastated 
whatever hopes they retained that the British might yet regain control of the South. In 
London, Parliament responded to the news by voting, in January 1782, to halt offensive 
military operations against the colonists. Although George III remained determined to 
prosecute the war, the ministry’s loss of support in Parliament led to Germain’s 
resignation in February, and the next month Lord North also resigned. Lord Rockingham, 
the new chief minister, and the Earl of Shelburne, secretary of state for the colonies, were 
both sympathetic to the Americans and opened peace negotiations.34
Inspired by Washington’s success, Greene marched his army toward Charleston 
in mid-November. Loyalists informed the British of his approach, but the newly arrived
30 Peter Horry to Greene, Sept. 20, 1781, PNG, 9:379.
31 Marion to Greene, Sept. 23,1781, PNG, 9:386.
32 Marion to Greene, Sept. 27, 1781, PNG, 9:403.
33 Horry to Greene, Sept. 27, 1781, PNG, 9:406.
34 Pancake, This Destructive War, 233-235.
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commander of the southern district, Gen. Alexander Leslie, chose not to contest Greene’s 
advance. Finding the morale of his soldiers poor, Leslie ordered the evacuation of the 
post at Dorchester, forty miles from Charleston, and also withdrew the troops and
•> c
loyalists from Wilmington, North Carolina. The only opposition Greene encountered 
during his march came from loyalists. “Twenty or thirty tories were killed wounded and 
taken in the different skirmishes,” he wrote.36
If the disaster at Yorktown had demoralized the British, it galvanized the loyalists 
into taking a more active role against their enemies without expecting the army to assist 
them. William Bull noted that the people in and around Charleston were “with great 
alacrity laying in large supplies of wood, grain etc. in order to avoid any distress which 
the want thereof may occasion to them or may weaken the necessary and obstinate 
defence of the town” and continued to show “a steady attachment to the British 
government and loyalty to the King.” On November 1, 150 loyalists went to Charleston
to obtain “clothes, blankets and arms.” They also brought four wagons to carry the
• . . .  ^8expected issue of ammunition, which they apparently intended to use against the rebels.
At Orangeburg, the loyalists “kept Sumter pretty much within his pickets,” and their 
leader, Henry Giessandanner wrote to Leslie asking for aid to drive out the rebels.39 
Sumter sent an officer to arrest Giessendanner, but the loyalist escaped. Efforts to get 
other Orangeburg loyalists to accept Rutledge’s offer of amnesty brought so few converts
35 Pancake, This Destructive War, 237; Lee, Revolutionary War Memoirs, 523; Leslie to Clinton, Dec. 1, 
1781, DAR, 20:267-268.
36 Greene to John Rutledge, Dec. 3, 1781, in Dennis M. Conrad, ed., The Papers o f  General Nathanael 
Greene, Vol. 10 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1998), 3-4.
37 Bull to Germain, Nov. 11, 1781, DAR, 20:259.
38 Derrill Hart to Colonel Richard Hampton, Nov. 1, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:205.
39 Gray, “Observations,” 154-155.
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that Sumter declared in frustration that “Nothing but the sword will reclaim them!”40 
Greene found that “the Tories are getting troublesome and insolent,” not only around 
Orangeburg but “in the Forks of Edisto, and even up as high as the ridge towards Ninty 
Six.” He suggested that Sumter and Pickens establish a post at Orangeburg to “check 
their insolence and prevent supplies from going to Charles Town,” if Sumter thought that 
the state troops and militia were adequate for the task.41 Yet another group of loyalists 
was active at the forks of the Saluda River, endangering Whig forces there.42
In accordance with Greene’s instructions, Sumter marched toward Orangeburg, 
skirmishing with loyalists along his route, only to blunder into a powerful force of 
loyalists who had launched an offensive from Charleston. The combined strength of the 
loyalist parties was about five hundred men, under the command of Gen. Robert 
Cunningham. The loyalists dispersed Sumter’s advance guard, harassed the Whigs in the 
area for more than a week, and then separated. Cunningham withdrew toward Charleston 
with some of the troops, while William Cunningham with nearly one hundred men and 
Hezekiah Williams with two hundred set out on different routes for the backcountry, 
easily eluding rebel pursuit.43
William Cunningham’s detachments defeated their Whig opponents on several 
occasions. They forced one rebel party to surrender at Tarra’s Spring, after which 
Cunningham allegedly executed all but two of the prisoners. Cunningham later 
surrounded another rebel force in a house at Hayes’s Station, forced them to surrender by 
setting the building on fire, then executed three men who earlier had participated in
40 Bass, Gamecock, 212-213.
41 Greene to Sumter, Nov. 2, 1781, PNG, 9:517-518.
42 Greene to William Parsons, Nov. 3, 1781, PNG, 9:524.
43 Sumter to Greene, Nov. 14 and Nov. 23, 1781, PNG, 9:575, 615; Sumter to Greene, Dec. 7 and Dec. 9, 
1781, PNG, 10:15, 24; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 207.
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whipping Cunningham’s brother to death. Other loyalists also identified and killed some 
of the prisoners who had committed cruelties against them or their families. 
Cunningham’s troops also burned mills, houses, and crops. Meanwhile, Williams’s party 
captured a Whig post at Whitehall as well as a wagon train; among the teamsters and 
guards taken prisoner was Andrew Pickens’s brother John. Williams later turned John 
Pickens over to some Cherokees, who allegedly burned him to death. Some loyalists 
chose to go to Cherokee territory and to continue harassing the Whigs from there, but 
Cunningham and Williams returned to Charleston with most of their men in December, 
defeating some of Sumter’s troops along the way.44
Cunningham’s raid encouraged other loyalists to strike at the rebels, and Whig 
leaders feared that loyalist attacks would jeopardize the army’s intended operations. 
Sumter reported that on November 22 loyalists attacked a rebel foraging party near 
Orangeburg, killing four men, capturing four, and taking twelve horses.45 “I am 
convinced you have No Idea of the Number of tories that is between this and 
Charlestown,” Sumter wrote Greene from Orangeburg. “Which when Collected will be a 
Great Reinforcement to the enemy” unless something was done to defeat them or win 
them over to the rebels 46 In addition to the numerous loyalists outside British lines, 
Greene learned from a reliable informant that “there is in Charlestown not less than 1000 
Tories who bear Arms.”47
The Whigs’ fears soon proved to be exaggerated. Leslie’s refusal to provide the 
loyalists with military assistance, combined with the rebels’ ruthless retaliation for the
44 LeRoy Hammond to Greene, Dec. 2, 1781, PNG, 9:651; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 208-209; 
Waring, Fighting Elder, 103-104; Bass, Gamecock, 212-213.
45 Sumter to Greene, Nov. 23,1781, PNG, 9:615.
46 Sumter to Greene, Nov. 24, 1781, PNG, 9:623-624.
47 Greene to Otho H. Williams, Dec. 2, 1781, PNG, 9:650.
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havoc Cunningham had wrought, resulted in a collapse of loyalist morale. Sumter’s men 
scoured the woods and swamps around Orangeburg, killing or capturing several loyalists. 
A few began to come into the rebel camp and surrender, while others fled west of the 
Edisto River. Greene and Sumter agreed that a combination of intimidation and offers of 
pardon would induce many loyalists to submit and this strategy had immediate effect.48 
As it became clear that no help could be expected from the British army, “the people 
disheartened by being unsupported, gradually made a submission to the enemy,” a 
loyalist officer wrote 49
On December 9, Sumter reported that “Considerable Numbers” of “the Outlying 
Tories, Who are much terified by So Many parties being out,” had surrendered. He 
allowed most of them to return to their homes, but worried that “from the Temper of the 
people,” abetted by many militia officers, “I fear Many of them Will be privately 
Injured.”50 Many loyalists decided to take the risk, since it was no greater than the danger 
they faced if they continued to resist. More than two hundred had given up by December 
19 and another fifty had been captured. Sumter noted that “there is Still a Great many 
lying out,” but he believed that they would soon surrender. “The Number and 
Retchedness of the Women & Children Cant be Conceived,” he observed, adding that it 
was “Utterly out of the power of Many to Move, or Subsist much longer where they 
are.”51
Some of the afflicted loyalists sought refuge within the British lines; others 
submitted to the Whigs. Upon arriving in Charleston, Leslie found the loyalists’ distress
48 Sumter to Greene, Nov. 23, 1781, Nov. 27, 1781; Greene to Sumter, Nov. 25, 1781, Nov. 28, 1781, PNG, 
9:615, 627, 633-634; Sumter to Greene, Dec. 7, 1781, PNG, 10:15.
49 Gray, “Observations,” 154-155.
50 Sumter to Greene, Dec. 9, 1781, PNG, 10:24.
51 Sumter to Greene, Dec. 19, 1781, PNG, 10:80-81.
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so great that he said he would have “to get my heart Steeled” in order to be able to focus
• S'?on his other responsibilities. Their sufferings, Leslie declared, were “beyond belief.”
Yet while he lamented his inability to provide the loyalists with more than a fraction of 
the financial relief they required, he also questioned their military value.53 He complained 
of the expense involved in supporting “the Several Regiments of militia from Camden, 
and Ninety Six,”54 even though their 750 men comprised a significant percentage of his 
total force.55 In addition, he informed Clinton that the South Carolina provincials “are 
mostly deserted;” only 120 men remained in early December.56
Leslie tried to reduce defections by issuing a proclamation assuring the loyalists 
that his army was committed to their protection. He attempted to win back those who, 
“partly through Dread of the Cruelty of their Enemies, and partly from false 
Representations being made to them of the State of Publick Affairs,” had cast their lot 
with the Whigs, and at the same time threatened to inflict “the severest Punishments” on 
anyone who had taken British protection and later took up arms against royal authority.57 
The proclamation had little effect, for less than two weeks after it was issued, Leslie 
noted that “people are daily quitting the town and great part of our militia are with the 
enemy.... the whole of the country is against us but some helpless militia with a number 
of officers, women, children, Negroes etc.”58
The loyalists’ fading morale and their frequent desertions came as welcome news 
to the Whigs, who gained confidence as they realized that their opponents “have lost their
52 Alexander Leslie to the Earl o f Leven, Nov. 29, 1781, Alexander Leslie Papers, 26/9/512, NAS.
53 Alexander Leslie to the Earl o f Leven, Dec. 14, 1781, Leslie Papers, 26/9/512, NAS.
54 Leslie to Clinton, Dec. 4, 1781, Carleton Papers, Vol. 34, No. 3927.
55 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 220.
56 Leslie to Clinton, Dec. 4, 1781, Carleton Papers, Vol. 34, No. 3926.
57 Proclamation of Alexander Leslie, Dec. 15, 1781, Alexander Leslie Paper, NCSA.
58 Leslie to Clinton, Dec. 27, 1781, DAR, 20:287.
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spirit & their hopes.” Whig judge Aedenus Burke noted in late January 1782 that about 
one hundred loyalists from Charleston and the backcountry districts recently deserted to 
the Americans. “The Tories are turning arrant Rebels,” he exulted.59 Edward Rutledge 
believed that many people in Charleston were ready to surrender, asserting that “99 in 
100 of them would come out if they thought they would be received.”60
One factor encouraging the loyalist exodus was the confiscation legislation passed 
by South Carolina’s reconstituted Assembly in early 1782. Designed both to raise 
revenue for the state government and to punish loyalists, the confiscation act seized the 
property of those whom the Assembly considered the most notorious loyalists, and 
assessed a twelve percent fee on the estates of lesser offenders. The law, clearly 
“legislation of revenge,” also banished most of those whose estates were confiscated.61 
Those subject to confiscation or amercement included people who had signed 
congratulatory addresses to British officers, banished loyalists who had returned to South 
Carolina after the capture of Charleston, men who held civil or military commissions
fS)under the British, “& some others who have been guilty of extraordinary Offences.”
Even some ardent Whigs considered the new law unduly harsh. Edward Rutledge
favored limited confiscation and protested when the list of those subject to the act grew to 
(\\“an amazing Length.” Although Burke believed that “the men who are the objects of it 
should never be received into the bosom of this Country,” he opposed confiscation 
because it threatened the rights of all citizens to be secure in their property and would
59 Burke to Middleton, Jan. 25,1782, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” SCHGM, Vol. 26, No. 4, Oct. 1925, 
191.
60 E. Rutledge to Middleton, Feb. 26, 1782, “Correspondence of Middleton,” SCHGM, Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan. 
1926, 7.
61 Nadelhaft, Disorders o f  War, 11.
62 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Feb. 8, 1782, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” SCHGM, Vol. 27, 
No. 1, Jan. 1926, 2-3.
63 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Feb. 14, 1782, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 2, 5.
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also create unnecessary hardship by bringing “many families & their children to beggary 
& ruin.”64 Arthur Middleton shared Burke’s concern: “I cannot approve of the inhuman 
Sentence of visiting the Sins of the Fathers upon the guiltless women, Children ... It is a 
Doctrine suited only to the Climates of Despotism.”65
If some Whigs disliked the confiscation act, they were nevertheless satisfied with 
its results. Only a few days after the legislative committee released its confiscation list, 
the information filtered into Charleston, where the names of 222 people subject to 
confiscation were eventually published in the Royal Gazette.66 In response, Whig 
officials began receiving “several broad Hints” from loyalists in the town, “wishing that 
we wd permit they would return to their Countrymen.” “The Confiscation Act began to 
work on them some time since,” Burke noted in May, “and continues to sweat them
ZTQ
considerably.” American Maj. William Pierce believed that Burke had understated the 
loyalists’ reaction, declaring that the confiscation act had “put the tories into a state of 
insanity, and all they want is the gibbet and halter to put an end to their existence.”69 
Loyalists denounced the confiscation act as yet another example of the Whigs’ 
atrocious behavior. One writer called the law “an unprecedented injustice” which 
revealed the rebels’ true motives: “the desire of power” and “a lust after the wealth of 
others.”70 William Bull stated that confiscation was “cruel to the loyalist” and added that 
members of the rebel Assembly had vied with one another in promoting “an excess of
64 Aedenus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jan. 25, 1782, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 1, 192-193.
65 Arthur Middleton to Burke, April 7, 1782, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 2, 29.
66 South Carolina Royal Gazette, March 16-20, 1782, micro film, LOC.
67 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Feb. 14, 1782, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 2, 5-6.
68 Burke to Middleton, May 14, 1782, “Correspondence o f  Middleton,” Part 1, 197.
69 William Pierce to St. George Tucker, April 6, 1782, in “Southern Campaign o f Greene,” 441.
70 “A Suffering Loyalist” to the printers o f the Royal Gazette, July 12, 1782, South Carolina Royal Gazette, 
July 10-13,1782, microfilm, LOC.
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* 71seventy” toward loyalists. Leslie also considered the confiscation laws unduly harsh 
and eventually sent British troops on forays to seize rebel-owned slaves with which to 
compensate loyalists for their confiscated property.72
Despite the threat of confiscation and the decline in British fortunes, many 
loyalists still refused to submit to the Whigs. Leslie noted in late January 1782 that
7-3 t
people came into Charleston every day seeking protection. Having kept his militia in 
the field until the British army withdrew into the lines around the town, Robert Ballingall 
was one of those who abandoned their homes to seek safety with the British. The Whigs 
immediately took their vengeance; his “Plantation and House was plundered, his negroes 
& Effects carried off,” and his property seized by state officials.74
Other loyalists remained outside the lines and harassed the Whigs when 
opportunity offered. On January 2, 1782, near Gov. Rutledge’s plantation, Pennsylvania 
Continentals who had recently arrived to reinforce Greene realized that their ammunition 
wagons had fallen behind during the march. Fearing that “the Tories, who are very 
numerous, should take them,” troops were sent back to escort the wagons to camp. That 
night loyalist raiders fired on the guards, but failed to capture the wagons.75 A few days 
earlier, a Pennsylvania officer noted that in a “German settlement” south of the Congaree 
River, where his regiment had camped, the inhabitants were, “like the greater part of this
7 f\country, all Torys.” However, these loyalists generally avoided combat with regular
71 Bull to Germain, March 25, 1782, DAR, 21:50.
72 Frey, Water from the Rock, 137.
73 Leslie to Clinton, Jan. 29, 1782, RAM, 2:388.
74 Memorial o f Robert Ballingall, Mar. 13,1786; Affidavit o f Balfour, Mar. 10, 1783; Affidavit o f  Leslie, 
Jan. 30, 1784, Misc. Mss., SC7003/AT7003, 1 5 4 ,154a, NYSL.
75 “Extracts from the Journal o f Lieutenant John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782,” 
PMHB, Vol. 19,1895, 217.
76 “Journal o f  Lieut. William McDowell, o f the First Penn’a Regiment, In the Southern Campaign. 1781- 
1782.” Pennsylvania Archives, Second Series, Vol. 15, 1890, 310.
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troops, focusing their attacks on individuals and small parties of militia. Their raids 
sparked vicious little battles in which neither side gave quarter.77 In addition to the 
casualties they inflicted, these diehard loyalists often forced Greene to divert troops from 
his main force. For example, the rebel general had to send a militia company to the 
Beaufort area in January “to protect and guard that part of the Country ... from the
78ravages of the Tories.”
As usual, the Whigs responded to this harassment by unleashing a torrent of 
violence upon any loyalists they could find. The “inveterate hatred & spirit of 
Vengeance” the rebels displayed shocked Burke, although he attempted to justify it by 
claiming that it had been inspired by the earlier “cruelty of the British.” He noted that 
South Carolina women “talk as familiarly of sheding blood & destroying the Tories as the 
men do,” and observed that one member of the Assembly “kept a tally of men he has 
killed on the barrel of his pistol, and the notches amount to twenty-five. I know another 
who has killed his fourteen, &c. &c.”79 Burke asserted that the Whigs were so consumed 
with vengeance that “you cd. not enter a Company that some do not talk of hanging many 
hundreds.” If the laws against murder, theft, and house-burning were enforced, he 
declared, “I may venture to affirm, there are not one thousand men in the Country who
SOcd. escape the Gallows.”
Amidst the carnage and chaos, the loyal militia continued to serve and often 
performed well in cooperation with regular troops. The South Carolina Royalists 
comprised part of a force that inflicted a costly defeat on the rebels outside Charleston in
77 Aedenus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jan. 25, 1782, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 1, 192.
78 Greene to Joseph Vince, Jan. 3, 1782, PNG, 10:155.
79 Aedenus Burke to Arthur Middleton, Jan. 25, 1782, in “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 1, SCHGM, 
Vol. 26, No. 4, Oct. 1925, 192.
80 Aedenus Burke to Arthur Middleton, May 14, 1782, in “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 1, 200, 201.
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January. On February 24, Col. Benjamin Thompson, a New Hampshire loyalist who 
commanded the British cavalry during his brief stay in South Carolina, emerged from the 
British lines to attack and rout Marion’s brigade. Thompson praised the “spirit and 
intrepidity” the militia demonstrated in the battle. “No men behaved with greater 
gallantry,” he wrote. John Cruden had formed his own loyalist cavalry unit in October 
1781 to protect the sequestered plantations. Before the troops were ready, Cruden 
realized that they would not be strong enough to resist Greene’s army, so he instead 
financed the construction of galleys and assigned the erstwhile cavalrymen to these 
vessels. The troops and galleys succeeded in covering some of the plantations long 
enough for their produce to be shipped to Charleston. When Leslie’s army retired within 
the town’s defenses, however, Cruden had to abandon the sequestered plantations that lay
0 -5
outside British lines.
Encouraged by the performance of his loyalist troops, Cruden then devised a plan 
to enlist seven hundred of the refugees in Charleston and form a corps of marines to raid 
along the coast. He brought the proposal to Balfour, who replied that he lacked the 
authority to approve the plan and suggested that Cruden seek permission from Clinton. 
Cruden wrote to Clinton on February 19, explaining that he would provide his marines 
with vessels, augment their numbers with “a few Companys of determined Negroes,” and 
send them to raid the coastal inlets, capturing or destroying rebel privateers and merchant
OA
ships. He even offered to equip this corps at his own expense.
81 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 221.
82 Benjamin Thompson to Leslie, Feb. 25, 1782, RAM, 2:404-405.
83 Narrative o f  John Cruden, [1782], South Carolina Loyalists, South Carolina Box, NYPL.
84 John Cruden to Sir Henry Clinton, Feb. 19, 1782, in Crary, ed., The Price o f  Loyalty, 292.
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An even more ambitious plan was proposed by the Earl of Dunmore, former 
governor of Virginia, who arrived in Charleston in late December. During his stay in 
Charleston, Dunmore “endeavoured to procure the best information of the state of 
affairs.” These inquiries convinced him that loyalists were numerous enough to retake 
control of the southern colonies if properly led. Dunmore asked Germain for permission 
to recruit a loyalist force separate from the regular military establishment, with which he
Of
would carry out this plan. However, by that time both Clinton and Germain knew they 
were about to be replaced and took no action on the proposals. Their successors rejected 
both plans.86
By the spring of 1782,lhe loyalists were ready to join in an offensive to retake the 
interior of South Carolina. “If ever our army take the field they will give a powerful 
assistance,” Robert Gray wrote. “Ninety-Six & Orangeburg Districts would be recovered 
by their own inhabitants & they would not be easily dispossessed again.”87 But when it 
became clear that the British had ruled out any further aggressive action, the loyalists 
offered to take matters into their own hands.
On April 1, a rebel spy who had just left Charleston informed Greene that the 
loyalists hoped to launch an attack against the rebels. “The refugees and most respectable 
inhabitants have had two or three meetings,” the informant reported, “and addressed Gen. 
Leslie to request he would make use of 1200 of them as soldiers, and go out and attack 
the army you command.”88 Additional information reached Greene on April 11 that “the 
Refugees are pushing the General [Leslie] very hard” for permission to undertake an
85 Dunmore to Germain, Feb. 5, 1782, DAR, 21:36-37.
86 John Selby, Dunmore, Williamsburg: Virginia Independence Bicentennial Commission, 1977, 65.
87 Gray, “Observations,” 158.
88 Unnamed to Greene, April 1, 1782, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:288.
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• .  « 4 o qoffensive. Greene initially believed the reports and expected an attack. Many American 
officers, however, doubted that Leslie would approve of such a measure.90
Parliament’s prohibition of offensive action in the colonies did prevent Leslie 
from authorizing an attack by the loyalists in Charleston, but those outside British lines 
persisted in fighting the Whigs despite the apparent hopelessness of their situation. In the 
vicinity of Georgetown, loyalist activity had become such a threat by early March that 
Marion advised Peter Horry to remove the vessels and supplies at the town to safety at 
Black Mingo “and send a guard there for their protection from the Tories.”91 A few days 
later, Marion instructed Horry to build a redoubt at Black Mingo for greater security in 
the event that loyalists mounted a surprise attack. Farther inland, along the Little Pedee 
River, loyalists burned the house of Whig Col. Abel Kolb on April 28, then executed
q i
Kolb after he surrendered because “he had been so notorious a villain.” Two weeks 
later, another party of loyalists operating in the area captured Col. Hezekiah Maham, one 
of Marion’s best officers, in his own home. Maham and his fellow prisoner, a rebel 
lieutenant, “expected nothing else then to be torturd in the Most Horrid Manner,” but to 
their surprise the loyalists paroled them.94
South and west of Charleston other loyalists also challenged the Whigs. Gen. John 
Barnwell, commanding rebel militia in that region, told Greene in March that he could 
not defend the area adequately and that two of his regiments were unable to leave their 
home districts to do duty elsewhere “or the Torys will destroy every thing.”95
89 Greene to Marion, April 12, 1782, PNG, 11:36.
90 Josiah Harmar to Otho Holland Williams, April 10, 1782, Williams Papers, MHS.
91 Marion to Peter Horry, March 7, 1782, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:264.
92 Marion to Peter Horry, March 13, 1782, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:271.
93 Moultrie, Memoirs, Vol. 2, 340-341.
94 Hezekiah Maham to Greene, May 20, 1782, PNG, 11:225-226.
95 John Barnwell to Greene, March 6, 1782, PNG, 10:458.
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Greene himself noted that Georgia and the Carolinas “are still tom to peices by 
little parties of disaffected who elude all search, and conceal themselves in the thickets 
and swamps from the most dilligent pursuit and issue forth from these hidden recesses 
committing the most horrid Murders and plunder and lay waste the Country.” He asserted 
that “altho their collective force is not great yet they do a world of mischief and keep the 
people in perpetual alarms and render traveling very unsafe.” However, Greene believed 
that the Whigs were gaining the upper hand against the loyalist raiders.96
British observers also commented on the fierce nature of the fighting behind rebel 
lines, but believed that it was growing in intensity. Robert Biddulph wrote that “the War 
has driven both Parties to that State of Animosity that they fight whenever they meet 
with’t prospect of Advantage, like two Species of Animals whose Nature it is to work the 
Destruction of each other.”97
Biddulph’s assessment of the situation proved more accurate than Greene’s as 
loyalist activity continued unabated throughout the spring. Shortly after Greene had 
declared that loyalist activity was subsiding, a raiding party captured a Whig messenger 
carrying military dispatches, and on April 10 a rebel officer complained that Greene’s 
correspondence was frequently being intercepted.98 Another Continental officer described 
the area around the army as “Totally abandened to the Torys, and the Roads Dayle 
infested by those Miscreants.”99 Near Orangeburg, one party based in Dean’s Swamp 
ambushed a Whig force that was attempting to root them out. Recovering from the 
unexpected assault, the Whigs counterattacked, but managed only to drive the loyalists
96 Greene to Robert Morris, March 9, 1782, PNG, 10:469.
97 Robert Biddulph to [parents], March 12, 1782, “Letters o f Robert Biddulph,” 106.
98 Major John Wallace to Greene, March 26, 1782, PNG, 10:542; Mordecai Gist to John Sterett, April 10, 
1782, Gist Papers, MHS.
99 Diary entry for April 6, 1782, in Joseph Lee Boyle, ed., “The Revolutionary War Diaries o f  Captain 
Walter Finney,” SCHM, Vol. 98, No. 2, April 1997, 134.
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deeper into the swamp at the cost of many casualties.100 At the end of May, loyalists on a 
foray from Charleston captured a rebel lieutenant, two other men, and several horses.101
Some loyalists demonstrated a growing willingness to cooperate with blacks 
against the rebels. “Two hundred of those persons called Refugees including some 
Negroes Armed” left James Island in late April and on two successive nights “plundered 
all the Inhabitants on Ashly River Neck” for a considerable distance. Expecting further 
attacks, residents of the area begged Greene for protection.102
Greene’s aide, Maj. Ichabod Burnet, conceded that the Whigs had proved unable 
to suppress loyalist partisans. “The disaffected are numerous and their Situation so 
desperate,” he wrote, “that they confine themselves to their private haunts and conceal 
themselves in the Swamps from whence they issue forth and murder and rob every person
on the road.” The danger was so severe that “in the greatest part of the three Southern
101States it is unsafe to travel without an escort of Dragoons.” This was made plain on 
May 7 when only three loyalists succeeded in capturing and burning six wagons filled 
with supplies for Greene’s army; the raiders also took most of the horses. The 
repercussions of the attack were felt long afterwards. A month later, a rebel officer 
reported that he was unable to ship provisions from North Carolina to Greene’s army 
because after news of the incident spread, no one could be found to drive the wagons.104 
When the flow of supplies finally resumed in late May, Greene found it necessary to send 
Lt. William McDowell with a detachment of Continentals to the Congaree River to guard 
a shipment of clothing coming to the American army. McDowell reported that “the Torys
100 Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences, 548-549.
101 Marion to Greene, June 1, 1782, PNG, 11:278.
102 Thomas Farr to Greene, April 27, 1782, PNG, 11:127.
103 Maj. Ichabod Bumet to Charles Pettit, April 12, 1782, PNG, 11:38.
104 Capt. William Pierce, Jr., to the Officer Commanding at Orangeburg, May 8, 1782; Capt. Abner Crump 
to Greene, May 8, 1782; Col. Thomas Wade to Greene, June 11, 1782, PNG, 11:172, 173, 321.
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was verry troublesome” in that area. After marching a mere twenty-five miles from 
Greene’s camp, McDowell reported that he was “in the midst” of a loyalist stronghold.105
Emboldened by their ability to operate with impunity virtually within musket shot 
of the Continental army, some loyalists plotted to seize its commander. A woman who 
lived on Ashley River concocted the bold plan of luring Greene away from his camp and 
arranging his capture. She invited the general and his wife to her home for dinner, then 
notified British officials in Charleston of the time and location of the gathering so that 
troops could be dispatched to capture the American commander. The scheme nearly 
succeeded, but a rebel in Charleston happened to witness the woman’s meeting with 
British officers and somehow deduced its purpose. On the evening of April 29, this man 
managed to leave Charleston, reached the woman’s house, and interrupted dinner to warn 
Greene, his wife, and two aides that “he was not safe in that place, for there was a plot 
laid for him.” Greene immediately left “and had not been gone twenty minutes when the 
house was surrounded by a number of the British Horse.” The commander of the 
detachment was “sadly disappointed” to learn he had so narrowly missed his quarry.106
The Whigs’ continuing inability to establish control of the province had an effect 
on both Greene’s own troops and the civilian population. William Peters, the general’s 
steward, was angered by the army’s lack of success and constant supply shortages and 
opened a correspondence with loyalists in Charleston. He eventually agreed to enlist 
other disgruntled American soldiers for British service, but was caught and sentenced to 
death.107 At the same time, many former Whigs who had taken British protection chose to 
await the outcome of the ongoing struggle before recommitting themselves to the rebels.
105 William McDowell, “Journal,” 323.
106 William Seymour, Journal o f  the Southern Expedition, 36-37.
107 William Seymour, Journal o f  the Southern Expedition, 36.
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Edward Rutledge derisively referred to such people as “protection Gentry” and 
complained that “not one in ten ... will do any Duty at all. The Reason is plain; if the 
Enemy should again get the Country, they can do what you & I cannot, that is, they can 
turn back again, & live as easy under one Government as another; Curse on such Politics 
& such Principles!”108
The British, too, had problems with lukewarm supporters. A steady stream of 
disheartened loyalists trickled out of Charleston, avoiding both the British posts intended 
to keep them in the town and American patrols attempting to prevent their escape. Leslie 
complained to Clinton that ‘.‘some of the leading people of our militia” were escaping to 
the rebels “and persuading others to follow them.”109 In a three-day period in late April, 
between thirty and forty people made their way back to their homes from Charleston. 
Edward Rutledge thought that they would be allowed to stay “if they are peaceably 
inclined; if not, the People in that part of the State will soon make their Situation very 
uncomfortable.” But Rutledge believed they had suffered enough misfortune to 
discourage them from acting in support of the British. “The Tories in general seem 
heartily tired of their Situation,” he concluded.110 An officer in Greene’s army agreed. 
“The loyalists in Charles Town and upon the islands within its vicinity are very much 
dissatisfied with their situation,” he wrote. “They complain bitterly of their ill-usage, and 
desert every day to the American standard.”111
Leslie attributed the loyalists’ desertion in part to the cruel treatment prisoners 
received from the Whigs and appealed to Greene to halt the brutality. When the Whig
108 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, April 14, 1782, Edward Rutledge Letters, SCHS.
109 Leslie to Clinton, March 12, 1782, RAM, 2:418.
110 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, April 23, 1782, in “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 2, 14.
111 William Pierce to St. George Tucker, April 6, 1782, in “Southern Campaign o f Greene,” 441.
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commander failed to send a satisfactory response, Leslie threatened retaliation. On May 
18, he reminded Greene that he had received no answer to his complaint that Capt. House 
of the loyal militia was confined in irons at Orangeburg, and pointed out that two other 
militiamen, Henry Johns and James Nix, were similarly confined. “Having thus on 
principles of humanity” failed to effect their release, Leslie issued an ultimatum, stating 
that unless the three loyalists were released, “immediate orders will be given for 
retaliating, to the extent of its rigours, their treatment on the persons” of an equal number 
of rebel prisoners, “in which I shall not discriminate between civil or military characters.” 
Such a severe response was necessary, Leslie said, to “evince to His Majestys faithful 
subjects in this province, that their interest and security, will be at all times, with me, a 
principal object of consideration.”112
Although a Charleston merchant noted that “militia Duty is ... severe on the
1 1 ^inhabitants,” many loyalists continued to serve with the faithfulness Leslie had noted. 
Hundreds helped to man the defensive lines around Charleston, and the militia provided 
about half of the 750 troops stationed on James Island.114 Yet Leslie and his subordinates 
understood that a factor more important than fear of Whig cruelty was working to 
undermine loyalist morale. At a meeting on April 15, British officers observed that 
Charleston residents “are mostly of doubtful principles, many desirous by every means to 
make their peace” with the rebels, and thus “there is too much reason not implicitly to
112 Leslie to Greene, May 18, 1782, Leslie Letterbook, SCDAH.
113 John Hicks to Thomas Dickson, Jr., May 27, 1782, in Robert Earle Moody and Charles Christopher 
Crittenden, eds., “The Letter-Book of Mills & Hicks (Nathaniel Mills and John Hicks), August 13 ,1781  
to August 22nd, 1784, at Charles Town (South Carolina), Saint Augustine (East Florida), New York (New  
York), and Granville (Nova Scotia),” NCHR Vol. 14, No. 1, Jan. 1937, 62.
114 Thomas Farr to John Laurens, May 17, 1782, “Revolutionary Letters,” SCHGM, Vol. 38, No. 1, Jan. 
1937, 7-8.
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confide in the attachment of the Militia.” The officers agreed that persistent rumors that 
Charleston would soon be evacuated were the principal cause of this disaffection.115
Given added credence by the withdrawal of two British regiments from 
Charleston at the end of April, reports that the evacuation of the province was imminent, 
combined with offers of pardon, convinced many loyalists to cease resistance.116 One 
especially dangerous band of “Out Lyers,” which had killed many Whigs including a 
member of the Assembly and defied all efforts to defeat them, agreed in mid-May to 
return to their homes after Gov. John Mathews sent them “terms of pardon & 
reconciliation.”117
In the Pedee region, Micajah Gainey and sixty-five of his men renewed their 
activities in May, forcing Greene to detach Marion to quell them. Greene hoped that 
Marion could convince the loyalists to submit without bloodshed. Gainey also preferred 
to avoid further combat and sent representatives to Marion asking what peace terms the 
Whigs were willing to offer. At a conference on June 7, Marion and Gainey reached an 
agreement. The loyalists pledged to lay down their arms, give up all their military 
supplies, captured property, and prisoners, take an oath to the United States, and conduct 
themselves peaceably. In return, Marion promised them full protection for their persons 
and property. Any loyalists who chose not to comply were given until June 25 to go into 
the British lines. The black loyalist partisan, Gibson, and David Fanning and his troops 
were exempted from the treaty, but managed to reach British-held territory.118 Marion
115 Meeting o f  a Board o f Field Officers, April 15, 1782, Leslie Letterbook, microfilm, SCDAH.
116 Embarkation Return o f the 19th and 30th Regiments, April 28, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 39, No. 4496.
117 Aedenus Burke to Arthur Middleton, May 14, 1782, in “Correspondence o f  Middleton,” Part 1, 201.
118 Marion to Greene, May 21, 1782; Capt. William Pierce, Jr., to Marion, May 24, 1782, PNG, 11:232,
238. Articles o f a Treaty between General Marion... and Major Ganey, June 7, 1782, in Moultrie, Memoirs, 
Vol. 2,419-421; Bass, Swamp Fox, 236-237; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 205-206; James, Life o f
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permitted some loyalists to go to Charleston, he explained to Greene, because they “had 
Committed so many Enormaties that my men woud kill them tho they had been pardon’d, 
& they ware so Attached to the British that they woud never Comply With any terms,” 
but instead take to the swamps and “give us a Great deal of trouble to subdue them.” The 
effect of the treaty justified this concession. Twenty men from the Lynch’s Creek area 
and thirty from the Cheraws promptly “came in & submitted” after learning that the 
agreement also applied to them. Marion believed that the treaty would finally pacify 
northeastern South Carolina.119 Despite doubts as to whether most of the inhabitants in 
the Pedee region agreed with Gainey’s actions, Leslie approved of the agreement because 
it restored “tranquility” and prevented unnecessary loss of life.120
By the time he learned of the treaty, Leslie knew that further loyalist resistance 
was futile. On June 11, Leslie received orders from Gen. Sir Guy Carleton, who had 
replaced Clinton as commander-in-chief in America, to evacuate Charleston, Savannah, 
and East Florida as soon as adequate shipping was available.121
Leslie tried to conceal the news as long as possible, but finally published the 
evacuation order on August 7.122 The announcement threw the loyalists into a panic, and 
news of their consternation soon reached the American lines. Col. Tadeusz Kosciuszko 
heard that the evacuation orders had caused “Great terror and confusion among the Tories 
and the Inhabitence of the Town.”123 Lewis Morris told his father that “you cannot 
possibly conceive the confusion despair and distresses which prevail” in the town. Morris
Marion, 166-167. The treaty is misdated 1781 in Moultrie, and Lambert also uses that date, although the 
Greene Papers clearly indicate that this occurred in 1782.
119 Marion to Greene, June 9,1782, PNG, 11:313-314.
120 Leslie to Greene, June 30, 1782, PNG, 11:383.
121 Leslie to Carleton, June 11, 1782 (two letters o f this date), Carleton Papers, Vol. 42, Nos. 4771, 4772.
122 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 250.
123 Kosciuszko to Otho Holland Williams, [1782], Williams Papers, MHS.
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stated that many loyalists “are determined to throw themselves upon the mercy and 
protection of their country,” but those “whose crimes are too atrocious to be pardoned” 
intended to seek refuge in East Florida.124
In succeeding days, “a prodigious number of refugees” left Charleston.125 They 
included militiamen and civilians “of all ranks and denominations” who sought “to make 
their peace with the State.” Lt. William McDowell of Greene’s army, on guard duty at the 
American outposts, was “much troubled” when nearly three hundred people entered 
Whig lines to seek pardon from Gov. Mathews.126 Three militia deserters told John 
Laurens that “their Comrades do duty with reluctance & are anxious only for 
opportunities to escape.”127
Mathews encouraged the exodus by offering amnesty to loyalists; with victory 
certain, the Whigs’ desire for vengeance began to wane. “The minds of men are growing 
more cool, & subsiding into calmness,” Aedenus Burke observed. The governor still 
wished to prosecute loyalists accused of serious crimes, but only through proper judicial 
proceedings. He asked Burke to convene a special court at Orangeburg to try about one 
hundred loyalists.128
Although state officials encouraged loyalists to flee Charleston, Greene ordered 
his troops to turn back the refugees in the hope that food shortages in the town would 
speed the British evacuation. Maj. Ebenezer Denny of the Pennsylvania Continentals, 
whose soldiers guarded a bridge over the Ashley River in October, disagreed with the 
general’s policy. “Many poor devils had taken protection and followed the British in” to
124 Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Aug. 13, 1782, “Letters to General Lewis Morris,” 504.
125 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to Arthur Middleton, Aug. 13, 1782, in “Correspondence of Middleton,” 
Part 3, 65.
126 McDowell, “Journal,” 327.
127 John Laurens to Major Burnet, Aug. 10, 1782, John Laurens Papers, SCL.
128 Burke to Middleton, July 6, 1782, in Barnwell, ed., “Correspondence o f  Arthur Middleton,” Part 1, 205.
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the town, Denny wrote, “and those people sick of their situation -  they were anxious to
get back to their old places of abode in the country. Some very miserable objects came
out -  whole families, battered and starving.” Denny felt such pity for these loyalists that
he sent an appeal to headquarters, expecting that “upon my representation, leave would
be given to let them pass.” Greene, however, would not relent, a decision Denny
considered “an unnecessary cruelty.”129 Nevertheless, many American officers apparently
ignored Greene’s orders. In November, a Continental officer estimated that an average of
thirty people per week were leaving Charleston and believed that more refugees would
have reached American lines had British patrols not prevented their escape.130
Some loyalists who preferred to remain in Charleston sought to ingratiate
themselves with the Whigs by acting as spies. One unnamed informant, an English-born
“Gentleman,” made his private peace with the rebels by providing them with information
on such matters as the quantity of provisions in Charleston and the positions of British 
1
troops. A Maryland officer wrote that he had “several capital spies in town, who 
furnish me ... with every interesting intelligence,” including “accurate returns” of British 
strength. Col. Edward Fenwick of the loyal militia became one of Greene’s most 
reliable informers. The American commander praised Fenwick for the valuable service he 
had provided, and Greene promised “to use all my influence” to have Fenwick’s 
citizenship and property restored after the war.133
129 Ebenezer Denny, “Military Journal o f Major Ebenezer Denny,” Pennsylvania Historical Society 
Memoirs, Vol. 7, 1860, 252-253.
130 William Seymour, Journal o f  the Southern Expedition, 41.
131 Thomas Farr to John Laurens, May 17, 1782, “Revolutionary Letters,” SCHGM , Vol. 38, No. 3, July 
1937, 7-8.
132 William Wilmot to William Smallwood, Sept. 26, 1782, in Francis B. Culver, “The Last Bloodshed of 
the Revolution. Death o f Captain Wilmot o f  the Maryland Line,” MHM, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dec. 1910, 336.
133 Greene “To Whom It May Concern,” Aug. 14, 1782, PNG, 11:545.
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British merchants in Charleston also decided to make their own accommodation 
with the Whigs. At an August 8 meeting, they appointed ten men to represent them and 
petitioned Leslie asking what measures had been taken to provide for their security after 
the army evacuated the town. If Leslie could not guarantee their safety, they asked his 
permission to open private negotiations with Mathews. Leslie’s aide replied that no 
provisions could be made for the merchants’ security and approved their plan to 
negotiate. The merchants then requested permission from Mathews to remain in 
Charleston for eighteen months after the British evacuation to sell their stocks of 
merchandise and collect outstanding debts. Mathews consented to their remaining, but 
only for six months.134
Outside British lines, loyalists continued to control some parts of South Carolina 
into the summer of 1782, but began to surrender after learning that the British army was 
to leave Charleston. In mid-July, Mathews observed that the state government still could 
not exert its authority in many areas and that each region outside Whig control served as 
“a nest for a great part of the devils in the British service.”135 Once news of the planned 
evacuation circulated, however, rebel officers reported that the loyalists became “quiet 
and peaceable” and “are joining us very fast.”136
As gloomy as their circumstances appeared, many loyalists chose to continue 
fighting. Just two days after Gainey and Marion came to terms, Greene ordered Marion to 
rush his troops to the Santee region. “The Tories in that quarter are doing Great Mischief,
134 Proceedings o f  the Merchants & Citizens o f Charlestown, Aug. 8,1782; Major Wemyss to the 
Merchants and Citizens, Aug. 10, 1782; Memorial and Petition o f the Committee representing the Merchts. 
& other Citizens o f  Charles town to Governor Mathews, [Aug. 11, 1782]; Mathews’ Answers to Proposals, 
Aug. 14, 1782, George Chalmers Collection, LOC.
135 John Mathews to Francis Marion, July 18, 1782, in Gibbes, Documentary History, 2:200.
136 Col. William Davis to Francis Marion, August 24, 1782, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 2:212.
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& distressing all the good people” in that area,” Greene wrote.137 Andrew Pickens had to 
leave many of his militiamen behind when he marched to join Greene’s army in late July, 
because “several parties of Tories” began raiding in the Long Canes district, requiring 
many men to remain to protect their crops and families.138 After Pickens returned to Long 
Canes in early September, he reported that the area was again in “Allarm & Confusion” 
as the result of loyalist attacks. The Whigs, however, eventually killed or drove off most 
of the raiders.139
Other loyalist bands met a similar fate. Learning that as many 1,500 loyalists were 
concealed in swamps near the Edisto River, Greene ordered Sumter to circulate offers of 
pardon along with false rumors that the Americans were to receive substantial 
reinforcements in hopes of inducing them to surrender. These tactics led many loyalists to 
submit, many of them women and children. Others remained in their hideouts, so Sumter 
assigned several Catawba Indians to hunt them down, but the Catawbas could not find all 
of them. In Ninety Six district, the Whigs used dogs to track loyalist partisans and 
succeeded in killing and capturing several men who had been raiding in the area.140
Angered by the Whigs’ confiscation laws, some Charleston loyalists in September 
“solicited Gen. Leslie for leave to go out into the Country and make reprisals of all 
property they could lay their hands on to compensate themselves for what they had lost.” 
British merchants, busily trying to negotiate their own agreement with American 
authorities, “remonstrated with Gen. Leslie against sending expeditions to the Country 
and Plundering property.” Leslie refused to authorize the proposed raid. When David
137 Greene to Marion, June 9, 1782, PNG, 11:311.
138 Pickens to Greene, July 23, 1782, PNG, 11:452.
139 Pickens to Greene, Sept. 7, 1782, PNG, 11:633-634.
140 Thayer, Nathanael Greene, 388-389; Ward, Between the Lines, 176.
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Fanning left Charleston that same month “to endeavour to accomplish some vile 
Purpose,” rumors circulated that he intended “to carry the Head” of Greene, Marion, or 
another prominent Whig back to Leslie. The report, however, proved completely false.141
Other loyalists believed that with the help of armed slaves, they could retain 
control of Charleston after the British troops departed. On August 5, John Laurens sent 
Greene intelligence from Charleston indicating that a committee of diehard loyalists 
planned to ask Leslie for “Arms Ammunition &c for the defence of Charlestown which 
they promise to undertake with the aid of Negroes.” The plan, Laurens said, “resembles 
the desperate unavailing efforts of a drowning man.”142 Several days later, Whig Capt. 
William Wilmot heard a similar report; his informant asserted that the loyalists wished to 
make their appeal to Carleton in person and insisted they could “defend themselves in the 
Town” with the aid of “all the Neggros now in their Lines.”143 Perhaps as an offshoot of 
this plan, a “party of Whites & Blacks” emerged from Charleston in September and 
burned houses and carried off provisions in the Goose Creek area.144
All of these schemes came to naught after failing to win Leslie’s approval. On 
October 10, the first stage of the evacuation began as almost 1,100 men of the South 
Carolina Royalists, King’s Rangers, and Royal North Carolina Regiments embarked for 
St. Augustine. They were accompanied by loyalist civilians, family members, and slaves. 
Later in the month, another five hundred loyalists sailed for Nova Scotia. A few wealthy 
loyalists chartered ships and left the province.145 Chaos reigned in Charleston in late
141 Thomas Farr to [Nathanael Greene], Sept. 9, 1782 [misdated 1783], “Revolutionary Letters,” SCHGM, 
Vol. 38, No. 1, Jan. 1937, 9-10.
142 John Laurens to Greene, [Aug. 5, 1782], PNG, 11:490.
143 William Wilmot to Ichabod Bumet, Aug. 8, 1782, PNG, 11:507.
144 Sarah Detollenare to Greene, Sept. 10, 1782, PNG, 11:641.
145 Embarkation Return... to East Florida, Oct. 10, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 51, No. 5836; Lambert, 
South Carolina Loyalists, 254-255, 256.
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November as preparations were completed for the last phase of the evacuation. “It is 
impossible to describe, what Confusion people of all denominations, seem to be in at the 
thought of the Approaching evacuation,” a loyalist soldier wrote. Some people bought up 
all the goods they could, others tried to make sure they had a place on the transports or 
“went from house to house” trying to collect debts, while “the Young Ladies” were 
heartbroken at the thought of being left in “the power of the Merciless and Insolent” 
Whigs.146 Leslie and his officers managed to restore sufficient order to get the ships 
loaded, and on December 14 the fleet carrying 3,794 whites and 5,333 blacks left 
Charleston as American troops entered the town.147
While the evacuees set about rebuilding their lives in England, Jamaica, Nova 
Scotia, or other British colonies, those loyalists who remained behind often found that 
their sufferings were far from over. Upon entering Charleston, Gov. Mathews appointed 
Daniel Stevens sheriff of the town, giving him orders to arrest and confine anyone he 
found who was named in the banishment and confiscation acts. Stevens arrested a total of
1 48126 loyalists, who were confined until they could be put on trial.
In the backcountry, groups of Whigs gathered at night to strike at those loyalists 
they considered most obnoxious. “Wherever we found any Tories, we would surround the 
house, one party would force the doors and enter sword in hand, extinguish all the lights,” 
and then “commence hacking the man or men that were found in the house, threatening 
them with instant death,” James Collins recalled. While the attack took place inside, other 
Whigs “would mount the roof of the house and commence pulling it down; thus the 
dwelling house, smoke house and kitchen, if any, were dismantled and tom down.”
146 Nase, Diary, Nov. 27,1782, NBM.
147 McCowen, British Occupation, 149n; Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 255.
148 Daniel Stevens, “Autobiography,” 16; Gibbes, “Story o f His Life,” 66.
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Collins noted that the attacks were meant to intimidate rather than kill: sword blows were 
deliberately misdirected at furniture and other objects. “There were none of the poor 
fellows much hurt, only they were hacked about their heads and arms enough to bleed 
freely.” But this was enough to extort promises from the victims that they would leave 
the state and never return, which was the object of these assaults. “I never knew an 
instance of one that failed to comply,” Collins stated, “and numbers put off without any 
such measures.”149
A far worse fate befell a loyalist named Love, who had participated in William 
Cunningham’s raid in the winter of 1781. Love had been accused of killing rebel 
prisoners in Ninety Six district. When he returned to Ninety Six in 1784, he was promptly 
arrested for the crime. At his trial, Judge Aedanus Burke dismissed the charges on the 
grounds that Love was immune to prosecution under the terms of the peace treaty 
between Britain and the United States. Love was released, only to be immediately retaken 
by a party of local men, who prepared to hang him. The prisoner, “urging in vain the 
injustice of killing a man without a trial,” was reminded by his captors that “he should 
have thought of that when he was slaughtering their kinsmen.” The execution was duly 
carried out.150
Prominent loyalists with ties to leading Whigs often avoided the severe 
punishments inflicted on their less well-connected counterparts. Philip Porcher’s estate 
was placed on the confiscation list, but Porcher remained in South Carolina after the 
British evacuation. He and other loyalists petitioned the Assembly in January 1783 for 
permission to remain in the state and for the restoration of their property. Although some
149 Collins, Autobiography, 66-67.
150 Aedanus Burke to Gov. Guerard, Dec. 14, 1784, Aedanus Burke Papers, SCL.
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of the petitioners were “Confined in the Provost,” legislators allowed Porcher to stay at 
the home of a relative. He “amongst others having great many Powerfull Friends,” a 
legislative committee recommended that Porcher’s estate be restored; he and about 
seventy other loyalists were permitted to return to their homes on bail and a decision 
concerning their estates was postponed. Porcher was eventually permitted to retain his 
property, but many other loyalists lost their homes and possessions, were denied 
permission to return to the state, or were imprisoned when they tried to do so. One Whig 
asserted that the confiscation laws had made South Carolina “a very Distressed and 
disagreable” place.151
Georgia loyalists suffered the consequences of defeat and evacuation five months 
earlier than their counterparts in South Carolina, despite putting up a fierce resistance of 
their own in the final months of the war.
The first months following the Whigs’ capture of Augusta had been relatively 
quiet as the rebels worked to consolidate their hold on the Georgia backcountry and Gov. 
Wright labored to undo the damage to the British position in the province. Wright noted 
that Augusta’s surrender had dampened the spirits of Georgia loyalists and that the 
backcountry militia at Ebenezer could be kept at their post only with difficulty. He asked 
Balfour to send five hundred regulars from Charleston to assist in recapturing Augusta; 
otherwise, Wright warned, nearly eight thousand people in the backcountry, most of them 
loyalists, would be lost to the British. When Balfour effectively shelved the proposal by 
referring Wright to Cornwallis, who was so distant that it might take months to receive a 
reply, Wright formulated his own plan. The Savannah militia and two hundred regulars 
from the town’s garrison would advance to Ebenezer, unite with the four hundred militia
151 “Stephon Mazyck to Philip Porcher,” June 14, 1783, SCHGM, Vol. 38, No. 1, Jan. 1937,12-13.
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there, and with the aid of another two hundred men Wright expected to join along the 
march, seize Augusta. Wright set about strengthening his forces for this mission, forming 
three new troops of cavalry while recently exchanged Thomas Brown rebuilt his depleted
1 S’?Rangers. Many of the recruits were refugees from the backcountry.
Several loyalists who had escaped punishment by enlisting in Georgia’s rebel 
forces also devised a scheme to strike at the Whigs. Twenty men led by John Goodgame 
and William Simmons contacted Clarke in the summer of 1781, informing him that they 
intended to kill their commander, Col. James Jackson, then capture Gov. Nathan 
Brownson and his Council and carry them to Savannah. Clarke allegedly sent a small 
party to the vicinity of Augusta to aid the plotters, but the plan failed when a rebel soldier 
overheard the conspirators, insinuated himself into the conspiracy, and revealed the 
details to Jackson, The participants were arrested, three of the leaders hanged, and the 
remainder pardoned in exchange for their confessions.153
These men were not the only victims of Whig cruelty. In mid-September, a 
Hessian officer noted that the rebels “do nothing but murder, plunder, lay waste by fire 
and the sword, and drive away the women and children within our lines; who belong to 
those who will not side with them.”154 Six weeks later, Whig troops overwhelmed a guard 
of fifteen militiamen at James Butler’s plantation near the Great Ogeechee River. The 
victors then “barbarously murdered” six loyalists, including one man dragged from his 
sickbed when the Whigs set Butler’s house on fire.155 Another account put the loyalists’
152 Wright to Balfour, July 27, 1781, and Aug. 16,1781, RAM, 2:306, 315; Cashin, King's Ranger, 142,
144.
153 William Omer Foster, Sr., James Jackson, Duelist and Militant Statesman, 175 7-1806 (Athens: 
University o f Georgia Press, 1960), 17-18; Royal Georgia Gazette, Sept. 20, 1781.
154 Friedrich von Porbeck to Sovereign, Sept. 18, 1781, “Matters Concerning the Garrison Regiment von 
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death toll at eleven. A party of the King’s Rangers avoided a similarly bloody fate on 
November 2 when rebel Capt. Patrick Carr, whose penchant for murdering loyalists had 
made him infamous, killed a man while the Rangers were in the process of surrendering 
to Whig militia. The Rangers promptly resumed the fight and withstood the rebel 
attack.156
The violence caused many loyalists to flee the backcountry or conceal themselves. 
Wright informed Clinton on October 16 that “upwards of 500 Country People, have 
quitted their Families,” gone to Savannah, “and have taken Arms in Support of 
Government & a great many more, have been, and still Skulking about, and hiding in the 
Swamps.”157 These people struck back at the Whigs whenever opportunity offered; some 
parties attacked rebel troops in the vicinity of Augusta during the summer. Partisans in 
the Ceded Lands killed eight Whigs in a skirmish on September 1. Other loyalists on a 
foray from Savannah attacked a rebel force at Heard’s Mill on September 10, killing 
three and capturing seventeen. Another raiding party succeeded in killing Myrick Davis,
1 5ftpresident of the state Council, on December 7.
Shortly afterward, the loyalists’ situation deteriorated. After defeating Cornwallis 
at Yorktown, Washington had dispatched Gen. Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania 
Continentals to reinforce Greene, and Greene ordered Wayne to take his troops to 
Georgia and assume command there. In response, Clarke evacuated Ebenezer and 
concentrated his forces closer to Savannah. Most of the militia accompanied the
156 James Jackson to Nathan Brownson, Nov. 7, 1781, in Lilia Mills Hawes, ed., “Miscellaneous Papers of 
James Jackson, 1781-1798,” GHQ, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1953, 56; Cashin, King's Ranger, 144.
157 Wright to Clinton, Oct. 16, 1781, Carleton Papers, Vol. 33, No. 3829.
158 Royal Georgia Gazette, Sept. 20 and Sept. 27,1781; Nathan Brownson to Greene, Dec. 15, 1781, PNG, 
10:59.
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retreating British troops.159 So did large numbers of panic-stricken civilians. Once the 
rebels took control of the area, they were said to “ill-treat the male inhabitants who have 
remained behind in the most murderous manner almost killing them, and take their 
negroes away, if they will not go over to their side.”160 In January, Georgia troops under 
James Jackson raiding the environs of Savannah encountered a camp where the Whigs 
held about two hundred loyalists, many of whom were wounded. Only Jackson’s 
intervention prevented his men from slaughtering the helpless prisoners.161
Many loyalists nevertheless left the British to take their chances with the rebels 
because at the same time Wayne’s troops arrived, so too had details of the surrender 
terms Cornwallis signed at Yorktown. On December 20, Clarke wrote Clinton that “the 
tenth article of the capitulation of Yorktown,” in which Cornwallis had effectively 
abandoned the loyalists with his army to the whims of the Whigs, “has made a very 
alarming impression on the minds of the people in general... I have just grounds of 
apprehension that it will amount to so considerable a defection of the militia -  if our 
situation should become more critical -  as to leave us but very little hopes of any material 
assistance from them, many having already gone off.” Clinton therefore instructed both 
Clarke and Leslie to assure the loyalists that in all cases army officers would give them
• 1 (\Kthe same consideration that was given to British troops.
While the British were trying to reassure their supporters, the Whigs made 
overtures of their own to Georgia’s loyalists. Hoping to end the bitter internecine warfare,
159 Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 141; Nase, Diary, Dec. 8, 1781, NBM.
160 von Porbeck to Sovereign, Jan. 1, 1782, “Matters Concerning the Garrison Regiment von Wissenbach,” 
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Greene instructed Wayne to invite them to join the Americans and to protect those who 
accepted the offer. “Try by every means in your power to soften the malignity and deadly 
resentment subsisting between the Whigs and tories,” Greene advised, “and put a stop as 
much as possible to that cruel custom of putting people to death after they have 
surrendered themselves prisoners.”164 Wayne relayed this advice to Gen. John Twiggs of 
the Georgia militia and Gov. John Martin. The general recommended to the latter the 
“expediency of opening a wide door for the reception of such Citizens, as have taken 
protection or joined the Enemy.” A generous policy, Wayne predicted, would secure the 
gratitude of repentant loyalists.165 He had already found that many Georgia loyalists had 
lost hope and wished to make their peace with the Whigs. In late January 1782, Wayne’s 
troops captured “a few armed tories who Immediately inlisted for the war” with the 
American forces. Another fifteen loyal militiamen and their commanding officer 
surrendered on January 22 and also joined the Whigs.166
Martin pronounced Wayne’s suggestion “extremely just and humane, and such as 
good policy at this crisis would undoubtedly dictate.” Martin noted that he had made 
similar proposals to the Assembly, “which were entirely disregarded.” The governor 
attributed the legislators’ refusal to pardon loyalists to the bitterness engendered by the 
war. “Owing to the repeated injuries and distresses those very characters have brought 
upon the virtuous citizens of this State, nature would not be nature could it immediately 
forget injuries like those,” he wrote.167
164 Greene to Wayne, Jan. 9, 1782, Anthony Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 14, HSP.
165 Wayne to John Twiggs, Jan. 14, 1782; Wayne to John Martin, Jan. 14, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 
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Greene urged Wayne “to hold out encouragement to the Tories, to abandon the 
enemy’s interest,” regardless of the policy of Georgia’s assembly. Even though Wayne 
had no power to issue pardons, Greene advised him to “promise to do all in your power to 
procure it, which will be nearly to the same amount.” Greene promised to do everything 
possible to assist Wayne in that regard.168
Wayne, in turn, continued to prod Martin on the issue. On February 20, the 
governor relented and issued a proclamation offering loyalists pardon in exchange for 
military service with the Whigs. Taking advantage of a network of Whig sympathizers in 
the town, Wayne had the proclamation circulated in Savannah, with immediate results. 
During the following weeks many loyalists, including prominent persons such as Sir 
Patrick Houstoun and Maj. David Douglass, members of the militia, and a unit of thirty- 
eight provincial cavalrymen, abandoned resistance and came into the rebel lines.169 These 
defections irritated Clarke, who took steps to prevent deserters from leaving Savannah. 
“The enemy have filled the Swamps round their works with tories, Indians & armed
170negros to prevent desertions,” Wayne observed. With the incentive of a two-guinea 
bounty ($275) for each captured deserter, the loyal militia patrolled the area just outside 
British lines and by the end of April had considerably reduced the number of 
desertions.171
Gov. Wright chafed as he watched loyalism in his province crumble while the 
military authorities refused to take action. In January, Clinton had rejected the governor’s
168 Greene to Wayne, Feb. 4, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15.
169 Wayne to Martin, Feb. 19, 1782; Wayne to Greene, Feb. 22, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15; Paul 
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plan to retake Augusta and also denied a request for reinforcements on the grounds that 
Savannah was not seriously threatened.172 The Assembly pressed Wright to do something 
to defend Georgia, noting in a petition dated February 23 that the rebels had been 
“continually committing depredations, and murders upon His Majesty’s loyal Subjects ... 
and have within these few days past, cruelly put to death many of our Constituents, for no 
other cause than their Loyalty and attachment to Government.”173 Wright had already 
appealed to Germain’s deputy, William Knox, in the hope that the ministry might order 
the army to act, but to no avail.174 “This Province has been Shamefully Neglected,”
Wright later complained to Carleton.175
If the loyalists who clung to their cause suffered for their allegiance to George III, 
those who had joined the Whigs found their situation equally unpleasant. On March 8, 
Gov. Martin was forced to send Maj. Douglass to Wayne for protection because “many of 
his Countrymen are very inveterate against him” and had threatened to kill the loyalist 
officer. Martin believed that if he had not intervened, Douglass “wou’d have been 
Murderd.” A few days earlier, the governor told Wayne, another former loyalist “was 
cooly and deliberately murderd at noon day, in the streets of Augusta” by someone who 
claimed that the victim had been involved in the death of the murderer’s father. The 
people refused to comply with Martin’s demand to arrest the killer.176 Martin declared 
that at the present time “it is morally impossible to carry the laws fully into effect. 
Plundering and killing have heretofore been frequent.” He expressed his determination
172 Clinton to Wright, Jan. 6, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 35, No. 4042.
173 Georgia Assembly to Wright, Feb. 23, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 36, No. 4145.
174 Wright to William Knox, Feb. 16, 1782, DAR, 21:41.
175 Wright to Carleton, June 1, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 42, No. 4716.
176 John Martin to Wayne, March 8, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15.
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“to crush these horrid practices in future.”177 The governor wrote that “if justice is 
prevented, and every man to be a judge in his own cause, there will shortly be no safety
1 78in this country.” He also informed Wayne that “the many daily murders committed, in 
which women & children are not excluded,” required him to employ the militia to 
prevent such crimes, and thus limited the number of men Martin could send to assist the 
Continentals.179
The violence irritated Wayne, who warned Martin that if people who came to the
18nWhigs expecting protection were “exposed to this cruelty,” they “will act against us.”
The general did not need more enemies, since his own troops were few and he was 
disappointed with the loyalists who had enlisted in the Whig forces, calling them “an 
unprincipled banditti.”181 Wayne told a friend that of all the problems he had encountered 
since his arrival in Georgia, “what is yet more difficult than all” was “to make Whiggs 
out of tories, & with them wrest their Country out of the enemy.”182
Not every loyalist desired to become a Whig, and those who did not launched 
occasional attacks marked by retaliatory violence. In the spring of 1782, five loyalists 
captured former Whig governor John Adam Treutlen at his home, “carryed him some 
Distance into a Swamp,” and “barbarously murder’d him.”183 Some loyalists harassed the 
rebel army’s lines of communication and one party raided Augusta, where they captured 
and paroled three Whigs, although they failed to capture Gov. Martin because he was
177 John Martin to GA Delegates in Congress, March 14, 1782, in “Letters o f  Governor Martin,” 295.
178 Martin to Wayne, March 14, 1782, in “Letters o f Governor Martin,” 295-296.
179 Martin to Wayne, March 14, 1782 (second letter o f this date), in “Letters o f Governor Martin,” 298.
180 Wayne to Martin, March 15, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15.
181 Wayne to Greene, Feb. 28, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15.
182 Wayne to Col. Walter Stewart, Feb. 25, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15.
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away from home at the time of the raid.184 Daniel McGirt’s troops ranged across Georgia 
with the objective of capturing rebel property; on March 23, Martin reported that McGirt 
had “collected a large property belonging to this State consisting of negroes, horses,
185cattle, etc.” The raids resulted in frequent skirmishes, with losses on both sides. As the 
evacuation of Georgia approached, however, many loyalists outside the British lines 
surrendered to the rebels or made their way to Savannah.186
Some of the loyalists who submitted to the Whigs did so in hopes of retaining 
their property because the Georgia Assembly passed a confiscation law in May 1782. 
Whig Joseph Clay described the act as “pretty general, perhaps more so than sound 
Policy wou’d dictate.”187 It pronounced 277 people guilty of treason, only 61 of whom 
had been named in the similar act of 1778. The assembly appointed thirteen 
commissioners to supervise the confiscation and sales of the loyalists’ property.188
Wright learned of the law in early June, and promptly wrote to Wayne to 
remonstrate against it. The governor argued that confiscation “must Raise Animosities 
instead of Healing & Conciliating.” He also asked the general to allow an officer to carry 
a similar message to the rebel governor.189 Wayne sympathetically replied that he, too, 
wished “to heal Animosities,” but that the matter “being of Civil resort precludes me 
from interfering.”190
Throughout the spring and early summer, Clarke ignored confiscation and other 
matters relating to the loyalists and focused on carrying out his orders to evacuate
184 Martin to Wayne, May 3, 1782, in “Letters o f Governor Martin,” 309; Cashin, K ing’s Ranger, 149.
185 John Martin to Anthony Wayne, March 23, 1782, in “Letters o f Governor Martin,” 302.
186 James Jackson to Wayne, May 10, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 16; Wayne to Jackson, April 27, 
1782, James S. Schoff Collection, WLCL.
187 Joseph Clay to Greene, May 13, 1782, PNG, 11:189.
188 Lambert, “Confiscation o f Loyalist Property in Georgia,” 82-83.
189 Wright to Wayne, June 5, 1782, Anthony Wayne Papers, WLCL.
190 Wayne to Wright, June 7, 1782, Wayne Papers, WLCL.
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Savannah. Preparations were completed in early July and the last of the garrison and 
refugees boarded the transport ships on July 11. Many loyalists who had decided to 
remain behind were grief-stricken. “Nothing Can Surpass The Sorrow, which many of the 
Inhabitants express’d at our departure,” a loyalist soldier wrote.191 Robert Biddulph 
called the evacuation “an Act which of all others hurts the Pride of Loyalists all over the 
Continent, whilst it absolutely Ruins the Inhabitants affected to Government.”192 
Altogether, between 2,500 and 3,100 whites, and 3,500 to 5,000 blacks left Georgia at the 
evacuation, with most going to East Florida and Jamaica. The evacuees comprised 
between fifteen and thirty-three percent of the province’s prewar white and black 
populations, respectively.193
To the very end Wright protested the government’s policy in Georgia. From the 
evacuation fleet at Tybee, he informed Carleton that only the latter’s lack of knowledge 
of the situation could have led him to insist on abandoning the province. Wright found it 
difficult to believe that “when a reinforcemt of 4 or 500 Men would have effectually held 
the country,” it had been given up and the loyalists left to suffer. The “distress and misery 
brought on His Majesty’s Loyal Subjects here, you cannot conceive,” Wright 
concluded.194 Members of the Assembly echoed the governor’s sentiments, asserting that 
the loss of the province “hath not been owing to any want of attention or exertions on the 
part of the Civil Government or of the loyal Inhabitants.” Rather, military officers in the 
garrison, jealous at having to share power with civil officials, had undermined the
191 Nase, Diary, July 11, 1782, NBM.
192 Robert Biddulph to [parents], [July 10, 1782?], “Letters o f Robert Biddulph,” 108.
193 Robertson, Loyalism in Revolutionary Georgia, 15; Coleman, Revolution in Georgia, 145. Robertson 
gives figures o f 2500 whites and 4900 blacks, Coleman 3100 whites and over 3500 blacks, but also cites a 
contemporary estimate o f  5000-6000 black evacuees.
194 Sir James Wright to Sir Guy Carleton, July 6, 1782, in Report on American Manuscripts, Vol. 3 
(Hereford: for His Majesty’s Stationery Office by Anthony Brothers, 1907), 11.
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authority of the governor and Assembly and ignored the province’s defense. As a result, 
the writers declared, the rebels had gained “full possession” of Georgia, “the friends of 
Government either Murder’d or obliged to fly for protection within our narrow Lines & 
many well affected, compell’d to join the Rebels as the only means left them to save their 
own lives & their helpless families.” In the previous year, the authors stated that over two 
hundred loyalists had “been cruelly murder’d in cold by their inhuman enemies attended 
with circumstances of wanton barbarity that would disgrace a savage.”195
This barbarity did not end with the departure of the British. Learning that the 
evacuation of Savannah was imminent, rebels at White Bluff that “embodyed & are 
already striking at the Tories” even before the British left.196 Loyalists fought back, and 
although by mid-August many had surrendered, others were “still sculking about their 
homes.” One band led by Sam Moore, which a rebel officer described as an “infernal set 
of outlaws,” frequently murdered and robbed Whigs while eluding the militia.197
Gov. Martin assured Greene on August 9 that “my endeavors shall not be wanting 
to soften the resentment of parties and correct the abuses which the confusion and 
disorders of war have given rise to.”198 In an effort to halt the raiding which had broken 
out along the border with East Florida, Martin sent a delegation to St. Augustine to ask 
Gov. Tonyn for an agreement to end the warfare. Tonyn accepted the proposal and by
195 [Georgia Assembly] to unnamed, [1782], Loyalist Papers, GHS. This letter is unfinished. It appears to 
have been composed shortly before the evacuation o f Savannah, and when the authors realized it would not 
accomplish its purpose, they did not complete it. The salutation indicates it was to be sent to a prominent 
British official.
196 James Jackson to Wayne, June 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 17.
197 Patrick Carr to John Martin, Aug. 11, 1782, in “Letters o f Patrick Carr, Terror to British Loyalists, to 
Governors John Martin and Lyman Hall, 1782 and 1783,” GHQ, Vol. 1, No. 4, Dec. 1917, 337-338.
198 John Martin to Nathanael Greene, Aug. 8, 1782, in “Letters o f  Governor Martin, 316.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
548
mid-September both governors had issued orders prohibiting cross-border incursions.199 
Gangs of bandits on both sides of the border, however, ignored these orders and 
continued “plundering both sides indiscriminately.”200
In the backcountry, Patrick Carr noted that the “Tories keep dropping in every 
day. Their number increases up here and is very large.”201 Martin ordered Carr to capture 
any loyalists he could and send them to Savannah, along with “any women that harbour 
those fellows.” Those who could not be captured, the governor ordered, should be dealt 
with as Carr thought proper, an invitation to greater violence.202
The continuing civil war, along with wartime deaths and the flight of thousands of 
loyalists, left Georgia devastated. The town of Queensborough lost so many of its 
inhabitants that it ceased to exist.203 Lachlan McIntosh asserted on October 30 that 
plundering “has grown to such a Higth, by a Lawless, Savage and unprincipled Banditti, 
that no Man is Safe one Night in His House in any part of this State[,] travelling a Mile 
upon the Roads, or even in the Town of Savannah.” He asserted that this criminal 
behavior had both disgraced the American cause “and nearly depopulated & ruined this 
fine Country.”204 In the spring of 1783, one observer reported that the town of Ebenezer 
was still “in a most deplorable Situation,” with nearly two-thirds of the inhabitants either 
having left with the British or been killed during the war. Those few remaining were 
impoverished and the buildings damaged.205 Noting that Georgia Whigs were still
199 John Martin to Patrick Tonyn, Aug. 15, 1782; Martin to Col. Cooper, Sept. 17, 1782, in “Letters o f  
Governor Martin,” 320, 328.
200 John Martin to Col. Cooper, Sept. 17, 1782, in “Letters o f Governor Martin,” 328.
201 Patrick Carr to John Martin, Aug. 22, 1782, in “Letters o f Patrick Carr,” 339.
202John Martin to Patrick Carr, Aug. 28, 1782, in “Letters o f  Governor Martin,” 323.
203 Green, “Queensborough Township,” 197.
204 Lachlan McIntosh to Nathanael Greene, Oct. 30, 1782, in “Letters to General Greene and Others,” Part 
2, SCHGM, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 1915, 148-149.
205 Jenkin Davis to Henry Muhlenberg, March 18, 1783, “Muhlenberg’s Georgia Correspondence,” 434.
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persecuting loyalists months after the evacuation of Savannah, British Gen. James 
Patterson declared that the sufferings of that state’s loyalists demonstrated that “prayers 
and tears cant obtain from the enemy pardon for the Crime of Loyalty.”206
Intensive lobbying by Gov. Tonyn and the Assembly spared East Florida from 
evacuation in 1782, so that it was the only southern province in British hands at the end 
of the war. This must have surprised Tonyn, who since the fall of Pensacola had expected 
a Spanish attack on St. Augustine. The governor had worked strenuously to strengthen 
the province; but at the end of December 1781, he could muster only 300 militia to 
support the garrison of 436 regulars. Tonyn could not even arm all of the militia. He had 
distributed the muskets available to him earlier to Brown’s Rangers, and Lt. Col. 
Beamsley Glazier, commander of the garrison, refused to supply the militia from the 
army’s stores.207
Fortunately, the Spaniards did not attack, and the Whigs in Georgia were too 
preoccupied with the British forces at Savannah to concern themselves with East Florida. 
Affairs in the province remained relatively quiet until the arrival of Carleton’s orders that 
East Florida be evacuated sparked a firestorm of protest.
Neither Tonyn nor the East Floridians could understand why the ministry wished 
to abandon a province that had been steadfastly loyal and was not menaced by the enemy. 
On June 14, 1782, the inhabitants composed a petition to Leslie, explaining the hardships 
they would suffer as a result of evacuation, East Florida’s economic importance to the
208empire, and its utility “as an Asylum for Refugees” from the other southern provinces. 
Five days later, the Assembly expressed similar objections to Tonyn; on June 20, they
206 James Patterson to Amherst, Sept. 13, 1782, Correspondence and Papers o f Amherst, microfilm, DLAR.
207 Tonyn to Germain, Dec. 31, 1781, DAR, 20:290, 291.
208 East Florida Proprietors to Leslie, June 14, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 42, No. 4793.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
550
passed a resolution declaring their intention to defend the province even if the troops 
were withdrawn. Tonyn, after informing the Assembly that he would request arms so that 
the inhabitants could hold East Florida on their own, forwarded the Assembly’s petitions 
and resolutions to Carleton and Leslie, accompanied by his own letters of protest.209
In response to the protests, Leslie suspended the evacuation and Carleton 
approved of the decision. The fate of the province had not yet been decided at the peace 
negotiations, and its proximity to Savannah made East Florida a convenient destination 
for the evacuated Georgians and South Carolinians. Thousands of refugees came to the 
province, which was ceded to Spain the following year. The Spaniards permitted the 
British inhabitants to remain until the summer of 1785.210
West Florida had been under Spanish control since May 1781, although some 
Britons and loyalists hoped that the province could be recovered. Robert Ross, a British 
merchant who had traded at Natchez and New Orleans, proposed to Lord Dunmore that a 
British army attack the latter town. The capture of New Orleans, Ross believed, would 
not only deal a serious blow to Spain, but would also enable the British to reestablish a 
presence at Natchez, where Ross believed the loyalists could maintain control. Possession 
of Natchez would also enable the British to retain their ties to the Choctaws and
•  “71 1 • • •  •Chickasaws. Dunmore liked the idea and submitted a revised version to the ministry, 
proposing that the various provincial units be united to form an army capable of
209 East Florida Assembly to Tonyn, Tonyn to East Florida Assembly, June 19, 1782; East Florida 
Resolution by William Brown and His Excellency’s Answer, Tonyn to Carleton, Tonyn to Leslie, June20, 
1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 42, Nos. 4809,4810, 1816,4818,4819.
210 Carleton to Leslie, July 15, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 44, No. 5071; Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 
Vol. 1, 131; Cashin, King’s Ranger, 169.
211 Jack D. L. Holmes, “Robert Ross’ Plan for an English Invasion of Louisiana in 1782,” Louisiana 
History, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1964,175.
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conquering the Mississippi Valley as far north as the Ohio River. The conquered territory 
could then be organized into a new province where displaced loyalists could reside.212
West Floridians unwilling to wait in the vain hope that the ministry would send 
troops to assist them instead left the province. After the fall of Pensacola, a large number 
of loyalist families decided to make their way to Georgia. The seven-hundred mile 
journey took them through Choctaw and Creek territory; the Indians provided the 
starving travelers with food once they were convinced that the bedraggled people were in 
fact loyalists. Upon leaving Creek territory the group split into two parties; one passed 
through East Florida and reached Savannah 149 days after they had set out. Their leader, 
Sereno Dwight, joined the British army along with many of the other men. The second 
group, less fortunate, was captured by the rebels.213
A few other loyalists took to the woods and occasionally harassed the Spanish 
along the Mississippi. John Turner, commanding a small force of ten whites and three 
blacks, captured a Spanish vessel on April 19, 1782, but only he and one black escaped 
when the crew revolted and overwhelmed their captors. Apparently, this convinced 
Turner to abandon his efforts, although other loyalists in the area continued to cooperate 
with James Colbert and the Chickasaws.214
Too Little, Too Late: The Indians’ Final Effort
After the capture of Augusta, Whig officer Lewis Morris had predicted that the 
victory “will lead to the most happy consequences as it was a place from whence all 
orders to the western tribes issued and from whence they were supplied with goods and
212 Dunmore to Sydney, Aug. 24, 1782, Thomas Townshend Papers, WLCL.
213 Fabel, “Bom of War, Killed by War,” in Ultee, ed., Adapting to Conditions, 112-113.
214 Gilbert C. Din, “Loyalist Resistance After Pensacola: The Case of James Colbert,” in Coker and Rea, 
eds., Anglo-Spanish Confrontation, 161.
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the implements of war.” With the town in Whig hands, he wrote, the region “will enjoy 
peace and tranquility.”215 Unfortunately for the rebels, Morris was completely wrong.
By the summer of 1781, the Cherokees had suffered more than any other southern 
Indian nation, yet they persisted in their support of the British. In the summer of 1781 
they launched another round of attacks in the backcountry, which provided indirect 
assistance to the British by depriving the rebels of the services of the overmountain 
militia. Isaac Shelby had promised Greene that he would march to join the army in mid- 
July, but the outbreak of hostilities with the Cherokees led Shelby to conclude that it was 
“impracticable to draw any force from here” until the Indians were defeated. The Whigs 
won a quick victory and a peace treaty was signed on July 29. Shelby then set out to join 
Greene with seven hundred men, only to turn back upon learning that the British had 
withdrawn from the South Carolina interior.216
The defeat caused another rift among the Cherokees. While Oconostota and other 
leaders discussed peace with the Virginians in Williamsburg, the Raven journeyed to 
Savannah in August to confer with Thomas Brown. Brown was in Charleston, but the 
Raven left a message assuring the superintendent of the Cherokees’ loyalty. Some 
Cherokees provided even stronger proof when they attacked a Whig party in Georgia in 
late August, killing several men.217
Another party of Cherokees and white traders was on its way to Savannah when 
two pro-rebel Creeks informed Gen. John Twiggs of the Georgia militia of its approach 
on December 1. Twiggs found and attacked the group, capturing nearly two hundred
215 Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, June 7, 1781, “Letters to General Lewis Morris,” 487.
216 Isaac Shelby to Nathanael Greene, Aug. 3, 1781, in “Letters to General Greene and Others,” Part 1, 104.
217 O’Donnell, Southern Indians, 118-119; Cashin, King’s Ranger, 141; Jonathan Bryan to Greene, Aug. 
27, 1781, PNG, 9:261.
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horses and a vast quantity of deerskins. He claimed to have killed twelve whites and 
twenty Indians. Seven women and two children were taken prisoner. “I am led to believe 
this Action will be attended with infinite good consequences to the Southern States, as it 
will be the means of stopping all Trade from that Nation to Savannah, or any Military 
Stores being sent them,” Twiggs wrote.218
Thomas Brown was equally aware that British inability to supply the Indians 
might put an end to their assistance. While noting in early December that “the indians in 
general are steady in their attachment to His Majesty’s interest” and that the Cherokees 
“have been warmly engaged” against the overmountain settlements,” he noted that both 
they and the Creeks were in dire need of goods. The two nations, Brown observed, 
“depend solely on Government for supplies of ammunition clothing etc.” Brown was 
busy assembling the needed items, which had to be sent “on packhorses by a circuitous 
route of 600 miles.”219
Brown’s troubles increased when Indian agent Alexander Cameron died on 
December 27. Germain rejected Brown’s offer to place all of the southern nations under 
the latter’s supervision and instead appointed John Graham, the lieutenant governor of 
Georgia, to succeed Cameron. Graham had no experience dealing with Indians and his 
appointment angered Cameron’s deputy, Farquhar Bethune, who felt he deserved the
promotion. Graham’s unfamiliarity with Indian affairs and strained relationship with
* • 220 Bethune further complicated British relations with the Choctaws and Chickasaws.
218 John Twiggs to Greene, Dec. 16, 1781, PNG, 10:66.
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Most Whigs were unaware of these difficulties and their response to the sporadic 
Indian raids was out of all proportion to the actual threat. Earlier, Twiggs had complained 
that “fear of the Indians” had kept many Georgians at home who would otherwise have 
been available to serve against the British.221 On December 1, Governor Brownson 
warned Greene that an Indian war would “add to our difficulties which are now almost
insupportable” and expressed his fear that William Cunningham’s raid into the
222backcountry was intended as “a diversion in favour of the Indians.” Greene agreed that 
the rebels’ position in the South would be endangered if the British managed to get the 
Indians to act in force. “Great industry is ... made use of to spirit up the savages,” he 
noted, “which I fear will be but too successful, as the Enemy can furnish them with such 
Articles as they want, and we cannot.”
Upon taking office as governor of Georgia, John Martin took immediate steps to 
eliminate the threat of Indian attacks on the exhausted and almost defenseless state. 
Martin sent a talk to the Creeks on January 11, 1782 in which he combined veiled threats 
and professions of friendship with denunciations of Thomas Brown and the British. 
Informing the Indians that a large American army was in South Carolina and would soon 
drive the British from Charleston while the Spanish attacked St. Augustine, Martin 
insisted that the Georgians desired “to live in peace and friendship with our old friends 
and brothers, the Creeks.” He attributed Creek hostilities against Georgians to a few 
“mad people and the Tories” instigated by “Brown’s lying talks,” thus indicating that he 
was not holding the whole nation responsible for past conflict. Martin advised the Creeks 
to prove their friendship by returning all the prisoners and livestock they had captured
221 John Twiggs to Greene, Oct. 30, 1781, PNG, 9:500.
222 Nathan Brownson to Greene, Dec. 1,1781, PNG, 9:644-645.
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and by sending down “all those Tories, bad people, and King’s men that are among you 
making mischief.” The governor concluded by emphasizing that the Americans did not 
want Creek assistance and that once the British left the Georgians “will then love you as 
friends ... and you shall share our riches and happiness with us.”224
Anthony Wayne assisted Martin in the effort to neutralize the Indians. On January 
27, Wayne learned that a party of Creeks was en route to Savannah and dispatched Col. 
James McKay to intercept them. McKay soon encountered the group of “about 30 
mounted Indians & tories” with over ninety pack horses. One of the whites was Joseph 
Cornell, an influential Indian trader.225 Cornell told his Whig interrogators that about 
three hundred Choctaws were also on the way to Savannah, but were eighty or ninety 
miles behind his party. He added that between two and three hundred Creeks under 
British agent William McIntosh had left Coweta Town about a month earlier intending
O') ft“to create a diversion on one of the frontiers of Georgia.” Wayne initially considered
Cornell “a dangerous villain.”227 But the trader’s cooperation convinced the general that 
Cornell could be trusted, whereupon Wayne sent him and another man to the Creeks and 
Choctaws with a talk. Wayne declared that the Indians could avoid bringing destruction 
upon themselves by ceasing to support the British and explained that he had spared
9 98Cornell and the twenty-six Indian prisoners as a demonstration of his good intentions.
Rather than fight the approaching Choctaws, Wayne detached Maj. John 
Habersham with sixty South Carolina dragoons and some Georgian militia to find the 
Indians. Upon encountering them, Habersham had orders “to send home the women &
224 John Martin’s Talk to the Creeks, Jan. 11, 1782, in “Letters o f Governor Martin,” 282-285.
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Children & keep their principle warriors as hostages, assuring them of the friendly 
disposition of the Americans, & the deception of the Enemy -  who have wickedly and 
Wantonly endeavoured to promote a war between them and a people who never Injured 
them.” But if the Indians wished to fight, Habersham was to tell them that the Whigs 
were prepared to move against them.229
Habersham set out on January 30 and immediately ran into problems with the 
militia and its commander, the notorious Patrick Carr. After a night of heavy rain, Carr’s 
men refused orders to march on February 1, insisting that the bad roads would kill their 
horses. Habersham “did not venture to expostulate with them, knowing it would not 
avail.” He would have preferred sending Carr and his men off. “Indeed had it not been 
that I was certain they would plunder the Inhabitants in our rear, I should have been glad 
to have got free of such a disorderly set,” Habersham wrote. Later that day, two of Carr’s 
men encountered a party of Indians they believed to be Chickasaws, one of whom the 
Georgians killed. On February 2, Carr’s men captured eleven more Indians, evidently all 
Choctaws. Habersham then decided to deceive the Indians by pretending to be Thomas 
Brown, and in this guise he dispatched one of the prisoners to bring the rest of the 
Choctaws into the rebel camp.
Habersham’s ruse brought another Choctaw and a white loyalist to the Whigs on 
February 3. These men assured the American commander that the rest of the Indians 
would come in the next day. But on February 4 the only arrival was a single Indian 
envoy, who reported that one of the Choctaw leaders had become ill and that the Indians 
were returning home. Habersham wanted to pursue the Choctaws, “but on sounding the 
Militia, I found them bent on going to the Scots settlements, in the Southern part of this
229 Wayne to Greene, Feb. 1, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15.
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State, in quest of plunder.” This convinced Habersham that he could no longer rely on the 
militia’s assistance; to compound the problem, the state troops demanded to be 
discharged. Forced to abandon his planned pursuit, Habersham sent two Indians and an 
interpreter to find the Choctaws. They had instructions to bring the Indian leaders and 
twenty of their men to Habersham’s camp the next day.
Habersham marched on the evening of February 4 to find forage, bringing along 
the twelve Indians still with him. To maintain the pose that he was Brown, Habersham 
did not place the Choctaws under restraint. One of the Indians disappeared on the march 
and another the next day. Habersham sent men to look for this second absentee, but the 
Indian could not be found. That night Habersham received disturbing news that boded ill 
for his expedition. A report arrived that some of the Georgia militia “had met with an 
Indian, whom they carried into the woods, tied to a tree, shot and afterwards cut him to 
pieces. I was now pretty certain that the two missing Indians ... were treated in the same 
way,” Habersham stated.
The ten Indians with Habersham clearly came to the same conclusion because 
they disappeared from the camp during the night. “I could not now entertain a doubt that 
the Indians were apprised of our being Americans,” Habersham wrote. This was 
confirmed when he learned that one of the Indians spoke some English and that the 
militiamen “had several times thrown out threats in their [Indians’] presence and abused 
them.” Thus the vicious behavior of the Georgians wrecked Habersham’s plan to deceive 
the Indians into entering his camp, where they could be disarmed and captured or 
convinced to return home. With his strategy ruined, Habersham’s only option was to 
pursue the Choctaws, but the militia refused to assist him. Instead, they created more
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trouble. Three rebels subjected a suspected loyalist to “barbarous treatment,” while others 
“completely plundered” the loyalist Scottish settlement at St. Andrews, where they 
“killed eleven Men.” Loyalist partisans retaliated by twice ambushing Habersham’s 
troops on their return, wounding one man. The savagery of the militia had completely 
sabotaged the expedition, causing Habersham to lament his failure as well as the injury 
done to “my reputation as an Officer, and my feelings as a Citizen.”230
Wayne overlooked the vicious behavior of the Georgians and instead blamed the 
desertion of the militia for Habersham’s failure. Had the expedition succeeded, Wayne 
told Gov. Martin, it would have secured Georgia from “an Indian Invasion.” Yet the 
general still hoped that “we have convinced the savages that the British can’t support 
them & that they are now upon their return to their own Country.”231 Some Choctaws did 
reach Savannah at the end of February, much to Wayne’s disappointment, but he still 
believed that the British “will not be able to derive much service” from the Indians.232
Wayne’s prediction soon proved to have been too optimistic. In late March, Whig 
troops captured letters that indicated “to a Certainty that every measure is attempted to 
draw down the Creeks & other Indians.” The Choctaws, Wayne declared, had “already 
commenced hostilities” by killing and scalping a rebel dragoon. The Whigs had in turn 
“taken a Chickasaw chief & I expect that the party he commanded are by this time either 
killed or Prisoners.” Wayne said that he would hold this Indian “as a Victim, who 
together with the first British Officer that fall into our hands will eventually be sacrificed 
to the Maner of that brave unfortunate Dragoon.” Wayne asserted that such retaliation 
was justified because the British had displayed the dragoon’s body in Savannah and
230 John Habersham to Anthony Wayne, Feb. 8, 1782, Anthony Wayne Papers, PERK.
231 Wayne to John Martin, Feb. 13, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15.
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paraded his scalp through the town.233 Whether the events in Savannah had actually 
occurred or were merely rumor, Wayne abandoned his intentions of dealing humanely 
with the Indians and adopted a policy of brutality instead. He determined “to prevent any 
more Indians getting in” to Savannah and “to strike them going out.”234
Andrew Pickens similarly expressed frustration with his inability to halt Indian 
raids. Early in 1782, the Cherokees, assisted by loyalists, renewed their attacks on the 
rebels; one raiding party killed several people and burned some houses in Ninety Six 
district. Pickens countered by mounting a winter campaign against the Cherokees, 
which destroyed their towns east of the Appalachians. To his dismay, however, Pickens 
found that “the Indians had removed from their towns with their provisions.” Since he 
had relied on capturing supplies to feed his militia, this unforeseen setback left the rebels 
hungry as well as physically exhausted.236 This, along with the failure to receive expected 
reinforcements from North Carolina and the overmountain settlements, forced Pickens to
7^ 7end his incursion. “We were well nigh perishing,” one participant wrote. The abortive 
offensive also deprived Wayne of reinforcements since Gov. Martin dispatched Elijah 
Clarke and eighty men to assist Pickens.238 Martin then withheld additional troops to 
protect the Georgia backcountry from “the frequent alarms on the frontiers, by the 
Indians and Tories.”239
Pickens believed that his operations would have succeeded “had it not been for 
the Tories that went up under Col. Williams and others small parties that has since gon
233 Wayne to Greene, March 25, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 15.
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up” to Cherokee territory to cooperate with the Indians. Pickens warned that “unless 
some Spirited meassures are taken and Immediately Carried into Execution against the 
Cherokees and Tories that are harboured in the nation -  this part of the Country must be 
Evacuated for some time.” In response, Gov. Rutledge approved a combined attack by 
militia from North and South Carolina and the overmountain settlers against the 
Cherokees and loyalists.240 Once Pickens had defeated the Cherokees, he hoped to strike 
the Creeks too. In a letter to Martin soliciting assistance from Georgia for his offensive, 
Pickens declared that he “would wish at the Same time to carry my Idear further than the 
Cherokees if possible, I mean to the Coweatuas.”241
While Pickens worked to assemble his expedition, Brown ordered further Indian 
attacks against the Whigs. He observed that the Cherokees had demonstrated “manly, 
spirited perseverance,” despite the “wanton bloody outrages ... committed by the rebels” 
against them, and had forced “all the inhabitants over the mountains to live in 
blockhouses for their security.” However, their efforts and those of the other nations 
“have not been productive of any other essential advantage other than preventing any 
very considerable reinforcements from the back country to Green’s army.” To increase 
the pressure on the rebels, Brown in February instructed his newly appointed deputy to 
the Cherokees, Col. Thomas Waters, to “send out from time to time as many Indians as 
you can possibly collect to harrass and annoy” the enemy. Brown also ordered Waters to
240 Andrew Pickens to Elijah Clarke, Jan. 25, 1782, Emmet Collection No. 6670, NYPL.
241 Andrew Pickens to Gov. John Martin, June 22, 1782, Andrew Pickens Papers, SCL.
242 Brown to Germain, April 6, 1782, DAR, 21:55.
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place his assistants in command of the raiding parties and that all “refugees ... must be 
employed” in what Brown envisioned as a joint Indian-loyalist effort.243
Brown’s plan accomplished little. On April 2, Elijah Clarke and his militia 
attacked a group of Creeks and loyalists west of the Oconee River. The outnumbered 
raiding party scattered. The Whigs pursued them, killed a few Indians, and captured two 
loyalists, who were promptly hanged. One week later, a rebel force under Maj. Francis 
Moore encountered about twenty Indians and a few loyalists near the mouth of the 
Altamaha River. The Indians and loyalists took refuge in a log house and repulsed their 
attackers, killing Moore and two of his men; another drowned trying to escape across the 
river. A party of Whig militia skirmished with fifteen Choctaws on May 2. Three Indians 
were killed before more arrived and forced the rebels to retreat. Several other Indian 
raiding parties launched attacks in the vicinity of Augusta later in the month, then quickly 
withdrew before the Whigs could mount an effective pursuit.244
A Creek attempt to reach Savannah resulted in the two largest battles of the 
campaign in May and June. Learning that Emestisiguo, the most ardent British supporter 
among the Creeks, was advancing to Savannah with 150 warriors, Brown sent a 
detachment of provincials and militia to the Ogechee River to meet the Indians. The 
loyalists drove back Whig troops in the area on May 19 and shortly afterward Brown 
joined them with 340 additional soldiers. Wayne also sent reinforcements and attacked
243 Thomas Brown to Thomas Waters, [Feb. 1782], Audit Office Papers, Class 13, Vol. 10, #79, 
www.royalprovincial.com/military/rhist/dian, Dec. 17, 2002.
244 Waring, Fighting Elder, 107; Hayes, Hero o f  Hornet’s Nest, 151-152; Capt. Jno. Lyon to Wayne, April 
13 1782; James Jackson to Wayne, May 3, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 16; Elijah Clarke to John 
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the loyalists. Brown defeated the Whigs, but seeing no sign of the Indians withdrew to 
Savannah the next day.245
Emestisiguo’s party did not approach Savannah until late June. In the early 
morning of June 24, the Creeks encountered Wayne’s Continentals encamped for the 
night at Gibbons’s plantation and launched a surprise assault. According to Brown, who 
received his information from Creek participants, the Indians attacked the rebels twice, 
driving Wayne’s troops from their camp, overrunning the American artillery, and 
destroying “a great part of their ammunition tents & baggage.” The Creeks successfully 
resisted three charges made by the Continentals after Wayne rallied his troops. Brown 
reported the Indian losses as seventeen killed, wounded, or captured, compared to an 
estimated seven American officers and about one hundred soldiers killed and wounded. 
The most serious loss to the Creeks, Brown wrote, was their horses; the animals “took 
flight at the noise of the musketry & ran off in the night.”246 The Americans claimed to 
have killed eighteen Creeks and two loyalists, while losing five killed and eight wounded. 
Among the dead was Emestisiguo. Most of the Creeks took advantage of the confusion to 
evade the rebels and were able to reach Savannah.247
The morning after the battle, Gen. Thomas Posey of the Virginia Continentals saw 
a number of Creeks near the rebel position. On Posey’s approach, the Creeks, thinking 
the troops might be British, sent forward twelve men to confer with them. The Whigs 
seized them and the rest of the party fled. Posey brought the captives to Wayne, who 
became enraged when he saw them and ordered their immediate execution. Posey
245 Cashin, King's Ranger, 151.
246 Thomas Brown to Alexander Leslie, July 1, 1782, Emmet Collection No. 6673, NYPL.
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protested that it was inhumane to kill them, especially considering the circumstances of 
their capture. But Wayne would not relent and the Indian prisoners were murdered.248
The Creeks had given their lives in vain because preparations for the evacuation 
of Savannah were already well advanced. Wayne feared that the Indians would either try 
to fight their way out of town before the British left or that the British would transport the 
Indians by boat to the west side of the Ogeechee River, from whence they would raid the 
backcountry on their way home. “I have every reason to Apprehend that they will 
endeavour to avenge their blood they have lost, by sheding that of the Innocent & 
defensless Women & Children in their route,” Wayne stated. He ordered the Georgia 
militia to Sunbury to protect the inhabitants there.249
The Indians, however, decided to sail to St. Augustine in the evacuation fleet. 
About 200 Choctaws and 250 Creeks accompanied Brown and Graham to East Florida.250 
Brown was uncertain of what he should do with the Indians; Leslie had sent no orders
other than to see that “the strictest economy may be preserved” in the Indian
1department. Brown praised the Cherokees and Creeks for their “fidelity and attachment 
to His Majesty’s interest,” but realizing that the war was over, he asked Carleton if the 
general thought it worthwhile to purchase the Indians’ neutrality since their military
• • TCIservices were no longer required. Graham likewise lauded the “spirit... good order and 
regularity” that the Choctaws had displayed throughout their service with the British;
248 John Thornton Posey, General Thomas Posey: Son o f  the American Revolution (East Lansing: Michigan 
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however, he proposed to Carleton that they and the Chickasaws should continue “to 
harrass the Spanish” in West Florida.
After the British evacuated Savannah, Whig leaders tried to convince the Creeks 
to shift their allegiance to the Americans. In a message to the leaders of both the Upper 
and Lower Creeks, Gov. Martin pointed out that the Americans had clearly won the war 
and therefore Creek interests could be best served by abandoning their alliance with the 
British, who had “basely deserted” the Creeks. The governor offered the Creeks peace 
and a generous supply of trade goods if they would “deliver up all the commissaries & 
traders. Likewise all our negroes, horses & cattle that are among you.”254 Wayne 
cooperated with Martin in the effort to make peace with the Creeks, sending Tactor of the 
pro-American Tallassees back to his people in late July with presents and a message of 
friendship.255 A second messenger Wayne dispatched to the Creeks was seized by pro- 
British warriors and the documents he carried were turned over to Brown.
Some Creeks continued to harass the Whigs. One group of ten warriors who had 
been captured by Wayne’s troops in August escaped and avenged an earlier wrong 
inflicted on their friend Thomas Brown. After escaping, these Indians “went straight to 
Thomas Graham’s house ... & killed him,” Patrick Carr reported. Graham was “the most 
active man in tarring and feathering Brown” in 1775.257 In the fall of 1782, three 
thousand Creeks visited St. Augustine to consult with Brown and to express their 
willingness to continue the struggle. Brown gave them presents, but advised them to
253 John Graham to Sir Guy Carleton, July 20, 1782, RAM, 3:30.
254 John Martin to the Tallassee King & the Head Men and Warriors of the Upper and Lower Creek Nation, 
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come to an accommodation with the Americans. Some Creeks offered to leave with the 
British when East Florida was evacuated, but Brown suggested they would do better to 
remain on their lands and turn to the Spaniards for support.258 Meanwhile, several Creek 
leaders had gone to Augusta in October for talks with the Georgians, which proved 
inconclusive. Martin did not attend the meetings and was not optimistic about reaching an 
agreement, noting that the Indians “have by no means complied” with the demands he 
had made earlier.259
While the Creeks’ war against the Americans petered out with a mixture of 
sporadic fighting and hesitant negotiations, Cherokee participation in the Revolution 
ended in a cataclysm of violence. In the summer of 1782, Col. Thomas Waters had led 
the Cherokees and loyalists in another series of attacks in the backcountry, which spurred 
Whig officials to launch Pickens’s long-delayed offensive against the Cherokees. On 
September 16, an eager Pickens assembled his troops at Cherokee Ford on the Savannah 
River. The Cherokees, he told Greene, “are a people who only can be brought to 
measures by fear or Necessity” and he hoped this time to punish them severely.261
Pickens set out two days later with five hundred South Carolinians and Georgians, 
while another force advanced against the Cherokees from North Carolina. After crossing 
the Chattahoochee River, the Whigs captured two Indians, one of whom agreed to guide 
them.262 Moving through the woods to avoid being sighted, Pickens’s troops reached and 
attacked a Cherokee town, but “gave a great many of the Indians an opportunity of
258 Cashin, King's Ranger, 157,160-161.
259 John Martin to Col. McMurphy, Oct. 4, 1782, in “Letters o f Governor Martin,” 330.
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making their escape” because his principal objective “was to get the white men that was 
in the Nation and bring about a peace with the Indians.”263 About fifty Cherokee women 
and children, plus a few men, were captured. Pickens sent three of the male captives to 
tell the Cherokees that he promised to halt his march and release the prisoners if the 
Indians released their white captives and all the slaves they had taken.264
One Whig participant described a much more violent battle than Pickens reported. 
The troops, this soldier asserted, had orders “to kill all who had the appearances of 
warriors, to save the old men, squaws & children.” Taken by surprise, the Cherokees “ran 
in the greatest consternation in every direction” with the Whigs in pursuit, “cutting down 
the Indians with their swords.” When the slaughter ended, seventy-seven Indians, a 
loyalist, and a black were dead and another forty-six Indians captured. The rebels then 
destroyed all the crops before advancing to a smaller town, where they captured five 
loyalists. A hastily organized tribunal sentenced them to death, but Elijah Clarke 
interceded to have four of them spared on condition that he would return them to Georgia 
for trial. The fifth, charged with murder and burning houses, was hanged.265
Pickens had sent his message to the Cherokees on September 25, threatening them 
with further destruction if they did not make peace. Frightened by the devastation the 
Whigs had already inflicted, the first Cherokee leaders arrived for negotiations five days 
later. Pickens formally presented his demands on October 17. He insisted that the 
Cherokees return all prisoners, slaves, horses, and other captured property and that they 
seize any loyalists and British agents still among them and turn them over to the W higs..
263 Pickens to John Martin, Oct. 26,1782, Bevan Collection, LOC.
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In addition, the Cherokees had to surrender all of their land claims south of the Savannah 
and east of the Chattahoochee Rivers as the price for peace with South Carolina and 
Georgia. The Cherokees agreed to the terms and signed the Treaty of Long Swamp the 
same day. As a sign of their good intentions, they also turned over six loyalists to 
Pickens. Waters and most of his men, however, escaped and made their way to East
Of t f tFlorida. For the Cherokees, their last battle ended like the first, with defeat and the loss 
of their land.
The Seminole Creeks fared far better than the Cherokees, not only preserving 
their land but also avoiding further combat. Since the surrender of Pensacola, Patrick 
Tonyn had understood that “the aid of Indians will be of the utmost importance to us” if 
the Spaniards attacked East Florida as expected, and the governor had labored to keep the 
Seminoles’ friendship. He “employed them as scouting parties along the coast” to give 
advance warning of a Spanish invasion. The only battles involving the Seminoles in the 
last months of the war were those Tonyn fought with the army and the ministry to secure 
a generous supply of presents for his Indian allies.267
If the Seminoles never had to fight the Spaniards, the Creeks, Choctaws, and 
Chickasaws maintained constant pressure on the Spanish in West Florida. In December 
1781, Brown informed Leslie that the “Upper Creeks carry on their operations against the 
Spaniards” at Pensacola and Mobile, despite Spanish officials’ “many ineffectual 
attempts by promises & presents to detach the Indians from His Majesty’s Service.” 
Creek pressure was so severe, Brown reported, that the troops at Pensacola could “draw
266 “A message sent to the middle Grounds by. Charles Beaman,” Sept. 25, 1782; “A Talk delivered by 
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no subsistence from the country & are compelled to live on jerked beef... from 
Mexico.”268
The Spanish also offered the Choctaws bribes to switch their allegiance to Spain, 
but without success. Instead, Farquhar Bethune sent raiding parties to carry off the cattle 
around the Spanish posts. Inspired by the lack of Spanish opposition, Bethune suggested 
that if the Choctaws and Chickasaws received adequate ammunition, with the help of two 
troops of cavalry formed from loyalist refugees, a major attack could be made along the
“J f L Q
Mississippi “and the whole country reduced to the utmost distress.”
The Chickasaws, under the leadership of loyalist James Colbert, were already 
attacking the Spanish along the Mississippi. Colbert, who had lived with the Indians since 
his youth, began his operations in the spring of 1782 in hopes of forcing the Spanish to 
release eight loyalists still imprisoned for their role in the Natchez Rebellion. Colbert and 
the Chickasaws made travel so hazardous that few Spanish vessels dared venture upriver 
from New Orleans. Their most successful attack took place on May 2, when they seized 
vessels carrying munitions, provisions, and the wife and children of the lieutenant 
governor of Illinois. Colbert released his captives on parole so that they could arrange 
their exchange for the loyalist prisoners. The Spaniards did release a few of the loyalists, 
then launched an unsuccessful attack on the Chickasaws. Colbert’s force of Indians and 
loyalists continued to harass the Spaniards into 1783. Eventually, however, the
268 Brown to Leslie, Dec. 5, 1781, Carleton Papers, Vol. 34, No. 3930.
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Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks all followed the Cherokees’ example and opened 
peace negotiations with the Spanish and Americans.270
African Americans: From Bargaining Chips to Soldiers 
When the British army withdrew to the environs of Charleston, many South 
Carolinians began trying to reclaim their slaves, who were often scattered throughout the 
South. Robert Heriot, a paroled American prisoner in Charleston, sought his missing 
slaves so that they could be sent to his plantation at Georgetown. He learned that three of 
them were in North Carolina, where they had been “reserved for me,” and found a fourth 
in town. Another, Jac, had vanished, while Mingo had been employed by the British “on 
the public works, but I understand is run away from them.”271 On his journey south from 
Philadelphia, Aedenus Burke stopped at Yorktown, Virginia, and there took possession of 
“several Negroes” belonging to his Carolina friends, who had been with Cornwallis’s 
army. One, however, owned by Arthur Middleton, escaped aboard a British vessel.
Gen. Isaac Huger of the South Carolina militia took time from his duties to search 
for his slaves, only to learn that the British had taken most of them. Huger tried without 
success to find a white man to escort his remaining slaves to safety in Virginia. He also 
expressed concern at Sumter’s seizure of 150 slaves belonging to Lt. Gov. William Bull, 
probably because Huger feared that Sumter’s actions would provoke retaliation in kind 
by the British and the loss of more Whig-owned slaves.273 Sumter, however, continued to
270 Caughey, “Natchez Rebellion,” 70; Gibson, The Chickasaws, 73-74; Haynes, Natchez District, 143-144, 
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seize slaves to distribute as bounties to his troops and quickly accumulated a surplus.274 
In December, Gov. Rutledge advised Sumter to put a group of blacks the latter had 
recently taken “in Charge of some person, of honest Character,” to care for them and 
insure that “they do not escape to the Enemy,” until the state government called for 
them.275
Rebel officials assigned some unclaimed and loyalist-owned slaves to repair some 
of the deterioration that resulted from years of wartime neglect. In early December, a 
party of blacks was sent under guard to repair the road between Ferguson’s Mill and 
Orangeburg. The captain commanding the guards received orders to “prevent the Negroes 
from Defecting” as well as “to repel any attack that may be made on them by the 
disaffected Inhabitants who may desire to interrupt them in their duty or steal them from 
their masters.”276
The Whigs had good reason to fear the loss of their slaves because British and 
loyalist parties had made repeated forays from Charleston to capture blacks. On 
September 28, Greene had informed Sumter that “the enemy... are collecting all the
777Negroes they can.” Six weeks later, Francis Marion reported that several raiding 
parties took “a great number of Negroes out of St Stephens and St Johns” counties.278 
Marion initially thought the British wanted the slaves to work on Charleston’s 
fortifications, but was puzzled when raiders carried off “women and children, who will
274 For examples o f  slaves seized by Sumter and distributed as bounties to his troops, see Petition o f Anne 
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be of no use to them in Charleston and will use up provisions.”279 Evidently the British 
intended to use some of these slaves as laborers, while loyalists sought slaves as 
compensation for the property they had been forced to abandon. Depriving the Whigs of 
slaves also made it harder for them to raise the crops needed to feed the militia and 
Greene’s army.
A significant percentage of the seized slaves found themselves among the 
increasing number of blacks working directly for the army. By October 1781, the Royal 
Artillery Department employed 90 blacks, 85 of them as laborers. King Staniard 
continued as sergeant, assisted by four corporals. The number peaked at 95 in January 
1782, then declined slightly; there were 86 men on the rolls in September.280
In addition to these laborers, the royal artillery relied upon fifty-seven wagon 
drivers from the Horse Department to transport guns and supplies. Most or all of these 
were apparently black, since the muster roll lists first names such as Quamino, Monday, 
Bristol, Pompey, and Mingo. The artillery department also employed skilled blacks, 
although most of these appear to have been hired from loyalist owners, whereas most of 
the laborers and teamsters were apparently fugitives who had fled to the British. A return 
of skilled black workers dated April 21,1782 shows eight carpenters, a wheeler, two 
smiths, and ten sawyers, for a total of twenty-one men. Skilled workers who maintained 
the artillery train consisted of a mixed group of whites and black craftsmen. Pay, 
however, was generally lower for blacks. White workers received three shillings per day, 
blacks only two, except in the case of sawyers, who were paid two shillings per day
279 Marion to Greene, Nov. 14, 1781, PNG, 9:573.
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regardless of race. Blacks working for the army often had their families with them; one 
muster roll listed fifty-two women attached to the artillery department.281
British officers also turned to loyalist masters in the fall of 1781 to procure slaves 
to strengthen the defenses around Charleston. The army advertised in the newspapers for 
slaves to perform this task, instructing masters to have them report each morning to an 
official from the engineer department for assignment. The promised pay was one shilling 
per day, which apparently went to the masters rather than the laborers.282 General Leslie 
later established a fixed scale of payment to loyalists whose slaves worked in the various 
departments. Masters received eight pence per day for laborers, eighteen pence for skilled 
workers; women’s work was valued at half the rate of a male laborer. The slaves received 
clothing “made up in Uniform” along with a direct allowance of two dollars per month 
for artisans and one dollar for laborers, on condition that their overseer gave them a 
“Certificate of their deserving it.”283
Hired, seized, and refugee slaves still did not meet the army’s insatiable demand 
for labor, so officers turned to John Cruden, who had abandoned the sequestered 
properties he managed when the army withdrew to Charleston and taken his slaves within 
British lines. Cruden “amply supplied the Public Departments” with able-bodied males, 
but retained responsibility for supporting the “Women, Children, and Infirm.” The cost of
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clothing, medical care, and food for these people nearly bankrupted him, even though 
“provisions was purchased of the cheapest kind, and issued as sparingly as possible.”284 
While slave women and children often proved to be more burden than benefit to 
the British, many of the men sometimes provided more assistance than simple labor. The 
roster of a company of fifty-four black laborers listed the particular information each man 
possessed, such as knowledge of certain roads and wooded areas.285 This information 
indicates that these men may have been called upon occasionally to carry messages or 
procure information for the army.
Black spies and messengers comprised a key component of British intelligence 
operations. Henry Lee discovered in August that a loyalist behind rebel lines was using 
“two of his Negroe fellows” to send a steady stream of information to Balfour in 
Charleston.286 Lee also learned that one black had offered to lead the British across the
987Santee and through the swamps to make a surprise attack on Greene’s camp. Boston 
King thwarted a planned rebel attack on the British post at Nelson’s Ferry by carrying a 
message through Whig lines to another British detachment at Monk’s Comer, which 
promptly marched to the aid of the threatened position. The officer to whom he delivered 
the message welcomed him “with great kindness” and praised King’s “courage and 
conduct in this dangerous business.” The British paid King a three shilling reward for his 
services, a sum that the former slave considered paltry in view of the risks he had 
taken.288
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Angered by the harm blacks were doing to the rebel cause, Gov. Rutledge issued 
orders in September to punish slaves who helped the British. “Severe examples must be 
made of all negroes who carry any provisions of any kind, aid or assist, or carry any 
intelligence to or for the enemy,” he wrote; “agreeably to the laws of this State all such 
negroes shall suffer death.” The governor’s threats had little effect, for two months 
later Greene decided that kindness toward slaves might work better than threats. Greene 
told Henry Lee to insure that Whig troops did not abuse “the Negroes from whom the 
enemy get all their best intelligence and who will be either more or less useful to them as 
they are treated well or ill by us.”290
Of even greater concern to Greene was the growing possibility that the British 
might augment their forces by arming large numbers of slaves. In August, Greene 
believed that “four or five hundred Negroes may be calculated upon” to fight alongside
901the British and loyalists. By December, he learned that the British had finally begun to 
organize black military units. “An attempt is ... making to Arm the Negroes and some are
909now in service,” he reported.
Balfour had been considering ways to procure more assistance from slaves since 
the summer, but even the limited plan he had suggested then provoked an outburst of 
furor among loyalists in New York when it became known. “There is an Absurd and 
exasperating Promise of Freedom and a Gratuity to Slaves who will inform against their
289 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, Sept. 2, 1781, in Gibbes, ed., Documentary History, 3:131.
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Masters Strange Defect of sound Policy!” raged William Smith when he heard Balfour’s 
proposal. James Simpson pronounced the idea “Madness.”
But others believed that the best means to retrieve British fortunes in America 
was to abandon all reservations and arm large numbers of blacks. An anonymous writer 
calculated the strength available to the rebels and concluded that black troops would give 
Britain a decisive advantage in the war. He estimated the population of the thirteen 
colonies at 2.4 million, of which 600,000 were “Negroes or Slaves.” Assuming that one 
in four people were capable of bearing arms, the rebels had a potential fighting strength 
of 460,000 men and the blacks 150,000. However, the writer calculated that the war had 
already incapacitated about 50,000 whites and that the number of whites available for 
military service would be further reduced because many farmers and artisans made 
indispensable contributions as civilians, while merchants and the propertied class would 
not fight. Therefore, since slaves were “desirous of recovering their freedom, and are ever 
ready to embrace an opportunity of doing it,” and their numbers would not be diminished 
by merchants, artisans, and others who could not or would not serve, “more fighting Men 
might be raised among them upon proper Encouragement than among the Whites.”294 
Although the writer did not say so explicitly, he clearly believed that armed slaves could 
provide the manpower needed to defeat the rebels.
Loyalists and British officers in South Carolina had come to the same conclusion. 
When Greene’s army advanced in mid-November and forced the British to evacuate their 
post at Dorchester and to withdraw into the fortifications of Charleston, “the most active
293 William Smith, Historical Memoirs, 443.
294 “A View o f the present Strength o f America in respect to Her Number o f Fighting Men,” 1781, British 
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negroes were called to arms and enrolled” to meet the emergency295 The new policy was 
limited and almost furtive. Only a fraction of the many slaves with the army were armed, 
and neither Leslie nor Balfour ever mentioned the black units in correspondence with 
their superiors.
John Laurens saw the British decision to arm blacks as an opportunity to revive 
his cherished plan to enlist slaves to serve in the Whig forces. He proposed that South 
Carolina use the promise of freedom after the war to recruit 2,500 slave soldiers. Greene,
296who was eager to increase the strength of his army, lent his full support. Laurens 
intended to bring the proposal before the Assembly, and Greene urged Gov. Rutledge to 
help secure its passage. “The natural strength of this country in point of numbers, appears 
to me to consist much more in the blacks, than the whites,” Greene observed. “Could they 
be incorporated, and employed for it’s defence, it would afford you double security. That 
they would make good Soldiers I have not the least doubt.”297 After consulting with the 
Council, Rutledge replied that the decision would be left to the legislature. He also 
reminded Greene that the previous proposal to arm blacks had been overwhelmingly 
rejected.298
Pressured by Laurens, who declared that “unless they are goaded upon the 
subject” state officials would do nothing, Greene again addressed the governor.299 “I 
cannot help repeating my recommendation of raising some black regiments for the more 
effectual protection and security of this country,” the general wrote. He conceded that 
this “remedy may be disagreeable,” yet it was preferable to having the province again
295 Ward, Delaware Continentals, 476.
296 Greene to Robert Livingston, April 12, 1782, PNG, 11:35.
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overrun by the British. To emphasize this danger, Greene asserted that the British “are 
now arming a considerable body of negroes and I am well informed that they determine 
to compleat them to the number of 3,000.”3°°
Laurens managed to have the matter brought up for a vote in the Assembly on 
February 4, but his proposal was overwhelmingly defeated. Only Laurens, David 
Ramsay, and fourteen others voted for the measure. “By all the rest it was execrated,” 
Burke wrote. He noted that the use of slave soldiers was becoming a divisive issue 
between the northern and southern states. “The northern people I have observed, regard 
the condition in which we hold our slaves in a light different from us. I am much 
deceived indeed, if they do not secretly wish for a general Emancipation, if the present 
struggle was over,” Burke declared.301
Leading the opposition to Laurens’s proposal were John and Edward Rutledge, 
Jacob Read, and Christopher Gadsden, and nearly one hundred other representatives 
supported them. Edward Rutledge described the contest over the bill as a “hard Battle” 
and said that although Laurens and his allies had “pushed the matter as far as it could 
well go,” upon hearing the debate “people in general returned to their Senses” and 
opposed arming slaves. Rutledge confessed to being “very much alarmed on the 
Occasion” and expressed a hope that the issue “will rest for ever & a day.”302
A Continental officer agreed with Rutledge’s assessment, writing that the “fears 
of the people started an alarm, and the force of interest annihilated the scheme.”303 
Another added that “prejudices against the measure are so prevailing that no
300 Greene to John Rutledge, Jan. 21, 1782, Myers Collection, No. 1209.
301 Burke to Middleton, Jan. 25, 1782, addition dated Feb. 5, “Correspondence o f  Middleton,” Part 1, 194.
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consideration could induce them to adopt it.”304 In a letter to George Washington, Greene 
asserted that the Assembly had rejected the plan “not because they objected to the 
expence ... but from an apprehension of the consequences.”305 Laurens sarcastically 
remarked to Alexander Hamilton that he could not succeed in the face of overwhelming 
odds, “having only reason on my side and being opposed by a triple-headed monster ... of 
Avarice, prejudice, and pusillanimity.”306
Informing Greene that the Assembly had rejected Laurens’s plan, South 
Carolina’s new governor, John Mathews, offered instead to provide the army “with a 
Sufficient number of Negroes, as Officers servants, Pioneers, Waggoners, Artificers &c.” 
However, state officials wanted Greene’s assurance that the Continental Congress would 
count those men toward the quota of troops the state had been asked to furnish. In other 
words, the state government refused to provide the army with black troops, but it wanted 
black noncombatants counted as white soldiers.307 Greene replied that the army could use 
four or five hundred blacks to serve in the capacities Mathews had specified, but only if 
they were employed “upon such terms as will engage their fidelity .... unless the Negroes 
have an interest in their servitude, I am persuaded they will be of little benefit.” The 
general suggested that the state clothe the blacks and pay them the same amount that
• m oContinental soldiers received.
In addition to providing slaves to perform noncombat duties with Greene’s army, 
the legislators approved their own version of “Sumter’s Law,” the practice of distributing 
slaves as an enlistment bounty. Their plan called for the formation of two Continental
304 Lewis Morris, Jr. to Jacob Morris, Feb. 7, 1782, “Letters to General Lewis Morris,” 499.
305 Greene to George Washington, March 9, 1782, PNG, 10:472.
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battalions, with each recruit to receive “the enormous Bounty of 1 Negroe for each Year” 
served, Edward Rutledge explained. He wished, however, that Congress would send 
more troops to South Carolina, which would “let us save two Negroes out of three.”309
Contrary to what Rutledge implied, Gov. Mathews in March 1782 assured Sumter 
that an adequate supply of slaves was available to provide bounties for the recruits. The 
commissioners of confiscation had assumed control of loyalists’ slaves and “wish to get 
rid of the Negroes as fast as possible,” Mathews wrote. He instructed Sumter to assemble 
recruits in parties of twenty and send them to him with “an Order on me for a Negroe 
each.”310
The loss of their land and slaves angered many loyalists, who sought to reclaim 
the latter or at least replace them with other slaves. Some, like James Penman of John’s 
Island, sought the help of Whig officers in recovering their slaves. Penman had left thirty 
slaves behind when British troops evacuated the island, “flattering himself that this Sort 
of property would not be molested.” The rebels, however, carried off his slaves, and 
Penman appealed in vain to one of Greene’s officers for their return.311
Most loyalists turned to Gen. Leslie, requesting that he seize slaves from the 
Whigs in retaliation for the confiscation act. On March 27, Leslie ordered Maj. Simon 
Fraser of the provincial cavalry to pursue a rebel party and recover slaves stolen from 
loyalists as the first step in the general’s plan to secure compensation for the loyalists. 
Leslie’s aide explained to Fraser that “the principal business to prosecute, is, the 
collecting of all the Slaves, who belong to those, in arms against the British government.”
309 Edward Rutledge to Arthur Middleton, Feb. 14, 1782, “Correspondence o f  Middleton,” Part 2, 5.
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Fraser was to circulate word throughout the country that if slaves of rebel masters came 
to the British, “it is the determination of the General never to return them to their masters, 
but to take care of them and their familys, and that they may depend upon the generosity 
of the English Government should they behave with fidelity during the course of the 
war.” The aide told Fraser to send all blacks who came in response to this offer to 
Haddrell’s Point, where they would receive Leslie’s directions.312
Leslie informed Clinton that he had been “induced to make this movement in 
order to convince the loyalists of my desire ... to counteract the effect of the sanguinary 
laws lately passed by the rebel assembly against them.”313 Leslie also explained his 
actions to Greene and offered to discuss the issue of confiscation. The British general 
stated that he had watched the state’s proceedings regarding confiscation “with deep 
concern,” hoping that “Humanity, as well as Policy, would have Arrested their 
execution.” Now that the Whigs had begun to carry out their confiscation measures,
Leslie believed that he had no choice but to counter them by “seizing the Negroes of your 
friends, that restitution may be thereby made to such of ours, as may suffer under these 
oppressive and ruinous resolutions.” He proposed to send commissioners to meet with 
rebel leaders to discuss the issue.314 Greene replied that the matter was “of civil resort” 
and referred Leslie to Gov. Mathews.315 Greene then ordered Francis Marion to warn the 
people of “the enemies intentions.”
The warnings had little effect, as parties of British troops carried off large 
numbers of slaves. The Royal Gazette announced in March that in a recent raid the troops
312 Edward Scott to Major Simon Fraser, March 27, 1782, Leslie Letterbook, microfilm, SCDAH.
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had seized three times as many slaves from the Whigs as had recently been lost to them. 
“The Rebels will therefore find that their Estates, not those of the Loyalists have been 
confiscated by the Assembly at Jacksonborough,” the newspaper asserted.317 On March 
29, Marion reported that British troops were in St. James Parish, “taking all the negroes 
from every place.”318 Another officer noted that in early April the British had made two 
raids into St. Thomas Parish, from which “they carried off 150 negroes.”319 John Laurens 
denounced the British “excursions” as having “no other object than the stealing Negroes” 
and hoped that pressure from Whig civil and military officials would force Leslie to 
“renounce his project of kidnapping.”320
Greene sent troops to oppose the British raiding parties, but occasionally these 
men engaged in the very practice they had been ordered to stop. Pennsylvania soldiers 
returning from a failed attempt to intercept a British force themselves “began to plunder 
the negroes” along the Cooper River on April 3. They were stopped when a soldier from
T91Lee’s Legion shot one of the Pennsylvanians.
Although British officers kept no record of how many slaves were forcibly seized 
and how many willingly accompanied the raiding parties, many Whigs feared that their 
slaves would take the opportunity to escape if British troops were in the area. In May, a 
rebel militia officer removed the slaves from the Gaillard plantation “for the sake of 
Security,” but John Fauchereau Grimke suggested that they be brought back, “as there is 
little difference in the two Situations & it would be impossible to restrain the negroes
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from running away from either place.”322 Slaves belonging to planter Thomas Fan- 
threatened to go to Charleston “whenever I cannot feed them.” In turn Fan, who owned 
about a hundred slaves, asked Greene to take no more provisions for the army from his 
plantation, which had only a two-month food supply left.323
While his troops collected some slaves to be used as pawns in the dispute over 
confiscation, Leslie at last officially proposed to arm others for the defense of Charleston. 
He did so in response to growing pressure from loyalists and from the former governor of 
Virginia, Lord Dunmore, who had made his own attempt to arm slaves in 1775.
Dunmore, who had recently arrived in Charleston, saw the large number of blacks 
with the British and immediately recognized their military potential. He recommended 
arming ten thousand slaves as “the most efficatious, expeditious, cheapest, and certain 
means of reducing this Country to a proper sense of their Duty.” Furthermore, he 
asserted, blacks “are perfectly attached to our Sovereign, and by employing them you 
cannot desire a means more effectual to distress your Foes.” Dunmore suggested that the 
government pay slave recruits an enlistment bonus of one guinea and one crown (over 
$150), and free them when the war ended.324 The government would also compensate 
loyalist masters whose slaves were enlisted. Other slaves would labor behind the lines to 
provide the black soldiers with supplies. Dunmore sent this proposal to Germain on 
February 5, along with his plan to create a separate loyalist army; he apparently 
envisioned the two forces cooperating to drive the rebels from the southern provinces. By 
the time the letter reached England, however, Germain was out of office. The plan ended 
up in the hands of Lord Shelburne, who did not reply until June 5. He stated that Gen.
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Carleton had received instructions concerning black troops and would respond to 
Dunmore’s proposal.
In the interim, Dunmore had sent loyalist Edmund Fanning to London with a 
request that the governor be given “Command of all the Provincials ... and Liberty to 
raise several Corps of Blacks upon the Promise of Freedom.” Dunmore himself went to 
New York and presented his case to Clinton. Despite Dunmore’s insistence that “the 
King’s Affairs are recoverable” if the army would adopt a policy of “more War and less
• « • 'K'JfxConciliation,” Clinton rejected the plan. Frustrated, Dunmore gave up and sailed for 
England. A similar proposal to train blacks in Charleston as soldiers and use them to 
retake some of the southern provinces was advanced by John Morison, a loyalist who 
while in India had previously trained sepoys (native troops who served under British 
officers). The ministry ignored his suggestion.327
Lacking Dunmore’s boldness, Leslie did not suggest the use of black soldiers to 
Clinton until March 12. Lt. Col. James Moncrief, the highly-respected engineer officer, 
added his endorsement the next day. He proposed forming an entire brigade of black
1^ 0
troops. Desperate loyalists also embraced the idea; on March 30, Leslie sent Clinton an 
address from the loyalists requesting that slaves be armed and asked the commander in 
chief “how far the measure of arming the negroes should be carried into execution.” 
Leslie declared his own support for such a measure: “It is an object o f great importance to 
establish a plan upon this subject, and to determine in what manner their officers should 
be appointed and on what terms their freedom should be given them.” He suggested
325 Selby, Dunmore, 65-66; Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 151.
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Moncrief “as a very proper person to be at their head, being well acquainted with their 
disposition, and in the highest estimation amongst them.” Leslie indicated that if the plan 
was to be effective, he needed Clinton’s immediate approval.329 Neither Leslie nor 
Moncrief mentioned the troops of black cavalry that had been in the field since late 1781, 
perhaps because they feared Clinton would order the unit disbanded. Leslie did ask Lt.
Col. Benjamin Thompson, a New Hampshire loyalist who was going to New York, to 
explain the need for black troops to Clinton. In a letter sent with Thompson, Leslie 
insisted that arming slaves “will soon become indispensably necessary shou’d the war 
continue ... in this part of America.”
Thompson was an excellent choice for the mission, because in addition to having 
served as Germain’s assistant, he had commanded and trained the black troops during his 
stay in South Carolina. When Thompson arrived in Charleston in December 1781, Leslie 
placed him in command of the cavalry, which consisted of “five weak Troops” of 
regulars, “Two strong Troops of Mounted Militia, and a Seapoy Troop (Gens de 
Couleurs) that will act with us occasionally,” Thompson noted.331 He immediately began 
training his men to instill “order and attention to discipline.” After some time spent in 
lengthy marches and mock charges, Thompson took his cavalry on a sweep of the area 
near Dorchester on January 23, 1782, in which they scattered a rebel unit and took five 
prisoners. “Capt. Smarts Seapoy Troop” was placed in the rear of the column. Thompson 
praised the performance of his soldiers on this expedition, without distinguishing between 
whites and blacks.332
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Eventually, the black cavalrymen became known to loyalists and Whigs alike as 
the “Black Dragoons” and were one of the most active British units in the last months of 
the war. Their operations showed both the advantages and disadvantages of using black 
soldiers. While they did a creditable job in a variety of roles, including foraging, 
capturing deserters, and combat, they aroused great enmity among rebel civilians and 
soldiers.
William Mathews, who lived a short distance from Charleston, was enraged when 
the Black Dragoons visited his home on the night of January 17, 1782. Guided by a 
runaway slave from a nearby plantation, the black troops commanded by “one John 
Jackson” surrounded Mathews’s house and demanded entry. Mathews complied and 
provided the soldiers with food and drink. After they had refreshed themselves they left, 
declaring “that had I not been an Invalid they would have fired the House & cut me in 
Peices.”333 In August, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney complained that the Black Dragoons 
“are daily committing the most horrible depredations and murder in the defenceless parts 
of our Country.”334 And just over a week before the evacuation of Charleston, Thomas 
Bee wrote Gov. Mathews “at the request of several inhabitants of the Goose Creek 
neighborhood,” soliciting protection “from the ravages of the Black Dragoons who have 
been out four times within the last ten days plundering & robbing between the Quarter 
House and this place.”335 Former lieutenant governor William Bull, a slave owner and
333 William Mathews to Gideon White, April 26, 1782, Gideon White Collection, microfilm, HCIL.
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opponent of the use of black troops, sympathized with the Whigs. He declared that the 
“savage nature” of blacks made it inevitable that they would commit depredations.336
The mere sight of armed blacks infuriated rebel soldiers as much as it did 
civilians, leading to several violent encounters. On April 21, an American cavalry patrol 
battled a British mounted force between Dorchester and the Quarter House. The British 
unit included white troops as well as the Black Dragoons.337 During the fighting, some 
American soldiers singled out March, a former slave who had been “extremely active, &
1 1 0
very troublesome,” and “cut him” and two or three other black troops “to pieces.”
Edward Rutledge praised the rebel soldiers’ behavior. “Besides dispatching so infamous a 
fellow, I have my hopes that others will be prevented from following his Example, if they 
are not, I hope they will meet his Fate,” he wrote.339
Francis Marion encountered the Black Dragoons, operating with a loyalist unit, in 
a late August skirmish near Biggin’s Bridge. About one hundred white cavalrymen and 
“some Coloured Dragoons” charged the rebels, but Marion had posted some of his men 
to fire into the British right flank, which forced the attackers to withdraw.340 In another 
skirmish, some of Marion’s troops “encountered a party of twenty-six of the British black 
dragoons, and cut them to pieces.”341 Marion fought the Black Dragoons again in October 
and this time captured some. He then asked Gov. Mathews what he should do with his
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black prisoners. Mathews replied that since “the negroes you mention ... were taken in 
arms, they must be tried by the negro law; and, if  found guilty, executed” unless the court 
recommended clemency or they were pardoned by him. Such lenience, however, was 
unlikely. “Exemplary punishments on such notorious offenders will have a very salutary 
effect,” Mathews declared.342
Animosity toward the Black Dragoons was not limited to southerners. Even 
northern soldiers, who were often sympathetic to the plight of slaves, expressed disgust 
with the Black Dragoons. Col. Lewis Morris of New York lamented the condition of “the 
poor unhappy blacks who, to the disgrace of human nature, are subject to every species of 
oppression while we are contending for the rights and liberties o f mankind.”343 Yet he 
wrote admiringly of the ‘'‘slicing Captain,” a Continental officer who craved a 
confrontation with the black soldiers. “Fortunate for the poor black dragoons that he did 
not fall in with them,” Morris stated.344 Capt. Walter Finney of the Pennsylvania Line 
gloated that a skirmish between the rebels and “a Negroe Captn. Nam’d Smart, and some 
of his Affrican Banditty” had resulted in the Americans “Dissecting” Smart.345 Polish- 
born Col. Tadeusz Kosciuszko seemed to harbor a particular enmity for the black 
cavalrymen. He constantly tried to bring the Black Dragoons to battle, although he 
succeeded on only one occasion.346
In addition to fighting and foraging, the Black Dragoons patrolled the lines to 
deter or capture deserters. Low morale and inactivity among the soldiers resulted in high
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rates of desertion, especially among the three Hessian regiments in Charleston. During 
October 1782, forty-six Hessians deserted. But desertions practically ceased after three 
fugitives from the von Benning regiment “were pounced upon by the Black Dragoons” in 
the early morning of October 31. Two of the deserters were killed, and although the third 
escaped, few soldiers dared make the attempt afterward. The Dragoons received a bounty 
of two guineas ($275) for each deserter, living or dead, that they brought back to the 
British lines.347
Leslie apparently organized a second black unit shortly before the British left 
Charleston, since Kosciuszko informed Greene on November 14 that the British had 
formed a black corps. These troops were posted on Charleston Neck and may have been 
armed for the specific purpose of holding the lines while British and provincial soldiers 
were withdrawn to prepare for the evacuation.348
A few blacks carried arms as individuals attached to British units or fought as 
partisans alongside white loyalists. Capt. Alexander Campbell evidently armed his 
servant, since the unnamed man died in battle with the rebels in April 1782 after “making 
a most gallant defence.” The man’s actions merited a flattering newspaper report, 
indicating that many loyalists had come to accept, and even admire, the military service 
of blacks.349 “Two White men & some Negroes” wounded Whig Capt. Richard Gough 
and a companion behind rebel lines on July 13 and escaped unscathed.350
Blacks had also served aboard British naval vessels since the beginning of the war 
and did so until the evacuation of Charleston. Most were crew members of the armed
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galleys that protected the inland waterways.351 When the Whigs captured the galley 
Balfour at the end of September, they found a roster of “Blacks on Brd” which contained 
the names of two free men, five slaves, and “Moses a good friend.”
The captain of the Balfour was unusual in compiling such a list, since British 
officers rarely kept records or made reports of the black soldiers and sailors. Thus it is 
impossible to say with certainty how many blacks served in combat roles. Greene’s 
estimate, made in April 1782, that “not less than 700 are said to be armed and in Uniform 
at this time” in South Carolina, was undoubtedly exaggerated.353
The contributions black spies and informants made to British operations often 
proved as valuable as those made by black soldiers. Greene always worried that blacks 
were furnishing the British with intelligence of his army’s strength and position. On 
January 29, he ordered his officers to carefully watch “all unknown characters coming 
into camp, particularly Negroes among who Spies are suspected.”354 Thomas Farr warned 
the general on March 13 that a “Mulato Servant” belonging to John McQueen, another of
ICC
Greene’s informants, was probably a spy for the British.
Benjamin Thompson questioned slaves he encountered during his February 24 
march to strike the rebels outside Charleston, and received information that enabled him 
to mount a successful attack.356 But when Kosciuszko planned to surprise British parties 
operating outside Charleston in September, he had to cancel his attack when “two 
Negroes Coming from Town” spotted his concealed troops and “went down and told the
351 Tadeusz Kosciuszko to Greene, Dec. 26,1781, Feinstone Collection, No. 710, DLAR.
352 “Papers taken in the Galley Balfour,” Sept. 31 [sic], 1782, Mordecai Gist Papers, MHS.
353 Greene to George Washington, April 15, 1782, PNG, 11:65.
354 Greene’s Orders, Jan. 29,1782, PNG, 10:277.
355 Thomas Farr to Greene, March 13, 1782, PNG, 10:495.
356 Bemjamin Thompson to Leslie, Feb. 24, 1782, RAM, 2:403.
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British.” A slave thwarted Kosciuszko yet again on November 14, in what may have 
been the last combat in South Carolina. The colonel led a small force to attack a party of 
British troops cutting wood on James Island. Instead of taking the British by surprise as 
Kosciuszko had expected, the rebels marched unsuspectingly into a volley of musket fire 
that killed one man and wounded several others. The Whigs were certain that the slave 
whose information led Kosciuszko to make the attack had arranged the ambush.358
Blacks who provided information to the British ran great risks. Officially 
employed as a guide in the quartermaster’s department, a former slave named Harry 
served primarily as a “very serviceable” spy for Lord Rawdon and later for Balfour. In 
late November, Harry set out from Monk’s Comer to get intelligence of the rebel army, 
in what proved to be his last assignment. Captured by some of Marion’s men, Harry “was 
beheaded & his head set upon a Stake” near Greenland Swamp.359
On rare occasions, slaves acted as clandestine messengers for the rebels. A Whig 
sympathizer living behind British lines used his slave, Prince, to deliver intelligence 
reports to Kosciuszko. Prince’s knowledge of the countryside around Charleston enabled 
him to slip past British outposts into the Whig lines. Prince was clearly a willing 
participant in the scheme; he could easily have escaped to the British and received a 
reward for the information he carried.360
As Gen. Leslie observed the faithful service of thousands of blacks in many 
important roles, he became increasingly sympathetic towards them, which soon provoked 
a serious dispute with Whig officials. Initially, Leslie had hoped to use the slaves in
357 Kosciuszko to Greene, Oct. 1, 1782, PNG, 12:7.
358 Culver, “Last Bloodshed o f the Revolution,” 334.
359 Maj. John Doyle to Jno. McKinnon, Nov. 27, 1782, 
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British possession to convince state authorities to ameliorate the confiscation laws in 
exchange for the slaves’ return, or if that failed, to compensate the loyalists for their 
confiscated property. He therefore tried to prevent his officers from carrying off slaves 
when two regiments were sent from Charleston to the West Indies in May 1782. Having 
learned that “a number of Negroes the property of Persons in this Province ... are now 
embarked on board the different Transports contrary to a general Order of mine,” Leslie 
demanded that the blacks be sent ashore and turned over to Col. Ballingall, the 
commissioner of claims for Negroes.361
Gov. Mathews had ignored the overtures Leslie had made through Greene in 
April to negotiate the issue of slaves and confiscation. In mid-August, however, Mathews 
learned that the British intended to take away all of their supporters when Charleston was 
evacuated, and the governor correctly assumed that former slaves were included. This 
prompted him to dash off a letter to Leslie threatening retaliation if the British refused to 
return Whig-owned slaves. “It is well known that there are also a considerable number of 
the Negroes and other property of the Citizens of this State, that are in possession of the 
Officers and other persons belonging to the Army under your command,” Mathews 
wrote, “and others that are employed in the various departments of your Army, who are 
lyable to be removed from the State with the Army.” If these blacks were evacuated, the 
governor warned Leslie, state officials would “seize on the whole of the debts due to the 
Subjects of Great Britain, and to those whose estates are Confiscated,” which, according 
to Mathews, far exceeded the value of the slaves that would leave with the British.
361 Leslie to O’Hara, May 3, 1782, Leslie Letterbook, microfilm, SCDAH.
362 John Mathews to Leslie, Aug. 17, 1782, Emmet Collection #6829, NYPL.
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Anticipating that the matter would soon come to a head, Leslie had already taken 
steps to resolve it. In late July, he wrote Carleton asking what he should do with the 
slaves in the event Charleston were evacuated. Leslie noted that “many negroes” had 
provided valuable services to the army and had been promised their freedom.363 Two 
weeks later, Leslie made an effort to distinguish between those slaves whose masters 
were in rebellion, and therefore were considered sequestered property, and other blacks 
who had come to the British voluntarily. He ordered everyone possessing sequestered 
slaves to submit lists of them and declared that anyone who attempted “to secret or carry 
out of this district any Negro that does not belong to them” would be punished.364
Leslie found it necessary to issue such orders because some loyalists were 
pressing him for permission to sell slaves from the sequestered estates and keep the 
proceeds as compensation for their property that had been confiscated by the rebels.
These people saw every slave that left the province as a potential financial loss. Leslie 
asked Carleton for directions on this subject. He also reminded his commander that 
there were many slaves “who have voluntarily come in, under the faith of our protection.” 
These blacks, Leslie declared, “cannot injustice be abandoned to the merciless 
resentment of their former masters; I shall form these under some regulation, and make 
an appointment of proper Officers to superintend them.” They could then be sent to East 
Florida or the West Indies, as Carleton might direct, “where their past services will 
engage the grateful attention of Government to which they will continue to be useful.”
363 Leslie to Carleton, July 27, 1782, RAM, 2:544.
364 Leslie’s Orders, Aug. 13,1782, “Correspondence o f Middleton,” Part 3, 69.
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Carleton left the fate of the slaves to Leslie’s discretion. Regarding sequestered 
slaves, Carleton stated that the matter “is left to Genl. Leslie’s decision, to act as he 
judges best.” Those slaves who had joined the British of their own accord and been 
promised freedom were to have it; “the others left to the General’s decision.”367 Later, 
Carleton asked Leslie to recruit two hundred blacks at Charleston for military service in
i r o
the West Indies, at wages of sixpence per day.
After receiving Carleton’s reply, Leslie considered himself authorized to open 
direct negotiations with the Whigs to resolve the slave issue. Mathews accepted the offer 
and appointed Edward Rutledge and Benjamin Guerard to represent the state. Leslie 
chose Alexander Wright and James Johnston to act for the loyalists. On October 10,
1782, the negotiators came to an agreement. The treaty stipulated that all slaves with the 
British who belonged to citizens of South Carolina “shall be restored to their former 
Owners, as far as is practicable, except such Slaves as may have rendered themselves 
particularly obnoxious on Account of their Attachment and Services to the British 
Troops, and such as have had specifick Promises of Freedom.” Slaves thus excepted 
would be “fairly valued by a Person to be chosen on each Side” and their owners 
compensated by the British government. Slaves returned under the agreement would not 
be punished by the state for having escaped to the British, and officials would advise 
slave owners to forego punishing their slaves as well. Loyalists were permitted to take 
their slaves with them at the evacuation, and the state pledged to allow both loyalists and
367 “Answers to General Leslie’s queries,” [July, 1782?], Carleton Papers, Vol. 45, No. 5180.
368 Carleton to Leslie, Sept. 10, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 49, No. 5575.
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British merchants to collect debts owed them by South Carolinians so long as the 
agreement remained in force.369
Neither side was satisfied with the agreement. Christopher Gadsden thought it 
was “so particularly careful of the great negro owners” that most South Carolinians might 
“think their honor and safety sacrificed to that particular species of property!” He implied 
that throughout the war, large slaveholders had put their personal welfare ahead of the 
public good and were now being rewarded for doing so. “Their interest has indisputably 
occasioned more danger to the State than their fellow citizens, with less of that kind of 
property,” Gadsden declared.370 Loyalists, for their part, denounced the treaty as unfair to 
rebel-owned slaves who “have borne arms in our service.” In an address to British 
officials, many loyalists insisted that it would be inhumane to their owners. The loyalists’ 
motives were not entirely altruistic -  they wanted the British government to pay those 
slaves’ value into a fund to compensate loyalists for their wartime losses. Leslie replied 
to the petition with a pledge that the number of such blacks and their families returned to 
the rebels would be kept “within the narrowest possible limits.”371
The dispute over the agreement had barely begun when the treaty itself was 
repudiated. Mathews appointed commissioners to identify slaves in Charleston and send 
them back to their owners, but the Whig agents immediately ran into difficulties. The first 
group of refugees was preparing to sail, and British naval officers refused to allow the 
commissioners to board their vessels and search for slaves. Instead, the captains gave 
their word that there were no blacks subject to the agreement on their ships. Leslie tried
369 “Articles o f a Treaty, Respecting Slaves within the British Lines, British Debts, Property secured by 
Family Settlements, &c.,” Oct. 10,1782, George Chalmers Collection, LOC.
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to resolve the controversy by sending Carleton a request to have the admiral at New York 
order naval officers to permit the Whigs to search the ships. However, it would take 
weeks to get an answer from New York, and in the meantime the commissioners 
searched privately owned vessels and claimed 136 slaves. British officers approved the 
return of only 73 and declared the rest exempt under the terms of the treaty.372
As Leslie explained to Carleton, “officers long in this country look on negroes as 
their property, and the slaves are exceeding unwilling to return to hard labour, and severe 
punishment from their former masters.” It was difficult to press the matter because “every 
department, and every officer, wishes to include his slave into the number to be brought 
off. They pretend them spys, or guides, and of course obnoxious, or under promises of 
freedom from Genl. Prevost, Ld. Cornwallis, Ld. Rawdon, or some other officer of rank, 
or free by proclamation.” Leslie feared that if the rebels were compensated for all of the 
slaves retained for these reasons, it would “amount to a monstrous expense.”
The seventy-three slaves claimed by the Whigs never left Charleston. While the 
commissioners searched for slaves, some of Greene’s troops captured three British 
soldiers just outside the town’s fortifications. Leslie believed that a truce was in effect to 
permit the transfer of slaves, accused Greene of violating it, and refused to allow any 
slaves to leave the British lines until the rebels returned the prisoners. When Mathews 
learned of Leslie’s actions, he became angry and informed the general that the treaty was 
dissolved.374
Whigs blamed British greed for the collapse of the agreement. Thomas Farr had 
heard reports in June that British officers were taking “the first Negroes they meet with”
372 Leslie to Carleton, Oct. 18, 1782, RAM, 3:175; Moultrie, Memoirs, Vol. 2, 346-347.
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and selling them “for whatever money they can obtain” to Spaniards who came to 
Charleston from Havana to purchase slaves.375 An informant told Marion in November 
that the British wished to retain as many slaves as possible in order to “Gratify an 
Infamous avarice, which must be accompanied with a like breach of Faith, to the poor 
unfortunate negroes who will be carried from hence, into a Thousand times (if Possible) 
worse Bondage, than they Experience here.” William Moultrie agreed, asserting that 
the opportunities to profit “from the sale of plundered negroes, were too seducing to be 
resisted by the officers, privates and followers of the British army.” He accused Moncrief 
of transporting over eight hundred slaves to the West Indies and selling them for personal 
profit, and estimated that a total of 25,000 South Carolina slaves were lost during the
”^ 77war. The figure represents about one-fourth of the state’s pre-war slave population, but 
more conservative estimates put the number at approximately 13,000.378
Amidst all the accusations of greed and larceny, few Whigs considered that the 
slaves themselves might have had a preference. One rebel informant, however, did 
question several blacks in Charleston and found that “none Inclines to go home.”379
Leslie did make an effort to return some slaves to Whig owners after Mathews 
abrogated the treaty. In November, he appointed a board of officers headed by Maj. 
Thomas Fraser to determine which slaves had voluntarily come to the British and which
375 Thomas Farr to Greene, June 21, 1782, PNG, 11:355.
376 ‘<9 7 » tQ prancis Marion, Nov. 4, 1782, Horry’s War Letters, Peter Force Collection, Series 7E, 
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had served as soldiers or in other capacities.380 The board evidently identified a few 
slaves whom they decided should be returned, since on November 25, Whig officers sent 
a small force of troops to Charleston “to escort the Negroes from the lines.”381
In the last months before the British left Charleston, rebel soldiers directed most 
of their efforts to securing slaves. Because provisions were scarce in Charleston, Leslie 
sent out foraging parties that invariably returned with considerable numbers of slaves. 
Greene urged his subordinates to do everything possible to the British expeditions, as 
“the more scanty we can render their supplies of provisions the sooner [the evacuation] 
will take place and the fewer Negroes they will have it in their power to take with 
them.”382 In obedience to Greene’s orders, John Laurens led an attack on one raiding 
party in late August. Laurens lost his life in the battle and the British still succeeded in 
carrying off all the slaves from two nearby plantations. A few weeks before the 
evacuation, Gov. Mathews asked Greene to order that “all Negroes ... not belonging to 
the inhabitants found in the town, be detained” when Continental troops entered 
Charleston, until Mathews determined what to do with them.384 Greene complied with the 
request.385
The victorious rebels found few slaves to arrest when they marched into the town. 
As many as two thousand had gone to St. Augustine in October, more than fifty had 
sailed for Halifax with the army’s heavy artillery that same month, and 5,327 left in the 
December evacuation. Others made their way overland to East Florida or Indian territory.
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William Bull put the total number of blacks who left South Carolina with the British in 
the final months of the war at nine thousand.386
Thousands of other blacks had already left Georgia after steadfastly supporting 
the British despite the deteriorating military situation. The small number of British 
regulars in Savannah led Lt. Cols. Alured Clarke and Thomas Brown to arm slaves for 
the defense of the town. In early January 1782, a rebel prisoner, who had enlisted in the 
Georgia Royalists to avoid confinement on a prison ship, deserted and informed Whig 
officers that Savannah’s garrison included “about 150 Negroes armed & equipt as 
infantry, commanded by Coll: Brown.” These men comprised more than ten percent of
1DO
the troops under Clarke’s command.
By spring, substantial numbers of black soldiers joined Indians and loyalists in 
forays against the rebels. A Whig officer described a British raiding party that emerged 
from Savannah on April 2 as “a motly crew ... consisting of British Hessians Indians and 
Negroes.”389 Later that month, black foragers succeeded in driving a large quantity of 
cattle into Savannah, where there was a severe food shortage.390 Rebel troops 
encountered “a strong party of Indians & Negroes” two miles from town in late May and 
defeated them, killing “three Indians & one Negroe.” The same day a second rebel unit 
“broke up a Guard of Tories & Negroes at White Bluff,” all of whom managed to 
escape.391 On May 23, Anthony Wayne advanced his army within sight of Savannah,
386 Lambert, South Carolina Loyalists, 254-256; Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 167.
387 Deposition o f Mark King, Jan. 5, 1782, GHS.
388 Quarles, Negro in the Revolution, 149.
389 James Jackson to Wayne, April 3, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Removed Box.
390 Rebecca Read to Wayne, April 29, 1782; James Jackson to Wayne, April 16, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, 
Vol. 16.
391 James Jackson to Wayne, May 20, 1782, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 17.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
599
hoping to provoke a battle, but Clarke responded by “advancing a few Indians & negroes 
to the skirt of a swamp from whence the commenced a scattering and ineffective fire.” 
Blacks who had remained outside Savannah also harassed the Whigs in company 
with loyalists and Indians. “Some outlaying negroes” and a white loyalist plundered 
several houses on the night of March 24 and “had the insolence to fire two Guns” at an 
American sentry early the next morning. Rebel troops captured the group, but all of the 
prisoners managed to escape.393 A rebel scouting party searching for Indians in early 
April surprised the camp of “six White Men & some armd Negroes;” three whites and “a 
few” blacks escaped and the rest were taken prisoner.394
Many Georgia loyalists remained uncomfortable with the idea of arming blacks.
In a petition to Gov. Wright, they complained that Daniel McGirt’s troops were 
plundering people without distinction and noted that McGirt, “not Content with 
Employing his Gange in the sole business of Robbery, had, & now has a Great number of 
Negroes arm’d.” The petitioners alleged that McGirt had procured these blacks “from the 
Kings or Superintendants stores” under false pretenses.395
Georgia’s Whigs disliked the idea of black soldiers even more than the loyalists 
did. After the South Carolina Assembly had rejected John Laurens’s proposal to arm 
slaves, Greene sent copies of his correspondence with South Carolina officials on the 
subject to Gov. Martin in hopes that the Georgians might adopt the plan. Martin replied 
that he agreed in principle and promised to bring the matter before the Assembly. He also 
warned Greene that “the raising of a body of blacks I am sure would answer every
392 Wayne to Greene, May 24, 1781, Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 17.
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purpose intended; but, am afraid it will not go down with the people here.” Nevertheless, 
Martin promised to do all he could to “carry it into effect.”396 Wayne also argued on 
behalf of the proposal, telling Martin that “this measure will become a matter of necessity
-5Q7
if the report is true of the enemy forming a black Corps in Charlestown and Savannah.” 
Greene made another appeal to the Georgians in June, asking them to form “a 
black Regiment” in order to meet the state’s quota of troops. “It appears to me that you 
have no other resource but trying the experiment of raising a black Corps,” Greene told 
Martin, noting that neither Georgia nor South Carolina had been able to enlist a sufficient 
number of white soldiers. Greene declared that he was so convinced of “the practicability
l Q O
success and advantage of the measure that I cannot help wishing to see it attempted.”
Like their counterparts in South Carolina, the members of Georgia’s Assembly 
refused to approve the use of black troops and instead opted to distribute slaves to 
recruits as an incentive to enlist. In May, representatives voted to give every man who 
enlisted for three months’ service “a Bounty of 20 Guins ... to be paid in Negro’s.”399 
The following month, the Assembly decided that recruits for the state cavalry should also 
“be paid the bounty out of the Negroes provided for that Purpose,” while loyalists who 
switched their allegiance and assisted the Whigs would receive one slave each.400
Slaves became in effect the currency of the financially-strapped state government, 
and officials routinely diverted manpower from military duty in order to gather slaves. To 
pay for horses purchased for the State Legion, Martin sent troops to seize slaves from 
loyalists’ plantations near Savannah. All slaves thus taken were to be sent under guard to
396 John Martin to Greene, March 15, 1782, PNG, 10:506-507.
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Augusta to be appraised and applied to the cost of the horses.401 In addition, having 
learned that many loyalist-owned slaves had “been feloniously carried out of this State” 
to South Carolina, Martin issued a proclamation on May 3 authorizing Capt. John Green 
to recover such slaves for the state’s use. The governor ordered all civil and military 
officers to assist Green in this endeavor.402 Martin also asked the governor of North 
Carolina, where authorities had recovered some slaves belonging to a Georgia loyalist, to 
“have the said negroes disposed of as speedily as possible ... for the benefit of this 
State.”403
Martin was not without a personal interest in such matters. He had repeatedly 
asked the Assembly to grant him some sort of financial assistance, since the state had no 
cash to pay salaries to its officials. The Assembly eventually awarded him ten slaves 
from confiscated estates to support his family, and Martin promptly asked the 
commissioners of confiscated property “to select ten prime slaves” for him. If the price of 
slaves was not excessive, Martin told the commissioners that he would like to purchase
404six more.
When Georgia’s leaders discovered that the British were in the process of 
evacuating Savannah, they immediately tried to prevent the removal of Whig-owned 
slaves. The Assembly demanded that Alured Clarke take steps to insure “that no negroes 
or other property” belonging to Americans should be taken from the state. If the British 
did carry off such slaves, the legislators threatened that loyalists who remained in 
Georgia might suffer and slaveowners would be reimbursed for their lost property “out of
401 John Martin to Col. Jackson, April 29, 1782, “Letters o f Governor Martin,” 307.
402 Proclamation o f Governor John Martin, May 3, 1782, “Letters o f  Governor Martin,” 310.
403 John Martin to Gov. Martin o f  North Carolina, March 6, 1782, “Letters o f  Governor Martin,” 292-293.
404 John Martin to Messrs. Washington and Odingsell, Aug. 13, 1782, “Letters o f  Governor Martin,” 318.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
602
debts owing to British Merchants.”405 The Assembly also sent commissioners to 
Savannah to negotiate for the return of the slaves and asked Wayne to pressure Clarke for 
his cooperation.406
Clarke brushed aside the rebels’ demands. “My intentions went no farther than to 
assist any of the Inhabitants of the neighbourhood of Savannah in the recovery of Such 
Negroes as had recently absented themselves from the service of their owner,” he 
informed Wayne, “and this I have done in every instance within my power, though not 
altogether wth the Success I could have wished.”407
Several months after the evacuation of Savannah, Gov. Martin made another 
attempt to regain slaves claimed by Georgians. In November, he appointed Col. John 
Eustace and Maj. Peter Deveaux as his representatives, and sent them to Charleston to 
meet with Leslie. The pair brought Leslie a letter from Martin, in which the governor 
stated that all reports indicated that Carleton had “directed the immediate restoration of 
such slaves as have eloped from the citizens of the United States, and have followed the 
armies and fleets of his Brittanic Majesty.” Martin understood that there were many such 
slaves belonging to Georgians in Charleston and asked Leslie to assist Eustace and 
Deveaux in “that humane and generous purpose” of restoring these slaves to their owners. 
Leslie, however, refused to cooperate.408
About five thousand blacks, possibly as many as six thousand, left Savannah in 
the evacuation. Most went to East Florida or Jamaica; a few went to Indian territory or
405 Resolve o f  Georgia Assembly, n.d., Wayne Manuscripts, Vol. 17.
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Spanish West Florida.409 Nearly all slaves traveled in vessels provided by the British 
government and were sometimes allowed to choose their destination.410 David George 
was an exception. Because he wanted to be sure that he and his family went to 
Charleston, he saved money to pay for their passage on a private vessel. Unfortunately, 
some British soldiers robbed him. George earned more and sailed to Charleston, where he 
met a British major who “was very kind” to him. The officer found places for George and 
his family aboard a vessel bound for Halifax.411
Blacks who went to East Florida typically found themselves laboring to establish 
new plantations for loyalist refugees. In the late autumn of 1781, Gov. Tonyn and his 
Council had engaged in a bitter dispute with the Assembly over how slaves accused of 
crimes should be tried. Tonyn and the Council advocated jury trials before provincial 
judges, while the Assembly wished to leave such cases to local justices of the peace. Both 
sides, however, did agree on the role of slaves in defending the province. Officials asked 
the inhabitants to provide ten percent of their slaves to work on the fortifications; when 
progress appeared too slow, many masters allocated twenty percent of their slaves to the 
project.412
With Spanish attack still a possibility in 1782, the Assembly authorized Tonyn to 
arm every male in the province if an invasion occurred. Tonyn estimated that in addition 
to the white inhabitants, “about five hundred negroes might be trusted with arms.” No
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invasion occurred, however; Spain acquired the province without bloodshed in the 1783
413peace treaty.
Through the months leading to the British evacuations of Georgia and South 
Carolina, the loyalists, Indians, and slaves of the deep South colonies had for the most 
part remained faithful to king and country. Neither defeat, loss of their property, nor 
fierce persecution swayed them from their allegiance. Even in the seemingly hopeless 
atmosphere that followed the disaster at Yorktown, all were willing to continue the fight; 
in fact, loyalists advocated aggressive action in an effort to turn the tide against the 
rebels. Loyalists cast aside old prejudices and proposed to make common cause with 
slaves and Indians against the king’s enemies. Many loyalists, and some British officials, 
believed with considerable justification that, even in 1782, it was not too late to reverse 
the military situation in the South. Deprived by Parliament and the Shelburne ministry of 
leadership and the British army’s support, however, the king’s American supporters 
never got the chance to try. The British government had chosen to admit defeat, and 
loyalists, Indians, and blacks had no alternative but to accept the outcome.
413 Tonyn to Carleton, Oct. 11, 1782, Carleton Papers, Vol. 51, No. 5850.
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CONCLUSION
As the war came to a close, tens of thousands of the king’s southern supporters 
struggled to establish themselves in new homes or to adjust to new conditions in their old 
homes. For many, postwar life would be an endless battle fought with few resources 
against circumstances they had not made and could not control. Some would achieve a 
fairly comfortable new existence, a few would thrive, but none would escape the stigma 
of defeat and of their association with a cause that had become equated with tyranny.
This stigma would endure and continue to tarnish their reputations for more than two 
centuries after the last loyalist, Indian, and slave who fought alongside the British had 
departed this world.
The loyalists had been slandered by their Whig neighbors as treacherous, cruel, 
and self-serving even before the first shots of the Revolution had been fired in 
Massachusetts; these accusations had grown more shrill and more frequent over the 
course of the war. In the last years of the conflict, many Britons added their voices to this 
chorus of denunciation. Members of Parliament who had opposed the war, and some 
generals and politicians who had directed it, began to seek excuses for Britain’s defeat 
and found the loyalists convenient scapegoats. The loyalists, these people charged, were 
liars and cowards, who had encouraged the British government to wage war in America 
with promises of support, and then shrank from battle, preferring to let the king’s troops 
do the fighting for them.
605
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
606
Although this characterization of the loyalists has persisted to the present day, 
many British officials who were in a position to judge staunchly defended the loyalists 
from their critics. Maj. Patrick Ferguson declared repeatedly that the loyalists were 
courageous and committed and needed only confidence to improve their effectiveness.
Sir Henry Clinton argued that the loyalists had never been given a fair chance to prove 
themselves because the army had never given them adequate support. And Lord Rawdon, 
after serving more than a year in South Carolina, testified to “the fidelity of the Loyalists” 
and criticized the “inhuman disregard with which they have been repaid.”1
“It has been the fashion to say,” Rawdon wrote, “that the Loyalists were few in 
number; & that their activity in our cause was never such as ought to have a claim upon 
our gratitude.” However, he asserted, his extensive experience in the South enabled him 
to refute this “most unjust opinion.” Rawdon pointed out that over five thousand whites 
had left Charleston at the evacuation, “all of whom had sacrificed their possessions thro’ 
attachment to us.” In addition, “[a] very considerable number” of loyalists chose to 
remain in South Carolina, “preferring the hazard of the Whig’s vengeance, to the danger 
of the Seas, at that inclement season, in such miserable Craft” as were provided for them. 
“This List of Sufferers,” he declared, “surely is not to be reckoned small.”2
Concerning the accusations that the loyalists had not exerted themselves in the 
king’s behalf, Rawdon explained that many difficulties had arisen in employing them. “It 
does not seem as if Lord Cornwallis had ever thought it necessary before his Victory over 
Gates to embody any of the Country People; on the contrary, the Proclamations of that 
Date enjoin a quiet residence in their several districts,” he wrote. After militia units had
1 “The attitude o f the Loyalists in America and particularly in the south.” Undated, but after 1782; 
authorship attributed to Lord Rawdon. Alexander Wedderbum Papers, Vol. 1, 46, WLCL.
2 Ibid.
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been organized, keeping them in the field for any length of time proved impractical. The 
subsistence of both loyalists and British troops in South Carolina “depended on the 
cultivation of the Country, which was already grievously wasted” by the ravages of war; 
thus “the most serious distress must have been entailed upon us by such a number being 
withheld from the tillage of their Farms.” The drawback to this was that when loyalists 
stayed at home to raise crops, they were vulnerable to surprise attack by rebel partisans.3
When embodied, Rawdon insisted, the loyalists fought well, if not always 
successfully, and demonstrated remarkable persistence in the face of adversity. “If a 
succession of misfortunes diminished the numbers & broke the spirits of these people, the 
circumstance does not weaken the testimony of their attachment,” he declared. Rawdon 
added that even in eastern South Carolina, where loyalists were far fewer in relation to 
the Whigs than in the backcountry and therefore “were more exposed to powerful efforts 
of the Enemy: Yet on several occasions they manifested a fidelity, which in other 
instances would have been universally extolled. A number of them fell in unsuccessful 
skirmishes; & still more of them were murdered in detail.” The weight of evidence, 
Rawdon concluded, proved “that in the Two Carolinas we had numerous Friends, who, to 
the hazard of their Lives, to the sacrifice of their Families, to the utter ruin of their 
Possessions, adhered to us under every change of Fortune.”4
Gen. James Murray believed that the ministry may have overestimated the 
number of loyalists in the colonies, but that the key problem was the army’s inability to 
mobilize more than a fraction of the loyalists. Murray attributed this in part to the 
constantly shifting military fortunes: the number of professed loyalists increased when
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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the army was successful and declined in times of defeat. In addition, he pointed out that 
“the haughtiness of our Officers,” along with differing views on how the war should be 
conducted, impeded cooperation between the army and the loyalists. He identified the 
worst problem, however, as a lack of sustained support from the king’s troops. “Our 
Evacuation of places, & leaving” loyalists “to the vengeance of the Rebels after they had 
been induced to discover themselves, have rendered many of them hitherto Cautious,” 
Murray observed. The loyalists could hardly be expected to make greater exertions in 
light of “the disgusting Experience they have had of Us.”5
Another British officer, Frederick Mackenzie, agreed with Murray. Although he 
often criticized loyalists for their failure to turn out in support of the army, Mackenzie 
conceded that such behavior was to be expected. On numerous occasions, he noted, the 
army had arrived in a region, called on the loyalists to join them, and withdrawn shortly 
afterward, “abandoning the people to the fury of their bitterest Enemies.” If the loyalists 
became hesitant to declare themselves after such incidents, they had good reason for their 
reluctance.6
Many loyalists held similar opinions. Pennsylvanian Joseph Galloway, an exile in 
London, blamed British officers for first failing to employ the loyalists and then leaving 
them exposed to Whig brutality. “Instead of rejecting the loyal force of the country, and 
daily sacrificing it to the savage barbarity of rebellion, enjoin our Generals to embrace it 
with zeal and cordiality, and to make use o f its aid in suppressing the rebellion,” he 
suggested in a 1782 plea to continue the war. Galloway insisted that there remained 
“multitudes of our fellow subjects, attached to us by principle, and groaning under the
5 James Murray to Lord George Townshend, Sept. 1, 1782, Feinstone Collection, No. 992, DLAR.
6 Mackenzie, Diary, Vol. 2, 581-582.
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horrid tyranny and cruelty of the usurpers,” who stood “ready to unite in the proper 
measures for delivering themselves from their present slavery, and for restoring the 
government of your Sovereign.” He asked what measures had been taken “to embody, 
arm, and support the loyalists,” or to inspirit them, and provided his own answer: “There 
has been scarcely one!” Galloway singled out Cornwallis for particular criticism, 
asserting that the earl failed to secure South Carolina and instead raced off into North 
Carolina like “a winged Mercury” in futile pursuit of Greene’s army.7
Gov. James Wright also placed much of the blame for the loss of the southern 
provinces on Cornwallis, while defending the efforts of Georgia’s loyalists. Georgia “was 
Peopling very fast the latter End of the year 1780. when great Numbers of Loyal Subjects 
were Flocking in, to Settle, Expecting His Majesty’s Protection, and Safety, from the 
Tyranny & Oppression of the Rebellion. -  and When the Loyal Subjects in that Province, 
were beginning to Raise their Drooping Spirits, & to Collect & Improve the Remains of 
their Scattered & almost Ruined & lost Property,” Wright remarked. “But alas! ... before 
the Minds of the People were Settled, & wholly Reconciled to a return of their 
Allegiance,” most of the British troops were withdrawn from Georgia. Encouraged by the 
weakness of the British garrison and Cornwallis’s disappearance into North Carolina, the 
rebels began “to Raise Commotions ... & assassinated & Otherwise Cruelly Murdered, as 
Many Loyalists as they Could come at, & upwards of an Hundred Good Men, in the 
Space of one Month, fell Victims to their Loyalty, & the Cruelty of the Rebels.” 
Overpowered and without aid, by June 1781, 1,400 people had sought refuge in
7 Joseph Galloway, Fabricius: Or, Letters to the People o f  Great Britain; On The Absurdity and Mischiefs 
o f  Defensive Operations only in the American War; and on The Causes o f  the Failure in the Southern 
Operations (London: G. Wilkie, 1782, reprinted in Galloway, Selected Tracts, New York: Da Capo Press, 
1974), 1044, 1057, 1059, 1073.
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Savannah. Wright noted that his pleas for troops had been ignored, even though in his 
opinion five hundred regulars would have been sufficient to resurrect loyalist spirits and 
retake the province.8
Even a few Whigs recognized the steadfast commitment of many southern 
loyalists. William Pierce observed that large numbers of people had “been uniform in 
their opposition, and have favored the British measures through all the mutations of 
fortune. Such men appear to have a fixed principle for the governing rule of their 
conduct, and, although they stand confessed my enemies, yet I cannot help admiring and 
esteeming them.”9 Capt. Tarleton Brown of the South Carolina Whig militia likewise 
acknowledged that the loyalists had made significant contributions to the British cause, 
albeit in harsher terms. Had the British not been “aided and abetted by those unprincipled 
and bloodthirsty tools ... the enemy would never have gained a solid foothold upon our 
shores,” he fumed.10
In addition to such testimony, the very nature of the war in the South 
demonstrated that loyalists there were numerous, courageous, and steadfast in the face of 
brutal persecution. Long before British troops established a foothold in Georgia or South 
Carolina, loyalists in both provinces took up arms to oppose the rebels, turning the 
contest into a genuine civil war that continued long after officials in London ordered a 
cessation of operations against the Whigs. In dozens of small battles and untold numbers 
of skirmishes, loyalists fought rebels without either British prompting or British support.
8 James Wright, “A Concise View o f the Situation of the Province o f Georgia for 3 Years past,” n.d., 
Shelburne Papers, Vol. 66, 669, WLCL.
9 William Pierce to St. George Tucker, Feb. 6, 1782, in “Southern Campaign o f Greene,” 438-439.
10 Brown, Memoirs, 9-10.
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Nevertheless, the negative myths about the loyalists became widely accepted. In 
Britain, the views of politically influential critics like Earl Cornwallis and Gen. Charles 
O’Hara gained more credence than those of lower ranking officers or the discredited 
Clinton. Across the Atlantic, the victorious Whigs found that the stereotype of the greedy, 
vicious, craven loyalist made an ideal villain in the epic story of the glorious American 
cause. Loyalists could also be made to shoulder the blame for the cruelty that had marred 
what the Whigs considered a virtuous struggle. By portraying the loyalists as instigators 
of the murders and hangings that characterized the war in the South, Americans could 
justify their commission of such crimes as legitimate acts of vengeance against a ruthless 
foe.
Eventually myth became accepted as truth. The British government’s southern 
strategy was considered doomed from the outset, since it depended on loyalists who were 
not there. The few loyalists who did come forward alienated the people by murdering and 
plundering across South Carolina and Georgia, but were too cowardly to face rebel troops 
in the field.
Once the myths are pruned away, however, the historical record tells a very 
different story. It is an account of people who remained loyal to their king and suffered 
greatly for their allegiance. Beginning in 1775, loyalists were beaten, tarred and 
feathered, imprisoned, harassed, and sometimes murdered. Their property was seized; 
they were banished from their lifelong homes or fled voluntarily to escape the rebels’ 
wrath. Yet their loyalty to Britain remained unshaken. When British troops finally arrived 
in the South, some loyalists, intimidated by five years of savage persecution, hesitated to 
declare themselves. But many thousands came forward and served faithfully throughout
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the war. Whig partisans launched a campaign of violence more brutal than the loyalists 
had previously experienced, yet the king’s supporters persevered. Their neighbors and the 
British officer they trusted most were slaughtered at King’s Mountain and the survivors 
were forced to undergo the eighteenth-century equivalent of the Bataan Death March, but 
the loyalists soon returned to the field. When Nathanael Greene forced the British to 
abandon the Georgia and South Carolina backcountry, thousands of loyalists left their 
homes and marched hundreds of miles to Savannah and Charleston rather than forsake 
their principles. Others remained behind and continued the fight from the woods and 
swamps. After Parliament ordered an end to offensive operations against the rebels, the 
loyalists pleaded unsuccessfully with British officers for permission to carry the fight to 
the Whigs. The loyalists’ story is one of fidelity, courage, and persistence in the face of 
adversity, and it is every bit as heroic as the story of the Whigs’ fight for independence.
Like the loyalists, Indians also found themselves cast as villains in the 
Revolutionary saga. In the eyes of most Americans, this was hardly a new role; the 
Indians who allied themselves with the British in the Revolution merely added another 
chapter to a story of hostility and violence that had begun in 1607. Whether alone, or in 
partnership with France or Britain, the Indians had always been considered bloodthirsty 
savages blocking Americans’ path to land and wealth in the west.
Again, Britons joined Americans in denouncing the Indians. From the start of the 
war, members of the parliamentary opposition had assailed the ministry for employing 
the barbaric, murderous Indians against the rebels. Even Lord George Germain came to 
criticize the Indians in the latter years of the war, declaring that their feeble military 
contributions were out of all proportion to the expense incurred in supplying them. Rarely
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did anyone in Britain try to defend the Indians. Galloway made one of the few attempts to 
do so, replying to those who accused them of savagery that if the Indians had “killed in 
war a few rebels, who, they know, will deprive them of their country, and of their 
existence as a people as soon as they are independent, the rebel states have with yet more 
cruelty and less justice murdered in cool blood four times as many loyalists.”11
To add injury to insult, the Shelburne ministry completely ignored the Indians’ 
interests during the peace negotiations and in 1783 ceded all of the territory from the 
Appalachians to the Mississippi -  land claimed by the Indians -  to the new United States. 
This betrayal shocked the southern nations. Alexander McGillivray drew up a protest on 
behalf of the Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws, asserting that since the Indians had not 
been a party to the agreement, they did not consider themselves bound by it. McGillivray 
observed that the Indians had not given Britain any authority to dispose of their lands, 
“unless fighting by the side of [the king’s] soldiers in the day of battle and Spilling our 
best blood in the Service of his Nation can be deemed so.”12
If the Indians’ wartime assistance did not meet British expectations, most of the 
blame lay with the ministry and the generals. True, the Cherokees had gone to war 
against John Stuart’s orders in 1776 and suffered a defeat that made other nations 
reluctant to commit to the British alliance. But the Cherokees had nevertheless waged 
sporadic warfare against the Whigs into 1782. The Creeks and Choctaws helped forestall 
one Spanish attack on Pensacola and bore the largest burden in the defense against the 
1781 siege, even though Gen. John Campbell’s arrogant attitude resulted in fewer Indians 
turning out to assist the British. The Chickasaws maintained a fairly effective blockade of
11 Galloway, Fabricius, 1094.
12 Dowd, Spirited Resistance, 93.
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the Mississippi River throughout the war, while the Seminoles were the bulwark of East 
Florida’s defense. The Cherokees and Creeks disappointed Germain by launching few 
raids on the southern frontier, but in the early years of the war they realized that without 
British support, launching a war in the backcountry could accomplish nothing of 
significance. When the Cherokees and Creeks announced their readiness to fight in 1780, 
Cornwallis rejected their offer. By the time the siege of Pensacola ended and the Creeks 
were available to assist the British elsewhere in 1781, the king’s troops and loyalists had 
been driven from the backcountry, making effective cooperation impossible. Yet even 
when the Indians did not provide direct support, the threat of attack caused the Whigs to 
divert substantial numbers of militia to the frontier, complicating the Continental Army’s 
manpower shortages, although British commanders failed to take advantage of this.
Slaves, too, made important contributions to the royal cause, but quickly became 
the forgotten member of the trinity of Britain’s southern supporters. The Whigs, having 
denominated themselves defenders of liberty, preferred not to dwell on the fact that 
thousands of their slaves, over whom they claimed to exercise a benevolent paternalism, 
had seen the British army as the real agent of freedom. These slaves had served the king 
as laborers, spies, messengers, and occasionally as soldiers in hopes of securing their 
release from bondage.
Only a small percentage of slaves who joined the British earned their freedom 
after the war. The Black Dragoons, for example, became the nucleus of a 264-man unit 
that arrived in St. Lucia in December 1782 and “became a permanent part of the British 
West India military establishment” the following year.13 Other free blacks went to the
13 George F. Tyson, Jr., “The Carolina Black Corps: Legacy o f Revolution (1782-1798),” Review 
Interamericana, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1975/6, 648-664, esp. 649, 650-651, 656.
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West Indies, Britain, or Nova Scotia, while most of those who left Savannah and 
Charleston remained enslaved on West Indian plantations.14
But if few blacks realized immediate gains from their service, they and their 
descendants benefited in the long term. American independence “helped the cause of 
abolitionists in both Britain and the United States: it more than halved the number of 
slaves in the British Empire” and divided slaveowners on the mainland from those in the 
Caribbean, thus weakening the proslavery lobby in Parliament. In 1833, Parliament 
abolished slavery throughout the British empire.15 Those slaves who had gambled on 
finding freedom with the British had finally won, whereas those who remained with the 
liberty-loving Whigs would have to wait another thirty years and to endure a bloody war.
Given the valuable contributions of loyalists, Indians, and slaves to the British 
during the war in the South, why did the southern strategy fail? One reason was strategic: 
when Cornwallis took his army into Virginia and allowed Greene to bring the Continental 
troops back to South Carolina, it became impossible for the British to hold their widely 
scattered outposts and made withdrawal to the coast inevitable. Even then, the British 
could have recovered had not Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown led Parliament to put 
an end to offensive operations in America. A major flaw in policy was a second reason. 
Although the ministry counted on support from loyalists, Indians, and slaves from the 
beginning of the war, neither Germain nor anyone else devised a plan to bring the three 
peoples together in the king’s service. As a result, these incompatible allies fought 
separate wars against the Whigs (and occasionally against each other), while the British 
army also often fought in isolation. Thus the efforts of the British army and its supporters
14 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 244; Frey, Water from the Rock, 192.
15 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, xii.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
616
were diffused rather than concentrated, making the task of regaining the southern 
provinces much more difficult.
A third reason for the British failure to derive full support from loyalists, slaves, 
and Indians lay with the Whigs. While British officers hesitated to punish rebels who had 
violated their parole or committed atrocities, the Whigs showed no such compunction. 
Anyone who challenged rebel authority was likely to suffer terribly. Loyalists were shot, 
hanged, beaten; rebel militia burned Indian towns and crops, killed Indians regardless of 
age or sex, and sold captives into slavery; slaves caught assisting the British faced 
whippings, hanging, even beheading. This relentless cruelty, as intended, intimidated 
many supporters of the British into remaining inactive.
But could the large number of loyalists, Indians, and slaves who were undaunted 
by Whig terrorism have fought side by side? They could have, and sometimes did. Since 
1776, some backcountry whites had fought alongside the Cherokees, and by 1782 the two 
groups cooperated with considerable effectiveness. The same was true of whites and 
blacks. The Black Dragoons rode into battle alongside white militiamen, and parties of 
blacks and whites raided behind Whig lines late in the war. During the siege of Savannah, 
loyalists, Indians, and slaves fought together and successfully defended the town against 
a vastly larger force, an important lesson for the future had anyone in the ministry or 
military command bothered to heed it. If Germain and the generals had followed Lord 
Dunmore’s advice and brought every supporter of the king, regardless of race, into action 
against the rebels, victory in the South was well within the British grasp. British officials 
needed only to explain the need for such a policy, secure cooperation, and then sort out 
everyone’s situation after the war was won.
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There remains one other intriguing possibility, which would have spared the 
ministers from dealing with complex racial issues and might have won the war. Had the 
government chosen in 1776 to strike at what it knew was the soft underbelly of the 
rebellion, the southern provinces, rather than to direct a blow at the heart of the 
Revolution in the north, it is hard to imagine how the Whigs could have succeeded.
In this hypothetical scenario, Gen. William Howe brings his massive invasion 
armada to Georgia and South Carolina in the summer of 1776. Five thousand British 
troops land at Savannah, while Howe and the remaining 25,000 soldiers follow Clinton’s 
route and attack Charleston. Both towns would have fallen within days, and powerful 
British columns could have advanced into the backcountry and North Carolina with little 
opposition. The loyalists, emboldened by this show of force and not intimidated by five 
years of persecution, take control of the provincial governments. Because the Whigs have 
been deprived of five years to establish the civil and military machinery of government, 
there is little basis on which to build partisan resistance. Far to the north, George 
Washington faces a dilemma. Does he risk marching southward to aid the rebels there or 
hold his ground in case the British mount a later strike in New York or Pennsylvania? If 
he chooses to march south, it is hard to imagine many New England soldiers agreeing to 
undertake the trek when British forces are nearby in Quebec and Nova Scotia. And it 
would have been almost impossible for the poorly trained and disciplined, inadequately 
supplied Continentals to make such a march. Had the army not evaporated along the way, 
the exhausted, hungry soldiers would have offered only feeble opposition to Howe’s 
regulars. British troops might have been at the Susquehanna River, facing almost no 
organized resistance, by the spring of 1777.
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Such a plan, of course, would have had to originate in London, as would a policy 
to unite loyalists, Indians, and slaves into an effective force to operate in conjunction with 
British troops. That British officials never addressed the matter was not the fault of those 
in the Deep South colonies who fought so valiantly for King George. Without adequate 
guidance from the government, and often ignored by the generals whom they were 
supposed to assist, loyalists, Indians, and slaves made significant contributions that 
enabled the British army to come within a hairsbreadth of retaining Georgia, South 
Carolina, and the Floridas. Their achievements, however, have never been properly 
recognized; instead they were unjustly made the scapegoats for defeat.
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